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Abstract		
Shepherding	knowledge:	a	case	study	of	social	interactions	that	support	knowledge	
mobilisation	for	sepsis	care	in	Scotland	
Tricia	R.	Tooman,	Doctoral	Candidate,	School	of	Management,		
University	of	St	Andrews	
	
This	thesis	is	about	knowledge	that	interconnects	across	different	domains,	and	the	
social	interactions	that	support	the	mobilisation	of	such	knowledge	for	clinical	
practice.	These	issues	are	explored	in	the	context	of	sepsis	care	in	Scotland.	
Sepsis	claims	the	lives	of	at	least	52,000	people	in	the	UK	each	year,	more	than	breast,	
bowel	and	prostate	cancer	combined.	While	Hippocrates	observed	the	dangers	of	
sepsis	well	over	two	thousand	years	ago,	only	in	the	last	25	years	has	a	coordinated	
research	strategy	been	established	to	guide	modern	therapeutic	efforts.	Yet	despite	a	
mounting	clinical	evidence	base,	the	cause(s),	progression,	treatment	and	even	the	
very	definition	of	sepsis	remain	often	unclear	and	sometimes	contested.	In	care	
settings,	the	clinical	manifestations	of	sepsis	are	frequently	subtle	and	difficult	to	
distinguish	from	other	common	conditions,	and	the	lack	of	a	definitive	diagnostic	test	
heightens	the	range	of	knowledge	clinicians	depend	upon	in	order	to	recognise	and	
treat	potentially	septic	patients.	
Within	this	context	of	uncertainty,	connecting	the	domains	of	research,	policy	and	
practice	remains	an	enduring	concern	in	sepsis	care,	as	with	many	other	clinical	issues.	
In	particular,	there	are	significant	challenges	in	ensuring	that	knowledge	(and	
knowing)	in	each	of	these	domains	better	connect	for	continued	improvements	in	
patient	care.		
This	thesis	then	contributes	to	improved	understanding	of	the	persistent	‘knowing	in	
practice’	problem:	using	a	knowledge	mobilisation	framing	to	capture	the	
development,	sharing,	and	use	of	knowledge,	where	these	processes	are	
conceptualised	as	multifaceted	and	intertwined	rather	than	segmented	and	detached.	
With	a	dual	focus	on	both	knowers	and	their	knowledge,	this	work	seeks	a	closer	
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understanding	of	the	social	interactions	that	contribute	to	an	interconnected	
‘knowledge	network’,	a	network	that	can,	in	turn,	underpin	better,	safer	patient	care.	
Using	a	qualitative	case	study	design,	this	study	provides	a	detailed	exploration	of	an	
interconnected	knowledge	network	(on	sepsis	care	in	Scotland)	that	successfully	drew	
together	the	research,	policy,	and	practice	communities	and	resulted	in	improved	
patient	outcomes.	Drawing	on	documentary,	observational,	and	interview	data,	this	
work	found	that	knowledge	is	carefully	curated	(through	social	interactions)	in	order	
to	connect	knowledge	from	the	different	domains	and	to	support	the	mobilisation	of	
new	actionable	understandings	for	care.	Tensions	within	both	what	knowledge	‘is’,	as	
well	as	the	social	system	in	which	knowledge	is	employed,	are	negotiated	
and	nurtured	by	social	practices	that	have	been	termed	‘shepherding’.	Shepherding	
practices	are	those	that	tend	to	the	social	interactions	that	support	the	mobilisation	of	
knowledge,	and	they	are	in	evidence	throughout	the	distributed	areas	of	research,	
policy	and	practice.	In	concluding,	this	thesis	argues	that	–	because	knowledge	is	
complex	and	emergent,	and	because	mobilising	knowledge	is	an	ongoing	social	
process	–	a	developmental	perspective	needs	to	be	taken	as	the	normative	frame	for	
the	‘knowing	in	practice’	problem.		
The	thesis	makes	two	main	contributions:	
• empirically	it	provides	a	rich	and	detailed	account	of	interconnected	
knowledge	and	the	social	interactions	that	contribute	to	the	mobilisation	of	
that	knowledge	in	sepsis	care	in	Scotland;		
• theoretically,	this	work	extends	the	academic	literature	that	explores	the	
diversity,	complexity,	and	interconnectivity	of	knowledge	for	practice	by	
emphasising	the	role	of	social	interactions	in	supporting	knowledge	networks;	
and	the	study	demonstrates	the	successful	use	of	Soft	Knowledge	Systems	
(SKS)	and	Clinical	Mindlines	(CM)	as	a	combined	‘relational	knowledge	
systems’	lens	to	better	understand	knowledge	mobilisation	processes.		
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1. Chapter	1—Introduction	
This	thesis	is	about	developing	and	connecting	knowledge	within	and	across	the	
research,	policy	and	practice	communities	and	the	social	interactions	that	support	the	
mobilisation	of	such	knowledge	for	clinical	practice.	The	broad	research	question	that	
the	thesis	addresses	is:	how	is	knowledge	mobilised	within	and	between	the	research,	
policy	and	practice	communities	for	clinical	practice?		
This	introductory	chapter	first	explains	the	research	problem	and	outlines	some	of	the	
main	ways	this	knowledge-in-practice	problem	has	been	understood	with	particular	
attention	to	the	knowledge	mobilisation	way	of	framing	the	problem.	Next	the	
chapter	overviews	the	research	approach	and	setting,	explaining	why	sepsis	care	is	a	
relevant	and	fertile	empirical	area	in	which	to	set	the	study.	The	final	section	sketches	
an	outline	of	the	remaining	chapters	in	the	thesis.	
1.1. The	Research	Problem	
There	is	a	seemingly	intractable	knowledge	problem	within	health	services.	Despite	
the	proliferation	of	evidentiary	sources	and	substantial	dedication	of	public	resources,	
the	utilisation	of	research	findings	within	policy	and	practice	contexts	remains	
inconsistent.	Expediting	and	enhancing	the	use	of	research-based	knowledge	in	
clinical	practice	has	been	given	many	names,	including	research	utilisation,	evidence	
based	practice,	knowledge	translation,	and,	more	recently,	knowledge	mobilisation.	
Knowledge	mobilisation	addresses	the	problem	of	contested	forms	of	knowledge	and	
the	amount	of	time	knowledge	takes	to	reach	across	different	domains	in	order	to	
improve	health	policy	and	practice	for	the	wellbeing	of	patients.		
Connecting	knowledge	between	the	research,	policy	and	practice	communities	can	
take	time	and	often	does	not	happen.	Relatedly,	some	practices	spread	quickly	with	
little	basis,	whilst	others	spread	slowly	despite	having	strong	evidentiary	support	
(Ferlie	et	al.,	2005).	The	underuse,	overuse,	and	misuse	of	research-informed	evidence	
is	a	challenge	that	includes	both	learning	and	unlearning	by	individuals,	teams,	
organisations,	and	systems	(Institute	of	Medicine,	2001;	Rushmer	&	Davies,	2004).	It	
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appears	that	“knowledge	obstinately	refuses	to	be	driven	unproblematically	into	
practice”	(Greenhalgh	&	Wieringa,	2011,	p.	501).	
The	discrepancy	between	actual	care	and	evidence-informed	care	has	been	described	
as	a	“quality	chasm”	(Institute	of	Medicine,	2001).	Furthermore,	the	chasm	has	often	
been	understood	as	a	deficit	in	clinician	knowledge	resulting	from	a	‘knowledge	
translation’	or	flow	problem	(Haynes	et	al.,	1986;	Laine	&	Weinberg,	1999;	Cooksey,	
2006).	Thus,	strategies	have	emerged	to	assist	health	professionals	with	the	
consolidation	and	prioritisation	of	ever	more	data	and	information.	These	strategies	
include	the	development	of	systematic	reviews	and	practice	guidelines,	as	well	as	the	
establishment	of	compulsory	continuing	education.	However,	despite	considerable	
effort	and	allocation	of	public	resources,	these	strategies	alone	have	not	proven	
sufficient	to	bridge	the	chasm	(Cabana	et	al.,	1999;	Cochrane	et	al.,	2007;	Gabbay	&	le	
May,	2011;	Oborn	et	al.,	2013).	
The	inconsistent	percolation	of	evidence	to	practice	has	proven	alarming	for	health	
systems	across	the	world	(Cooksey,	2006;	Institute	of	Medicine,	2001).	Seminal	
reports	by	David	Cooksey	in	the	United	Kingdom	(2006)	and	the	Institute	of	Medicine	
(2001)	in	the	United	States	depict	the	problem	as	a	breakdown	between	the	creators	
and	users	of	scientific	knowledge,	representing	the	knowledge	flow	problem	as	a	
series	of	pipeline	stoppages.	In	other	words,	the	knowledge	boundaries	between	
research,	policy	and	practice	contexts	are	of	significant	concern.	
The	reason	this	problem	has	garnered	so	much	attention	is	because	the	stakes	are	
high.	The	processes	of	developing,	sharing	and	applying	professional	knowledge	for	
patient	benefit	touch	every	part	of	society.	Healthcare	funders	have	finite	resources.	
They	are	pressured	to	fund	“what	works”	(Davies	et	al.,	1999,	2000;	Boaz	et	al.,	2019).	
Policymakers	are	judged	according	to	health	outcomes.	Researchers	are	increasingly	
held	accountable	for	the	usefulness	of	their	work.	Healthcare	recipients	place	their	
trust	in	a	profession	that	requires	a	balancing	act	to	attain	and	maintain	competence.		
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All	the	while,	the	task	has	grown	ever	more	daunting.	In	the	knowledge-intensive	
context	of	healthcare,	the	proliferation	of	evidence	holds	promise	for	clinical	
improvements	that	can	result	in	better	health	outcomes.	However,	this	is	coupled	
with	the	formidable	task	of	remaining	up	to	date	with	the	latest	research	findings	as	
health	providers	balance	the	responsibilities	of	professional	practice	in	complex	social	
contexts	(Gabbay	&	le	May,	2011;	Smith	et	al.,	2012).	The	result	has	been	described	as	
an	‘information	paradox’	whereby	clinicians	are	overwhelmed	with	information,	and	
yet	are	unable	to	locate	relevant	material	when	they	need	it	(Nicolini	et	al.,	2008).	As	
a	result,	a	clearer	understanding	of	what	forms	of	knowledge	are	useful	and	how	such	
knowledge	is	mobilised	within	practice	takes	on	increased	importance.	
To	address	the	challenge,	some	scholars	have	called	for	the	consideration	of	a	wider	
range	of	metaphors	and	models	beyond	‘knowledge	translation’	that	would	
contribute	to	a	richer	understanding	of	the	link	between	knowledge	and	practice	
(Davies	et	al.,	2008;	Greenhalgh	&	Wieringa,	2011).	Often	‘knowledge	translation’	
connotes	an	individualistic	view	of	knowledge	and	a	purely	rational	activity.	
Moreover,	the	burden	of	responsibility	for	the	knowledge	deficit	is	placed	solely	on	an	
individual	practitioner’s	shoulders	(Davies	et	al.,	2008;	Gabbay	&	le	May,	2011;	
Rycroft-Malone,	2007).		
Specifically,	these	scholars	call	for	the	consideration	of	relational	and	systems-based	
models	to	better	understand	the	issues	(Best	&	Holmes,	2010;	Nutley	et	al.,	2007;	
Olson	et	al.,	2010).	This	involves	looking	to	fields	other	than	health	care	that	envisage	
‘knowledge’	and	‘knowledge	flow’	in	different	ways.	There	one	finds	terms	such	as		
‘co-constructed’	and	‘collectively	negotiated’,	which	implies	that	the	social	context	of	
human	interactions	plays	a	significant	role	in	how,	when,	and	often	whether	or	not	
knowledge	is	utilised	in	practice	(Brown	&	Duguid,	2000).	And	yet,	as	will	be	shown	in	
more	detail	in	Chapters	2	and	3,	while	a	portion	of	the	existing	literature	stresses	the	
importance	of	social	processes	for	knowledge	and	knowledge	flow,	there	is	little	
about	the	qualities	of	these	interactions	that	supports	the	social	processes.	
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1.2. Using	a	Knowledge	Mobilisation	Perspective	
Knowledge	mobilisation	has	surfaced	as	a	useful	way	to	frame	the	process	of	
developing	and	shifting	multifaceted	forms	of	knowledge	(Holmes	et	al.,	2017;	Swan	
et	al.,	2016;	Ward,	2017).	Knowledge	mobilisation	is	broadly	concerned	with	the	
processes	and	activities	that	encourage	the	development,	sharing	and	application	of	
knowledge	between	communities	(Nutley	&	Davies,	2016).	Knowledge	mobilisation	
moves	away	from	instrumental	and	linear	understandings	of	knowledge.	And,	
increasingly,	this	literature	embraces	a	complex	adaptive	systems	way	of	
understanding	the	world	and	how	actors	have	to	overcome	social	and	epistemic	
boundaries	in	order	to	helpfully	facilitate	knowledge	processes	(Beckett	et	al.,	2018;	
Greenhalgh	&	Papoutsi,	2018;	Reed	et	al.,	2018).	In	other	words,	knowledge	
mobilisation	is	about	identifying	and	addressing	boundaries	between	epistemic	
communities	in	order	to	help	them	develop,	spread,	and	use	their	knowledge	within	
the	milieu	of	complex	social	settings	(Swan	et	al.,	2016).	
In	this	way	knowledge	mobilisation	seeks	to	address	the	tensions	between	
disconnected	communities	that	sometimes	place	them	at	odds	with	one	another.	The	
divisions	cast	researchers	as	out	of	touch	with	the	needs	of	the	user	communities,	and	
practitioners	as	resistant	and	even	delinquent	(Locock	&	Boaz,	2004).	Furthermore,	
these	detachments	result	in	a	continuous	redirection	of	blame	where	mobilising	
knowledge	is	“in	everyone’s	interests	and	no	one’s	job	description”	(Boaz	et	al.,	2015,	
p.	147).	
1.3. Research	Approach	and	Setting	
Rather	than	expand	the	already	sizeable	‘barriers	to	knowledge	use’	literature,	this	
study	instead	uses	an	appreciative	approach	to	learn	from	a	series	of	interconnected	
knowledge	networks.	This	qualitative	case	study	explores	interrelated	and,	to	a	
degree,	nested	research,	policy	and	hospital	networks	(also	referred	to	as	
‘communities’,	which	is	explored	more	fully	in	Chapter	3)	that	have	overlapping	
responsibilities	for	sepsis.	(See	Box	1-1	for	the	networks	of	interest.)		
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Sepsis	is	the	result	of	a	body’s	maladapted	response	to	an	infection	and	can	injure	
essential	organs,	in	particular	the	heart,	kidneys	and	brain.	While	those	with	
weakened	immune	systems	are	at	higher	risk,	it	is	a	condition	to	which	every	person	is	
susceptible,	young	and	old,	healthy	and	frail	(see	Box	1-2,	Sepsis	Description).	Sepsis	is	
the	leading	cause	of	death	from	infection	and	one	of	the	costliest	to	treat	(Gary	et	al.,	
2016;	Levy	et	al.,	2010).	Each	year	sepsis	kills	more	people	than	bowel,	breast	and	
prostate	cancer	combined.	Furthermore,	the	lingering	consequences	for	patients	who	
survive	include	irreversible	cognitive	
impairment	and	serious	physical	
disabilities	(Angus,	2010;	Iwashyna	et	
al.,	2010).		
Sepsis	is	a	particularly	difficult	
condition	to	identify	because	it	has	
no	distinctive	features	and	early	
symptoms	are	masked	within	normal	
and	even	expected	markers	for	
hospitalised	patients	(Marshall,	
2014).	Adding	to	the	difficulty,	the	
What	is	Sepsis?	
1) The	body’s	potentially	life-threatening	
response	to	infection	
2) Sepsis	leads	to	septic	shock,	multiple	
organ	failure,	and,	sometimes,	death	
3) There	are	150,000	cases	of	sepsis	in	
the	UK	each	year	
4) Septic	shock	is	sometimes	preventable	
if	recognised	early	and	treated	
promptly	
5) High	mortality	rate	when	not	identified	
and	treated	early	
(Source:	UK	Sepsis	Trust)	
Box	1-2	Sepsis	Description	
Interconnected	Networks	
Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign	–	A	international	research-based	network	that	
develops	and	distributes	materials	for	use	in	policy	and	practice	contexts.	
Chaired	by	two	professional	specialist	societies:	the	Society	for	Critical	Care	
Medicine	and	the	European	Society	of	Intensive	Care	Medicine.	Discussed	
in	Chapter	5.	
NHS	Scotland	Sepsis	Collaborative	–	A	national	policy-oriented	network	
that	includes	policy	leaders	and	clinicians	from	every	regional	health	board	
in	Scotland.	Discussed	in	Chapter	5.	
Aurora	General	Hospital	–	A	local	Scottish	practice-based	network	of	
people	providing	sepsis-related	care.	Discussed	in	Chapter	6.	
Box	1-1	Three	Interconnected	Networks	
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very	definition	of	sepsis	remains	highly	contested	(Angus,	2016;	Angus	et	al.,	2016).	
And	lacking	a	biomedical	understanding	of	what	causes	this	maladapted	response	to	
infection	means	there	is	no	definitive	test	available	for	clinicians	to	depend	upon	for	
the	diagnosis	of	sepsis.	For	this	tricky	condition,	bedside	practitioners	must	rely	upon	
a	combination	of	the	best	available,	yet	still	insufficient,	evidence,	their	experience	
and	judgement	in	order	to	identify	and	treat	this	potentially	deadly	and	damaging	
disorder.		
However,	there	are	hospitals	that	have	found	ways	to	address	sepsis	and	have	a	far	
lower	mortality	rate	than	their	peers.	For	this	reason,	data	collection	for	this	study	
began	at	Aurora	General	Hospital.	Aurora	had	been	identified	by	multiple	people	at	
the	NHS	Scotland	policy	level	as	a	high-performing	hospital	in	respect	to	sepsis	care.	
The	interrelated	research	and	policy	networks,	the	Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign	and	NHS	
Scotland’s	Sepsis	Collaborative	respectively,	arose	from	these	data	as	the	key	
interrelated	bodies	that	shaped	Aurora’s	sepsis	work.	
Sepsis	is	a	highly	relevant	clinical	area	for	studying	the	research	problem	because	the	
evidence	base	for	defining,	diagnosing	and	treating	sepsis	is	dispersed	amongst	many	
stakeholders	with	different	forms	of	specialist	knowledge.	The	sepsis	knowledge	base	
is	unsettled	and	at	times	heavily	contested,	which	brings	to	the	fore	the	social	
processes	needed	to	develop	consensus.	As	a	result,	the	sepsis	research	community	
that	many	participants	at	Aurora	repeatedly	named,	the	Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign,	
brings	a	lively	example	of	an	emergent	and	messy	social	process	underpinning	
knowledge	mobilisation.		
Also,	within	Scotland	the	Scottish	Patient	Safety	Programme	(SPSP)	focused	on	
improving	sepsis	care	throughout	the	nation.	The	SPSP	established	a	Sepsis	
Collaborative	drawing	together	multidisciplinary	stakeholders	from	every	health	
board,	which	officially	lasted	from	2012-2014.	These	gatherings	provided	the	
opportunity	to	witness	how	the	policy	community	structured	the	arrangement	of	
actors,	processes,	and	materials	in	order	to	reduce	the	burden	of	sepsis	in	Scotland.		
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Finally,	although	sepsis	is	challenging,	the	disease’s	knowledge	problems	are	not	
unique	in	the	health	field	(Angus	et	al.,	2016).	The	scientific	basis	for	understanding	
diseases	are	inevitably	incomplete	and	thus	continually	revised,	updated,	and	
reversed	(Angus	&	van	der	Poll,	2013;	Prasad	et	al.,	2013).	The	long	list	of	reasons	for	
a	delayed	or	missed	sepsis	diagnosis	recorded	by	an	Australian	public	campaign	to	
eradicate	sepsis	can	be	thematised	into	three	areas:	a	lack	of	knowledge,	structural	
deficiencies	with	health	systems,	and	poor	interpersonal	communication	between	
system	actors	(Clinical	Excellence	Commission,	2009).	This	thesis	seeks	to	address	
these	areas	by	focusing	on	how	one	hospital	was	able	to	draw	on	research	and	policy	
communities	to	mobilise	knowledge	and	improve	outcomes	for	their	patients.	
1.4. Structure	of	Thesis	
The	purpose	of	this	thesis	is	to	contribute	to	a	richer	understanding	of	professional	
knowledge	and	how	such	knowledge	is	mobilised	within	and	between	the	research,	
policy	and	practice	communities.	To	do	so,	the	remainder	of	the	thesis	will	unfold	in	
six	further	chapters.		
The	relevant	literature	is	covered	in	two	chapters.	First,	Chapter	2	appraises	the	
knowledge	and	knowing	literature	to	reveal	varying	epistemic	assumptions	that	divide	
actors	and	communities.	In	particular,	this	chapter	foregrounds	existing	tensions	
around	knowledge	in	the	health	professions	linked	to	the	evidence	based	medicine	
agenda.	The	chapter	also	introduces	Clinical	Mindlines	(Gabbay	&	le	May,	2011)	as	a	
useful	theory	for	conceptualising	knowledge	and	how	knowledge	is	acquired	and	
developed	for	practice.	Chapter	3	then	moves	to	explore	the	ways	actors	are	
organised	to	mobilise	their	knowledge.	The	chapter	focuses	on	teams	and	networks	as	
they	are	two	key	structures	that	health	systems	have	used	to	address	social	
boundaries	between	actors.	This	chapter	explores	the	assumptions	about	knowledge	
mobilisation	upon	which	these	structures	are	set.	Next,	the	chapter	presents	Soft	
Knowledge	Systems	theory	(Engel,	1997).	Soft	Knowledge	Systems	is	useful	because	it	
is	a	knowledge	network	lens	to	understand	how	actors	band	together	and	overcome	
boundaries	to	accomplish	their	shared	knowledge-orientated	goals.	Chapter	3	
concludes	by	focusing	on	the	what	is	seen	in	these	literatures	that	sheds	light	on	
20	
	
interactions	that	address	social	boundaries	in	order	to	help	facilitate	knowledge	
mobilisation.	
Chapter	4	reviews	the	research	goals	and	questions	and	then	discusses	the	qualitative	
methodology,	case	study	design	and	methods	used	in	this	study.	Furthermore,	this	
chapter	explains	why	and	how	Clinical	Mindlines	and	Soft	Knowledge	Systems	theories	
were	used	to	design	the	project,	focus	data	collection,	and	analyse	these	data.	
The	findings	of	this	study	are	presented	and	analysed	over	two	chapters.	Chapter	5	
details	the	sepsis	research	and	policy	networks.	The	purpose	of	the	chapter	is	to	
describe	the	relevant	background	actors	and	sources	that	contributed	to	the	evolution	
of	ideas,	evidence	and	initiatives	at	Aurora	General	Hospital,	the	practice	network.	
Chapter	5	is	divided	into	two	parts.	The	first	covers	the	emergence	of	sepsis	and	the	
sepsis	care	field	found	in	the	research	literature	with	particular	focus	on	the	
development	and	work	of	the	Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign.	The	second	part	turns	to	
explore	the	policy	setting,	with	an	emphasis	on	the	Sepsis	Collaborative	as	a	subset	of	
the	Scottish	Patient	Safety	Programme.	Here	patterns	of	connection	and	interaction	
emerge	that	foreshadow	what	is	seen	more	clearly	within	Aurora	in	Chapter	6.	These	
groups	provide	a	glimpse	of	how	knowledge	is	formed,	agreed	and	shared	for	use.	In	
this	way	we	also	begin	to	see	how	knowledge	is	shepherded	within	and	across	
network	boundaries.	
Chapter	6	provides	a	detailed	empirical	account	of	Aurora	General	Hospital	that	shows	
the	dynamic,	evolving	and	interaction-based	knowledge	system	for	sepsis	practice.	
These	data	substantiate	the	claims	of	this	thesis,	which	are	that	in	this	case	knowledge	
and	knowledge	mobilisation	are	interconnected	social	processes.	Furthermore,	
particular	interaction-based	practices	help	nurture	the	social	engagement	between	
actors	that	in	turn	support	the	development,	sharing,	and	use	of	knowledge.	
Lastly,	Chapter	7	reviews	the	overall	findings	of	this	thesis	and	explains	how	these	
data	answer	the	core	research	question.	(Box	1-3	provides	a	preview	of	the	thesis	
claims.)	The	chapter	then	examines	how	these	findings	and	insights	provide	an	
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empirical,	theoretical,	and	methodological	contribution	within	the	knowledge	and	
knowledge	mobilisation	literatures.	Finally,	the	study’s	implications,	limitations,	and	
potential	avenues	for	further	research	are	outlined.		
In	summary,	this	introductory	chapter	explains	the	rationale	for	and	importance	of	
this	study.	Furthermore,	the	chapter	proposes	that	another	look	at	the	knowledge	in	
practice	problem	is	warranted.	Specifically,	a	study	is	needed	that	considers	the	
complex	forms	of	knowledge,	the	ways	knowledge	develops,	disperses,	and	is	utilised	
within	and	between	groups	of	actors,	and	the	interactions	that	bind	knowledge	and	
knowers	together.	Next,	Chapters	2	and	3	delve	into	the	literature	on	knowledge	and	
ways	of	organising	for	knowledge	mobilisation.	
	
	 	
RQ:	How	is	knowledge	mobilised	within	and	between	the	research,	policy	and	
practice	communities	for	clinical	practice?	
Thesis	claims:	Knowledge	and	knowledge	mobilisation	are	regularly	referred	to	as	
social	processes.	Drawing	on	a	case	of	successful	knowledge	mobilisation	within	and	
between	interrelated	sepsis	practice,	policy	and	research	communities,	this	thesis	
shows	that	both	knowledge	and	knowledge	mobilisation	were	shepherded	processes.	
This	thesis	contends	that	these	social	processes	involve	both	binding	together	
different	forms	of	knowing	(tending	knowledge)	as	well	as	relevant	actors	and	
communities	(tending	the	knowers).	Shepherding	practices	nurture	the	social	aspects	
of	developing,	sharing,	and	using	knowledge,	which	are	often	harmonised	(or	
damaged)	at	the	micro-interaction	level.	How	knowledge	is	mobilised	involves	both	
the	structural	organisation	of	knowledge	systems	and	the	relational	activities	between	
actors.	In	other	words,	knowledge	is	mobilised	within	systems-based	structures	
(arrangement	of	actors,	the	processes	and	the	materials	they	use).	But	to	understand	
how	knowledge	is	mobilised	within	these	structures	we	must	look	to	the	muddle	of	
human	interactions.	
Box	1-3	Thesis	RQ	&	Claims	
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2. Chapter	2—Knowledge	and	Knowledge	Use		
If	only	knowledge	could	be	picked	up	like	shells	from	the	seashore	or	pulled	from	
bushes	and	trees	like	fruit	or	netted	like	butterflies.		
(Peter	Burke)	
2.1. Introduction	
At	the	heart	of	the	knowledge	in	practice	problem	are	differing	viewpoints	on	the	
construct,	or	nature,	of	knowledge.	Some	view	knowledge	as	explicit	and	codifiable,	a	
thing	that	is	portable	and	transmissible	from	person	to	person	and	across	contexts.	
Others	assert	that	knowledge	is	better	captured	in	terms	of	a	process	of	knowing	that	
is	not	readily	separable	from	the	knower	and	is	embedded	within	specific	contexts	
(Cook	&	Brown,	1999;	Tooman	et	al.,	2016).	It	is	essential	to	delineate	our	views,	for	
how	we	conceptualise	knowledge	shapes	our	understanding	of	not	just	knowledge	
itself,	but	also	the	ways	we	mobilise	our	knowledge	in	practice.	
The	last	chapter	established	the	research	problem	and	context	of	study.	This	chapter	
reviews	the	relevant	concepts	and	research	that	provide	a	basis	for	this	thesis.	We	
step	through	this	complex	literature	in	two	primary	parts.	The	first	part	sets	out	key	
understandings	around	what	knowledge	and	knowing	are,	and	is	organised	in	four	
parts.	It	begins	with	a	description	of	key	conceptualisations	and	debates	about	
knowledge	and	knowing	primarily	from	the	management	and	organisation	studies	
literatures,	and	then	turns	to	focus	on	related	evidence-based	medicine	debates	set	
within	the	medical	and	health	services	literatures.	It	then	provides	an	explanation	of	
Clinical	Mindlines	(Gabbay	&	le	May,	2004,	2011),	one	of	the	two	theoretical	
frameworks	used	to	examine	the	knowledge	mobilisation	problem	in	the	present	
study.	The	section	concludes	with	a	consideration	of	the	implications	these	
conceptualisations	have	about	ways	we	use	our	knowledge	to	facilitate	practice	
improvement.		
The	second	part	outlines	and	critiques	the	conceptual	and	empirical	research	on	
knowledge	use	and	the	major	ways	we	have	responded	to	the	knowledge	and	practice	
divide	in	healthcare.	To	do	so,	the	chapter	draws	on	Best	and	Holmes’	(2010)	
segmentation	of	knowledge	use	approaches	and	assesses	the	linear-based	transfer	
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and	translation,	relationally-based	linkage	and	exchange,	and	systems-based	
knowledge	mobilisation	frames	for	facilitating	knowledge	use	in	professional	practice.	
The	chapter	concludes	emphasising	the	importance	of	understanding	knowledge	and	
related	knowledge	concepts	of	creation,	diffusion	and	use	as	interconnected,	social	
processes	that	are	based	upon	the	social	interactions	between	individuals,	within	and	
between	teams,	and	across	networks.		
2.2. Understanding	Knowledge	and	Knowing	
Knowledge	is	a	diffuse	and	ambiguous	concept	that	defies	simplistic	categories	
(Easterby-Smith	&	Lyles,	2011;	Tooman	et	al.,	2016).	A	wide	array	of	terms,	types,	and	
descriptors	are	found	within	academic	discourse.	Knowledge-related	terms	can	be	
used	in	incongruent	and	incompatible	ways.	The	lack	of	agreement	on	terminology	
reveals	the	discontinuity	between	philosophical	frames	(Nutley	et	al.,	2007).	It	is	not	
uncommon	to	see	terms	like	‘knowledge’	and	‘information’	used	interchangeably	(as	
well	as	labels	such	as	‘data’,	‘research’	or	‘evidence’).	The	seeming	alignment	between	
these	terms	gestures	to	a	view	of	the	nature	of	knowledge	as	an	object	that	is	readily	
detachable	from	a	knower;	something	that	can	be	de-contextualised,	that	is	
generalisable,	and	thus	transmissible	intact	from	one	context	to	another.	Instead,	
some	propose	a	progression	of	terms	beginning	with	data,	information,	knowledge,	
and	onward	to	wisdom,	based	on	the	increasing	role	of	human	intervention	and	
judgement	(Tsoukas	&	Vladimirou,	2001;	Greenhalgh,	2010),	or,	as	Burke	(2000)	puts	
it,	from	‘raw’	to	‘cooked’.	These	scholars	hold	that	knowledge	is	not	a	variant	of	
information	but	rather	involves	the	ability	to	make	judgements,	draw	distinctions,	and	
imbue	information	with	meaning	based	upon	a	particular	time	and	place.	Crucially,	a	
distinction	is	made	between	whether	one	sees	that	knowledge	can	be	separated	from	
the	knower,	or	is	inseparable	and	‘sticky’	(Brown	&	Duguid,	2001;	von	Hippel,	1994).	
In	the	‘sticky’	view	knowledge	is	anchored,	or	situated,	and	tightly	dependent	on	both	
the	knowers	and	the	context	(Lave	&	Wenger,	1991).	What	is	known,	the	one	who	
knows	it,	and	the	context	of	action	are	bound	together,	and,	as	a	result,	knowledge	is	
far	more	than	an	object	and	is	more	aptly	recognised	as	a	process	of	knowing	
(Gourlay,	2006).		
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2.3. Key	Conceptualisations	and	Debates	
To	build	a	case	for	interconnected	conceptualisations	of	knowledge	a	closer	
examination	of	the	complex	character	of	knowledge	is	needed.	Indeed,	many	forms	
and	dimensions	of	knowledge	are	portrayed	in	the	literature.	An	Aristotelian	
understanding	of	knowledge	is	often	taken	as	a	useful	place	to	begin	(Abbasi,	2011;	
Greenhalgh	&	Wieringa,	2011;	Montgomery,	2009;	Nonaka	et	al.,	2008;	Van	de	Ven	&	
Johnson,	2006).	Aristotle	viewed	knowledge	as	a	nexus	of	three	interdependent	parts:	
episteme	(i.e.	systematic,	often	scientific,	research-informed	knowledge,	or	
information),	techne	(i.e.	skilful	craftsmanship,	artistry,	stemming	from	experience),	
and	phronesis	(i.e.	wisdom	or	judgement).	In	this	conceptualisation,	no	one	strand	
constitutes	knowledge	on	its	own,	but	rather	‘knowledge’	is	a	fusion	of	these	forms,	
and	each	form	plays	an	essential	role	within	knowing,	doing,	and	context-based	
understanding.		
Gilbert	Ryle’s	(1949)	demarcation	between	knowing	that	and	knowing	how	set	forth	
an	important	distinction	between	content-based	subject	matter	and	skills-based	
capability.	Knowing	that	is	to	know	about	something,	to	accumulate	abstract	or	
explicit	forms	of	knowledge	(Blackler,	1995).	And	yet,	knowing	how	is	an	embodied	
process	of	using	explicit	forms	of	knowledge	(Brown	&	Duguid,	2000).	Knowing	that	
and	knowing	how	are	interconnected.	Ryle	used	the	game	of	chess	to	demonstrate	
the	interconnection	of	these	forms.	He	observed	that	to	know	the	rules	of	chess	
(know	that)	is	connected	to,	but	not	the	same	thing	as,	knowing	how	to	play	chess	
(Brown	&	Duguid,	2001).	Knowing	how	is	personal,	often	action-oriented,	exhibited	in	
the	demonstration	of	skills,	and	thereby	inseparable	from	the	knower	(Blackler,	1995).		
Some	view	knowing	and	doing	as	separate	and	sequential	tasks,	while	others	view	
them	as	connected	and	intertwined	(Star,	2005).	For	example,	to	say	that	someone	is	
fixing	a	car	indicates	both	knowing	that	(i.e.	a	cognitive	process	of	holding	and	
accessing	relevant	facts	about	mechanical	problems	and	their	solutions),	as	well	as	
operational	knowing	how	(evidenced	in	specific	skills	and	behaviours)	(Cook	&	Brown,	
1999).	Engaging	in	the	process	of	fixing	a	car	brings	the	potential	for	developing	new	
knowledge,	emerging	insight,	and	refined	skills,	thereby	increasing	the	capacity	to	
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both	know	that	and	know	how.	Know	how	is	“to	a	great	extent	the	product	of	
experience	and	the	tacit	insights	experience	provides…and	is	critical	in	making	
knowledge	[know-that]	actionable	and	operational”	(Brown	&	Duguid,	1998,	p.	95).		
Michael	Polanyi	proposed	two	‘dimensions’	of	knowledge	(Polanyi,	1966).	Polanyi’s	
distinction	was	that	explicit	forms	of	knowledge	are	those	that	are	articulable,	
whereas,	tacit	forms,	are	not	(Brown	&	Duguid,	2001).	However,	Polanyi	did	not	view	
explicit	and	tacit	knowledges	as	independent	of	one	another,	but	rather	
interdependent	dimensions.	The	articulable	dimensions	do	not,	and	cannot,	convey	all	
that	the	person	knows.	Some	forms	of	knowledge	are	held	deeply	within	the	knower	
and	are	not	communicable	and	transferable.	Furthermore,	explicit	knowledges	are	
rooted	in	and	given	meaning	by	a	person’s	tacit	forms	including	life	experiences,	
values,	and	perceptions	of	self.	Contrary	to	some	views	(e.g.	Nonaka	et	al.,	2001),	tacit	
forms	of	knowing	are	more	than	domains	of	knowledge	not	yet	articulated,	but	forms	
that	cannot	be	articulated	and	transferred	to	another	(Tsoukas,	2003).	The	
subjugation	of	tacit	knowledges	misconstrues	what,	holistically-speaking,	knowledge	
is.	Like	Aristotle’s	interdependent	strands,	the	explicit	and	tacit	dimensions	mutually	
constitute	and	build	ways	of	knowing	(Cook	&	Brown,	1999).		
Polanyi’s	two	dimensions	have	been	extended	further	to	include	four	interdependent	
types	of	knowledge:	explicit,	tacit,	individual	and	group	(or	collective)	(Cook	&	Brown,	
1999).	Just	as	explicit	and	tacit	knowing	are	interdependent,	individual	and	collective	
knowing	are	as	well.	Each	form	is	“unique	and	irreducible”	and	“does	work	that	the	
others	cannot”	(1999,	p.	54).	However,	collective	knowing	is	often	mis-conceptualised	
as	clustered	individuals,	each	still	fundamentally	discrete.	Individuals	and	collectives	
influence	and	shape	one	another	in	the	course	of	learning	and	developing	their	
knowledge.	While	there	is	no	collective	knowing	without	individuals,	knowing	is	
constructed	in	and	has	meaning	only	within	human	interactions	and	context.	
Communities	build	and	hold	shared	knowledges	that	are	conceptually	distinct	from	an	
individual’s	(Bouty	&	Gomez,	2010;	Brown	&	Duguid,	2001)	as	well	as	disbursed	
specialised	knowledges	within	a	community	that	require	collective	action	to	
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accomplish	interlaced	tasks	(Lave	&	Wenger,	1991;	Wenger,	1998).	The	shared	
context	is	the	social	milieu	from	which	collective	forms	of	knowing	develop.		
Socially	situated	knowing	involves	a	dynamic	interplay,	and	an	inseparable	
relationship	between	personal	knowledge	and	social	context.	Individual	knowing	is	
not	an	isolated	process,	but	is	one	borne	out	of	interactions	with	others	and	with	the	
world	(Cook	&	Brown,	1999).	The	individual	and	collective	are	dynamic	and	distinct	
entities,	nevertheless	simultaneously	interdependent	(Brown	&	Duguid,	2001).	Like	
Aristotle’s	interwoven	nature	of	knowledge,	each	form	of	knowledge	differs	and	suits	
particular	roles,	even	as	they	are	interwoven	in	the	process	of	knowing.	In	sum,	
collective,	individual,	explicit,	and	tacit	dimensions	of	knowing	function	in	tandem	and	
dependence	upon	one	another.		
A	further	example	of	interrelated	knowledge	delineates	three	domains	of	knowing:	
empirical,	theoretical,	and	experiential	(Brechin	&	Sidell,	2000).	Empirical	knowing	is	
considered	the	most	explicit.	This	includes	research-informed	knowledge	derived	from	
scientific	methods	direct	and	structured	observation.	Theoretical	knowing	suggests	a	
conceptual	reasoning	process	where	various	ways	of	approaching	a	problem	are	
considered	to	constitute	a	plausible	way	of	understanding	what	is	observed.	
Experiential	knowing	involves	craft	and	mastery	that	are	hard-won	through	
experience,	often	more	evident	in	the	doing	than	in	any	explicit	articulation	of	
knowledge.	
Accounts	of	knowledge	and	knowing	contain	within	them	divergent	assumptions	and	
give	rise	to	differing	implications	for	how	to	set	about	the	tasks	of	creating,	sharing	
and	using	knowledge.	Some	of	these	assumptions	are	laid	out	in	Table	2-1	(below),	
under	the	two	broad	headings	of	knowledge	as	a	thing	and	knowing	as	a	process.	
Rather	than	dualist	opposites,	these	descriptors	can	be	taken	as	anchors	for	
arguments	of	extent.	For	example,	to	the	extent	that	knowledge	is	a	thing	to	be	
found,	then	it	is	seen	as	primarily	explicit,	value-neutral,	and,	often,	individualistic;	
whereas	construing	knowing	as	a	situated	and	dynamic	process	of	discovery	
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emphasises	the	social	and	specific	context,	where	collective	and	tacit	forms	of	
knowing	are	an	elemental	part.	
Table	2-1	Assumptions	about	knowledge	
Whether	knowledge	is…	
…an	object,	a	product,	a	commodity…	 …a	situated	process	of	knowing…	
…	suggests	these	assumptions	and	implications:	
Pre-existing	knowledge	 Emergent	knowing	
Objective	 Subjective	
Value-neutral	 Value-laden	
Discovered	 Constructed	
Certain	 Uncertain	
Static	 Dynamic	
Focused	on	data	and	information	 Combining	information,	experience,	
judgement	
Meaning	is	found	 Meaning	is	interpreted	
Explicit:	know	that	 Tacit:	know	how	
Content	knowledge	 Skills	and	judgement	
Generic,	generalisable,	independent	of	
context,	de-contextualised	
Specific	to	a	time	and	place,	context-
dependent,	situated	
Individual	 Collective	
Received,	interpreted,	and	understood	by	
the	individual	
Co-constructed	from	and	understood	within	
the	social	context	and	system	
(Wittgenstein’s	‘all	knowledge	is	collective’)	
Can	be	packaged	and	transferred	 Cannot	be	packaged	and	transferred	
(Polanyi’s	‘all	knowledge	is	personal’)	
Getting	‘knowledge	into	practice’	 Building	shared	‘knowing	in	practice’	
Simplified	when	reduced	to	ever	smaller	
parts,	which	builds	richer	understanding	
of	the	whole	
Deepens	in	complexity	when	narrowed	to	
smaller	focus,	which	further	complicates	
understanding	
	
Adapted	from	Blackler,	1995;	Tsoukas	&	Vladimirou,	2001;	Brown	&	Duguid,	2000;	Duguid,	
2005;	Gourlay,	2006;	Greenhalgh,	2010								
	
In	summary,	there	are	different	views	about	the	nature	of	knowledge,	and	many	
terms	are	used	to	describe	knowledge	and	knowing.	Some	point	to	knowledge	as	
separate	from	the	person	and	the	context;	others	hold	to	a	dynamic	interplay	
between	different	forms	of	knowledge	within	and	between	social	beings.	This	
overview	reveals	a	core	tension	within	knowledge-based	terms.	If	we	hold	to	a	
dynamic	inter-play	between	Aristotle’s	strands	of	knowledge,	as	opposed	to	a	
diminished	subset,	as	Ryle	and	Polanyi	argued	(Brown	&	Duguid,	2001),	we	begin	to	
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frame	the	debates	around	divided	and	reduced	or	interconnected	and	interdependent	
knowledges.		
2.3.1. Evidence-Based	Medicine	and	the	Nature	of	Knowledge	
Within	the	health	literature,	the	terms	‘evidence’	and	‘research’	are	used	to	refer	to	
‘knowledge’	(Ferlie	et	al.,	2012a).	And	evidence	based	medicine	(EBM)	is	the	“health	
sector	version	of	‘type	of		knowledge’	debate”	(Ferlie	et	al.,	2012a,	p.	1299).	The	aim	
of	this	section	is	to	explore	EBM,	particularly	in	how	it	conceives	of	the	nature	of	
knowledge.		
The	ground	was	cultivated	for	the	modern	day	EBM	movement	by	Scottish	
epidemiologist,	Archie	Cochrane	(Claridge	&	Fabian,	2005).	He	was	concerned	about	
the	forms	of	knowledge	that	clinicians	relied	upon,	and	critical	that	care	provision	was	
based	upon	the	anecdotal	experience	of	individual	physicians	(Ashcroft,	2004;	Dopson	
et	al.,	2003).	Cochrane	explained	that	this	knowledge	was	untested,	sometimes	
wasteful	and	potentially	unsafe,	and	advocated	for	the	systematic	and	scientific	
evaluation	of	treatments	in	order	that	physicians	could	better	meet	their	professional	
obligations.		
Work	began	in	the	1980s	that	documented	Cochrane’s	concerns	by	showing	
disturbing	practice	variance.	The	Dartmouth	Atlas,	using	publicly	available	Medicare	
data,	demonstrated	variations	of	health	interventions,	spending,	and	patient	
outcomes	by	geographic	location.	For	example,	a	subset	of	primary	care	practitioners	
ordered	twice	as	many	CT	scans	as	other	doctors,	and	some	cities	placed	coronary	
stents	at	three	times	the	rate	of	neighbouring	cities	(Skinner	&	Fisher,	2010).	The	
overuse,	underuse,	and	misuse	of	interventions	had	concerning	implications	for	both	
the	quality	of	care	for	patients,	as	well	as	waste	of	health	system	resources	(Rushmer	
&	Davies,	2004;	Timmermans	&	Mauck,	2005).	
The	explanation	for	these	widely	varied	practices	was	that	physicians	were	drawing	
upon	non-scientific	sources	of	knowledge	(Haynes	&	Haines,	1998).	Physicians	relied	
upon	knowledge	generated	from	professional	experience,	potentially	out	of	date	
material	from	their	foundation	training	and	textbooks,	or	as	time	elapsed,	important	
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information	was	forgotten.	The	pre-EBM	professional	knowledge	systems	relied	upon	
the	serendipitous	capture	of	relevant	journal	articles	and	periodic	attendance	at	
continuing	education	activities	(Sackett	&	Rosenberg,	1995).	Up	to	date	information	in	
medical	journals	was	disorganised,	and	due	to	time	constraints,	physicians’	
information	needs	were	most	often	obtained	by	asking	colleagues	and	regional	
experts	(Sackett	&	Rosenberg,	1995).	The	wide	range	of	practices	seen	in	the	
Dartmouth	Atlas	sharply	called	into	question	the	reliability	of	both	these	systems	and	
sources	of	knowledge	that	doctors	were	using.	
A	promising	solution	to	this	knowledge	in	practice	problem	appeared	called	Evidence	
Based	Medicine.	The	influential	Journal	of	the	American	Medical	Association	published	
what	was	described	as	“a	new	paradigm	for	medical	practice”	(EBM	Working	Group,	
1992,	p.	2420)	(with	Gordon	Guyatt	as	chair).	The	new	paradigm	“de-emphasizes	
intuition,	unsystematic	clinical	experience,	and	pathophysiological	rationale	as	
sufficient	grounds	for	clinical	decision-making	and	stresses	the	examination	of	
evidence	from	clinical	research”	(EBM	Working	Group,	1992,	p.	2420),	the	sources	
that	concerned	Cochrane.	Guyatt	and	colleagues	also	pointed	out	that	physicians	
sought	out	clinical	experts’	opinions	and	used	reasoning	based	on	biological	principles	
and	logic	instead	of	“established	facts	based	on	data”	(Sackett	&	Rosenberg,	1995,	p.	
330).	Rather	than	depend	upon	others’	expert	clinical	opinion	or	one’s	own	
experience	and	judgement,	the	Working	Group	made	the	case	that	knowledge	to	
guide	clinical	practice	should	be	drawn	from	large,	unbiased	quantitative	data	sets	
that	were	systematic,	observable,	measureable,	and	reproducible,	in	other	words,	
based	on	the	scientific	method	encapsulated	in	a	randomised	controlled	trial	(RCT).	
EBM	required	new	skills	from	practitioners.	These	skills	were	methodological.	The	
patient	problem	could	be	framed	in	such	a	way	that	aligned	with	the	research	
literature.	The	clinician	completed	an	“efficient”	search	of	all	relevant	research	in	
order	to	“resolve	the	problem”	(EBM	Working	Group,	1992,	p.	2421),	assessed	the	
validity	of	each	piece	by	“applying	the	rules	of	evidence”	(p.	2421),	determined	the	
clinical	action(s)	recommended	by	these	data,	and	applied	it	to	the	patient.	Namely,	
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reliable	forms	of	knowing	were	drawn	from	the	systematic	and	rigorous	search	for	
science-based	information.	
Thus,	at	its	inception	EBM	upended	the	epistemological	basis	of	medical	practice.	EBM	
advocates	were	clear	that	not	all	knowledge	was	equally	reliable.	Where	reasoning	
based	on	pathophysiological	mechanisms	of	disease,	years	of	clinical	experience,	and	
the	resulting	clinical	judgement	were	considered	sufficient	for	clinical	expertise,	the	
new	EBM	paradigm	questioned	the	basis	for	each	of	these	knowledges	(Dopson	et	al.,	
2003;	Goldenberg,	2006;	Greenhalgh	et	al.,	2014).	The	primary	fulcrum	shift	was	one	
of	authority.	Authority	moved	from	that	which	was	derived	from	clinical	opinion	
based	on	experience,	or	expert-based	medicine,	to	methodological	expertise,	or	
evidence-based	medicine	(Godlee,	2014).	The	forms	of	knowledge	and	skills	
considered	trustworthy	and	reliable	transferred	from	specialist	clinicians	to	
methodological	experts.	
The	perceived	benefits	were	that	EBM	would	save	time,	be	efficient,	provide	shared	
language	between	specialties	and	professions,	align	educational	efforts,	and	provide	
credible	information	to	guide	practice	(Sackett	&	Rosenberg,	1995).	These	authors	
recognised	that	even	once	clinicians	began	to	learn	EBM	methods,	further	strategies	
were	needed	to	incorporate	EBM	into	everyday	practice.	Sackett	and	colleagues	
(1989,	1992,	1995,	1996)	recommended	drawing	on	evidence-based	summaries	and	
protocols	generated	by	methodological	experts.	One	such	example,	was	the	Cochrane	
Collaboration,	established	in	Oxford	to	collate	and	distribute	unbiased	scientific	
reviews	(Dopson	et	al.,	2003).	The	ascendency	of	the	randomised	controlled	trial,	and	
soon	systematic	reviews	of	RCTs	and	the	meta-analyses	of	collated	systematic	
reviews,	established	a	hierarchy	of	valuable	and	valid	evidence.	New	journals,	the	ACP	
Journal	Club	and	Evidence	Based	Medicine,	were	established	with	the	dedicated	goal	
of	publishing	methodologically	rigorous	content	for	the	clear	communication	of	
evidence.	
The	underlying	message	was	clear:	not	all	knowledge	is	equal.	Reliable	and	
trustworthy	evidence	was	available	from	scientifically	rigorous	epidemiological	and	
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bio-statistical	sources	(Goldenberg,	2006).	Statistical	data	based	on	studies	of	
populations	superseded	clinical	experience	and	judgement.	The	use	of	these	data,	
instead	of	clinical	judgement,	was	the	answer	to	the	research	in	practice	problem	
(Dopson	et	al.,	2003).	
Initial	backlash	to	EBM	was	fierce.	Some	took	umbrage	at	the	implication	that	they	
were	not	already	using	evidence	(Dopson	et	al.,	2003;	Sackett	et	al.,	1996).	Some	
described	EBM	as	‘cookbook	medicine’	that	did	not	adequately	take	into	account	
patient	values,	views	or	local	concerns	(Berg,	1997;	Dopson	et	al.,	2003).	In	contrast	to	
the	statistical	power	of	RCT	data,	clinicians’	hard-earned	professional	experience	was	
considered	unsystematic	and	biased,	and	thereby	deemed	unreliable.	This	shift	of	
authority	represented	a	potential	loss	of	clinical	and	professional	autonomy,	and	
there	was	suspicion	that	managers	would	manipulate	EBM	structures	for	cost-cutting	
purposes.	
A	few	years	later,	the	definition	of	EBM	was	modified	saying,		
[EBM]	is	the	conscientious,	explicit,	and	judicious	use	of	current	best	
evidence	in	making	decisions	about	the	care	of	individual	patients.	The	
practice	of	evidence	based	medicine	means	integrating	individual	
clinical	expertise	with	the	best	available	external	clinical	evidence	from	
systematic	research.	By	individual	clinical	expertise	we	mean	the	
proficiency	and	judgment	that	individual	clinicians	acquire	through	
clinical	experience	and	clinical	practice.	Increased	expertise	is	reflected	
in	many	ways,	but	especially	in	more	effective	and	efficient	diagnosis	
and	in	the	more	thoughtful	identification	and	compassionate	use	of	
individual	patients'	predicaments,	rights,	and	preferences	in	making	
clinical	decisions	about	their	care	(Sackett	et	al.,	1996,	p.	71).		
This	definition	intended	to	calm	concerns	and	defuse	the	controversy	around	EBM.	
This	definition	of	EBM	remains	intact	today.	The	revised	definition	appears	to	re-join	
and	revalidate	the	spectrum	of	clinical	knowledges;	yet,	further	in	the	document	the	
authors	reaffirmed	the	preeminent	position	of	RCTs.		
Because	the	randomised	trial,	and	especially	the	systematic	review	of	
several	randomised	trials,	is	so	much	more	likely	to	inform	us	and	so	
much	less	likely	to	mislead	us,	it	has	become	the	"gold	standard"	for	
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judging	whether	a	treatment	does	more	good	than	harm	(Sackett	et	al.,	
1996,	p.	72).	
In	other	words,	clinicians	must	rely	on	other	forms	of	knowledge	when	RCTs	are	not	
available	or	relevant,	but	should	otherwise	depend	upon	the	objective,	unbiased	data	
that	RCTs	provide	in	order	to	treat	patients.	
Nevertheless,	caution	must	be	used	regarding	the	phrase	“EBM”	as	if	it	encapsulates	a	
unified	perspective.	While	often	narrowed	to	exclusively	focus	on	the	scientific	inputs	
as	appropriate	and	acceptable	bases	for	practicing	medicine,	Sackett,	amongst	others,	
adhered	to	a	fuller	conceptualisation	of	knowledge	(Thornton,	2006).	And	yet	despite	
the	more	nuanced	1996	definition,	EBM	is	often	narrowed	to	a	reliance	upon	scientific	
evidence	alone	(Sehon	&	Stanley,	2003).	While	EBM	is	sometimes	conceived	as	
drawing	upon	a	wide	range	of	knowledges,	with	standards	of	evidence	based	on	the	
results	from	epidemiology	and	systematic	trials	studies,	there	is	little	doubt	that	in	
function,	EBM	heavily	favours	explicit	forms	of	knowledge	over	all	others	(Fitzgerald	&	
Harvey,	2015).	The	results	of	which	are	increasingly	witnessed	as	many	public	
accountability	structures	that	are	heavily	weighted	in	favour	of	explicit	guideline-	and	
protocol-based	care	(Ferlie	et	al.,	2012a).	
EBM	has	been	paraded	as	one	of	the	greatest	medical	achievements	in	the	last	200	
years	(Hofmeijer,	2014).	The	widespread	acceptance	of	EBM	and	use	of	RCTs	has	
indeed	put	important	information	into	the	hands	of	clinicians.	For	example,	high	blood	
pressure	for	elderly	patients	was	once	considered	acceptable	and	not	necessary	to	
treat.	Large	RCTs	showed	the	opposite	(Greenhalgh,	2002).	We	now	know	that	radical	
mastectomy	is	not	necessary	for	many	patients	with	breast	cancer	(Montini	&	
Graham,	2015).		
In	the	midst	of	these	advances,	concerns	have	been	raised	about	the	overly	optimistic,	
and	perhaps	dogmatic,	view	of	what	the	EBM	method	can	accomplish	(Dopson	et	al.,	
2003;	Gabbay	&	le	May,	2011;	Rycroft-Malone	et	al.,	2004).	One	critique	is	the	
overrating	of	scientific	evidence	as	a	definitive	source	of	knowledge	for	clinical	
decision	making	(Ingold	&	Monaghan,	2016;	Miles	et	al.,	2007).	EBM	has	been	
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seductive	in	seeming	to	offer	certainty	(Dopson	et	al.,	2003)	when	decisive	findings	
are	rare.	A	study	of	Cochrane	reviews	found	just	1%	indicated	enough	certainty	that	
further	studies	were	not	required	(El-Dib	et	al.,	2007).		
Another	concern	is	that	the	proliferation	of	RCTs,	systematic	reviews,	and	meta	
analyses	has	spawned	a	number	of	difficulties.	Carrying	out	RCTs	is	costly,	
consequently,	the	majority	of	trials	are	funded	by	companies	with	commercial	
interests	in	the	outcome	(Timmermans	&	Mauck,	2005).	The	dominant	source	of	
funding	for	RCTs	has	raised	concerns	that	organisations	drawing	on	these	studies,	
such	as	the	Cochrane	Collaboration,	are	inadvertently	giving	credibility	to	vested	
interests	(Greenhalgh	et	al.,	2014;	Ioannidis,	2016).	Furthermore,	contrary	to	the	
premise	of	EBM,	RCTs	are	not	‘objective’	and	value	free	(Hofmeijer,	2014;	Ioannidis,	
2016).	Lastly,	EBM	has	been	criticised	for	providing	research	outputs	that	were	either	
irrelevant,	unrealistic	or	both	within	clinical	work	precisely	because	highly	relevant	
voices	are	silenced	in	the	clinical	setting,	including	those	of	patients	and	carers.		
Nutley	and	colleagues	explain	that	quality	evidence	depends	upon	what	it	is	we	want	
to	know	(Nutley	et	al.,	2013).	RCTs	of	the	kind	that	Sackett	and	Guyatt	promote	can	
produce	useful	efficacy	data	for	generalised	populations.	But	EBM,	in	its	strict	
stepwise	system	for	obtaining	credible	knowledge,	rejects	an	Aristotelian	
understanding	of	complex,	multidimensional	ways	of	knowing.	As	a	result,	what	
constitutes	evidence	is	highly	contested	and	critics	of	EBM	say	that	it	inappropriately	
narrows	what	counts	as	useful	knowledge	(Buetow	&	Kenealy,	2000).	Furthermore,	
the	seemingly	adversarial	relationship	between	clinical	judgement	and	evidence	is	a	
false	dichotomy.	Judgement	is	intertwined	across	the	full	spectrum	of	knowledge	
creation	and	use	(Greenhalgh,	2002;	Hofmeijer,	2014).		
The	tensions	regarding	EBM	are	not	about	whether	scientific	evidence	is	a	useful	
source	of	knowledge,	but	rather	the	role	of,	or	how,	evidence	is	used	in	practice.	
Critiques	of	EBM	do	not	dispute	that	research-informed	evidence	has	an	important	
role	to	play	in	clinical	practice.	Their	objections	rest	on	the	grounds	that	what	
constitutes	evidence,	and	‘best’	science	for	clinical	practice,	is	contested	and	that	
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clinical	expertise	entails	a	wider	conception	of	knowledge	in	practice	(Miles	et	al.,	
2000).	They	resist	the	perceived	hierarchy	of	explicit	forms	of	knowledge	and	
“emphasize	the	value	of	clinical	experience	and	the	judgment	of	individual	
physicians...and	sometimes	emphasize	the	art	of	medicine,	and	contrast	this	with	the	
science	of	medicine,	or	they	speak	of	techne	vs.	theory	or	compassion	vs.	reason"	
(Sehon	&	Stanley,	2003).	This	correlates	with	other	studies	that	purport	that	giving	
codified,	decontextualised	knowledge	privileged	status	misunderstands	the	role	of	
experience,	artistry	and	competent	clinical	judgement,	and	does	not	reflect	the	
realities	of	exemplary	professional	practice	(Gabbay	&	le	May,	2011;	Harvey	et	al.,	
2011;	Rich,	1997).		
In	summary,	the	debates	around	the	EBM	movement	are	largely	epistemological	
debates	about	what	constitutes	(and	which	methodologies	uncover)	trustworthy	
forms	of	knowing.	One	side	represents	a	shift	away	from	dependence	on	clinical	
expertise	to	dependence	on	(often	others’)	bio-statistical	methodological	expertise.	
On	the	other	side	is	a	complex,	interdependent	conceptualisation	of	knowledge	where	
rather	than	competing,	forms	of	knowledge	complement	and	work	in	tandem.		While	
the	refined	1996	EBM	definition	eased	the	controversy	and	marked	a	turn	in	
widespread	acceptance,	we	have	witnessed	over	the	last	two	decades	an	engrained	
overreliance	on	a	diminished	construction	of	knowledge	alongside	difficulty	getting	
this	knowledge	‘taken	up’	in	practice.	At	the	same	time,	we	have	seen	the	
introduction	of	rich	conceptualisations	of	knowledges	and	calls	to	consider	research	
use	strategies	based	upon	continually	evolving	interconnected	forms	of	knowledge	
within	complex	systems	(Best	&	Holmes,	2010;	Gabbay	&	le	May,	2011;	Rycroft-
Malone	et	al.,	2004).	
2.3.2. Clinical	Mindlines	and	Interconnected	Ways	of	Knowing	
Clinical	Mindlines	is	one	such	conceptualisation	of	interconnected	knowledges	
(Gabbay	&	le	May,	2004,	2011).	Clinical	Mindlines	theory	was	based	on	an	extensive	
ethnographic	study	of	an	exemplary	primary	care	practice.	The	study	set	out	to	
understand	how	clinicians	acquired	and	used	their	knowledge.	A	growing	body	of	
literature	made	it	clear	that,	despite	extensive	efforts	to	promote	evidence	based	
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medicine	(EBM),	clinicians	appeared	to	frequently	ignore	research-informed	evidence	
in	their	practice.	Gabbay	and	le	May	reasoned	that	if	they	stood	alongside	members	
of	an	ordinary,	yet	high-performing,	general	practice,	they	would	witness	first-hand	
how	these	clinicians	made	use	of	various	sources	of	evidence	(e.g.	research	findings,	
new	treatment	information,	guidelines)	in	their	clinical	decision-making.	The	authors	
observed	what	they	called	‘clinical	mindlines’,	which	“blend	formal,	informal,	tacit	and	
experiential	evidence”	(2011,	p.	xiii)	seamlessly	in	action.	Mindlines,	in	essence,	are	
the	clinician’s	“internalized	guidelines”	(2011,	p.	47)	that	are	drawn	from	an	
amalgamation	of	their	professional	training,	experiences,	evidence-informed	
materials,	and	interactions	with	colleagues	and	patients.	These	mindlines	entangle	to	
the	degree	that,	in	most	cases,	one	source	cannot	be	clearly	distinguished	from	the	
others.	Mindlines	are	“a	complex	social	construction,	linked	to	a	web	of	sources	
that...build	and	reinforce	the	embedded	knowledge	and	values	that	allow	the	
clinicians	to	function”	(2011,	p.	46).		
Clinical	Mindlines	is	a	conceptualisation	of	multidimensional,	interconnected	
knowledges	that	provides	an	empirically	rich	articulation	of	the	countless	sources	that	
enrich	clinicians’	ever-evolving	knowledge	over	their	lifetime	(see	Figure	2-1).	
Emerging	from	tacit,	explicit,	individual	and	collective	ways	of	knowing,	mindlines	
inform,	direct,	and	shape	their	practice.	In	this	way,	Clinical	Mindlines	theory	provides	
a	picture	of	knowing	in	practice	that	aligns	with	Aristotle’s	view	where	knowing	is	the	
interplay	of	many	strands	of	knowledge	that	are	continually	evolving,	and	blend	to	
form	holistic	knowing.	Clinical	Mindlines	theory	presents	an	alternative	view	of	what	
‘is’	(ontologically	speaking)	that	challenges	EBM’s	prevailing	positivist-based	view	of	
reality.		
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Collective	mindlines	widen	the	lens	from	the	individual	to	incorporate	interconnected	
actors	resembling	an	interconnected	web	of	knowing	(see	Figure	2-2).	Gabbay	and	le	
May	(2011)	point	out	the	inherently	social	nature	of	clinical	mindlines	as	they	“were	
being	implicitly	shared	and	checked,	refined	and	continually	developed	through	
interactions	between	colleagues”	(p.	130),	most	often	through	engagement	with	
trusted	colleagues	that	was	part	of	the	regular	flow	of	clinical	practice	such	as	
“informally	swapping	stories,	sharing	experiences,	helping	each	other	solve	tricky	
problems,	collectively	making	sense	of	new	ideas	they	had	come	across,	and	changing	
how	they	behaved”	(Gabbay	&	le	May,	2016,	p.	402).	In	this	way,	individual	and	
collective	mindlines	develop	in	tandem	through	social	interactions.	
	
Figure	2-1	A	schematic	representation	of	accumulated	content	of	mindlines	
(Source:	Gabbay	&	le	May,	2011,	Figure	4.1,	p.	73)		
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Figure	2-2	A	representation	of	collective	mindlines	
(Source:	Gabbay	&	le	May,	2011,	Figure	7.1,	p.	131)		
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Mindlines’	incorporation	of	Polanyi's	tacit	dimension	of	knowledge	is	not	set	in	
opposition	to	the	explicit	sources,	but	draws	together	tacit	and	explicit	knowing	as	
working	together.	Similarly,	knowing	is	both	individual	and	set	within	a	context	of	
mutuality	with	colleagues	as	well	as	the	wider	realm	of	knowers	that	includes	
teachers,	trainers,	researchers,	and	guideline	developers.		
A	review	of	Clinical	Mindlines	indicates	this	framework	has	received	a	mixed	reception	
in	the	health	services	literature	(Wieringa	&	Greenhalgh,	2015).	The	original	2004	
publication	has	been	nominated	as	one	of	the	most	influential	pieces	in	the	British	
Medical	Journal	over	the	last	decade	(Greenhalgh	et	al.,	2016).	And	yet,	some	authors	
have	dismissed	Clinical	Mindlines	as	misguided	and	subversively	supportive	of	non-
evidence-based	practice	because	tacit	and	social	forms	of	knowing	are	considered	
important	as	well	as	scientific	sources	(Wieringa	&	Greenhalgh,	2015).	Other	authors	
mistakenly	distil	the	Clinical	Mindlines	concept	down	to	‘consulting	colleagues’	(Gupta	
et	al.,	2009),	missing	essential	elements	such	as	prior	professional	experiences	and	
explicit	forms	of	evidence.	Wieringa	and	Greenhalgh	conclude	that	“mindlines	offers	a	
philosophically	and	theoretically	sophisticated	perspective	on	knowledge	and	clinical	
method”	(2015,	p.	14).		
2.3.3. Implications	for	Conceptualising	Knowledge	to	Improve	Practice	
A	clear	articulation	of	how	we	understand	knowledge	matters	because	how	one	
conceptualises	knowledge	provides	the	foundation	upon	which	we	base	our	
understanding	about	how	our	knowledges	develop,	are	shared	and	used.	The	
spectrum	described	thus	far	shows	that	often	the	premise	of	knowledge	within	EBM	is	
reduced	to	an	object,	in	the	form	of	quantified	data	from	RCTs,	which	is	readily	
transferable	regardless	of	context.	Whereas	a	conceptualisation	of	interconnected	
knowledges,	such	as	Clinical	Mindlines,	provides	different	picture.	This	view	brings	
together	knowledges	of	varying	forms	and	sources	that	are	distinct	(including	RCTs)	
and	yet	no	one	subjugates	another.	These	domains,	explicit,	tacit,	individual	and	
collective	(Cook	&	Brown,	1999),	are	interdependent	and	work	in	tandem,	each	
providing	input	that	another	cannot.		
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How	we	conceptualise	the	nature	of	knowledge	also	has	implications	for	learning,	
both	individually	and	at	the	organisational	level.	If	knowledge	is	an	object,	then	
individual	learning	is	often	construed	as	a	linear,	stepwise	process	of	knowledge	
acquisition.	This	is	demonstrated	in	Bloom	and	Krathwohl’s	(1956)	six	levels	of	
learning,	which	are	ordered	from	the	knowledge	of	something	to	the	ability	to	
evaluate	and	offer	a	critique	of	it.	Alternately,	when	knowledge	is	viewed	as	socially	
constructed,	emergent,	and	having	meaning	drawn	from	a	particular	context,	then	
learning	is	both	an	individual	and	collective	process	of	transformation	(Merriam	et	al.,	
2007).	This	view	shifts	the	focus	from	individual	knowledge	acquisition	to	how	
individuals	and	groups	change,	transform,	and	learn	as	a	result	of	connecting	and	
engaging	over	a	shared	task	(Wenger,	1998).	In	this	way,	learning	is	viewed	as	social,	
interactive,	influenced	by	system	structures,	and	a	life-long	process	(Illeris,	2002).		
In	sum,	this	section	has	reviewed	the	literatures	around	the	array	of	knowledge	and	
knowing	terminologies	and	the	philosophical	frames	linked	with	differing	views	on	the	
nature	of	knowledge.	It	is	questions	about	the	nature	of	knowledge	that	are	at	basis	
of	the	ongoing	debates	around	EBM.	For	the	tensions	regarding	EBM	are	not	about	
whether	scientific	evidence	is	a	useful	source	of	knowledge,	but	rather	the	role	of,	or	
how,	evidence	is	used	in	practice.	Frameworks	such	as	Clinical	Mindlines	provide	a	
contrast	to	positivistic	views	and	help	explain	why	“knowledge	obstinately	refuse[s]	to	
be	driven	unproblematically	into	practice”(Greenhalgh	&	Wieringa,	2011,	p.	501).	
2.4. Research	on	Knowledge	in	(or	into)	Practice	in	Healthcare	
As	already	indicated,	how	one	conceives	of	the	nature	of	knowledge	not	only	shapes	
one’s	understanding	of	the	knowledge	in	(or	into)	practice	problem	(Ward	et	al.,	2012)	
but	the	strategies	used	to	enhance	the	knowledge	base	for	practice.	If	knowledge	is	an	
object	and	understood	as	a	‘flow	of	information’,	knowledge	creation,	diffusion	and	
use	look	very	different	than	if	knowledge	is	a	complex	fusion	of	interconnected	
domains,	that	is	socially	constructed	and	context-dependent.	A	clear	delineation	of	
the	philosophical	underpinnings	being	employed	clarifies	why	particular	strategies	are	
deemed	to	have	merit	in	constructing	solutions	to	knowledge	construction,	diffusion,	
acquisition,	and	use	challenges	in	professional	practice.	
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As	the	problematic	divide	between	what	we	know	(our	knowledge)	and	what	we	do	
(our	practice)	becomes	apparent,	various	strategies	have	emerged	in	the	health	
services	research	literature	to	address	the	knowledge	use	problem.	Ways	to	improve	
the	use	of	knowledge	in	practice	have	been	grouped	into	three	categories:	linear,	
relational,	and	systems	approaches	(Best	&	Holmes,	2010).	The	next	section	will	
consider	each	approach	in	turn	by	highlighting	some	of	the	dominant	knowledge	use	
strategies	that	fit	within	the	scope	of	each	approach,	drawing	out	the	assumptions	
made	about	the	nature	of	knowledge,	and,	finally,	explaining	what	the	literature	says	
about	the	effectiveness	of	the	strategy	for	getting	knowledge	used	in	practice.	
2.4.1. Linear-Based	Views		
Linear	models	for	promoting	knowledge	use	are	those	that	envision	a	stepwise	and	
uni-directional	progression.	Knowledge	is	produced	by	researchers	and	flows	to	users	
in	policy	and	practice	communities.	With	these	kinds	of	models,	the	‘knowledge	in	
practice’	problem	is	understood	as	a	‘knowledge	deficit	in	practice’	problem,	and	thus	
the	solution	is	to	provide	the	information	that	will	change	behaviour	resulting	in	
improved	outcomes.	Names	such	as	‘research	uptake’	and	‘knowledge	pipeline’	
provide	an	apt	description	of	these	models	(Best	&	Holmes,	2010).		
Within	the	healthcare	literature	a	“lively	subfield”	(Nicolini	et	al.,	2008,	p.	248)	on	
knowledge	use	has	an	ever-growing	proliferation	of	terms	and	metaphors	to	capture	
the	process,	‘knowledge	translation’	being	the	most	common	among	them	(McKibbon	
et	al.,	2010).	Knowledge	translation	is	a	close	kin	of	‘knowledge	transfer’,	and	was	
defined	by	the	Canadian	Institutes	for	Health	Research	as:		
The	iterative,	timely	and	effective	process	of	integrating	best	evidence	
into	the	routine	practices	of	patients,	practitioners,	health	care	teams	
and	systems,	in	order	to	effect	to	optimal	healthcare	outcomes	and	to	
optimize	health	care	and	health	care	systems.	(Davis,	2006,	p.	8)	
	
This	definition	aligns	the	goals	of	those	drawing	on	a	knowledge	translation	view	with	
the	EBM	movement.	Both	conceptualise	the	problem	of	less	than	optimal	care	
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provision	as	a	knowledge	gap,	where	knowledge	is	often	reduced	to	an	evidence	
product	(Cooksey,	2006;	Davis	et	al.,	2003).	
As	for	how	the	evidence	product	would	make	its	way	to	practice,	the	assumption	was	
that	evidence	would	naturally	find	its	way	to	those	who	needed	it	(Oborn,	et	al.,	
2013).	An	often	used	example,	where	Captain	James	Lancaster’s	discovery	in	1601	
(that	citrus	fruits	can	prevent	scurvy)	took	a	further	264	years	to	wend	its	way	to	
British	naval	policy,	illustrated	that	important	information	often	is	not	applied	as	soon	
as	would	be	desirable	(Berwick,	2003).	The	knowledge	deficit	problem	became	a	
diffusion	and	dissemination	problem.	A	more	active	distribution	of	research-based	
information	was	needed.		
Linear-based	theories	and	interventions	emerged	as	a	key	strategy	for	closing	the	gap	
in	a	timelier	manner	(Straus	&	Mazmanian,	2006).	The	introduction	of	mandatory	
participation	in	regular	continuing	professional	development	is	one	example	of	
pushing	research	along	the	pipeline	more	quickly.	With	the	exponential	growth	of	
clinical	information	in	the	EBM	age,	ways	were	needed	to	address	the	deficit,	
distribution	and	increasingly	information	overload	problem	(Hall	&	Walton,	2004).	As	
noted	earlier	in	the	chapter,	Cochrane,	Sackett	and	others	advocated	for	evidence	
summaries,	clinical	guidelines,	and	meta-analyses	drawn	from	RCTs	to	make	the	
transfer	and	translation	of	credible	data	easier	for	the	busy	clinician.	
For	linear-based	models,	assumptions	about	knowledge	fall	more	heavily	on	the	
object	or	product	side	of	the	spectrum	(depicted	earlier	in	Table	2-1)	because	it	is	
viewed	as	generalisable	and	can	be	readily	packaged	and	transferred.	Linear	models	
tend	to	dominate	knowledge	sharing	practices	in	part	because	they	are	comparatively	
easy	to	implement	(Davies	et	al.,	2015).	Indeed,	information	technology	has	played	a	
vital	role	in	the	linear	delivery	and	advancement	of	EBM	materials	(Claridge	&	Fabian,	
2005;	Crilly	et	al.,	2010).	And	yet	differing	knowledge	translation	studies	apply	
different	and,	at	times	competing	definitions	of	knowledge.	As	a	result,	what	
‘knowledge	translation’	actually	means	has	been	irreparably	lost	(Davies	et	al.,	2008;	
Oborn	et	al.,	2013).	
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Dependence	on	linear	models	has	increasingly	been	met	with	criticism	(Balconi	et	al.,	
2010).	Some	of	the	criticisms	are	that	these	perspectives	depend	upon	a	reductionist	
view	of	the	nature	of	knowledge	(i.e.	to	mean	only	explicit	scientific,	technical	forms),	
misrepresent	knowledge	use	as	a	cerebral,	rational	activity,	and	support	a	
disproportionate	power	balance	between	researchers	and	practitioners	(Gabbay	&	le	
May,	2011;	Rich,	1997;	Rycroft-Malone	et	al.,	2016).	Because	evaluations	of	
knowledge	translation-based	interventions	rely	primarily	on	instrumental,	usually	
quantitative,	approaches,	these	have	also	been	criticised	because	essential	voices	
were	being	silenced	(Locock	et	al.,	2014;	Locock	et	al.,	2017;	Oborn,	2013).	
Numerous	studies	have	shown	that	linear-based	strategies	were	not	achieving	the	
goal	of	closing	the	knowledge	gap.	While	didactic	content	delivery	via	continuing	
professional	activities	could	influence	behaviour	(Olson	&	Tooman,	2012),	educational	
lectures	did	not	consistently	change	clinical	performance	that	brought	about	
improved	health	outcomes	(Forsetlund	et	al.,	2009;	Marinopoulos	et	al.,	2007).	
Similarly,	adherence	to	clinical	guidelines	was	disappointing	(Cabana	et	al.,	1999;	
Grimshaw	et	al.,	2004;	Gabbay	&	le	May,	2011).	As	a	result,	it	became	increasingly	
clear	that	the	context	of	research	use	could	not	remain	an	after-thought	in	the	
‘transfer’	or	‘translation’	of	knowledge.	Reality	on	the	ground	of	research	use	
rendered	the	‘transfer’	and	‘translation’	metaphors	insufficient	to	the	task	(Davies	et	
al.,	2008;	Kitson,	2009).	There	were	calls	for	a	wider	range	of	metaphors	and	models	
that	might	contribute	to	a	richer	understanding	of	the	link	between	knowledge	and	
practice	(Davies	et	al.,	2008;	Greenhalgh	&	Wieringa,	2011;	Regehr,	2010).	
2.4.2. Relational-Based	Views	
Relational	models	can	be	viewed	as	an	evolution	of	linear-based	models	(Best	&	
Holmes,	2010).	Within	this	perspective	the	knowledge	in	practice	problem	was	seen	to	
be	more	than	a	knowledge	deficit	issue:	it	was	reconceived	as	a	social	connectivity	
problem.	Relationship-based	strategies	for	knowledge	use	acknowledge	a	social	
foundation	for	knowing	and	focus	on	the	linkages	between	people.	Solutions	to	
knowledge	problems	are	found	by	bringing	knowledge	creators	(e.g.	researchers)	and	
knowledge	users	(policymakers	and	practitioners)	together.	The	weight	of	emphasis	
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shifted	from	crafting	explicit	content	to	facilitating	interactions	between	stakeholders.	
The	goal	was	to	build	relationships	such	that	mutuality	and	reciprocity	could	form,	
understanding	could	increase,	and	as	a	result	researchers	would	design	relevant	
studies	that	took	into	account	users’	needs	(Crilly	et	al.,	2010).	The	‘transfer’	
metaphor	altered	to	‘knowledge	exchange’	(Lomas,	2000),	which	was	reflected	in	the	
World	Health	Organization’s	(WHO,	2006)	updated	definition	of	knowledge	
translation:	“the	synthesis,	exchange,	and	application	of	knowledge	by	relevant	
stakeholders	to	accelerate	the	benefits	of	global	and	local	innovation	in	strengthening	
health	systems	and	improving	people’s	health”	(emphasis	added,	2006,	p.	2).		
Knowledge	use	strategies	and	models	based	on	a	divided	or	two	community	
understanding	of	the	knowledge	and	practice	problem	proliferated	(Oborn	et	al.,	
2010).	These	included	the	‘push’	and	‘pull’	strategies	associated	with	a	linear	
perspective	alongside	‘linkage	and	exchange’	models	for	specific	researcher-user	
partnerships,	and	the	incorporation	of	knowledge	intermediary	groups	that	enabled	
linkage	and	exchange	on	a	larger	scale	(Lavis	et	al.,	2006).	For	example,	the	Knowledge	
to	Action	framework	(Graham	et	al.,	2006)	and	Integrated	Knowledge	Translation	
(Kothari	&	Wathen,	2013)	emphasised	the	two-way	flow	of	knowledge	borne	out	of	
partnership	and	collaboration	(Oborn	et	al.,	2010;	Ward	et	al.,	2009).	Similarly,	Mitton	
et	al.	(2007)	defined	Knowledge	Transfer	and	Exchange	(KTE)	as	“an	interactive	
interchange	of	knowledge	between	research	users	and	researcher	producers	(Kiefer	
et	al.,	2005).	The	primary	purposes	of	KTE	are	to	increase	the	likelihood	that	research	
evidence	will	be	used	in	policy	and	practice	decisions	and	to	enable	researchers	to	
identify	practice	and	policy-relevant	research	questions”	(Mitton	et	al.,	2007,	p.	729).		
In	addition	to	a	focus	on	relational	connectivity,	what	changed	in	the	relational	
models	was	that	research	generation,	synthesis,	sharing,	implementation	and	use	was	
envisioned	as	an	integrated	social	activity,	and	part	of	an	ongoing	cyclical	partnership	
(Lomas,	2000).	Ongoing	relationships	between	the	research	and	use	communities	
were	the	foundation	of	knowledge	and	practice.	Relationally-based	strategies,	such	as	
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engaging	opinion	leaders	and	knowledge	brokers	to	form	knowledge-based	networks	
and	communities	of	practice,	help	knowledge	use	to	blossom	(Gagnon,	2011).	
Despite	some	enthusiasm	for	the	promise	of	relational	approaches	to	knowledge	
mobilisation,	there	remains	the	question	of	what,	precisely,	“is	this	knowledge	that	
we	seek	to	‘exchange’?”	(Greenhalgh,	2010,	p.	492).	Just	as	knowledge	translation	
includes	contradictory	stances	about	the	nature	of	knowledge	involved,	so	do	the	
relational	models.	Davis	(2006)	asserts	that	“Lomas’	model,	while	clearly	
comprehensive	and	holistic,	is	highly	linear”	(2006,	p.	9).	The	research	enterprise	may	
be	a	mutual,	engaged	and	social	process,	but	knowledge	often	remains	viewed	as	a	
(now	more	useable)	research	product	derived	by	one	constituency	and	used	by	
another.	
Indeed,	the	effectiveness	of	relational	strategies	remains	inconclusive.	Various	studies	
have	shown	promise	for	research	use,	but	barriers	continue	to	confound	this	promise	
and	measurable	outcomes	are	considered	either	inconclusive	or	sub-optimal	
(Gagliardi	&	Dobrow,	2016).	Fazey	and	colleagues	(2014)	questioned	whether	the	
chosen	methods	of	evaluating	effectiveness	were	suited	to	the	task	and	proposed	
instead	the	use	of	mixed	method	evaluations	to	assess	the	efficacy	of	knowledge	
exchange	work.	Their	reasoning	was	that	quantitative	methodology	is	not	useful	for	
identifying	a	multiplicity	of	factors	that	influence	the	complex	dynamics	of	context	or	
the	outcomes	of	the	interventions.		
2.4.3. Systems-Based	Views		
Systems	models	for	knowledge	use	include	elements	of	linear	and	relational	models,	
but	incorporate	these	with	an	appreciation	of	complexity	of	the	whole	system,	and	
tend	to	view	healthcare	as	a	complex	adaptive	system	(Best	&	Holmes,	2010;	Davies	et	
al.,	2015).	Complex	adaptive	systems	are	distinct	from	mechanical	systems.	They	
encompass	both	individuals	and	collectives	who	simultaneously	contribute	to	and	are	
affected	by	change	as	a	result	of	their	interconnections	(Crabtree	et	al.,	1998).	
“Complexity	is	not	simply	about	there	being	many	moving	parts:	it	is	about	what	
happens	when	these	parts	interact	in	ways	that	cannot	be	predicted	but	that	will	
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nonetheless	heavily	influence	or	shape	the	probabilities	of	later	events”	(Holmes	et	
al.,	2017,	p.	547).	Complex	adaptive	systems	are	viewed	as	a	self-organising	entity,	
and	the	influence	of	one	upon	another	is	not	predictable.	Thus	cause	and	effect	
relationships	are	difficult,	and	often	impossible,	to	observe	(Holden,	2005).	Examples	
of	complex	adaptive	systems	are	evident	throughout	the	natural	world	and	within	
“just	about	any	collection	of	humans”	(Plsek	&	Greenhalgh,	2001,	p.	625).		
Given	the	intractability	of	the	research	in	practice	problem,	there	is	a	growing	view	
that	the	qualities	of	complex	adaptive	systems	explain	the	impotence	of	linear	and	
even	solely	relational	models	for	bringing	about	desired	clinical	behaviours	(Holmes	et	
al.,	2017).	Echoing	this	sentiment,	Kitson	(2008)	states,	“The	(healthcare)	system	is	
best	viewed	as	a	complex,	interactive,	organic	entity	where	experimentation,	
experiential	learning	and	reflection	are	central	to	creating	a	culture	of	innovation,	
improvement	and	consequently	effectiveness”	(p.	220).	A	re-visioning	of	not	just	
knowledge	but	of	the	context	of	knowing	is	required.	
With	the	recognition	that	‘research	use’	does	not	adequately	capture	complexity,	a	
broader	term	of	‘knowledge	mobilisation’	has	been	proposed.	It	is	intended	to	convey	
complex	knowledges	within	and	between	the	research,	policy,	and	practice	
communities	(Davies	et	al.,	2015).	A	knowledge	mobilisation	frame	also	aims	to	
embrace	the	multiplicity	of	actors	and	groups	acting	within	a	complex	adaptive	
system.	Individuals,	teams,	organisations	and	wider	networks	are	nested	together	as	
multifaceted,	emergent,	and	interdependent	parts	of	a	system.	There	is	a	mutual	web	
of	interdependence	between	people	who	make	up	the	system,	and	the	system	
structures	themselves.	Within	the	web,	stakeholders	“selectively	interpret	and	use	
knowledge	as	it	serves	their	own	purposes,	fits	their	unique	situations,	and	reflects	
their	relations	with	their	practicing	community”	(Van	de	Ven	&	Johnson,	2006,	p.	804).	
With	this	perspective,	the	diffusion	process	is	better	understood	as	a	highly	complex,	
iterative,	contingent,	unpredictable,	and	social	process	where	clinicians	are	more	than	
users.	They	are	producers	and	creators	in	their	own	right	(Van	de	Ven	et	al.,	2008;	
Olson	et	al.,	2010).	Research-informed	evidence	does	not	simply	insert	or	supplant	
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previous	understanding,	but	is	more	aptly	depicted	as	entering	a	socially-based	
“mêlée”	(Gabbay	&	le	May,	2011).	
Of	theories,	models	and	frameworks	that	focus	on	knowledge	and	knowledge	use	and	
arguably	crossover	from	relational	to	system-based	views,	only	a	few	have	been	
tested	in	empirical	settings	(Davies	et	al.,	2015).	Two	such	frameworks	provide	
noteworthy	exceptions:	Promoting	Action	on	Research	Implementation	in	Health	
Services	(PARIHS)	framework	(Kitson	et	al.,	1998)	and	Knowledge	to	Action	framework	
(Graham	et	al.,	2006).	PARIHS	was	created	as	an	alternative	framework	to	linear	
models	that	did	not	adequately	account	for	contextual	aspects	of	implementing	
research	in	practice.	The	PARIHS	framework	proposed	that	successful	implementation	
resulted	from	the	intersection	of	strong	evidence,	effective	facilitation	and	contextual	
readiness	(Kitson	et	al.,	1998;	Harvey	&	Kitson,	2016).	The	framework	provided	
practical	planning	tools	that	could	be	used	in	the	design	and	implementation	phases	
of	bringing	research	into	practice.	However,	while	well	over	a	dozen	publications	used	
PARIHS	to	predict	and	explain	the	success	or	failure	of	implementation	efforts	(Davies	
et	al.,	2015;	Harvey	&	Kitson,	2016),	only	one	empirical	study	used	PARIHS	in	this	
fashion	(Rycroft-Malone	et	al.,	2013).	Rycroft-Malone	and	colleagues	(2013)	
concluded	that	the	framework	did	not	sufficiently	account	for	individual	agency	within	
the	implementation	process.	Harvey	and	Kitson	(2016)	have	responded	to	this	and	
other	critiques	and	offered	a	refined	version,	‘integrated’	PARIHS.	
The	Knowledge	to	Action	framework	worked	to	synthesise	over	30	knowledge	
translation-based	planned	action	theories	that	had	sprouted	in	the	literature	(Graham	
et	al.,	2006).	The	Knowledge	to	Action	framework	envisioned	two	distinct	yet	still	fluid	
aspects	of	translating	knowledge:	the	knowledge	creation	funnel	and	the	action	cycle.	
And	each	aspect	had	further	phases.	The	Knowledge	to	Action	framework	placed	a	
heavy	emphasis	on	the	involvement	of	end-users	throughout	the	knowledge	creation	
and	application	processes.		Both	PARIHS	and	Knowledge	to	Action	frameworks	sought	
to	address	the	deficiencies	of	linear	models	that	ignored	research	users	and	the	
complexities	of	context-based	factors	that	affected	the	implementation	of	research	in	
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practice.	But	a	common	criticism	of	these	frameworks	was	that	despite	the	attempt	to	
address	important	facets	of	using	research,	they	were	overly	complex	and	thereby	
difficult	to	operationalise	(Davies	et	al.,	2015).	
The	development	of	Clinical	Mindlines	theory	was	the	result	of	a	lengthy	empirical	
work.	Many	have	resonated	with	Gabbay	and	le	May’s	work,	especially	as	an	
explanatory	theory	of	professional	knowledge	(Wieringa	&	Greenhalgh,	2015;	
Greenhalgh	et	al.,	2016).	But	as	yet	only	one	study	has	employed	Mindlines	to	
conduct	empirical	work	(Cowdell,	2018).	Cowdell	(2018)	executed	an	ethnographic	
study	of	patients	and	carers	with	eczema	based	in	the	primary	care	setting	to	
investigate	if	and	how	mindlines	were	developed	by	lay	people.	Cowdell	found	that	
participants	took	varied	approaches	to	managing	their	eczema	and	as	a	result	differed	
in	their	information	needs.	Their	openness	to	interacting	more	with	the	practice	staff	
and	seeking	additional	sources	of	information	about	eczema,	which	could	potentially	
shape	their	thinking,	varied.	The	study	concluded	that	influencing	and	shaping	
individual	mindlines	remained	a	challenge.	
While	there	is	a	growing	move	to	embrace	a	systems	view	for	understanding	
knowledge	and	knowledge	use,	methods	have	not	yet	developed	that	align	to	the	
fresh	perspective	(Davies	et	al.,	2016;	Riley,	2012).	In	fact,	Davies	and	colleagues	
(2016)	observed	that	“there	are	many	key	aspects	of	a	systems	approach	to	
knowledge	that	have	not	yet	had	sufficient	attention,	including	the	nature	of	evidence	
and	knowledge,	the	role	of	leadership,	and	the	role	of	networks”	(p.	288).		
2.4.4. Implications	for	Conceptualising	Knowledge	Use	
The	foregoing	discussion	highlights	an	apparent	distinction	where	the	knowledge	and	
knowledge	use	theories,	models	and	frameworks	fall	into	two	camps.	On	one	side	are	
explanatory	theories	and	on	the	other	are	intervention-oriented	models.	Whereas	
some	theories	excel	at	capturing	complexity,	they	appear	unable	to	provide	clarity	for	
action.	And	models	that	provide	operational	action	plans	for	interventions	have	yet	to	
be	substantiated	for	reliably	reflecting	how	things	actually	work.	Greenhalgh	and	
Papoutsi	(2018)	identified	this	challenge.	They	said	that	while	recognition	of	
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complexity	has	grown	as	yet	no	one	seems	to	be	able	to	capitalise	on	this	
understanding	for	planning	purposes.	
Adopting	a	knowledge	mobilisation	frame	that	utilises	both	complex	knowledges	
(such	as	Clinical	Mindlines)	and	complex	adaptive	systems	perspectives	provides	
richer	explanations	for	the	research	use	problem.	It	explains	why	strategies	that	focus	
primarily	on	the	individual’s	use	of	explicit	materials	may	miss	the	interconnectedness	
of	knowledges	as	well	as	the	interconnectedness	of	knowers.	The	emergence	of	
relational	and,	more	recently,	systems-based	ways	to	support	knowledge	mobilisation	
have	the	potential	to	address	these	shortcomings.	Drawing	on	a	holistic	knowledge	
mobilisation	frame,	we	need	to	consider	how	interpersonal	interactions	influence	the	
relationship	between	knowing	and	doing	(Davies	et	al.,	2008,	2015).	
2.5. Conclusion	
These	literatures	highlight	the	tensions	between	differing	conceptualisations	of	
knowledge	and	the	importance	of	digging	beneath	the	often	unclear	knowledge	
terminology	to	uncover	the	philosophical	perspectives	that	provide	meaning.	The	
nature	of	knowledge	and	knowing	is	highly	contested	and,	in	health	contexts,	too	
often	entails	pitting	forms	of	knowledge	against	one	another.	These	contestations	are	
apparent	in	the	health	literatures	as	well.	EBM	often	gives	pre-eminence	to	explicit,	
scientific	forms	of	knowing.	Yet	the	influence	of	social	science	research,	drawing	on	an	
Aristotelian	conception	of	complementary	and	interpretive	knowledges,	has	
increased.	Concepts	such	as	Clinical	Mindlines	provide	a	useful	explanation	of	how	
science-informed	sources	can	work	in	tandem	and	productive	tension	with	
experience,	judgement	and	wisdom,	both	within	individuals	and	collectives.		
Such	conceptualisations	of	knowledge	and	knowing	directly	influence	the	ways	we	
structure	solutions	to	our	research	in	practice	problem.	Dependence	upon	linear-
based	strategies	for	getting	research	used	has	not	reliably	resulted	in	the	desired	
outcomes.	Relationship-based	strategies,	while	appearing	to	hold	promise,	are	
emergent,	take	time	and	are	often	ephemeral,	and	thus	difficult	to	measure	and	
demonstrate	efficacy	based	upon	scientific	methods.	This	has	led	some	health	services	
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scholars	in	recent	years	to	question	the	dominant	paradigm	of	knowledge	and	
knowledge	use	in	place,	and	turn	to	embrace	complex	adaptive	systems	as	a	more	
satisfying	explanation	for	the	‘wicked’	challenges	we	encounter	(Greenhalgh	&	
Papoutsi,	2018;	Holmes	et	al.,	2017;	Reed	et	al.,	2018).	
The	knowledge	mobilisation	frame	captures	the	interconnectedness	of	individuals	and	
communities	within	a	complex	adaptive	system	and	brings	to	the	fore	a	diversity	of	
socially-situated	knowledges.	Knowledge	mobilisation	builds	upon	the	social	nature	of	
knowledge	and	links	complex	knowledges	within	a	complex	set	of	interdependent	
knowers.	Yet,	as	Boaz	and	colleagues	said,	“evidence	for	‘what	works’	in	knowledge	
mobilisation	remains	patchy”	(2015,	p.	146).	We	have	only	begun	to	draw	upon	the	
knowledge	mobilisation	frame	in	order	to	better	understand	the	implications	for	
developing,	sharing	and	using	of	our	individual	and	collective	knowledges.	This	thesis	
contributes	to	understanding	how	interactions	between	actors	can	facilitate	
knowledge	mobilisation	throughout	the	health	system.		
As	a	result	of	traversing	these	literatures	on	different	types	of	knowledge	and	
knowledge	use	strategies,	and	reflecting	on	how	these	literatures	shape	this	study	of	
interconnected	networks,	a	further	refinement	of	the	research	question	has	emerged.	
Based	on	a	view	of	knowledge	that	involves	a	dynamic	interplay	between	different	
forms	of	knowledge	(from	Clinical	Mindlines)	a	further	sub-research	question	is:	
Sub-RQ	1:	What	are	the	sources,	forms	and	ways	of	knowing	involved	in	mobilising	
research-based	knowledge	in	practice?	
Finally,	this	chapter	has	exposed	the	importance	of	articulating	assumptions	about	the	
nature	of	knowledge	because	depending	on	how	knowledge	is	conceptualised	impacts	
our	understanding	of	how	knowledge	is	used.	Relatedly,	conceptualisations	about	
knowledge	and	knowledge	use	shapes	the	ways	health	organisations	and	systems	
organise	for	mobilising	such	knowledge.	If	knowledge	and	knowing	are	indeed	social	
processes,	then	a	deeper	examination	of	the	social	interactions	between	actors,	
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within	teams	and	across	networks	is	warranted.	Thus,	the	next	chapter	turns	to	
examine	some	common	ways	of	organising	for	knowledge	mobilisation.		
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3. Chapter	3—Organising	for	Knowledge	Mobilisation:	Teams	and	
Networks	
Effective	knowledge	utilization	requires	a	degree	of	division	of	labor,	coordination	and	
collaboration	throughout	the	social	system	
(Ronald	Havelock)	
3.1. Introduction	
From	the	early	days	of	research	utilisation	studies	scholars	recognised	that	
knowledge-based	work	was	social	and	collective	in	nature	(Berger	&	Luckman,	1966;	
Havelock,	1969).	Subsequent	work	around	the	creation,	diffusion	and	utilisation	of	
knowledge	further	emphasised	that	knowing	is	a	process	set	within	a	social	context	
(Brown	&	Duguid,	2001;	Gabbay	&	le	May,	2011;	Nonaka	et	al.	2008;	Nutley	et	al.,	
2007).	More	recently,	Kitson	et	al.	(2018)	claimed	that	“the	growing	
acknowledgement	of	the	inherent	complexity	in	[knowledge	mobilisation]	…	includes	
recognising	the	important	role	of	actors,	relationships	and	networks,	in	order	to	
actively	mobilize	knowledge”	(Kitson	et	al.,	2018,	p.	231).		
The	previous	chapter	considered	varying	conceptualisations	of	knowledge	and	how	
these	views	influence	strategies	for	fostering	knowledge	use.	The	purpose	of	this	
chapter	is	to	explore	and	problematize	some	of	the	prevalent	social	structures	used	in	
health	services	to	organise	many	actors’	knowledge	for	patient	care.	Specifically,	this	
chapter	considers	the	structural	arrangements	of	actors	and	how	these	structures	are	
often	predicated	upon	underlying	assumptions	about	how	knowledge	is	mobilised.	
The	chapter	is	divided	into	two	sections.	The	first	section	considers	how	teams	have	
been	a	dominant	approach	for	drawing	together	dispersed	actors	and	their	divergent	
forms	of	knowledge.	The	second	section	turns	to	the	network	literature	to	consider	
how	networks	have	been	seen	as	a	way	of	conceptualising	and	analysing	knowledge	
within	and	between	organisations.	The	second	section	also	presents	Soft	Knowledge	
Systems	(Engel,	1997),	a	network-based	lens	for	understanding	knowledge	systems.	It	
is	used	in	this	study	(in	conjunction	with	Clinical	Mindlines)	to	examine	how	actors	in	
the	sepsis	research,	policy	and	practice	networks	organised	to	address	their	
knowledge	mobilisation	problem.	This	chapter	is	principally	concerned	with	the	
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structural	configurations	of	actors	because	they	reveal	assumptions	about	how	health	
services	and	the	surrounding	architecture	are	set	up	to	mobilise	knowledge.		
3.2. Organising	for	Knowledge	Mobilisation:	Teams	
The	first	section	considers	literature	on	teams	and	how	they	provide	a	structural	
approach	for	mobilising	knowledge.	The	content	is	covered	in	five	steps.	Firstly,	the	
section	explains	the	dependence	on	teams	in	health	systems	as	a	way	of	organising	
knowledge	for	the	provision	of	care.	Then	the	section	considers	in	turn	three	common	
team	structures	utilised	for	mobilising	sepsis	knowledge:	multidisciplinary	teams,	
rapid	response	teams,	and	critical	care	outreach	teams.	These	different	team	
structures	illustrate	assumptions	(often	implicit)	that	underpin	these	arrangements	of	
actors.	Finally,	the	section	explores	the	problem	of	relying	upon	teams	to	address	
social	and	epistemic	boundaries	in	order	to	mobilise	knowledge.		
3.2.1. Teams	in	Healthcare	
Teams	dominate	the	organisation	of	professional	work	(Edmondson	et	al.,	2007;	
Waring	&	Currie,	2009).	In	the	healthcare	sector,	as	in	most	professional	contexts,	
teams	are	the	essential	unit	for	accomplishing	organisational	goals	(Janhonen,	2011;	
Olson	et	al,	2010).	Especially	in	health	services	rarely	can	one	person	or	profession	
know	and	deliver	the	spectrum	of	care	required,	and	thus	a	team	is	considered	the	
smallest	unit	that	holds	the	requisite	knowledge	and	resources	to	accomplish	the	
provision	of	care	(Ferlie	&	Shortell,	2001).		
The	NHS	has	capitalised	on	teams	as	a	primary	strategy	for	managing	complexity	and	
providing	efficient,	high	quality	care	(Bleakley,	2014;	Fleissig	et	al.,	2006).	For	
example,	various	studies	have	shown	that	teams	can	reduce	the	length	of	
hospitalisation,	medical	errors	and	related	costs,	and	can	increase	patient	safety	and	
staff	satisfaction	(Borrill	et	al.,	2000;	West	&	Lyubovnikova,	2013).	Teams	both	know	
and	can	accomplish	what	individuals	alone	cannot,	and	as	a	result,	the	majority	of	
care	is	delivered	by	teams	(West	&	Lyubovnikova,	2013;	West	&	Markiewicz,	2016).		
There	is	broad	consensus	that	teams	are	social	entities,	composed	of	multiple	actors	
who	have	a	level	of	task	interdependency	for	accomplishing	shared	objectives	
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(Ghebrehiwet	et	al.,	2016;	Hollenbeck	et	al.,	2012;	Salas	et	al.,	2008;	West	&	
Markiewicz,	2016).	Mohrman	and	colleagues	(1995)	expand	the	definition	of	a	team,	
defining	it	as,		
[A]	group	of	individuals	who	work	together	to	produce	products	or	
deliver	services	for	which	they	are	mutually	accountable…they	are	
interdependent	in	their	accomplishment,	and	they	affect	the	results	
through	their	interactions	with	one	another.	Because	the	team	is	held	
collectively	accountable,	the	work	of	integrating	with	one	another	is	
included	among	the	responsibilities	of	each	member	(Mohrman	et	al.,	
1995,	in	Borrill	et	al.,	2000,	p.	2).	
In	addition	to	team	members	depending	upon	one	another	to	accomplish	their	
responsibilities,	Mohrman	et	al.	propose	that	a	level	of	interaction-based	integration	
is	needed	in	the	process.	Rather	than	an	aggregate	of	individuals,	teams	are	groups	of	
people		negotiating	and	coordinating	with	one	another,	to	varying	degrees	of	success,	
in	order	to	meet	their	collective	goals	(Gorski,	2013).		
The	distinction	between	definitions	is	key	to	understanding	the	implications	for	
mobilising	knowledge.	With	the	initial,	basic	definition,	the	team	structure	contains	
the	actors	needed	to	carry	out	their	knowledge-dependent	roles.	In	other	words,	
teams	are	organisational	structures	that	overcome	spatial	separations	(i.e.	geographic	
boundaries)	and	connect	the	different	knowledge	bases	(i.e.	epistemic	boundaries)	
needed	for	undertaking	a	task.	
In	the	second	(Mohrman	et	al.’s)	definition,	a	team	is	more	than	a	collection	of	actors	
but	a	matter	of	interdependent	team	functioning.	At	stake	is	whether	they	are	able	to	
coordinate	and	cooperate	(or	not)	to	perform	as	a	collective	unit.	Van	der	Haar	et	al.	
(2013)	agreed,	saying	that	teamwork	was	“a	set	of	interrelated	thoughts,	actions	and	
feelings	of	each	individual	team	member	that	are	needed	if	the	team	is	to	really	
function	as	a	team”	(2013,	p.	2).	Collective	functioning	is	different	than	individuals	
functioning	in	the	same	location.	Competent	individuals	can	combine	with	other	
competent	individuals	and	create	an	incompetent	team	(Lingard,	2012).	Teams	are	
more	than	structural	units	that	address	proximity	issues	and	the	division	of	
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knowledge-based	roles;	they	are	social	units	set	within	complex	contexts	(Lingard	et	
al.,	2012;	West	&	Lyubovnikova,	2013).		
Unfortunately,	the	health	literature	does	not	reflect	the	complex	social	dimensions	of	
teamwork	particularly	well	(Greenhalgh	&	Papoutsi,	2108;	Lingard	et	al.,	2012;	Reed	et	
al.,	2018).	Borrill	and	colleagues	(2000)	studied	healthcare	team	effectiveness	in	400	
teams	across	the	UK,	involving	over	7000	NHS	staff	and	clients.	They	said	that	
“approaches	to	understanding	teams	at	work	have	been	dominated	by	the	input-
process-output	structure,	mainly	because	of	its	categorical	simplicity	and	utility”	
(Borrill	et	al.,	2000,	p.	32).	The	study	found	that	positive	qualities	of	team-working	
were	related	to	effectiveness	and	recommended	establishing	conditions	for	effective	
team	work.	One	example	was	that	“individuals	should	feel	that	they	are	important	to	
the	success	of	the	team.	When	individuals	feel	that	their	work	is	not	essential	in	a	
team,	they	are	less	likely	to	work	effectively	with	others	or	to	make	strong	
efforts…Roles	should	be	developed	in	ways	which	make	them	indispensable	and	
essential”	(Borrill	et	al,	2000,	p.	239).	The	report	concluded	that	“revolutionary	
organisational	change”	(p.	10)	throughout	the	NHS	was	necessary	to	take	advantage	
of	benefits	that	a	team-based	structure	could	provide.	To	accomplish	this,	the	health	
system	needed	to	facilitate	team	working	by	training	managers	and	staff	on	team	
working.	However,	descriptive	guidance	of	how	to	help	nurture	belonging	and	
importance	in	team	members	was	lacking.	
Lemieux-Charles	and	McGuire’s	(2006)	review	of	33	studies	of	healthcare	team	
effectiveness	used	similar	groupings:	team	design	(inputs),	processes,	and	
effectiveness	(outputs),	where	effectiveness	was	assessed	based	on	variations	in	
inputs	and	processes.	These	authors	found	that	the	most	common	method	for	
measuring	effectiveness	was	the	randomised	controlled	trial,	which	compared	teams	
and	usual	(non-team)	structures.	The	variables	associated	with	team	effectiveness	
were:	context,	task	features,	team	composition,	team	processes,	and	traits.	
Furthermore,	Lemieux-Charles	and	McGuire	highlighted	that	building	team	
effectiveness	through	collaborative	processes	involved	a	high	level	of	participation	by	
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members	and	a	high	degree	of	conflict	resolution	to	help	facilitate	group	
cohesiveness.	In	other	words,	these	findings	speak	of	social	boundaries,	yet	specific	
ways	that	teams	might	encourage	participation	and	resolve	conflict	in	order	to	build	
cohesive	relationships	were	unspecified.	
Furthermore,	a	large	segment	of	the	literature	casts	the	nature	of	team	knowledge	in	
product-orientated	terms.	Some	examples	are:	teams	“transferring	knowledge”	
(Janhonen,	2011),	teams	as	“information-processing	units”	that	“encode,	store	and	
retrieve	information”	(Henttonen,	2010,	p.	75);	as	well	as	the	“science	of	teams”	
(Gillam	&	Siriwardena,	2013;	Salas	et	al.,	2008)	that	begin	with	hypotheses	and	then	
seek	out	replicable	cause	and	effect	factors.	In	this	perspective,	teams	and	team-
working	are	separated	from	messy,	emergent,	real-life	contexts.	
The	omission	of	descriptive	interactions	that	help	resolve	conflict	and	generate	
cohesion	and	belonging	in	these	literatures	are	the	result	of	limited	study	methods	
(Lingard	et	al.,	2012).	There	are	few	studies	that	use	observational	methods	to	
capture	teams	in	their	workday.	“Direct	observation	of	collaborative	practice	in	
everyday	work	settings	holds	promise	as	a	method	to	better	understand	and	
articulate	the	complex	phenomena	of	interprofessional	collaboration,	yet	only	a	small	
number	of	studies	to	date	have	attempted	to	directly	observe	such	practice”	(Morgan	
et	al.,	2015,	p.	1217).		
Where	observational	methods	have	been	used,	they	tend	to	be	narrowed	to	one	
locale	and	unit	of	analysis,	rather	than	conceptualising	teams	as	nested	within	wider	
organisational	and	inter-organisational	social	structures.		Examples	of	these	locales	
include	operating	theatres	(Edmondson,	2003;	Lingard	et	al.,	2004),	intensive	care	
units	(Alexanian	et	al.,	2015;	Pronovost	&	Berenholtz,	2003;	Tucker	et	al.,	2007),	
cancer	units	(Fleissig	et	al.,	2006;	Jain	et	al.,	2016;	Oborn	&	Dawson,	2010)	and	
primary	care	settings	(Iliffe,	2008;	Sargeant	et	al.,	2008;	Solheim	et	al.,	2007;	Xyrichis	
&	Lowton,	2008).	As	a	result,	these		
	[L]ocalised	studies	of	teamwork	fail	to	reflect	the	highly	permeable	
inter-	and	intra-disciplinary	boundaries	between…health	care	
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providers…[and	they]	strip	away	the	richest	aspect	of	a	specific	story:	
the	meaningful	sense	of	human	interaction	derived	from	consideration	
of	the	inter-relationships	among	a	series	of	activities	accumulating	over	
time	and	space	(Lingard	et	al.,	2012,	p.	870).	
Nevertheless,	these	studies	provide	useful	insights	on	team	interactions.	For	example,	
Edmondson	(1999)	found	that	psychological	safety,	or	the	degree	to	which	team	
members	feel	safe	taking	interpersonal	risks,	is	associated	with	team	effectiveness.	
Other	work	found	that	higher	levels	of	psychological	safety	contributed	to	knowledge	
sharing	within	teams	(Kessel	et	al.,	2012).	Alexanian	et	al.’s	(2015)	ethnographic	study	
of	intensive	care	units	found	that	teamwork	involved	collaborative	decision-making,	
team	coordination,	communication,	trust,	and	a	lack	of	conflict.		
In	an	overview	of	team	functioning	studies	over	the	course	of	two	decades,	
Edmondson	(2012)	identified	four	social	behaviours	that	exemplified	effective	team	
working:	the	ability	for	all	team	members	to	speak	honestly;	a	collaborative	mindset	
characterised	by	mutual	respect	in	the	process	of	meeting	shared	goals;	a	tentative	
and	experimental	approach	where	mistakes	are	expected;	and	regular	communication	
amongst	team	members	that	solicits	critical	reflection.	Yet,	Edmondson	recognised	
that	high-pressured	environments,	such	as	hospitals,	are	not	readily	conducive	to	
creating	these	socially	safe	environments.	Instead,	hospital	teams	face	“social	and	
cognitive	barriers	to	teaming”	(Edmondson,	2012,	p.	60).	In	other	words,	social	and	
epistemic	boundaries	inhibit	productive	teamwork	and	thereby	constrains	knowledge	
sharing.	
A	further	deficiency	of	most	empirical	studies	of	teams	is	that	they	lack	a	theoretical	
grounding	(Lingard	et	al.,	2012;	Olson	et	al.,	2010).	Absent	a	theoretical	anchor,	
research	findings	remain	detached	from	one	another.	Thus	they	limit	the	contribution	
they	can	make	to	creating	robust	empirical	support	that	is	tethered	to	theoretical	
explanations	(see,	for	example,	Broom	&	Broom,	2018).	
In	sum,	this	section	has	shown	that	health	systems	are	dependent	upon	teams.	
Moreover,	there	are	differing	views	around	whether	a	team	is	merely	a	name	given	to	
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a	composite	of	actors,	or	if	instead	teams	are	integrated	in	their	functioning	where	
team	functioning	occurs	in	social	interactional	processes.	But	much	of	the	empirical	
literature	lacks	a	theoretically-linked	understanding	of	how	teams	work	together	in	
order	to	mobilise	knowledge.	Furthermore,	healthcare	team	structures	are	predicated	
upon	different	assumptions	about	what	knowledge	is	and	thereby	how	knowledge	
mobilises.	To	illustrate	some	assumptions	that	underpin	team	structures,	this	section	
now	turns	to	consider	and	analyse	the	literature	from	three	team	structures	
commonly	used	to	manage	sepsis	care:	multidisciplinary	teams	(MDTs),	rapid	
response	teams	(RRTs),	and	critical	care	outreach	teams	(CCOTs).	
3.2.2. Multidisciplinary	Teams	
Multidisciplinary	healthcare	teams	(MDTs)	can	be	differentiated	from	broadly	defined	
teams	in	that	they	are	made	up	of	a	collection	of	members	representing	diverse	
health	care	occupational	areas,	including	medical,	nursing,	allied	health	and,	at	times,	
social	care	professionals	(Solheim	et	al.,	2007).	The	organisational	goal	of	building	
multidisciplinary	team	structures	was	to	capitalise	on	the	synergy	of	bringing	together	
actors	from	diverse,	specialised	areas	of	knowing,	with	a	variety	of	skills	and	
perspectives,	but	with	a	shared	objective	(Ghebrehiwet	et	al.,	2016;	Oborn	&	Dawson,	
2010).	The	diversity	of	knowledge	was	linked	to	the	individual	member’s	roles	and	
responsibilities	in	respect	to	care	provision.	As	in	the	general	literature	on	teams	
above,	literature	on	MDTs	displays	tension	over	whether	they	are	teams	in	name	or	in	
function	(Jessup,	2007;	Madge	&	Khair,	2000).	
The	formation	of	multidisciplinary	teams	has	been	encouraged	for	many	decades,	and	
they	are	now	found	throughout	acute,	primary,	and	public	health	settings	(Fleissig	et	
al.,	2006;	Iliffe,	2008).	MDTs	share	a	patient	population	and	are	often	located	in	an	
area	dedicated	to	their	disciplinary	expertise,	for	example,	breast	cancer,	cardiac	
intensive	care,	and	accident	and	emergency.	Multidisciplinary	teams	are	predicated	
upon	the	assumption	that	assembling	the	relevant	professions	together	will	
unproblematically	result	in	shared	knowing	and	knowledge	use	(Oborn	&	Dawson,	
2010;	Sargeant	et	al.,	2008).	In	other	words,	the	assumption	is	that	teams	who	occupy	
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the	same	physical	space,	and	have	shared	responsibilities	for	patients,	will	
collaborate.		
However,	outcomes	from	MDTs	are	mixed	(Bleakly,	2014;	Ghebrehiwet	et	al,	2016;	
West	&	Lyubovnikova,	2013).	Various	studies	point	to	difficult	relationships	between	
professional	groups	as	the	reason.	Powell	and	Davies’s	(2012)	study	of	acute	pain	
services	found	that	boundaries	between	professions	“make	inter-professional	
communication,	collaboration	and	teamwork	more	challenging	and	can	jeopardise	the	
provision	of	safe,	high	quality	patient	care”	(p.	807).	Similarly,	Oborn	and	Dawson’s	
(2010)	work	examining	urological	cancer	care	teams	found	that	tensions	between	
professional	groups	undermined	patient	care.	In	this	case	study,	medical	team	
members’	forms	of	knowledge	were	privileged	over	the	nursing	staff’s	areas	of	
expertise,	and	the	privileging	of	some	actors’	knowledge	“then	becomes	embedded	in	
the	practices	of	the	group”	(Oborn	&	Dawson,	2010,	p.	1835).	Again,	Alexanian	et	al.	
(2015)	found	that	professional	and	epistemological	hierarchies	amongst	health	care	
professional	cultures	set	doctors,	nurses,	and	other	allied	health	professionals	apart	
and	thereby	impeded	interprofessional	collaboration.	Nurses,	pharmacists,	and	
dieticians,	etc.,	tolerated	and	thereby	supported	medical	dominance,	giving	deference	
to	doctors	rather	than	insisting	on	a	shared	decision-making	process.	
Within	the	critical	care	setting,	where	specialists	in	sepsis	care	are	often	located,	the	
divisions	between	doctors	and	nurses	existed	as	well	(Stein-Parbury	&	Liaschenko,	
2007).	Stein-Parbury	and	Liaschenko	(2007)	pointed	out	that	reliance	on	different	
forms	of	knowledge	was	most	evident	during	times	of	crisis.	In	these	times,	nurses’	
“patient	knowledge”	(p.	472)	was	diminished	in	favour	of	doctors’	scientific	
knowledge.	“Collaboration	broke	down	when	physicians	dismissed	nurses’	clinical	
assessment	and	concerns	about	a	patient	because	the	nurses’	contributions	did	not	fit	
into	a	schema	of	case	knowledge”	(Stein-Parbury	&	Liaschenko,	2007,	p.	475).	
Nor	are	the	communication	patterns	better	between	physicians	and	nurses	on	the	
general	wards.	Zwarenstein	et	al.’s	(2013)	study	of	professional	interactions	in	this	
context	found	that	unscheduled	communication	between	medics	and	nurses	was	very	
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low.	Nurses	rarely	offered	unsolicited	input	even	in	scheduled	interchanges.	
Furthermore,	it	was	not	uncommon	for	doctors	to	disregard	and	completely	ignore	
nurse-initiated	contact.	“No	particular	planning	with	regards	to	effective	
interprofessional	collaboration	and	communication	had	gone…beyond	the	act	of	
bringing	different	health	professionals	together.	Consequently,	there	did	not	seem	to	
be	a	clear	idea	of	how	effective	collaboration	would	be	achieved”	(Zwarenstein	et	al.,	
2013,	p.	4).	
Thus,	the	dominance	of	medical	power	in	multi-professional	teams	influences	the	
interactions	between	team	members	(Hall,	2005;	Zwarenstein	et	al.,	2013).	But	the	
hierarchies	within	medical	specialisations	(intra-professional	boundaries)	similarly	
affect	team	interactions	(Ferlie	et	al.,	2005;	Oborn	&	Dawson,	2010;	Powell	&	Davies,	
2012).	Multidisciplinary	teams	are	rife	with	social	and	epistemic	boundaries,	and	thus	
too	often	fail	to	fulfil	the	organisational	hope	that	structures	bringing	diverse	
knowledge	and	shared	responsibilities	together	will	improve	patient	care	(Ferlie	et	al.,	
2005;	Iliffe,	2008;	Sargeant	et	al.,	2008).		
3.2.3. Rapid	Response	Teams	
Rapid	Response	Teams	(RRTs)	are	comprised	of	doctors	and	nurses	that	specialise	in	
critical	care	within	acute	care	hospitals	(Kitto	et	al.,	2015).	They	respond	to	calls	from	
(most	often)	nurses	on	general	medical	and	surgical	wards	when	a	patient	has	signs	of	
being	severely	unwell.	A	trained	critical	care	nurse	provides	the	first	response	and	
assesses	the	patient’s	condition.	If	the	specialist	nurse	deems	that	the	situation	
requires	immediate	intervention,	the	rest	of	this	specialist	team	will	tend	to	the	
patient	until	they	are	stabilised	(Danesh,	2015).	Medical	Emergency	Teams	are	largely	
based	on	the	same	model	except	that	a	physician	will	be	the	first	specialist	
professional	to	respond	to	the	alert	by	ward	staff	(Danesh,	2015).	
As	a	knowledge	mobilisation	strategy,	Rapid	Response	Teams	are	both	similar	and	
different	to	multidisciplinary	teams.	RRTs	were	a	response	to	growing	awareness	of	
patient	safety	problems	on	general	medical	and	surgical	wards	(Kitto	et	al.,	2015).	
They	are	similar	to	multidisciplinary	teams	in	that	they	are	multi-professional	and	tend	
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to	be	focused	on	particular	clinical	specialisations.	However,	they	provide	their	
specialist	knowledges	and	experience	on	an	as-needed	basis	and	are	not	regularly	
resident	within	the	unit	where	their	services	are	sometimes	used.	They	are	an	
organisational	system-based	way	of	shoring	up	knowledge	and	skills	of	ward-based	
staff.		
In	a	case	study	of	four	Australian	hospitals,	Kitto	and	colleagues	(2015)	are	critical	of	
Rapid	Response	Teams	(RRTs)	as	a	systems-based	response	to	the	deficiencies	of	ward	
staff	knowledge.	They	point	out	that	bringing	in	outside	expertise	is	not	a	proper	
solution,	but	a	work-around	that	does	not	address	the	social,	professional,	and	
cultural	boundaries	that	result	in	the	breakdown	of	collaboration.	Rather	than	
building	interprofessional	collaboration,	RRTs	leave	the	knowledge-based	
inadequacies	in	place	and	skirt	the	more	challenging	issues,	which	are	to	address	
barriers	between	professions.	In	other	words,	RRTs	respond	to	crises,	while	both	they	
and	their	knowledge	remain	segregated.	
With	the	implementation	of	Rapid	Response	Teams	over	the	last	decade,	questions	
have	been	raised	about	their	effectiveness	in	reducing	cardiopulmonary	arrests	rates	
and	mortality	within	hospitals	(outside	the	intensive	care	unit)	(Chan	et	al.,	2010).	
Chan	et	al.’s	(2008)	large	single	site	study	comparing	before	and	after	an	RRT	was	
implemented	found	no	change	in	either	rate	at	the	institution.	A	further	systematic	
review	based	on	17	publications	in	the	critical	care	literature	gave	a	mixed	picture	of	
RRT	effectiveness	related	to	patient	outcomes	(Chan	et	al.,	2010).	Comparatively,	
Solomon	et	al.’s	(2016)	systematic	review	and	meta-analysis	found	a	significant	
decrease	in	the	relative	risk	of	cardiac	arrest	(62%)	and	mortality	(88%)	tied	to	Rapid	
Response	Teams.	However,	these	potentially	positive	outcomes	(found,	for	example,	
in	Solomon	et	al.’s	work)	linked	to	RRT	structures	do	not	address	the	problem	of	ward	
staff	building	knowledge-based	skills	to	proactively	identify	patients	in	decline	rather	
than	await	severe	indicators	(Denesh,	2015).	RRTs	do	not	help	build	local	knowledge	
and	skills,	or	encourage	collaborative	capacity	of	the	ward	staff	(Denesh,	2015;	Kitto	
et	al.,	2015).	The	epistemic	and	social	boundaries	remain	in	place.	
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3.2.4. Critical	Care	Outreach	Teams	
Critical	Care	Outreach	Teams	(CCOTs)	provide	a	further	example	of	a	structural	
response	to	general	ward	staff’s	knowledge	and	skills	deficiencies	for	identifying	or	
treating	deteriorating	patients	(Danesh,	2015).	Following	a	Comprehensive	Critical	
Care	report	(Department	of	Health,	2001),	NHS	England	and	Wales	invested	in	funding	
Critical	Care	Outreach	services	in	hospitals	in	order	to:	(a)	detect	deteriorating	
patients	earlier	and	minimise	unplanned	admissions	to	ICUs;	(b)	provide	ongoing	
support	for	ward	staff	when	patients	were	discharged	from	ICUs	to	generalist	wards;	
and	in	the	process	(c)	share	their	critical	care	knowledge	and	skills	with	ward	staff	
(Department	of	Health,	2001;	Baker-McClearn	&	Carmel,	2008).	
Outreach	teams	are	made	up	of	experienced	Intensive	Care	Unit	(ICU)	nurses.	These	
nurses	share	a	common	professional	background,	training,	experience,	and	specialist	
knowledge.	A	further	difference	to	the	RRT	model	is	that	CCOTs	provide	continuous	
support	and	advice	to	the	ward	staff,	with	a	particular	focus	on	high-risk	patients,	as	
opposed	to	temporary	crisis	response.	In	other	words,	outreach	teams	regularly	spend	
time	on	the	wards,	they	are	proactive	in	their	surveillance	of	patients,	and	they	share	
their	abilities	to	provide	training	and	support	to	the	existing	staff.		
The	Critical	Care	Outreach	Team	model	is	based	on	the	premise	that	general	ward	
staff	have	less	experience	with	an	extremely	ill	patient	population.	Thus,	they	do	not	
have	the	opportunity	to	build	and	sustain	the	kinds	of	knowledge	and	skills	that	a	
trained	intensive	care	nurse	would	have.	An	outreach	service,	often	referred	to	as	
“critical	care	without	walls”	(Baker-McClearn	&	Carmel,	2008),	is	intended	to	
overcome	hospital	organisational	unit	boundaries	and	expose	ward	staff	to	critical	
care	expertise.	Thus,	CCOTs	address	both	geographic	and	epistemic	boundaries	
between	actors.		
And	yet,	the	effectiveness	of	CCOTs	has	also	been	largely	mixed	(Ball	et	al.,	2003;	
Esmonde	et	al.,	2006;	Gao	et	al.,	2007;	McGaughey	et	al.,	2007).	Two	systematic	
reviews	found	inconclusive	evidence	for	the	outcomes	of	Outreach	services,	noted	the	
deficit	of	methodologically	rigorous	studies,	and	called	for	further	work	(Esmonde	et	
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al.,	2006;	McGaughey	et	al.,	2007).	Gao	and	colleagues’	(2007)	examination	of	NHS	
England’s	hospital	admissions	and	outcomes	data	found	that	some	indicators	were	
improved	(e.g.	the	number	of	patients	requiring	cardiopulmonary	resuscitation)	but	a	
decrease	in	mortality	rates	was	not	statistically	significant.		
By	comparison,	Baker-McClearn	and	Carmel’s	(2008)	qualitative	study	of	critical	care	
outreach	services	presented	a	more	promising	picture.	Based	on	100	interviews	at	8	
hospitals	in	England	that	had	taken	advantage	of	the	funding	offered	in	2001,	they	
found	two	main	impacts	resulted	from	CCOTs.	The	first	was	a	positive	impact	on	the	
organisation	of	patient	care.	Participants	reported	that	they	perceived	patients	
received	more	timely	care,	overcame	communication	barriers	between	the	ward-
based	staff	(i.e.	medics	and	nurses).	Secondly,	intensive	care	specialists	said	that	they	
could	discharge	their	patients	onto	wards	with	greater	confidence	as	the	specialist	
outreach	nurses	would	be	able	to	keep	watch	over	these	patients	still	at	higher	risk	for	
problems.	Finally,	with	the	outreach	team	in	place,	there	were	fewer	admissions	into	
the	intensive	care	units.	This	meant	that	the	presence	of	the	outreach	team	did	
indeed	provide	timely	care	that	helped	catch	patients	before	they	required	intensive	
levels	of	care.		
The	second	impact	focused	on	the	confidence	levels	and	skills	of	the	ward-based	
nursing	staff	and	junior	doctors.	The	participants	reported	that	contact	with	specialist	
outreach	nurses	within	their	own	work	area	brought	more	opportunities	to	learn	and	
increase	their	skills.	Some	nurses	expressed	concerns	about	the	financial	sustainability	
of	the	outreach	model,	and,	more	specifically,	worried	about	the	impact	of	losing	the	
regular	support	that	outreach	provided.	Relatedly,	a	few	medics	noted	that	the	
outreach	service	decreased	critical	incidents	on	the	wards,	which	in	turn	brought	
about	fewer	opportunities	for	junior	doctors	to	learn	key	resuscitation	skills.	The	
potential	over-reliance	of	ward	nurses	and	de-skilling	of	junior	doctors	based	on	
outreach	was	seen	as	a	tension	that	had,	overall,	favourable	results	as	patients	had	
received	safer	care.	
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Thus	a	critical	care	outreach	structure	addresses	the	geographic	separation	of	ICU	
knowledge	by	bringing	specialists	into	the	generalist	ward	areas.	This	contact	provided	
opportunities	for	learning.	And,	as	outreach	teams	are	most	often	staffed	by	nurses,	
professional	boundaries	are	potentially	minimised	within	the	team	itself	and	between	
the	team	and	the	ward	nurses.	Additionally,	qualitative	research	has	shown	some	
benefits	for	patients	and	less-experienced	practitioners	from	the	deployment	of	
outreach	teams.	In	some	hospitals,	outreach	units	aided	communication	between	
doctors	and	nurses,	and	specialist	medics	were	reassured	when	discharging	their	
patients	from	the	ICU	to	the	ward.	However,	these	data	do	not	explain	how	the	
outreach	teams	overcame	social	boundaries	between	actors.	Further	work	is	needed	
to	understand	the	relational	dynamics	that	underpin	effective	knowledge	
mobilisation.	
3.2.5. Teams	Section	Conclusion	
This	section	has	shown	that	team	structures	carry	with	them	implicit	assumptions	
about	how	knowledge	is	mobilised.	Within	health	services,	a	division	of	knowledge	
and	labour	is	inescapable.	Yet	the	literature	above	illustrated	that	the	difference	
between	intended	and	actual	interdependency	between	team	members	often	
remains	unrealised.	Tensions	between	team	members	were	common.	These	tensions	
impeded	the	mobilisation	of	knowledge	(Ferlie	et	al.,	2005;	Oborn	&	Dawson,	2010).	
Social	and	epistemic	boundaries	and	related	power	differentials	inhibited	the	flow	and	
knowledge	between	actors	(Ghebrehiwet	et	al.,	2016;	Oborn	&	Dawson,	2010).		
In	conclusion,	each	team	member	has	a	share	of	partial	knowledge	that	stands	
incomplete	on	its	own	(Brown	&	Duguid,	1998).	Different	forms	of	knowledge	and	the	
diversity	of	actors	that	hold	their	knowledge	must	be	woven	together	for	effective	
knowledge	mobilisation	(Nicolini	et	al.,	2008).	Knowledge	mobilisation	breaks	down	at	
both	the	epistemic	and	social	boundaries.	This	has	left	some	scholars	urging	a	shift	of	
focus	to	the	relational	interactions	that	facilitate	productive	interactions	between	
healthcare	professionals	(Alexanian	et	al.,	2015;	Zwarenstein	et	al.	2013).	
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3.3. Organising	for	Knowledge	Mobilisation:	Networks	
This	section	considers	the	network	literature	as	another	structural	approach	for	
integrating	actors	to	mobilise	knowledge.	Just	as	team	structures	arose	from	the	
recognition	that	multiple	domains	of	knowledge	and	different	roles	were	needed	to	
provide	care,	networks	are	an	equivalent	concept	but	with	broader	organisational	and	
inter-organisational	scope.	A	spectrum	of	knowledge	and	forms	of	labour	are	needed	
from	different	sectors	to	address	complex	problems.	
The	content	of	this	section	is	covered	in	five	steps.	To	begin,	the	section	outlines	the	
healthcare	networks	literature	and	provides	two	conceptualisations	of	what	‘network’	
means	in	these	materials.	One	view	considers	‘network	as	metaphor’,	whilst	the	
others	uses	‘network	as	method’	(Oliver	&	Faul,	2018).	These	conceptualisations	are	
considered	in	turn.	The	metaphorical	use	of	‘networks’	represents	complex	social	
architectures	that	depict	multiple	organisational	groups	with	intersecting	interests.	
The	second	subset	of	literature	focuses	on	‘network’	as	a	method	of	analysing	these	
social	structures.	Next,	the	section	presents	Soft	Knowledge	Systems	(Engel,	1997),	
and,	finally,	the	section	revisits	the	problem	of	persistent	social	and	epistemic	
boundaries	in	networks	that	inhibit	the	mobilisation	of	knowledge.	
3.3.1. Networks	in	Healthcare	
For	reasons	similar	to	creating	team	structures,	growing	attention	has	been	given	to	
capitalising	on	network	structures	as	an	organising	principle	to	address	complex	
knowledge-based	problems	(Ferlie	et	al,	2012b;	Health	Foundation,	2014;	Sheaff	&	
Schofield,	2016).	Where	teams	provide	the	(largely	intra-organisational)	structures	to	
bring	multiple	individuals’	knowledge	together,	networks	link	collective	knowledge	
dispersed	throughout	various	organisational	domains	since	many	problems	span	
across	these	inter-organisational	boundaries	(Bailie	et	al.,	2018;	Swan	et	al.,	2016).	For	
example,	sepsis	care	depends	upon	different	domains	of	knowledge	coming	from	
researchers,	policymakers,	and	practitioners.	And	these	knowledge-based	needs	
stretch	beyond	any	single	group’s	remit.	As	a	result,	stakeholders	have	increasingly	
recognised	the	necessity	of	reducing	the	silos	that	separate	organisations	with	
overlapping	concerns.	Their	reasoning	is	that	in	order	to	address	complex	problems,	
65	
	
we	must	build	system-wide	strategies	whereby	policy	organisations	join	with	
professional	societies,	academic	research	units,	and	clinical	providers	to	build	inter-
organisational	networks	(Ferlie	et	al.,	2012b;	Fitzgerald,	2016;	Holmes	et	al.,	2017).		
The	network	literature	focuses	on	these	connections	between	actors	in	two	ways	
(Oliver	&	Faul,	2018):	firstly,	as	a	metaphorical	concept	that	represents	the	complexity	
involved	in	ties	between	actors	(e.g.	separate	worlds,	communities	and	systems,	see	
Bailie	et	al.,	2018;	Locock	&	Boaz,	2004;	Ward,	2017);	and	secondly,	as	a	method	of	
analysis	for	unveiling	the	structure	of	actors	(e.g.	structural	position	in	a	social	system,	
see	Cunningham	et	al.,	2012;	Henttonen,	2010).	Both	the	‘network	as	metaphor’	and	
‘network	as	analytical	method’	literatures	are	relevant	to	this	thesis	and	are	covered	
in	turn.	
3.3.2. Networks	as	Metaphor	
The	healthcare	network	literature	provides	varying	definitions	of	a	network	with	a	
range	of	terms	often	used	synonymously	including:	groups,	partnerships,	alliances,	
collaborations,	interconnected	sectors	or	communities,	and	systems	(Bailie	et	al.,	
2018;	Health	Foundation,	2014;	Kitson	et	al.,	2018).		
One	example	is	the	Health	Foundation’s	(2014)	case	studies-based	review	of	
networks.	This	study	defined	networks	as:	
	[A]n	interconnected	group	or	system	[that]	are	established	or	evolve	
spontaneously	to	facilitate	the	movement	or	exchange	of	resources	or	
commodities…A	network	can	be	defined	as	‘a	cooperative	structure	
where	interconnected	groups	or	individuals	coalesce	around	a	shared	
purpose	on	the	basis	of	trust	and	reciprocity’.	(Health	Foundation,	
2014,	p.	7)	
According	to	this	view,	a	network	encompasses	a	broad	set	of	actors,	more	than	those	
contained	in	a	single	organisation,	and	joins	together	multiple	organisations	and	(most	
likely)	multiple	sectors.	These	sectors	reflect	varying	kinds	of	otherwise	separated	
actors.	Examples	include	research,	policy	and	practice	communities	or	acute,	primary,	
public	health	and	social	care	settings.	Thus,	networks	are	a	metaphorical	‘collective	
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space’	or	‘nexus’	made	up	of	actors	that	share	a	common	concern,	but	where	control	
is	diffused	throughout	the	network	structure.		
Networks	are	not	all	of	a	type,	but	fall	along	a	spectrum	(Health	Foundation,	2014).	At	
one	end	of	the	spectrum	networks	can	be	intentionally	formed,	formal,	coordinated	
collaborations	and	at	the	other	end,	networks	can	be	self-organising,	loose,	informal	
connections.	A	separate	review	of	public	service	networks	(including	healthcare)	said	
that	networks	were	made	up	of	multiple	organisations	tied	together	by	“some	form	of	
structural	interdependence”	(Turrini	et	al.,	2010,	p.	529).	In	this	view,	networks	were	
defined	as	actors	who	were	dependent	upon	one	another’s	knowledge	while	not	
necessarily	being	subordinate	to	another.	Ward	and	colleagues	(2018)	take	this	view	
further	saying	that	“networks	are	viewed	as	a	descriptive	representation	of	underlying	
patterns	of	relationships	which	make	a	certain	set	of	actions	possible.	In	other	words,	
patterns	of	relationships	merely	represent	the	potential	routes	for	knowledge	
creation”	(Ward	et	al.,	2018,	p.	480).	In	other	words,	a	network’s	potential	for	
knowledge	sharing	can	be	realised	or	not.	Networks	are	a	metaphorical	way	of	
envisioning	the	inter-organisational	complexity	of	health	systems	research	throughout	
the	various	sectors,	who	represent	many	overlapping	networks	(Oborn	et	al.,	2016).	
In	comparison,	Sheaff	and	Shofield	(2016)	take	a	definition	of	networks	closer	to	the	
active	formation	of	communication	channels	between	groups.	They	said	that	a	
network	is	made	up	of	“regular	coordinating	links	for	coordinated	care	planning,	
referrals,	and	information	exchange	about	patients	across	the	providers	involved	
[including]…acute	hospital	and	primary	care…physical	and	mental	health	care”	(Sheaff	
&	Shofield,	2016,	p.	434).	While	recognising	some	level	of	interdependence,	these	
definitions	present	different	conceptualisations	of	networks	where	the	formalisation	
and	deliberate	coordination	of	ties	between	organisations	differ.		
Increasingly,	systems	thinking	is	aligned	with	network-based	studies	as	both	are	
concerned	with	ties	between	inter-organisational	actors	(Bailie	et	al.,	2018;	Best	&	
Holmes,	2010;	Holmes	et	al,	2017;	Kitson	et	al.,	2018).	For	example,	“health	system	
strengthening	requires	bringing	together	networks	of	stakeholders	across	traditional	
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disciplines	and	fields	in	order	to	achieve	relevant	goals	and	objectives”	(Bailie	et	al,	
2018,	p.	1).	Systems-thinking	is	about	aligning	organisational	and	inter-organisational	
bodies	for	collaboration,	as	collaboration	between	them	is	necessary	for	easing	
knowledge	spread	between	groups.	
Networks	are,	at	times	(and	particularly	in	the	knowledge	mobilisation	literature),	
portrayed	metaphorically	as	divided	knowledge	communities,	worlds,	or	camps	
(Locock	&	Boaz,	2004;	Crilly	et	al.,	2010;	Kislov,	2014;	Scarbrough	et	al.,	2014).	Each	
‘community’	represents	a	group	of	stakeholders	that	are	homogenous	in	some	way.	
The	most	common	example	is	the	research,	policy,	practice,	and,	increasingly,	patient	
(Boaz	et	al.	2015;	Cowdell,	2018)	groupings.	“Ideally,	research	and	practice	would	not	
be	seen	as	separate	activities	undertaken	by	distinct	groups	of	people	(researchers	
and	practitioners	or	policymakers),	but	would	be	conceptualised	as	an	overall	
approach	to	linking	the	generation	and	use	of	evidence”	(Holmes	et	al.,	2017,	p.	549).	
Indeed,	overcoming	the	boundaries	that	unhelpfully	segment	and	separate	
communities	is	the	raison	d’etre	for	knowledge	mobilisation	studies	(Fitzgerald	&	
Harvey,	2015;	Oliver	&	Faul,	2018).	“Networked	organization[s]”,	according	to	Swan	et	
al.	(2016),	“create	the	type	of	collaborative	relationship	between	researchers	and	
practitioners	that	can	generate	and	mobilise	knowledge”	(Swan	et	al.,	2016,	p.	103).	
Thus	an	examination	of	the	‘network	as	metaphor’	concept	reveals	a	close	
relationship	to	the	knowledge	mobilisation	literature	(Davies	et	al.,	2016;	Reed	et	al.,	
2018;	Swan	et	al.,	2016).	“Mobilizing	knowledge	is	about	making	connections.	Much	
of	the	literature	on	knowledge	mobilization	discusses	the	complex	institutional,	
professional,	and	social	environments	within	which	knowledge	is	created	and	flows	
(or,	more	often,	gets	stuck)…[there	is]	specific	consideration	of	the	role	of	specific	
networks	of	interests	or	the	practical	configurations…”	(Davies	et	al.,	2016,	p.	286).	
And	yet	there	are	few	studies	that	examine	the	complex	task	of	sharing	knowledge	
between	organisations	using	a	network	perspective	(Provan	et	al.,	2007;	Fitzgerald	&	
Harvey,	2015;	Oborn	et	al.,	2016)	despite	widespread	recognition	that	the	lack	of	
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alignment	between	organisations	inhibits	knowledge	spread	and	use	(Ferlie	et	al.,	
2005;	Fitzgerald	&	Harvey,	2015).		
In	response,	several	national	governments	have	sought	ways	to	address	this	
fragmentation	in	health	systems	by	proactively	building	infrastructure	and	funding	
initiatives	that	integrate	researchers,	policymakers,	clinicians	and	social	workers	
(Walshe	&	Davies,	2013;	Newell	&	Marabelli,	2016;	Wehrens	et	al.	2011).	In	England	
and	Wales	this	has	been	seen	in	funding	the	creation	of	Academic	Health	Science	
Centres,	Academic	Health	Science	Networks,	and	Collaborations	for	Leadership	in	
Applied	Health	Research	and	Care	(CLAHRCs)	(Walshe	&	Davies,	2013).	CLAHRCs,	also	
called	“translational	networks”	(Evans	&	Scarbrough,	2014;	Fitzgerald	&	Harvey,	
2015),	incentivised	partnerships	between	universities	and	NHS	organisations.	They	
were	intended	to	build	cross-organisational	capacity	for	using	research	in	practice	
settings.	And	over	the	last	decade,	studies	on	CLAHRCs	have	begun	to	provide	a	
growing	empirical	literature	about	interventional	efforts	to	capitalise	on	inter-
organisational	networks.		
Currie	et	al.	(2013)	conducted	a	qualitative	study	of	all	nine	(at	the	time)	CLAHRCs	and	
in-depth	case	studies	in	four	of	the	initiatives.	They	found	that	absent	directives	from	
policymakers,	the	CLAHRCs	each	devised	their	own	structure.	These	structures	varied	
widely	based	upon	key	decision-makers’	assumptions	of	knowledge	and	how	
knowledge	is	mobilised	(Currie	et	al.,	2013;	Oborn	et	al.,	2013).	Oborn	et	al.’s	(2013)	
examination	of	all	the	CLAHRC	structures	during	that	time	frame	found	that	they	
consolidated	down	to	five	archetypes	(multidisciplinary	research,	centralised	
management	with	designated	knowledge	brokers,	modular	independence	between	
research-	and	practitioner-based	actors;	capitalisation	on	existing	networks	without	a	
centralised	body;	and	centralised	control).		
Most	CLAHRCs	were	led	by	actors	from	university	settings.	Currie	et	al.	(2013)	
speculated	that	the	constrained	time	scale	for	early	collaboration	between	university	
and	NHS	actors	was	a	part	of	the	challenge.	Academic	partners	were	better	positioned	
to	write	a	clearly	articulated	bid	for	CLARC	funds.	As	a	result,	CLAHRC	initiatives	
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tended	to	meet	researchers’	need	for	academic	outputs	rather	than	practitioners’	
desires	for	service	improvement	(Currie	et	al.,	2013;	Kislov	et	al.,	2012;	Fitzgerald	&	
Harvey,	2015).	CLAHRCs	that	had	asymmetrical	structuring	of	stakeholders’	priorities	
and	limited	contact	time	between	disparate	groups	led	to	tensions	between	inter-
organisational	(academic	and	NHS)	actors	(Kislov	et	al.,	2012;	Fitzgerald	&	Harvey,	
2015).	However,	some	CLAHRC	initiatives	that	established	mixed	project	teams	with	
collaboratively-oriented	governance	structures	from	the	outset	found	ways	to	‘blur’	
the	social,	geographical,	and	(sometimes)	epistemic	boundaries	(Evans	&	Scarbrough,	
2014;	Oborn	et	al.,	2013).		
Oborn	et	al.’s	(2016)	study	of	the	nine	CLAHRCs	found	that	each	professional	
community	favoured	and	elevated	certain	forms	of	knowledge	above	others.	For	
example,	epidemiologists	relied	upon	statistical	data;	clinical	academics	favoured	
rigorously	controlled	clinical	trials	data;	while	nurses	and	managers	preferred	
qualitative	data	coming	from	action	research	and	evaluation	studies.	These	different	
forms	of	data	elicited	different	perspectives,	which	then	had	to	be	negotiated	in	order	
to	arrive	at	compromises.	
Some	studies	showed	that	the	CLAHRCs	led	by	small	groups	that	reflected	the	range	of	
stakeholder	interests	helped	to	build	overall	cohesiveness	between	inter-
organisational	members	and	provided	clearer	planning	guidance	for	the	initiatives	
(Scarbrough	et	al.,	2014;	Fitzgerald	&	Harvey,	2015).	And	yet	for	CLAHRCs	that	
maintained	the	segmentation	between	different	actors’	groups,	their	“divergent	views	
persisted	and	were	supported	by	the	structural	division	between	the	teams	and	
separate	lines	of	coordination	and	communication”	(Fitzgerald	&	Harvey,	2015,	p.	
197).	They	concluded	that	the	“composition	and	the	processes	of	operation	of	the	
network	board	were	flawed”	(p.	198).	Where	hierarchies	between	different	
stakeholders’	needs,	priorities,	and	knowledge	remained	intact,	and	actors’	tasks,	
responsibilities	and	time	remained	detached,	social	and	epistemic	divisions	persisted.	
And	while	upon	reflection,	various	CLAHRC	publications	recognised	that	these	
tensions	between	actors	might	be	overcome	through	communication	and	facilitation,	
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they	also	said	that	little	research	informs	how	to	organise	network-based	structures	
that	integrate	actors’	knowledge	and	resources	(Evans	&	Scarbrough,	2014;	Fitzgerald	
&	Harvey,	2015).		
Scarbrough	et	al.	(2014)	suggested	that	in	order	for	knowledge	mobilisation	to	
happen,	networks	must	hold	two	capabilities:	integrative	and	relational	capabilities.	
Integrative	capabilities	involve	bringing	together	different	forms	of	knowledge	from	
different	professional,	disciplinary,	and	geographic	areas.	Whereas,	relational	
capabilities	focus	on	the	ability	to	help	different	groups	to	work	together.	“Lateral	co-
ordination	across	professional	and	epistemic	boundaries	is	demonstrably	as	important	
as	inter-organizational	co-ordination…Arguably,	in	translational	networks,	with	
complex	inter-linkages,	relational	co-ordination	is	crucial”	(Fitzgerald	&	Harvey,	2015,	
p.	194).	
In	sum,	the	healthcare	network	literature	presents	a	myriad	of	metaphors	describing	
overlapping	groups	with	intersecting	interests.	Until	recently,	empirical	research	on	
knowledge	mobilisation	within	inter-organisational	networks	was	limited.	Deeply	
rooted	divides	between	network	actors	with	separate	control	mechanisms,	fractured	
accountability,	and	distinct	priorities	and	responsibilities	remain	in	place	(Locock	&	
Boaz,	2004;	Newell	&	Marabelli,	2016).		
The	“CLAHRC	experiment”	(Currie	et	al.,	2013,	p.	27)	provided	insights	into	ways	that	
nested,	overlapping	groups	with	intersecting	interests	might	be	helpfully	structured	
for	collaboration.	These	studies	also	concluded	that	varying	views	of	knowledge	and	
how	knowledge	is	mobilised	affected	the	ways	actors	were	structured	in	these	
initiatives.	However,	these	data	do	not	show	how	inter-organisational	networks	might	
self-organise	for	sharing	their	knowledge.	Given	the	diffuse	nature	of	healthcare	
research,	policy	and	practice	bodies	worldwide,	and	the	impossibility	of	overall	
centralised	control,	further	exploratory	work	is	needed	to	understand	how	these	
different	sectors	might	harmonise	the	development,	sharing	and	use	of	their	
knowledge.		
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3.3.3. Analytical	Methods	
In	addition	to	the	metaphorical	category	described	above,	‘network’	in	academic	
discourse	also	refers	to	an	analytical	lens	used	to	examine	ties	between	actors,	or	
‘social	systems’	(Oliver	&	Faul,	2018).	In	this	category,	networks	are	the	
methodological	unit	of	analysis	that	examines	the	arrangement	(i.e.	structure)	of	
actors	in	the	network.	A	prevalent	network	theory-based	method	is	Social	Network	
Analysis	(SNA).	Another	gaining	in	use	is	Soft	Systems	Methodology	(SSM),	and	yet	a	
further	network	analysis	tool	is	Soft	Knowledge	Systems	(SKS).	Each	of	these	will	be	
covered	in	turn.	
Firstly,	a	large	body	of	work	concerned	with	connections	between	individual	and	
collective	knowers	employs	SNA	as	a	framework	to	trace	patterns	and	structures	
within	social	systems	(Henttonen,	2010;	Long	et	al.,	2013;	Poghosyan	et	al.,	2016;	
Sabot	et	al.,	2017;	Scarbrough	et	al.,	2014;	Yousefi-Nooraie,	2012).	This	analytical	lens	
is	concerned	with	questions	such	as	how	connections	are	distributed	in	a	social	
system,	the	position	of	actors,	and	where	clusters	of	actors	(i.e.	nodes)	exist.	Most	
commonly,	SNA	employs	a	quantitative	methodology.	Strengths	of	connection	are	
determined	by	calculating	numbers	of	ties.	This	research	method	uses	a	highly	
specified	way	to	frame	social	networks,	for	example,	that	of	“betweenness”	and	
“centrality”	(Long	et	al.,	2013,	p.	159)	of	actors.	As	a	result,	SNA	studies	tend	to	leave	
the	qualities	of	connections	between	actors	unexamined.	
A	growing	collection	of	studies	in	healthcare	have	used	Soft	Systems	Methodology	
(SSM),	developed	by	Checkland	(Checkland	&	Scholes,	1999),	as	a	qualitative	way	to	
understand	complex	systems.	SSM	provides	a	methodical	structure	to	explore	
complexity	within	messy	real	world	settings.	It	is	a	learning	and	sense-making	tool	
that	begins	with	a	problem	situation	and	brings	to	the	fore	various	stakeholders’	
ontological	assumptions	about	‘how	things	work’.	Checkland	advocated	for	simple	
sketches	(i.e.	models)	that	captured	these	‘programme	theories’.	By	comparing	the	
perspectives	of	multiple	stakeholders	depicted	in	the	models,	and	together	reflecting	
on	how	the	models	did	or	did	not	capture	the	‘real	world’,	this	methodology	provided	
a	systems-based	way	to	develop	interventions	for	change	(Williams,	2005).	
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Clarke	and	Wilcockson	(2001)	used	Soft	Systems	Methodology	to	explore	the	
intersection	of	professional	and	organisational	learning	within	nursing	practice	
developments.	Using	a	comparative	case	study	design,	the	researchers	created	a	
model	of	healthcare	practice	development	that	included	three	processes:	using	and	
creating	knowledge,	understanding	and	engaging	in	patient	care,	and	putting	in	action	
the	newly	developed	practice.	Drawing	on	Checkland’s	methodology	enabled	the	
researchers	to	model	how	an	individual’s	knowledge	affected	the	organisation,	which	
had	a	cyclical	effect	and	affected	the	individual’s	knowledge.	This	work	demonstrated	
the	mutual	influence	of	individual	and	collective	knowledge	when	making	changes	in	
an	organisation.	
Pentland	and	colleagues	(2014)	also	employed	Soft	Systems	Methodology	in	an	
interventional	study	to	improve	the	evidence	based	practices	of	two	NHS	specialist	
mental	health	teams.	The	knowledge	of	concern	in	this	study	was	explicit,	research-
based	forms,	which	fit	with	the	study’s	focus	of	getting	research	into	practice.	They	
used	Soft	Systems	Methodology	to	inform	their	intervention	development.	The	study	
results	showed	a	shift	from	individuals	accessing	research-based	information	to	where	
teams	shared	their	acquisition	process	with	one	another.	In	other	words,	team	
members	found	the	value	of	drawing	on	collective	ways	to	manage	their	knowledge	
needs.	Because	the	study	limited	its	focus	to	explicit	forms	of	knowledge,	an	
understanding	of	evidence	use	in	relationship	to,	for	example,	tacit	forms	of	
knowledge	was	unexplored.		
Lastly,	a	University	of	Bangor	research	team	recently	promoted	the	value	of	SSM	
when	paired	with	realist	approaches.	Dalkin	et	al.	(2018)	noted	that	their	realist	driven	
approaches	and	SSM	both	emphasise	engaging	with	stakeholders	and	address	
complexity	of	systems	within	real	life	contexts.	They	pointed	out	that	SSM	helpfully	
brings	multiple	understandings	to	bear	on	designing	changes	within	systems.	The	
study	reported	two	case	studies	that	usefully	employed	SSM	for	organisational	
interventions	and	advocated	for	further	work	using	these	complementary	approaches.	
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In	summary,	SSM	is	a	practical	method	for	exploring	complex	problems.	However,	it	is	
primarily	intended	for	intervention-based	projects.	
3.3.4. Soft	Knowledge	Systems	
Soft	Knowledge	Systems	(SKS)	is	also	social	network	theory	specifically	designed	for	
understanding	how	knowledge	gets	used	in	practice	contexts	(Engel,	1997).	SKS	drew	
on	the	methodological	strengths	of	Checkland’s	Soft	Systems	Methodology	and	paired	
it	with	Röling’s	Knowledge	Systems	(1992)	to	provide	a	particular	focus	on	knowledge.	
Engel	developed	SKS	in	response	to	what	he	saw	as	a	problem	of	using	simplistic	and	
linear	methods	to	study	complex	social	problems.		
Engel	drew	on	Röling’s	conceptual	work,	Knowledge	Systems	(1992),	and	Checkland’s	
methodological	work,	Soft	Systems	Methodology	(1988),	to	construct	Soft	Knowledge	
Systems.	For	Röling	(1992),	‘system’	meant	a	configuration	of	actors.	Röling	explained	
that	a	‘knowledge	system’	was:	
The	articulated	set	of	actors,	networks	and/or	organizations,	expected	
or	managed	to	work	synergically	to	support	knowledge	processes	
which	improve	the	correspondence	between	knowledge	and	
environment	and/or	the	control	provided	through	technology	use	in	a	
given	domain	of	human	activity	(Röling,	1992,	p.	48).	
Knowledge	systems	included	actors	(both	individual	and	collective)	that	perhaps	did	
not	act	as	partners	in	a	whole	system	but	were	nevertheless	expected	to	manage	their	
work	in	synergistic	ways.		
Thus,	in	Engel’s	combining	of	Knowledge	Systems	and	Soft	Systems	Methodology	into	
Soft	Knowledge	Systems,	SSM	provided	a	methodological	way	to	consider	a	plurality	
of	views	in	the	dynamic	setting	of	social	interactions.	And	Knowledge	Systems	
provided	an	ontological	understanding	of	interdependent	actors	at	a	‘whole	network’,	
as	in	an	individual,	team	and	organisational,	level.		
Soft	Knowledge	Systems	(SKS)	is	concerned	with	understanding	how	actors	organised	
their	‘knowledge	network’.	Engel	defined	a	knowledge	network	as	a	group	of	actors	
that	have	“a	relatively	stable	pattern	of	communication	and	interaction…[and]	who	
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share	a	common	concern”	(Engel,	1997,	p.	38)	for	sharing	their	knowledge.	Therefore,	
SKS	focuses	on	the	generation,	sharing	and	use	of	knowledge	amongst	the	network’s	
actors.	A	‘knowledge	system’,	therefore,	analyses	the	structural	configuration	of	
knowers,	the	interactional	processes	and	materials	they	use	to	coordinate	the	flow	of	
knowledge	amongst	network	actors.	Processes	are	the	activities	or	ways	actors	
connected	to	develop,	share	and	use	their	knowledge.	Some	examples	include	
meetings,	procedures,	consensus-building	activities	like	voting,	as	well	as	the	activity	
of	reading	(other	actor’s	work).	Materials	are	physical	objects	created	by	actors	that	
are	explicit	presentations	of	actors’	knowledge	for	development,	sharing	and	use.	
Some	examples	are	guidelines,	patient	observation	charts,	journal	articles,	and	
checklists.		
Soft	Knowledge	Systems	was	developed	and	has	been	primarily	used	in	its	original	
discipline	of	agricultural	sociology.	One	study	by	Olson	and	colleagues	(2010)	
employed	the	network	theory	lens	in	the	health	sector.	Olson	et	al.’s	(2010)	
comparative	case	study	of	multidisciplinary	teams	in	three	US	hospitals	found	that	
team	members	drew	on	multiple	actors	in	the	knowledge	network	in	addition	to	their	
own	complex	knowledge	for	effecting	practice	improvement.	Indeed,	the	success	of	
the	projects	appeared	to	hinge	on	the	teams’	ability	to	blend	individual,	collective,	
explicit	and	tacit	forms	of	knowledge,	a	process	that	Olson	et	al.	(2010)	described	as	
bricolage	(“making	do	with	whatever	is	to	hand”,	p.	512).	The	primary	argument	of	
the	study	was	that	practical	forms	of	knowledge	(i.e.	practice-based	evidence	in	
contrast	to	evidence-based	practice)	should	not	be	dismissed	in	practice	improvement	
endeavours.	
3.3.5. Networks	Section	Conclusion	
This	section	has	shown	the	relationship	between	the	network	and	knowledge	
mobilisation	literatures,	and	exposed	the	ongoing,	but	relatively	unexplored,	tensions	
between	organisational	actors.	As	observed	in	the	prior	section,	teams	hold	partial	
knowledge;	this	section	revealed	that	organisational	actors	and	sectors	in	healthcare	
do	as	well.	Knowledge	must	be	woven	together	from	intersecting	and	overlapping	
networks	in	order	for	knowledge	to	mobilise.	And	yet,	as	seen	in	the	CLAHRCs	body	of	
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work,	once	again,	knowledge	mobilisation	breaks	down	at	both	epistemic	and	social	
boundaries	even	when	geographic	boundaries	have	been	(to	some	degree)	addressed.	
Studies	of	networks	take	into	account	the	complex	ties	between	actors	for	developing,	
sharing	and	using	their	knowledge,	and	Soft	Knowledge	Systems	dovetails	with	these	
interests.	
3.4. Conclusion		
In	summary,	this	chapter	reviewed	and	problematized	prevalent	structures	used	to	
mobilise	knowledge.	The	teams	and	networks	literatures	point	to	the	promise	these	
structures	hold	for	mobilising	knowledge,	however,	the	effectiveness	of	these	
structures	to	provide	reliable	outcomes	remains	variable.	If	bringing	actors	together	is	
not	enough,	how	then	is	knowledge	mobilised?	Personal	contact	and	interactions	
between	people	and	organisations	establish	the	connections	which	in	turn	enable	
evidence	to	be	incorporated	within	practice	(Lomas,	2007;	Reed	et	al.,	2018;	Ward	et	
al.,	2009).	And	yet	the	interactions	between	actors	are	unpredictable	(Greenhalgh	et	
al.,	2004).	The	ways	forward	for	aligning,	and	strengthening	the	inter-relationships	
between	the	research,	policy	and	practice	networks	require	further	exploration.		
We	have	seen	that	crossing	professional	and	organisational	boundaries	is	difficult	and	
this	difficulty	inhibits	the	spread	of	knowledge	(Ferlie	et	al.,	2005).	We	need	a	richer	
understanding	of	networks	and	how	they	influence	knowledge	mobilisation	(Swan	et	
al.,	2016).	Furthermore,	these	literatures	have	shown	that	physical	proximity	is	a	first	
step	but	does	not	guarantee	knowledge	mobilisation.	And	thus,	Soft	Knowledge	
Systems	was	selected	as	a	theoretical	framework	for	two	reasons.	Firstly,	it	is	
primarily	concerned	with	exploring	knowledge	within	networks.	Secondly,	the	theory	
specifically	focuses	on	how	research-informed	knowledge	is	infused	by	and	within	
connected	actors,	as	well	as	the	processes	and	materials	they	rely	upon	to	share	their	
knowledge.	An	underlying	assumption	of	SKS	is	that	actors,	individual	and	collective,	
are	both	generators	and	users	of	knowledge.	Actors	depend	upon	their	individual	and	
collective	knowledge	when	conducting	their	work,	observing	and	addressing	
problems,	and	constructing	solutions	to	meet	their	goals.		
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Set	alongside	the	overarching	research	goal	from	Chapter	1	of	how	to	better	
understand	knowledge	mobilisation	within	and	between	the	research,	policy	and	
practice	communities,	and	the	knowledge	and	knowing	literature	from	Chapter	2,	this	
review	of	prevalent	structures	used	to	mobilise	knowledge	provides	an	additional	area	
of	analysis.	A	further	sub-research	question	based	on	Soft	Knowledge	Systems	is:	
Sub-RQ	2:	How	are	knowledge	systems	(actors,	processes,	and	materials)	organised	
for	mobilising	knowledge?	
The	next	chapter	will	present	the	methodology	and	methods	of	this	study.	
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4. Chapter	4—Methodology	and	Methods	
4.1. Introduction	
This	purpose	of	this	chapter	is	to	describe	the	methodology,	design	and	methods	
selected	for	this	study,	and	explain	why	these	choices	were	made.	To	do	so,	this	
chapter	revisits	the	research	aims	and	questions	that	emerged	from	the	exploration	of	
the	literatures	and	then	turns	to	unpack	the	philosophical	underpinnings	of	this	
inquiry.	The	chapter	explains	why	a	qualitative	methodology	was	chosen	for	this	
research	project,	and	a	case	study	design	was	deemed	best	suited	for	the	research	
aims.	Finally,	the	chapter	provides	a	detailed	account	of	how	the	research	project	was	
carried	out.	
There	is	one	over-arching	question	that	captures	the	broad	research	problem	
described	in	Chapter	1,	and	two	sub-questions	that	emerged	from	Chapter	2	and	3	
that	delineate	the	interrelated	lines	of	inquiry	within	this	work.			
RQ:	How	is	knowledge	mobilised	within	and	between	the	research,	policy	and	practice	
communities	for	clinical	practice?	
Sub-RQ	1:	What	are	the	sources,	forms	and	ways	of	knowing	involved	in	
mobilising	research-based	knowledge	in	practice?	
Sub-RQ	2:	How	are	knowledge	systems	(actors,	processes,	and	materials)	
organised	for	mobilising	knowledge?	
4.2. Methodology:	Research	Approach	
4.2.1. Philosophical	Foundations		
The	goal	of	this	inquiry	is	to	build	deeper	and	richer	understanding	of	how	individuals	
and	collectives	interrelate	for	knowing,	and	how	their	interdependent	knowing	
contributes	to	the	mobilisation	of	different	types	of	sepsis	knowledge	for	patient	
benefit.	‘Truth’	in	this	context	is	interpreted,	situated	and	emergent,	and	thus	an	
interpretive	perspective	was	used	to	understand	these	socially	constructed	
phenomena.	
Health	services	research	straddles	distinct	(and	at	times	mixed	and	opposed)	
ontological	and	epistemological	paradigms.	This	study	was	conducted	using	an	
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interpretivist	perspective.	Such	a	view	sees	the	world	as	made	up	of	physical	and	
social	entities	where	physical	objects	and	social	phenomena	are	inherently	different	in	
their	nature.	And	thus,	the	ways	of	knowing	and	methodologies	used	to	understand	
them	differ.	This	study	sought	to	understand	how	research-based	sepsis	knowledge	
was	mobilised	and	used	in	three	interconnected	research,	policy	and	practice	
communities.	The	inquiry	centred	on	how	actors	organised	and	connected	with	one	
another	to	collaborate	and	share	their	knowledges.	Because	the	aim	of	this	work	was	
firmly	set	within	the	socially	constructed	world,	an	interpretive	epistemology	was	
chosen	because	it	adheres	to	a	socially	constructed	understanding	that	underpins	the	
interconnections	of	knowers	and	interconnectedness	of	their	knowledges.		
4.2.2. Qualitative	Research	
The	goal	was	an	interpretation-based	search	for	meaning	by	understanding	when	
important	and	relevant	phenomena	occurred.	Interpretive	forms	of	research	are	
utilised	to	understand	processes	and	lived	experiences	and	they	sit	within	a	social	
constructivism	paradigm	(Bhattacharya,	2008).	Qualitative	research	methodology	asks	
questions	of	‘how’,	‘who’,	‘why’	and	‘what’	(Creswell,	2013).	Qualitative	research	
emphasises	interpretation	to	build	understanding	from	within	the	ordinary	and	messy	
context	of	real	world	experiences	rather	than	stripping	meaning	away	from	its	
context.	This	methodological	pathway	embraces	complexity	and	multiple	interpreted	
realities	rather	than	seeking	a	reductionist	or	quantifiable	explanation	as	it	is	intended	
to	explore	meaning	within	social	contexts	(Kincheloe,	2001).	Qualitative	methodology	
fits	with	the	aims	of	this	research	project,	which	is	interested	in	the	multiple	socially	
constructed	perspectives	of	diverse	actors	and	their	complex	knowledges.	This	
methodology	is	also	suited	to	exploring	social	practices	and	interactions,	and	
understanding	how	interconnected,	complex	knowledges	and	knowers	support	
knowledge	mobilisation.		
4.2.3. Case	Study	Design	
Case	study	designs	are	congruent	with	an	interpretive,	social	constructivist	
epistemology	(Easterby-Smith	et	al.,	2015;	George	&	Bennett,	2005).	A	case	is	a	“real-
life”	and	“bounded”	example	in	that	it	has	the	potential	to	provide	helpful	insights	
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especially	for	complex	social	problems	such	as	knowledge	mobilisation	(Creswell,	
2013;	Merriam,	1998).	Case	study	work	is	conducted	within	the	context	of	interest,	
which	allows	for	an	in-depth	look	at	a	single	(or	small	number)	of	bounded	
phenomena,	ideally	over	an	extended	period	of	time	(Yin,	2014).	A	case	study	design	
is	well-suited	for	this	research	problem	because	our	understanding	of	the	
interrelationship	between	human	connections	for	complex	knowledges	that	enables	
knowledge	mobilisation	remains	sparse	(Boaz	et	al.,	2015).		
A	case	study	approach	was	determined	to	be	the	most	appropriate	design	for	this	
study	for	the	following	reasons.	Firstly,	the	methods	are	appropriate	to	the	research	
problem.	In	seeking	to	better	understand	how	clinicians	develop,	share	and	use	their	
knowledge,	case	study	methods	are	useful	in	building	understanding	where	little	
exists.	Therefore,	a	case	study	is	helpful	in	answering	the	question:	if	clinicians	are	not	
using	knowledge	as	they	‘ought’	to	be,	what	is	it	that	they	are	doing?	
Secondly,	case	study	work	depends	upon	multiple	sources	and	forms	of	data,	
including	a	concentrated	time	for	observing	participants’	interactions,	which	in	turn	
provides	a	more	authentic	foundation	for	the	interpretation	of	the	social	phenomena	
(Stake,	1995).	Case	study	work	draws	on	the	rich	tradition	of	ethnographic	research	
methods.	It	explores	“extensively”	and	“intensively”	in	order	to	build	a	rich	picture	of	
life	for	understanding	people’s	experiences.	“Case	study	is	the	study	of	the	
particularity	and	complexity	of	a	single	case”	(Stake,	1995,	p.	xi)	that	provides	the	
basis	for	the	researcher	to	build	understanding.		
Thirdly,	the	benefits	of	case	study	research	include	the	in-depth	study	of	a	specific	
place	and	contextualized	phenomena	as	these	real	life	particulars	best	capture	
complexity.	Research	designs	that	study	complex	phenomena	foreground	the	dynamic	
interactions	from	real-world	contexts	to	be	able	to	better	understand	how	knowledge	
actually	mobilises	to	care	(Greenhalgh	&	Papoutsi,	2018).	By	using	case	study	designs,	
the	researcher	is	able	to	explore	the	details	of	interactions	in	the	context,	not	
decontextualized	and	abstract.	Drawing	on	observations	of	actions,	behaviours,	
communication	(both	verbal	and	nonverbal	communication)	and	asking	the	actors	
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how	they	interpret	these	occurrences,	we	are	provided	with	the	opportunity	to	more	
fully	understand.	This	detailed,	actor-informed	understanding	contributes	to	the	
validity	of	the	interpretation.	
These	methods	were	selected	as	they	value	the	granularity	of	the	problems	that	are	
faced	within	the	uncertainties	of	clinical	work	and	are	thus	best	situated	to	obtain	
data	to	answer	the	research	questions.	Case	study	research	is	based	on	the	belief	that	
“the	nature	of	people	and	systems	becomes	more	transparent	during	their	struggles”	
(Stake,	1995,	p.	16),	and	there	is	value	in	observing,	first-hand,	the	struggles	they	
encounter	in	their	work.		
Finally,	the	choice	of	case	study	design	was	well	attuned	to	exploring	the	knowledge	
network	and	social	interactions	that	contributed	to	knowing	for	mobilising	knowledge.	
The	rationale	behind	a	single	case	design	is	to	confirm,	challenge	or	extend	existing	
theory	(Yin,	2014).	Stake	(1995)	agreed	and	considered	theory	essential	for	single	case	
study	work.	The	use	of	theory	in	qualitative	case	study	work	provides	direction,	a	way	
to	delimit	the	immense	range	of	“multiple	realities”	(Reeves	et	al.,	2008),	and	build	a	
reasonable	case	for	the	need	to	focus	on	specific	facets	of	the	research	problem.	
Although	drawing	on	similar	methods	as	ethnography,	theoretically	dependent	case	
study	research	enters	into	the	field	acknowledging	the	influence	of	other	work	in	
shaping	our	own,	and	providing	clues	of	what	to	be	attentive	to	in	particular	as	we	
approach	(and	analyse)	data	(Yin,	2014).		
4.2.4. Theoretical	Lens	
Clinical	Mindlines	(Gabbay	&	le	May,	2011)	and	Soft	Knowledge	Systems	(Engel,	1997)	
were	selected	as	a	‘dual	focus’	theoretical	lens	for	this	study.	Both	theories	adhere	to	
an	interpretive	frame	of	knowing	within	social	phenomena.	Engel	(1997)	states	that	
“knowledge	processes	are	socially	constructed”	(p.	32,	emphasis	in	original).	Gabbay	
and	le	May	acknowledge	that	while	theoretically	divergent	views	were	useful	in	
developing	their	findings	(see	2011,	p.	16)	understanding	knowledges	is	an	
interpretive	process	as	exemplified	in	their	data	analysis.	
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The	Clinical	Mindlines	conceptual	framework	(discussed	in	Chapter	2)	developed	a	
way	of	understanding	by	exploring	“what	was	really	going	on”	(Gabbay	&	le	May,	
2011,	p.	14)	within	complex	clinical	knowledge.	Furthermore,	Gabbay	and	le	May	
recognised	that	complex	knowing	was	not,	solely,	an	individual	process.	Mindlines	
were	“being	implicitly	shared	and	checked,	refined	and	continually	developed	through	
interactions	between	colleagues”	(2011,	p.	130).	In	other	words,	clinicians	did	not	
‘know	alone’,	but	developed	and	used	their	knowledge	in	the	midst	of	interacting	with	
others.	This	connectedness	of	knowing	they	called	a	community	of	mindlines	or	
“collective	mindlines”	(2011,	p.	44).		
Soft	Knowledge	Systems	theory	(discussed	in	Chapter	3)	was	also	concerned	with	the	
connection	of	stakeholders	for	knowing	and	employed	a	systems	lens	to	understand	
how	stakeholders	organised	for	mobilising	knowledge.	As	mentioned	in	Chapter	3,	in	
contrast	to	Social	Network	Analysis,	Soft	Knowledge	Systems	is	not	interested	in	the	
specifics	of	network	structural	design	per	se,	but	rather	the	qualities	of	the	social	web	
of	interconnections.	In	other	words,	by	building	an	understanding	of	the	kinds	and	
qualities	of	interactions	that	bind	knowledge	stakeholders	together,	we	gain	deeper	
and	richer	perspectives	of	how	to	encourage	knowledge	sharing,	growth	and	
application.		
Knowledge	systems,	for	the	purposes	of	this	work,	includes	actors,	processes	and	
materials.	Distinguishing	between	the	three	for	analytical	purposes	does	not	imply	
that	processes	and	materials	are	separable	from	the	knowers.	Indeed,	processes	and	
materials	are	both	created	and	used	by	actors,	but	examining	them	separately	helps	
to	unpack	the	actors’	underlying	assumptions	about	knowledge	that	underpins	them.	
The	reason	both	theories	were	used	for	this	is	work	is	that	Clinical	Mindlines	provides	
a	helpful	conceptualisation	of	knowledge	that	was	developed	from	ethnographic	
research	within	the	world	of	healthcare.	However,	as	rich	of	an	explanatory	theory	
that	Clinical	Mindlines	is,	at	present	it	lacks	a	structured	methodological	way	to	
explore	actors’	ways	of	knowing.	By	contrast,	Soft	Knowledge	Systems	brings	a	
relationship-focused	systems	view	that	explores	the	interconnection	between	
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stakeholders	for	achieving	knowledge-based	innovation.	While	Soft	Knowledge	
Systems	emphasises	the	collective	nature	of	knowing,	the	theory	lacks	a	nuanced	
depiction	of	complex	knowledge.	Engel	(1997)	explained	that	‘knowledge’	was	an	
actor’s	implicit	concepts,	ideas,	and	routines	in	contrast	to	‘information’,	which	was	
explicit,	as	yet	un-interpreted,	material.	However,	for	a	study	of	complex	knowing	
within	health	services,	a	more	nuanced	understanding	was	necessary.	Thus,	Soft	
Knowledge	Systems	and	Clinical	Mindlines	were	paired	in	this	research	as	
complementary	theories	that	each	strengthened	the	other.	
Additionally,	Clinical	Mindlines	and	Soft	Knowledge	Systems	theories	are	both	
interested	in	the	centrality	of	social	interactions	for	knowing,	which	aligns	well	with	
interpretivism.	They	focus	on	the	sources	of	knowing,	and	the	social	dimensions	that	
(can)	enrich	knowledges,	such	as	communication,	coordination	of	disbursed	
knowledges	and	responsibilities,	and	the	distributed	nature	of	leadership	within	a	
knowledge	network.	Together	they	consider	how	stakeholders	connect	and	organise	
for	knowing	and	change	via	interconnected	knowledges	(Clinical	Mindlines)	and	
interconnected	knowers	(Soft	Knowledge	Systems).		
Finally,	a	goal	for	this	work	was	to	utilise	lenses	that	paid	“attention	to	
interconnectedness	and	incorporate[d]	an	understanding	of	how	systems	come	
together	as	a	whole”	(Greenhalgh	&	Papoutsi,	2018,	p.	2).	Soft	Knowledge	Systems	
theory	precisely	meets	these	requirements	in	at	least	two	ways.	Firstly,	rather	than	
simplifying	to	one	level	for	analysis,	the	theory	holds	the	individual,	group,	and	
organisation	together	in	order	to	consider	the	whole	as	opposed	to	simplified	and	
reduced	parts.	Secondly,	Soft	Knowledge	Systems	uses	a	qualitative	methodology	to	
focus	on	the	links,	the	connections,	between	actors	at	these	various	levels	in	the	
whole	system.	Thus,	a	qualitative	case	study	using	Soft	Knowledge	Systems	along	with	
a	nuanced	conceptualisation	of	knowledge	from	Clinical	Mindlines	is	well	suited	for	
the	addressing	the	research	problem.	
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4.2.5. Attending	to	Rigour	in	Qualitative	Case	Study	Design	
Whereas	with	quantitative	analysis	rigour	may	be	assessed	depending	on	whether	the	
researcher	follows	the	relevant	rules	and	formulas,	qualitative	analysis	involves	
assessing	the	rigour	of	creative	pattern-making	and	puzzle-fitting	processes	
(LeCompte,	2000;	Pope	&	Mays,	2000).	Both	quantitative	and	qualitative	work	must	
demonstrate	philosophical	coherence	between	the	ontological	and	epistemological	
perspectives	and	methods,	but	as	a	result,	what	constitutes	a	trustworthy	
contribution	and	strategies	to	ensure	rigour	differs	between	the	two.	As	qualitative	
work	is	interpretive,	trustworthiness	is	reliant	upon	two	intertwined	facets:	the	
credibility	and	skills	of	the	researcher(s),	which	are	then	demonstrated	by	the	use	of	
transparent	methods	that	provide	an	ethical	and	“meaningful	account	of	the	complex	
perspectives	and	realities	studied”	(Cohen	&	Crabtree,	2008,	p.	334;	Patton,	1999).		
While	there	are	many	views	on	the	appropriate	criteria	for	assessing	qualitative	
content,	there	is	wide	agreement	on	the	need	to	demonstrate	the	credibility	and	
resonance	of	the	work	(Creswell	&	Miller,	2000;	Sandelowski,	2015;	Stake,	1995).	
Credibility	relates	to	internal	validity	in	that	the	primary	concern	is	to	provide	an	
accurate	portrayal	of	the	case.	And	yet	an	interpretivist	paradigm	accepts	that	there	
are	multiple	‘truths’.	As	Denzin	succinctly	explains,	“truth	is	always	partial”	(2009,	p.	
153).	To	address	the	‘partiality’	of	truth,	we	incorporate	a	broad	range	of	perspectives	
by	providing	multiple	forms	(e.g.	interviews,	observations,	documents,	etc.)	and	
sources	(e.g.	interviews	with	a	variety	of	stakeholders)	of	data.	When	possible,	we	
involve	multiple	researchers	in	the	data	collection	and	analysis	processes,	seek	out	
contradictory	examples,	obtain	participators’	feedback,	and	engage	in	constant	
comparison	of	this	multiplicity	of	data	(Anderson,	2010;	Booth	et	al.,	2013).		
The	independent	process	of	doctoral	work	meant	there	was	limited	additional	
researcher	involvement.	Yet	the	use	of	other	expert	researchers’	theories	to	guide	
both	data	collection	and	analysis	contributed	another	voice	for	comparison.	
Furthermore,	many	kinds	of	data	were	used,	including	in-depth	interviews,	
engagement	with	the	research	context	for	over	a	year,	and	numerous	kinds	and	
sources	of	documentation.	The	regular	visits	to	the	practice	site	provided	the	
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opportunity	for	ongoing	discussions	with	the	participants,	who	gave	corrective	
feedback,	a	form	of	member	checking,	for	example	on	interpretive	word	choices	and	
sketches	of	the	knowledge	network.	The	extended	time	also	allowed	for	participant	
feedback	to	confirm	and	amend	my	evolving	understanding.		
The	aim	is	also	to	provide	a	detailed	account	such	that	it	is	resonant.	A	common	
concern	of	qualitative	case	study	research	is	that	it	does	not	produce	‘generalisable’	
knowledge.	Stake	(1995)	strongly	pushes	against	the	idea	that	case	study	work	should	
seek	to	develop	general	laws	or	universal	principles.	He	argues	that	such	efforts	stand	
in	direct	opposition	to	the	precious	resource	that	case	studies	data	can	provide—rich	
particularity	and	specificity.	Rather	than	generalisable	material	as	the	basis	of	validity,	
Stake	concludes	that	providing	a	record	of	findings	that	are	resonant	is	the	
appropriate	goal.	Yin	(2014)	also	advocates	achieving	resonance	as	one	source	of	
validation	by	incorporating	rich	description.	Easterby-Smith	et	al.	(2015)	use	different	
terms,	“authenticity,	plausibility,	and	criticality”	(p.	88)	that	make	much	the	same	
point.	The	work	needs	to	demonstrate	a	deep	understanding,	must	fit	within	the	
broad	experiences	of	other	similarly	placed	researchers,	all	the	while	providing	a	
unique	contribution.	Ultimately,	qualitative	work	“should	be	believable”	(Easterby-
Smith	et	al.,	2015,	p.	89).		
An	interpretivist	paradigm	holds	that	exact	replicability	and	reproducibility	is	not	
achievable	in	the	dynamic	social	world	(Morse,	1997).	Social	contexts	are	complex	and	
ever-changing.	Sandelowski	(2015)	argues	that	evaluating	qualitative	work	is	“a	
matter	of	taste”	(p.	86),	where	‘taste’	is	a	deep	level	of	discernment	acquired	through	
extensive	focus	over	an	extended	period	of	time.	An	appropriate	external	assessment	
of	rigour	in	qualitative	research	then	is	based	on	a	refined	judgement,	a	
“connoisseurship”	(Sandelowski,	2015,	p.	90)	grounded	in	experience.	The	researcher	
must	provide	sufficient	and	clear	data	that	convinces	an	expert	evaluator.	
Thus,	the	interpretive	process	is	to	weigh,	explain	and	draw	out	the	specifics	of	a	
particular	case,	puzzle	and	turn	it	and	see	how	it	fits	or	does	not	fit	with	the	existing	
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theoretical	and	empirical	literature.	In	this	way,	we	can	see	that	‘rigour’	is	also	an	
interpretive	determination	bound	to	one’s	philosophical	perspective.	
4.3. Methods:	Carrying	out	the	Case	Study	
4.3.1. Identifying,	Recruiting	and	Selecting	a	Case	
Identifying	a	case	was	a	blend	of	purposive,	purposeful,	and	theoretically-guided	
decision-making	process	(Emmel,	2013).	Choosing	a	case	was	purposive	in	that	it	was	
shaped	and	influenced	by	existing	work,	for	example,	Clinical	Mindlines	(Gabbay	&	le	
May,	2011),	when	developing	a	research	focus	and	related	questions.	These	research	
questions	then	guided	the	determination	of	what	cases	would	be	useful	for	answering	
the	questions.	In	line	with	Gabbay	and	le	May’s	methods,	I	chose	to	study	high-
performing	contexts.	Thus	selection	was	purposeful,	or	strategic,	because	the	goal	was	
to	locate	cases	more	likely	to	provide	ample	data	for	the	area	of	inquiry,	a	reservoir	
with	the	potential	for	rich	resources	that	would	provide	insight	to	the	central	issues	
and	questions	(Patton,	2002).	Finally,	selecting	a	case	contributes	to	a	theoretical	base	
because	as	we	generate	data	and	engage	in	the	analysis	process	we	extend	or	reframe	
the	original	theoretical	work	and	refine	theory	(Burawoy,	2009).	Furthermore,	
“constructivists	opt	for	selecting	theoretically	‘crucial	cases’”	(Blatter,	2008,	p.	4).	In	
sum,	the	reasoning	behind	seeking	a	high-performing	context	of	practice	was	(similar	
to	Gabbay	and	le	May,	2011)	that	we	could	learn	about	how	knowledge	mobilises	
better	from	an	example	of	exemplary	practice.	
Soft	Knowledge	Systems	theory	also	provided	the	bounds	of	the	case.	A	‘knowledge	
network’	is	framed	as	individual	and	collective	actors	whose	knowledge	contributes	to	
a	shared	concern.	Using	Röling’s	(1992b)	explanation,	a	knowledge	network	is	a	“set	
of	actors,	networks	and/or	organizations	[who]	expected	or	managed	to	work	
synergistically	to	support	knowledge	processes”	(Engel,	1997,	p.	31).	A	knowledge	
network	overlaps	in	ways	with	a	Community	of	Practice	(Wenger,	2000),	but	also	
differs	in	key	ways.	A	community	of	practice	is	broadly	defined	as	a	group	of	people	
who	share	a	common	interest,	“concern,	a	set	of	problems,	or	a	passion	about	a	
particular	topic,	and	who	deepen	their	understanding	and	knowledge	of	this	area	by	
interacting	on	an	ongoing	basis”	(Wenger	et	al.,	1998,	p.	4).	Whilst	actors	in	a	
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knowledge	network	would	have	adjoining	concerns,	they	may	not	interact	directly.	
Their	interactions	may	be	mediated	through	physical	materials	such	as	guidelines	and	
the	content	deemed	important	and	placed	on	a	patient	observation	chart.	In	a	
community	of	practice,	the	shared	interactions	and	learning	result	in	a	shaping	and	
transforming	of	individual	member’s	identity.	Members	have	a	sense	of	belonging	to	
the	community	(Wenger	et	al.,	2002).	However,	while	each	subset	of	the	larger	
knowledge	network	(the	Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign	research	network,	NHS	Scotland’s	
Sepsis	Collaborative	policy	network,	and	Aurora	Hospital	practice	network)	might	well	
fit	the	remaining	criteria,	interactions	between	actors	in	the	whole	knowledge	
network	cannot	be	characterised	as	“ongoing”.	While	they	are	interrelated,	they	are	
not	one	community.	And	often	it	is	this	lack	of	direct	connection	that	separates	actors	
and	exemplifies	the	knowledge	mobilisation	problem.	
To	build	depth	of	understanding	of	the	‘whole	network’	involved	in	building	complex	
knowledge	for	mobilisation,	a	single	case	study,	bounded	by	overlapping	research,	
policy	and	practice	communities	within	a	sepsis	knowledge	network	case,	was	
selected.	This	complex	array	of	stakeholders	includes	the	Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign	
research	and	guideline	development	community,	the	NHS	Scotland	policy	community,	
and	Aurora,	a	Scottish	hospital.	Each	community	represents	a	subset	of	the	case	as	
each	has	distinct	responsibilities	and	yet	they	are	united	in	the	ultimate	goal	of	
mobilising	their	sepsis	knowledge	for	service	provision.		
The	reasons	for	choosing	a	case	in	the	patient	safety	area	were	four-fold.	First,	quality	
improvement	efforts,	namely	the	Scottish	Patient	Safety	Programme	(SPSP),	along	
with	comparable	initiatives	in	NHS	England,	have	been	a	high	priority	in	UK	health	
systems	in	recent	years.	Numerous	initiatives	have	been	launched,	tracked,	and	
provided	a	potential	breadth	of	relevant	contexts	of	study.	Second,	these	initiatives	
included	outcome	measures	that	incorporate	a	wide	range	of	judgements	about	what	
constitutes	‘success’.	For	example,	the	performance	measures	and	audit	data	
collected	over	the	course	of	the	SPSP	provided	support	to	the	views	of	those	within	
NHS	Scotland	as	to	which	boards	could	be	considered	high-performing	and	thus	more	
87	
	
likely	able	to	provide	informative	data.	Third,	a	focus	within	a	patient	safety	clinical	
realm	was	desirable	as	I	have	previously	completed	research	in	these	areas.	Though	
not	a	clinician,	I	am	familiar	with	patient	safety	terminology	and	procedures,	lessening	
my	cognitive	load.	One	final	benefit	of	choosing	to	explore	sepsis	within	the	hospital	
practice	setting	was	that	Gabbay	and	le	May’s	(2011)	work	focused	primarily	on	the	
general	practice	setting	with	limited	time	spent	in	the	secondary	care	context.		
Before	recruitment	began,	the	St	Andrews’s	University	Teaching	and	Research	Ethics	
Committee	reviewed	and	approved	the	ethics	application	in	June	2014.	(See	Ethics	
Approval	letter	in	Appendix	A.)	The	approval	was	based	in	part	on	a	screening	by	the	
regional	East	of	Scotland	NHS	ethics	body	which	took	place	earlier	in	February	2014.	
The	East	of	Scotland	review	determined	that	the	study	was	exempted	because	it	was	
not	clinical	research,	and	recruitment	could	commence.		
In	November	2014,	I	attended	a	day-long	meeting	of	the	Scottish	Patient	Safety	
Programme’s	Sepsis	Collaborative,	the	policy-based	community,	in	Glasgow.	I	asked	
the	Collaborative	coordinator	if	she	would	consult	with	colleagues	and	nominate	
hospitals	that	were	considered	high	performers	in	Scotland	for	sepsis	care.	In	January	
2015,	I	contacted	the	coordinator	again,	at	which	time	she	circulated	an	email	inquiry	
asking	specific	hospitals	recognised	nationally	for	their	efforts	if	they	would	be	willing	
to	participate	in	a	research	study.	Aurora	General	Hospital	agreed	and	I	began	
collecting	practice-based	data	in	February	2015.		
4.3.2. Data	Collection		
Consistent	with	case	study	methods,	the	goal	was	to	collect	data	from	a	wide	range	of	
sources	and	types.	This	included	documentation,	artefacts,	observations	captured	in	
field	notes,	as	well	as	interviews	with	a	range	of	stakeholders.	The	aim	was	to	collect	a	
wide	range	of	data	that	contributed	to	a	‘thick’	depiction	of	the	case	(Baxter	&	Jack,	
2008;	Yin,	2014).		
In	person	data	collection	spanned	from	November	2014	until	April	2016.	I	attended	
my	first	Sepsis/VTE	Collaborative	meeting	in	November	2014	and	finished	at	a	Health	
Improvement	Scotland	meeting	in	March	2016.	Data	collection	with	the	staff	of	
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Aurora	hospital	started	in	February	2015	and	concluded	with	a	final	visit	in	February	
2016.	Final	email	communication	for	data	analysis	purposes	was	in	April	2016.	
Documentary	sources	for	sepsis	research	and	NHSS	policy	were	publically	available	
and	collected	throughout	the	project	until	January	2019.		
In	sum,	I	went	searching	in	many	areas	where	sepsis	knowledge	would	be	located.	I	
looked	at	the	relevant	research,	policy	and	practice	networks	and	searched	for	peer-
reviewed	publications,	online	organisational	forums,	governmental	reports,	face-to-
face	meetings,	formal	and	informal	interviews	with	participants,	and,	where	possible,	
walked	alongside	participants	to	spend	time	with	them	whilst	they	were	engaged	in	
developing,	sharing	and	using	their	knowledge.	The	following	sections	explain	the	role	
of	interview,	observational	and	documentary	data	in	this	study,	as	each	form	played	a	
vital	part	in	studying	the	actors	within	the	‘whole’	sepsis	knowledge	network.	
Interview	Data		
Interviews	are	arguably	the	most	common	source	of	qualitative	data	(DiCicco-Bloom	&	
Crabtree,	2006;	Roulston	et	al.,	2003).	This	study	collected	data	via	semi-structured	
and	in-depth	interviews.	While	there	are	different	interview	approaches,	the	primary	
benefit	of	semi-structured	and	in-depth	interviews	is	that	they	provide	direct	contact	
with	participants,	and	they	are	a	flexible	way	of	inquiring	about	the	topic	of	research	
interest.	Interviews	are	interactive	and	allow	for	deep	exploration	of	topics.	
Furthermore,	the	conversational	format	provides	the	opportunity	for	unanticipated	
ideas	to	emerge	and	unfold	(Britten,	2000).	Initially,	I	used	a	semi-structured	interview	
format.	This	allowed	me	to	obtain	multiple	stakeholders’	views	about	who	the	key	
stakeholders	were	within	the	knowledge	network,	the	story	of	sepsis	care	at	Aurora,	
and	what	were	deemed	to	be	the	various	knowledge	sources	that	contributed	to	past	
as	well	as	present	systems	at	the	hospital	and	their	own	provision	of	sepsis	care.	As	
time	progressed,	in	both	ongoing	conversations	and	follow	up	in-depth	interviews	
with	key	stakeholders,	I	was	able	to	examine	emerging	themes	in	greater	detail.	
Further	email	exchanges	occurred	regularly	to	clarify	data	and	confirm	my	
interpretations.	
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I	drafted	multiple	interview	guides.	One	was	for	in-depth	interviews	with	key	
participants	(i.e.	those	primarily	tasked	with	sepsis	care	at	Aurora)	and	a	separate,	
shorter	version	was	used	during	semi-structured	interviews	with	the	less	central	
actors	in	the	knowledge	network.	For	both,	my	initial	interview	questions	were	
constructed	and	revised	to	reflect	the	primary	purpose	of	the	research	study.	I	used	
Soft	Knowledge	Systems	and	Clinical	Mindlines	theories	to	guide	my	inquiry.	Simply	
put,	I	used	narrative-based	interviews	and	asked	participants	to	tell	me	Aurora’s	
sepsis	story.	I	asked	prompting	questions	about	the	participant’s	involvement	and	
experience	with	the	hope	that	this	would	elicit	an	extensive	explanation.	This	
occurred	exceedingly	well	with	some	participants,	and	less	so	with	others.	(Due	to	the	
length	of	the	guide,	see	the	In-depth	Interview	Guide	in	Appendix	B.)	
For	the	less	intensive	interviews	and	those	with	pressured	schedules,	I	developed	a	
separate	semi-structured	interview	guide	that	asked	the	open-ended	questions	in	Box	
4-1:	
	
Semi-Structured	Interview	Guide:	
1. Can	you	describe	your	role	in	providing	sepsis	care?	
2. Who	else	has	been	involved	in	providing	sepsis	care?	Within	the	hospital?	
Outside?	(outlining	the	Knowledge	Network)	
3. Why	would	you	say	that	Aurora	has	been	recognized	as	a	high-performing	
hospital	in	regards	to	sepsis	care?	
4. What	sources	of	knowledge	and	information	have	contributed	to	this	
success?	People?	Evidence?	Organizations?	
5. What	sources	of	data,	information,	knowledge	do	you	draw	upon	in	your	
role?	(Explicit	sources?	Experience?)	
6. (If	they	mention	clinical	judgement):	How	would	you	describe	“clinical	
judgement”?	What	would	the	ingredients	be?	
7. When	faced	with	uncertainty,	what	sources	of	information	and	inspiration	
do	you	turn	to?	(E.g.	Where	did	you	turn	in	the	recent	construction	of	the	
new	observation	chart?)	
	
Box	4-1,	Semi-Structured	Interview	Guide	
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For	follow-up	interviews,	I	used	my	field	notes	to	construct	a	guide	based	on	issues	
arising	during	the	iterative	analysis	process	(see	example	in	Appendix	C,	Follow	Up	
Interview	Guide.)	I	used	these	guides	for	additional	in-depth	exploration	of	emerging	
issues	in	the	formative	analysis	process,	and	this	allowed	for	dialogue-based	member-
checking	along	the	way.	
With	one	exception,	all	interviews	were	carried	out	in	person.	One	participant	asked	if	
we	could	organise	our	interview	over	the	telephone	to	minimise	the	difficulty	we	were	
having	setting	a	time.	The	location	of	interviews	varied	and	was	largely	dependent	on	
the	flexibility	of	the	participant.	Interviews	with	senior	clinicians,	which	included	the	
outreach	nurses	as	well	as	medics	and	administrative	staff	took	place	either	in	their	
offices	or	in	a	more	secluded	area	of	the	dining	hall.	Interviews	with	ward-based	
nurses	were	conducted	in	a	quiet(ish)	corner	off	to	the	side	of	the	ward.	The	ward	
location	was	not	ideal	for	privacy,	but	the	bit	of	space	that	separated	us	from	others	
meant	we	could	not	be	overheard,	and	allowed	me	the	opportunity	to	talk	with	
people	I	would	not	have	otherwise	been	able	to.	Most	often	the	ward	nurses	
expressed	concern	that	they	would	not	have	a	helpful	perspective	to	offer.	After	
assurances	that	I	very	much	wanted	to	hear	their	experiences	and	views,	I	found	
remarkable	candidness	by	most	participants	despite	the	less	than	ideal	setting.	It	
appeared	conducting	the	interview	on	the	ward,	in	“their”	space,	helped	put	them	at	
ease.	
My	process	of	(and	views	about)	recording	interviews	altered	during	my	year	of	
collecting	data.	Early	in	the	process,	I	requested	and	received	permission	to	record	
each	interview.	By	my	third	or	fourth	visit,	one	doctor	greeted	me	in	his	office,	took	
my	papers,	and	then	with	no	time	to	settle,	he	ushered	me	along	on	a	walk	through	
his	ward	to	show	me	points	of	interest.	This	became	an	interview	on	the	run	(he	
walked	at	a	fast	pace).	Soon	after	that,	another	medic	began	sharing	when	my	
briefcase	containing	my	recorder	was	located	elsewhere	in	the	hospital.	What	had	
seemed	unfathomable	to	me	as	an	experienced	qualitative	researcher	(not	having	an	
interview	recorded)	became	a	necessity	to	remain	flexible	to	the	needs	and	
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preferences	of	the	participants	in	the	fast-paced	and	emergent	nature	of	the	field.	
Their	time	was	sometimes	limited	and	their	willingness	to	share	their	views	with	me	
was	valuable,	and	I	had	to	adapt	to	include	other	ways	of	capturing	these	data.	Later,	
as	I	interviewed	nurses	on	the	wards,	a	recorder	was	both	not	practical	and	I	believe	
very	likely	would	have	been	an	impediment	to	their	comfort.	For	all	the	interviews	
that	were	not	captured	on	the	recorder,	I	took	notes	on	paper	at	hand,	and	as	soon	as	
I	could	thereafter	I	captured	the	content	of	our	conversation	in	my	field	notes.	I	came	
to	realise	the	immense	value	of	the	accidental	and	serendipitous	contacts	that	
occurred	with	increased	frequency	during	my	time	at	Aurora.		
Eighteen	participants	agreed	to	be	interviewed	(see	Aurora	Interview	Data,	Table	4-1).	
Some	participants	were	interviewed	multiple	times.	
Table	4-1,	Aurora	Interview	Data	
Interviews	 18	participants	
25	interviews	
Interview	Length	Range	 22	minutes	–	2.5	hours	
(64	minutes	on	average)	
	
The	next	table	(Aurora	Interview	Participants,	Table	4-2)	contains	a	list	of	pseudonyms	
given	to	participants.	The	goal	was	to	protect	the	individual	identity	of	participants	to	
the	extent	possible	in	a	small	nation.	I	have	provided	pseudonyms	and	adjusted	
demographic	information	(e.g.	swapped	genders).		
The	pseudonyms	given	to	actors	reflects	the	way	that	the	people	at	Aurora	referred	to	
one	another	in	the	third	person.	The	nursing	staff,	including	the	senior	level	Outreach	
team	members,	spoke	to	and	of	other	nurses	by	given	names.	When	speaking	of	the	
medical	staff,	however,	the	Outreach	staff	alternated	use	of	their	first	name	and	their	
title.	For	example,	David	would	address	Dr	Lewis	with	his	given	name,	whilst	he	
alternated	names	during	recorded	interviews	and	when	talking	to	others.	The	same	
phenomena	appeared	with	Dr	Adams	(clinical	lead	in	ICU)	and	Mr	King	(clinical	lead	in	
the	Emergency	Department).	David	was	only	known	as	David,	and	never	Mr	McIntyre.	
In	essence,	only	senior	medical	staff	were	sometimes	given	honorifics	(e.g.	Dr	Lewis,	
Dr	Adams,	Mr	King),	otherwise,	people	were	mentioned	by	their	given	name	or	
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position	description.	In	keeping	with	the	practices	of	the	community,	Table	4-2	
identifies	key	actors	within	Aurora,	listing	the	senior	medical	staff	with	titles,	while	the	
rest	of	the	staff	are	represented	using	a	first	name	pseudonym.	
Table	4-2,	Aurora	Interview	Participants	 	
Name	 Professional	role	 	
David*	 ICU	Outreach	Team	nurse	 Team	lead	
Kelly*	 ICU	Outreach	Team	nurse	 	
Jackie*	 ICU	Outreach	Team	nurse	 	
Leann*	 ICU	Outreach	Team	nurse	 	
Martha*	 Clinical	Governance	 Patient	safety	asst,	Former	
nurse	
Sue*	 Clinical	Governance		 Team	lead,	practicing	nurse	
Dr	Nicholas	Lewis*	 Critical	Care	doctor	 Retired	clinical	lead	
Dr	Adams	 Critical	Care	doctor	 Present	clinical	lead	
Dr	Lomas	 Critical	Care	doctor	 	
Dr	Sloan	 Anaesthetist		 	
Dr	Jones	 Microbiologist	 	
Mr	King	 A&E	doctor	 Clinical	lead	
Hannah	 Training	and	Development	 Former	nurse	
Karen	 Staff	nurse	 	
Curt	 Staff	nurse	 	
Andy	 Charge	nurse	 	
Alison	 Staff	nurse	 	
Michael	 Clinical	support	nurse	 	
	 	 (*Multiple	interviews)	
	
I	conducted	five	further	interviews	with	one	NHS	Scotland	Sepsis	Collaborative	leader	
and	four	Collaborative	participants	from	hospitals	other	than	Aurora.	I	met	these	
individuals	either	at	Sepsis	Collaborative	meetings	or	visited	them	in	their	workplace	
(see	Table	4-3,	Sepsis	Collaborative	Interview	Data).	
Table	4-3,	Sepsis	Collaborative	Interview	Data	
Interviews	 5	participants	
Interview	Length	Range	 50	minutes	–	2.5	hours	
(90	minutes	on	average)	
	
I	transcribed	all	recorded	interviews.	I	did	not	transcribe	my	introductory	or	unrelated	
conclusion	comments,	nor	interruptions	during	interviews	(which	occurred	a	few	
times).	As	the	transcriptions	were	exclusively	for	my	analytical	purposes,	I	did	not	
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include	“Uh	huh’s”	or	other	conversational	noises.	Lastly,	when	transcribing	and	an	
analytical	thought	occurred,	I	inserted	it	in	the	document	set	off	by	brackets.	
Observational	Data	
As	the	use	of	qualitative	methods	have	increased	in	health	services	research,	the	value	
of	close	observational	data	has	grown	in	recognition	(Dixon-Woods	&	Shojania,	2016).		
Most	months	between	February	2014	and	February	2015	included	site	visits,	
sometimes	two,	that	lasted	at	minimum	5	hours	and	at	maximum	10	hours.	My	early	
observation	data	included	descriptions	of	the	physical	space	of	the	hospital	and	its	
surroundings.	The	length	of	time	for	the	visits	increased	as	the	relationships	grew.	
Shadowing	provided	direct	access	to	naturally	occurring	interactions.	I	witnessed	first-
hand	how	stakeholders	performed	during	their	work	day:	the	rhythm,	the	people,	the	
resources,	the	equipment,	the	activities.	I	could	see	how	meetings	were	conducted,	
who	the	team	ate	meals	with,	how	they	interacted	with	other	staff	and	patients.	
Furthermore,	key	informants	began	to	narrate	what	was	happening	at	the	time,	or	
soon	thereafter,	what	was	going	through	their	mind.	For	example,	on	one	occasion	I	
witnessed	a	discussion	between	an	ICU	consultant,	an	ICU	specialist	and	one	of	the	
ICU	Outreach	team	members.	The	Outreach	team	member	and	specialist	were	
concerned	about	a	patient	and	wanted	to	bring	him	from	the	ward	to	the	ICU	for	
closer	observation.	They	did	not	state	this	explicitly	but	I	later	learned	from	the	
Outreach	team	member	that	the	whole	conversation	was	spent	trying	to	convince	the	
consultant	to	agree	with	them	(they	did	not	succeed).	While	the	exchange	had	
appeared	agreeable,	the	Outreach	nurse	said	that	the	specialist	was	not	happy	with	
the	decision.	I	noted	that	this	decision	contradicted	the	oft-stated	proactive	stance	of	
the	ICU	staff	to	prevent	sepsis	(which	I	witnessed	most	often).	The	nurse	responded	
that	they	as	an	Outreach	team	could	only	go	so	far	in	their	authority.	She	noted	that	
they	knew	what	to	anticipate	from	each	of	the	medics	they	worked	with	regularly,	and	
had	to	assess	whether	it	was	necessary	to	push	harder	for	their	goal	or	be	patient	and	
not	squander	the	goodwill	of	and	relationship	with	the	consultant.		
Based	on	my	prior	qualitative	experience,	I	had	perceived	that	observational	data	
typically	filled	a	secondary,	confirmatory	role.	However,	in	this	study	I	found	that	
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observation	data	provided	more	than	confirmation	of	interview	data,	but	provided	
new	insights	and	an	enriched	understanding	of	the	relationships	between	the	actors	
at	Aurora.	Drawing	on	ethnographic	methods,	which	emphasise	observational	
methods	(Pope	&	Mays,	2000),	I	was	able	to	hear	the	viewpoints	of	the	actors	during	
their	interactions	with	others.	I	was	able	to	watch	and	hear	them	analyse	knowledge	
sources.	I	observed	how	and	when	they	reached	for	explicit	sources	that	were	
available	to	hand,	but	especially	in	the	last	months,	I	was	also	privileged	to	hear	them	
reason	aloud	for	my	benefit.	I	was	allowed	‘behind	the	curtain’	access	to	listen	in	to	
their	reasoning,	perspectives,	and	opinions.	This	involved	a	wide	range	of	subjects	
from	concerns	about	a	particular	patient,	explanations	of	their	actions,	and	how	they	
felt	about	the	staff	around	us.	I	could	witness	their	collecting,	coordinating	and	
negotiating	a	variety	of	information	sources	via	interactions	with	other	staff	members.	
I	would	attempt	to	remain	out	of	the	way,	but	increasingly	was	encouraged	to	come	in	
close	to	see	what	was	happening.	In	this	way,	I	found	shadowing	to	be	both	
participative	and	non-participative.	The	observation	process	was	interactive	and	did	
more	than	supplement	the	interview	data.	The	time	spent	watching	as	well	as	talking	
with	people	built	a	context-based	understanding	that	contributes	to	the	credibility	of	
these	data	(Waring	&	Bishop,	2010).		
As	my	contact	progressed,	it	became	clearer	to	me	that	the	richest	data	was	in	my	
observation	material.	This	included	unrecorded	conversations	around	a	dining	table,	
in	a	break	room,	and	when	walking	the	wards.	Recording	my	reflections	in	field	notes	
became	a	high	priority,	and	I	experimented	with	different	ways	to	capture	my	
observations.	In	the	end,	when	on	site	I	carried	a	hand-sized	notepad	around	with	me	
to	jot	down	key	words	and	phrases.	I	could	fit	the	pad	in	my	pocket.	It	seemed	that	
the	less	my	hands	were	filled	with	‘research-ery’	material,	the	more	comfortable	the	
hospital	staff	felt	to	just	talk.	But	when	I	had	a	moment	alone,	often	waiting	in	the	hall	
while	the	staff	attended	to	a	patient,	I	could	make	notes	to	myself	and	minimise	the	
chance	I	would	forget	something	worth	further	consideration	later.	Immediately	
following	my	visit,	I	would	take	the	notes	and	expand	them	to	describe	more	fully	the	
interaction,	event	or	my	thoughts.	
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In	addition	to	shadowing	clinical	staff	at	Aurora,	I	began	to	schedule	my	visits	on	the	
day	of	the	hospital’s	Deteriorating	Patient	meetings.	These	meetings	occurred	
fortnightly	and	included	clinical,	management,	and	administrative	staff	throughout	
the	hospital	responsible	in	some	way	for	sepsis	care.		
Observations	for	NHS	Scotland’s	Sepsis	Collaborative,	the	policy	community,	included	
attendance	at	NHS	Scotland	meetings	that	were	available	to	me	as	a	doctoral	
researcher.	This	included	Sepsis	Collaborative	meetings	and	Health	Improvement	
Scotland	meetings	that	involved	sepsis-related	research	presentations.	I	recorded	
observational	notes	in	my	research	journal	during	these	day-long	meetings.	
Observation	data	captured	in	field	notes	alongside	the	interview	and	documentary	
data	contributed	to	a	far	more	nuanced	account.	The	result	is	that	I	am	able	to	more	
confidently	affirm	the	credibility	and	authenticity	of	my	interpretation	of	the	case	
(Bloomberg	&	Volpe,	2008;	Cohen	&	Crabtree,	2008).	I	could	corroborate	and	piece	
together	the	points	made	during	incidences	I	personally	witnessed,	and	I	had	the	
opportunity	to	validate	or	clarify	my	interpretations.	One	example,	discussed	in	more	
detail	later	in	the	findings,	was	about	the	impending	switch	at	Aurora	to	a	new	patient	
observation	chart	and	scoring	system.	During	my	first	site	visit,	I	thought	I	had	picked	
up	tones	of	worry	in	off-handed	comments	during	interviews	as	well	as	in	informal	
discussions.	Later,	as	I	sat	in	on	the	Deteriorating	Patient	meetings,	I	could	see	that	
the	changeover	consumed	the	agenda	over	the	course	of	my	year	at	Aurora.	Over	
time,	I	was	able	to	talk	at	length	with	numerous	stakeholders	about	their	views	and	
concerns	(which	certainly	varied)	about	switching	to	a	new	chart	system.	
Ongoing	observation	and	time	in	the	field	allowed	for	member	checking	as	well.	I	was	
able	to	consider	the	emerging	themes	and	seek	clarifications	and	receive	feedback.	
One	example,	recorded	in	my	field	notes	(November	2015)	said,	“During	my	time	
today	with	[Kelly]	I	was	trying	to	pick	at	this	issue	of	what	sources	she	trusted.	I	asked	
if	this	was	information	she	would	trust.	She	didn’t	think	‘trust’	was	the	right	word.	It	
was	more	a	matter	of	trial	and	error.	She	said,	‘you	try	and	use	it,	does	it	work?	No,	
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well	let’s	try	this.	You	maybe	just	tweak	it	a	bit.	It’s	all	that	trial	and	error	and	doing	
PDSAs	[Plan-Do-Study-Act	cycles]	on	it.’”	
Drawing	on	both	observation	and	interview	data	also	allowed	me	to	see	the	holes,	or	
the	places	where	incongruences	took	place.	One	example	(explained	earlier)	was	seen	
in	the	consultant’s	lack	of	willingness	to	admit	a	patient	of	concern	to	the	ICU	despite	
numerous	claims	by	various	staff	to	‘always’	be	proactive	in	preventing	sepsis.	
Another	example	was	that	one	member	of	Aurora’s	staff	gave	a	rousing	description	of	
teamwork	and	respect	for	all	staff	in	their	interview,	but	I	observed	first-hand	and	
from	others	during	interviews	that	this	was	not	always	the	case.	Having	multiple	
sources	of	data,	collected	over	time,	provided	the	opportunity	to	uncover	the	less	tidy	
side	of	knowledge	mobilisation,	and	the	ways	the	staff	overcame	these	challenges.	
Documentary	Data	
The	printed	word	has	had	a	profound	influence	on	our	social	world	(Burke,	2000),	and	
yet	documents	are	an	often	underused	source	within	qualitative	research	(Prior,	
2003).	Atkinson	and	Coffey	(2011)	explain	that	documents	are	‘social	facts’,	meaning	
they	are	created	by	people	with	the	intention	to	communicate	ideas	and	concepts	
with	others.	Their	construction	and	production	are	dependent	on	interaction	with	
other	people’s	ideas,	content,	and	often	direct	input.	Prior	(2003)	agrees	saying	that	
documents	are	not	mere	words	on	paper,	but	represent	(and	thereby	are	in	a	sense)	
actors	engaged	in	“fields,	frames	and	networks	of	action”	(2003,	p.	2).		
This	research	project	collected	a	wide	variety	of	documentary	materials	from	the	
research,	policy	and	practice	communities.	Documents	drawn	from	the	research	
community	included	academic	articles	published	in	peer-reviewed	clinical	journals	
regarding	sepsis,	and	sepsis	care.	They	also	included	publications	from	the	Surviving	
Sepsis	Campaign	(found	in	journals	associated	with	related	specialist	organisations,	for	
example,	Critical	Care	Medicine	and	Intensive	Care	Medicine,	as	well	as	generalist	
journals	such	as	BMJ	and	JAMA).	For	both	the	research	and	policy	communities	I	also	
drew	upon	the	grey	literature	of	organisational	publications	and	other	publically	
available,	web-based	information.	The	organisations	included	the	International	Sepsis	
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Forum,	the	Institute	for	Healthcare	Improvement,	NHS	Scotland,	the	Scottish	Patient	
Safety	Programme,	and	NHS	Scotland’s	Sepsis	Collaborative.	The	materials	included	
white	papers,	planning	materials,	project	evaluations,	briefing	papers,	and	
organisational	structure	and	membership	information.	Additionally,	Aurora	provided	
audit	and	performance	reports,	internal	reports,	training	materials,	sample	patient	
observation	charts	and	paper-based	tools	(i.e.	their	Sepsis	Sticker)	and	Deteriorating	
Patient	meeting	agendas	and	minutes.		
Indeed,	all	of	the	data	from	the	research	network	were	collated	from	documentary	
sources.	These	materials	have	been	interrogated,	weighed	and	cross-referenced	to	
compile	a	narrative.	In	this	way,	this	study	did	not	privilege	one	form	of	data	over	
another.	The	published	literature	was	considered	with	as	much	seriousness	as	the	
data	that	came	from	interview	and	observational	methods	more	readily	available	in	
the	policy	and	practice	contexts.	And	the	Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign-related	
documents	demonstrated	a	long-standing	collaboration	with	ongoing	engagement	
and	interactions	that	continue	to	this	day.	
Data	sources	for	the	NHS	Scotland	policy	community	included	the	Scottish	Patient	
Safety	Programme	website,	peer	reviewed	publications	such	as	Tarrant	et	al.	(2015),	
journal	publications	on	Sepsis	6,	UK	guideline	bodies	(SIGN,	NICE)	sepsis	publications,	
publically	available	material	on	the	Sepsis	Collaboration	(e.g.	pre-recorded	interviews	
with	policy	leaders,	slide	sets	posted	from	collaborative	meetings,	evaluation	
documents),	my	own	interviews	with	a	policy	leader	and	other	Collaborative	
participants,	interview	data	from	Aurora,	observations	and	informal	conversations	
while	attending	two	Sepsis	Collaborative	meetings	and	one	Health	Improvement	
Scotland	meeting	that	included	a	sepsis	segment.		
The	documentary	materials	from	Aurora	provided	internal	validation	and	confirmation	
of	nationally	reported	performance	data	and	supported	their	claims	and	outsiders’	
beliefs	that	they	are	a	high-performing	hospital	with	regard	to	sepsis	care.	
Performance	and	audit	data	shared	in	documentary	form	were	frequently	referred	to	
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in	order	to	provide	justification	for	what	they	had	done	and	further	confirmed	and	
corroborated	information	shared	during	interviews.		
The	performance	and	audit	data	also	provided	a	point	of	reference	during	the	
interviews	(e.g.	did	the	person	trust	the	data	in	the	documents?).	I	thought	that	
collecting	documentation	might	be	a	sensitive	matter,	requiring	careful	planning	and	
wording.	However,	as	most	of	the	quality	and	performance	data	is	tracked	for	NHS	
Scotland	audit	systems	already,	the	staff	readily	shared	these	data.	
The	documentary	data	were	collected	from	sources	located	in	peer	reviewed	research	
journals,	in	particular	Critical	Care	Medicine	and	Intensive	Care	Medicine	(the	journals	
belonging	to	two	key	actors,	both	critical	care	specialist	societies),	organisations’	
website	content,	for	example	the	Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign,	Institute	for	Healthcare	
Improvement	(IHI),	and	the	International	Sepsis	Forum	websites,	as	well	as	grey	
literature,	such	as	specialty	organisation	position	statements,	UK	government	
documents,	and	IHI	White	Papers.		
In	this	research	project,	research	publications	are	viewed	as	a	form	of	communication	
from	(in	this	case	typically)	a	collective	actor	to	interested	parties.	For	example,	the	
Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign	guideline	development	committee	stated	that	the	guideline	
was	for	wide	distribution	and	intended	for	the	policy	and	practice	communities.	
Therefore,	these	documentary	data	are	analysed	using	the	same	methods	as	with	
interview	transcripts,	where	meaning	is	scrutinised	and	interpreted	(Bowen,	2009).	
Lastly,	with	permission,	I	photographed	some	visual	artefacts	from	Aurora.	This	
included	pictures	of	charts	and	signs	on	the	walls,	the	messy	piles	of	binders	
containing	sepsis	materials	in	Accident	&	Emergency,	and	a	calm	moment	with	a	key	
participant	(face	not	visible)	at	their	desk	entering	tracking	data	into	their	tracking	log.	
Care	was	taken	to	exclude	faces	or	distinguishable	features.	Of	all	these	materials,	
when	included	in	the	findings	section,	the	identifying	markers	are	masked.	
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Ceasing	Data	Collection	
Data	saturation	is	an	oft	used	expression	to	describe	when	a	qualitative	researcher	
recognises	that	they	can	stop	collecting	data.	Bradley	et	al.	state	that	“this	is	the	point	
at	which	no	new	concepts	emerge”	(2007,	p.	1764).	I	did	not	find	this	a	readily	
identifiable	moment.	Quite	the	contrary,	I	believe	there	was	much	more	to	learn	and	
see	at	Aurora.	Likewise,	the	research	community	continues	to	publish	highly	relevant	
articles.	Ceasing	data	collection	was	a	pragmatic	requirement,	not	at	all	a	matter	of	
saturation.	This	fits	with	my	ontological	perspective	that	views	human	phenomena	
and	experience	as	ongoing	and	emergent	in	nature.	There	will	always	be	more	that	
happens,	more	to	learn,	and	hence	more	to	understand.	Nevertheless,	all	research	
projects	must	find	an	ending	point.	As	a	PhD	researcher,	time	pressures	necessitated	
that	I	stop	and	shift	to	bringing	the	project	to	completion.	
4.3.3. Level	of	Inquiry	
The	level	of	inquiry,	often	referred	to	as	the	unit	of	analysis,	provides	the	basis	for	
data	collection	and	analysis	(Easterby-Smith	et	al.,	2015).	The	unit	can	range	from	
broad	(e.g.	countries,	cultures)	to	specific	(individuals,	stories).	While	it	is	uncommon	
to	incorporate	multiple	levels	of	analysis,	the	theoretical	aims	of	this	study	justify	this	
approach.	Crossan	et	al.	(2011)	acknowledge	that	learning	is	located	within	and	across	
levels.		While	one	area	can	be	placed	to	the	fore,	it	is	also	helpful	“to	expose	the	
multilevel	relationships”	(p.	454)	between	individuals,	groups	and	organisations.	
Knowledge	mobilisation	is	a	set	of	complex	interactions	that	occurs	at	all	levels.		
The	case	was	explored	both	retrospectively	and	as	events	unfolded.	The	reasons	for	
this	are	three-fold.	First,	a	documentary	analysis	of	sepsis-related	publications	and	
policy	position	papers	provided	a	historical	marker	of	the	ongoing	process	of	scientific	
research	and	policy	decisions	that	the	practice	context	experienced.	At	Aurora,	both	
documentary	information	and	interviewees	provided	a	retrospective	story	of	sepsis	
care.	Asking	participants	to	share	their	recollection	of	events	provided	an	opportunity	
for	reflective	learning	(Schön,	1987)	and	sense-making	of	how	prior	events	
contributed	to	their	present	sepsis-related	activities.	The	complexity	of	work	place	
change	can	sometimes	make	it	difficult	for	the	actors	to	see	and	understand	what	is	
100	
	
important	in	the	moment,	and	the	role	of	serendipity	in	change	is	often	only	evident	
in	the	aftermath	(McDaniel	et	al.,	2009;	Plsek	&	Greenhalgh,	2001).	Second,	because	
the	decision	was	taken	to	choose	a	hospital	that	had	succeeded	in	their	patient	safety	
efforts,	it	was	important	to	learn	how	the	actors	made	sense	of	their	successful	
quality	improvement	efforts.	Third,	the	time	in	the	field	at	Aurora	allowed	me	the	
opportunity	to	observe	their	ongoing	practice	during	each	visit	as	it	emerged.		
4.3.4. Data	Analysis		
“At	no	point	in	naturalistic	case	research	are	the	qualitative	and	quantitative	
techniques	less	alike	than	during	analysis”	(Stake,	1995,	p.	75).	Whereas	the	
quantitative	researcher	relies	upon	aggregation	to	demonstrate	a	finding	of	
significance,	the	qualitative	case	researcher	recognises	the	at	times	disproportional	
nature	of	significant	data.	A	one-time	incident,	or	a	behaviour	that	deviates	from	the	
norm,	can	hold	significant	meaning.	For	example,	many	times	the	staff	at	Aurora	
referred	to	their	friendly,	highly	relational	community,	and	this	was	indeed	evident.	I	
anticipated	that	the	collegial	environment	might	be	a	primary	reason	why	sepsis	
knowledge	had	been	mobilised	successfully	within	this	hospital.	I	was	therefore	
surprised	when	hints	were	dropped	that	mistrust	also	existed.	While	relatively	rare,	
the	revelations	of	communication	fractures	and	lack	of	trust	were	important	in	
reaching	a	more	nuanced	understanding	of	the	knowledge	mobilisation	process.	
Disconfirming	examples	affected	the	analysis	of	the	whole,	prompted	more	complex	
interpretations,	and	fundamentally	shaped	the	summative	analysis	and	contribution	
of	this	thesis.	Stake	(1995)	affirms	the	importance	of	noting	the	repetitive	occurrences	
alongside	infrequent,	albeit	powerful,	events.	
Analysis	for	qualitative	research	is	also	dissimilar	to	quantitative	research	in	that	it	is	
not	sequential	but	iterative	and	formative	(Bradley	et	al.,	2007).	Analysis	begins	in	the	
early	stages	of	data	collection	and	continues	until	the	last	word	is	written.	Silverman	
(2010)	recommends	a	two-stage	analysis	process.	First,	considering	the	data	according	
to	theoretical	schema.	Here	is	where	the	researcher	endeavours	to	make	sense	of	the	
mystery.	The	important	and	often	neglected	second	stage	is	to	look	for	connections	
between	the	themes,	which	provides	a	more	defined	focus.	Other	qualitative	research	
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scholars	explain	that	the	analysis	process	involves	describing,	classifying	and	
connecting	themes	to	provide	the	basis	of	interpretation	(Coffey	&	Atkinson,	1996).	
Some	see	these	occurring	in	separate,	distinct	stages	(Miles	et	al.,	2014)	and	others	
see	them	as	overlapping	and	occurring	in	parallel	(Wolcott,	1994).		
To	begin	the	formal,	or	summative,	stage	of	analysis,	I	decided,	following	Stake	(1995)	
to	‘listen	to	the	data’	and	not	prod	it	into	a	particular	shape.	I	entered	the	transcripts	
and	field	notes	into	N’Vivo	15	software	and	began	coding.	The	primary	goal	at	this	
point	was	to	familiarise	myself	with	the	whole.	“Coding	is	much	more	than	simply	
giving	categories	to	data;	it	is	also	about	conceptualising	the	data,	raising	questions,	
providing	provisional	answers	about	the	relationships	among	and	within	the	data,	and	
discovering	the	data…to	open	up	the	inquiry	and	move	toward	interpretation”	(Coffey	
&	Atkinson,	1996,	referring	to	Strauss,	1987,	on	p.	31).	
I	began	with	some	basic	codes—‘team’,	‘trust’,	‘knowledge’,	which	quickly	segmented	
into	differing	kinds	of	knowledge	(e.g.	experience,	explicit).	Thus,	the	first	attempt	at	
coding	was	loosely	based	on	the	research	purpose,	research	questions,	and	the	
emerging	themes	from	the	formative	stage	of	analysis.	In	the	process,	I	expanded	and	
divided	further	as	ideas	emerged.	One	example	is	the	role	of	meetings:	what	
occurred,	what	was	the	purpose	of	meeting	collectively,	who	was	there,	who	led	the	
meeting,	how	did	negotiations	and	decisions	happen	here,	where	did	the	negotiations	
take	place	outside	the	meeting	space,	who	spoke	and	who	didn’t.	These	were	indeed	
important	markers	for	my	analysis	process	and	yet	I	found	the	software	less	helpful	
than	I	had	expected.	I	was	splintering	the	content	further	and	further	down	to	ever	
more	specific	codes	and	nodes.	I	was	capturing	some	big	ideas,	but	dismantling	the	
interdependent	whole	in	such	a	way	that	I	found	it	difficult	to	“see”.	The	process	
simultaneously	helped	me	begin	to	sharpen	my	understanding	of	the	whole	but	also	
fragmented	my	data.	Thus,	the	coding	process	was	less	useful	for	my	ultimate	
purposes	than	I	had	anticipated.	In	the	end,	my	use	of	NVivo	was	valuable	for	
retrieving	specific	quotes,	but	was	less	helpful	for	moving	forward	the	analysis	
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process.	I	found	separating	data	into	electronic	pots	did	more	to	confuse	than	to	
move	the	analysis	process	forward.		
Instead,	I	shifted	to	a	theory-directed	analysis	process	to	illuminate	the	data	(Kelly,	
2010;	Reeves	et	al.,	2008).	This	entailed	a	cyclical	process	of	interrogating	the	data,	
having	reflective	discussions	with	experts,	and	returning	to	the	Soft	Knowledge	
Systems	and	Clinical	Mindlines	theoretical	material.	I	listened	through	all	of	my	
recordings,	whilst	reading	the	transcripts.	I	found	hearing	the	voices	of	my	
participants,	the	additional	sensory	component,	helpful.	I	listened	to	each	interview	
two	times,	and	key	participants	between	three	and	five	times.	I	reviewed	each	of	the	
key	Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign	definition	and	guideline	documents	(see	a	list	of	key	
documents	in	Appendix	D)	and	located	the	areas	that	spoke	of	multiple	forms	of	
knowledge	and	the	connections	between	individuals	and	groups.	Similarly,	I	re-
examined	the	Scottish	Patient	Safety	Programme	materials	related	to	sepsis.		
Eventually,	from	Soft	Knowledge	Systems	and	Clinical	Mindlines,	I	developed	an	
analytical	guide	to	interrogate	these	data.	I	asked	questions	such	as:	Who	are	the	
actors	involved?	How	were	they	arranged	in	their	setting	to	create,	share,	or	use	their	
sepsis-based	knowledge?	What	are	they	doing?	What	knowledge(s)	are	they	tending	
to?	How	are	they	organising	their	knowledge?	How	do	varying	forms	of	knowledge	
work	together	within	the	knowledge	mobilisation	process?	What	(explicit	or	implicit)	
processes	did	each	community	depend	upon	to	facilitate	knowledge	mobilisation?	
What	materials	did	they	devise	and	use	to	accomplish	their	work?	How	does	the	
community	connect	with	the	other	communities	in	the	whole	knowledge	network?	
Thus	I	used	Soft	Knowledge	Systems	and	Collective	Mindlines	as	tools	to	explore	and	
then	organise,	interpret	and	make	sense	of	the	data	(Llewelyn,	2003).	Soft	Knowledge	
Systems	helped	me	methodologically	define	the	case	boundary	as	the	interconnected	
knowers	that	made	up	a	‘whole’	sepsis	knowledge	network.	In	the	findings	chapters	I	
use	Soft	Knowledge	Systems	to	explore	and	understand	how	the	actors	connected	and	
the	ways	they	were	dependent	upon	one	another	to	accomplish	their	shared	goal	of	
bringing	a	consistently	high	standard	of	sepsis	care.		
103	
	
Using	theory	both	as	a	way	to	collect	and	analyse	these	data	allows	for	an	element	of	
‘theory-testing’:	is	Soft	Knowledge	Systems	resonant	(or	not);	is	it	credible,	
confirmable,	and	dependable?	Does	this	theory	prove	a	cohesive	way	to	account	for	
interconnected	knowers?	Does	Soft	Knowledge	Systems	hold	up	in	the	context	of	this	
study?	These	questions	hold	for	Clinical	Mindlines	as	well.	Using	theory	in	these	ways	
explicitly	connects	this	work	to	the	academic	literature,	and	provides	both	theoretical	
and	empirical	contributions	(discussed	further	in	the	Discussion	Chapter).	
4.4. Conclusion	
In	summary,	this	chapter	has	explained	the	research	methodology,	design	and	
methods	which	support	this	study.	The	next	chapter,	Chapter	5,	begins	to	unfold	the	
actors	and	events	in	the	research	and	policy	networks,	and	then	Chapter	6	turns	to	
Aurora	General	Hospital.	
	 	
104	
	
	 	
105	
	
5. Chapter	5—The	Research	and	Policy	Networks		
The	preceding	chapters	have	framed	the	research	problem,	described	the	
methodology	and	methods	used	in	this	study,	and	explored	the	health	services	
literature	regarding	knowledge	and	the	organisational	structures	that	are	relied	upon	
to	facilitate	knowledge	mobilisation.	The	following	two	findings	chapters	provide	an	
empirical	account	of	the	actors	that	were	part	of	this	sepsis-focused	knowledge	
network,	and	their	events,	processes,	and	materials	for	mobilising	sepsis	knowledge	in	
this	study.		
This	first	findings	chapter	traces	the	development	of	collective	actors,	concepts,	
evidence	and	initiatives	around	sepsis	in	the	research	and	policy	networks.	These	data	
provide	the	foundation	for	the	next	chapter’s	account	at	Aurora	General	Hospital.	
Furthermore,	these	data	provide	glimpses	of	interactions	within	these	two	community	
sectors	that	contributed	to	their	mobilising	knowledge	for	care.		
The	content	within	this	chapter	is	divided	into	two	main	sections.	The	first	section	
focuses	on	the	international	research	network,	specifically	the	knowledge	systems	
that	constitute	the	Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign	actors,	processes,	and	materials.	The	
second	section	turns	to	consider	the	NHS	Scotland	policy	network	tasked	with	sepsis	
care,	the	Sepsis	Collaborative.	These	actors	and	activities	are	not	comprehensive	
representations	of	their	respective	areas,	but	are	the	subsets	explicitly	identified	by	
many	participants	at	Aurora	General	Hospital.	A	third	section	provides	a	summary	
table	drawn	from	the	research	and	policy	content	that	consolidates	the	sepsis	specific	
terminology	presented	in	this	chapter	and	is	intended	to	be	a	helpful	reference	point	
moving	forward.	
As	explained	in	the	last	chapter,	Soft	Knowledge	Systems	and	Clinical	Mindlines	
shaped	the	design	and	data	collection	as	well	as	the	analysis	of	this	research	project.	
These	chapters	present	and	analyse	the	findings	to	answer	the	primary	research	
question	and	the	sub-research	questions	drawn	from	the	literatures	in	Chapters	2	and	
3.	As	a	reminder,	the	questions	are:		
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RQ:	How	is	knowledge	mobilised	within	and	between	the	research,	policy	and	practice	
communities	for	clinical	practice?	
Sub-RQ	1:	What	are	the	sources,	forms	and	ways	of	knowing	involved	in	
mobilising	research-based	knowledge	in	practice?	
Sub-RQ	2:	How	are	knowledge	systems	(actors,	processes,	and	materials)	
organised	for	mobilising	knowledge?	
The	content	for	each	community	unfolds	in	three	parts	to	answer	these	questions.	The	
first	part	presents	a	largely	chronological	account	of	sepsis-focused	activities	in	the	
network.	The	narrative	introduces	concepts	relevant	to	the	Soft	Knowledge	System	
sub-research	questions:	who	the	key	actors	are	in	the	community	and	what	they	did.	
The	second	part	shifts	to	analyse	the	data	in	relationship	to	the	knowledge	systems	
(the	structural	arrangement	of	actors,	the	processes,	and	materials).	Finally,	the	third	
part	draws	together	the	key	findings.	
5.1. The	Research	Network:	Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign	
The	chapter	now	turns	to	focus	on	the	Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign	and	related	
organisations’	efforts	to	provide	sepsis	definitions	and	guidelines	for	practicing	
clinicians.	The	Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign,	while	only	a	part	of	the	worldwide	sepsis	
research	body,	was	the	research	body	named	repeatedly	and	by	numerous	study	
participants	at	Aurora	General	Hospital	and	the	Sepsis	Collaborative.	As	explained	in	
Chapter	4,	the	following	content	was	distilled	from	journal	publications,	grey	
literature,	and	organisational	websites.		
As	noted	above,	this	section	has	three	parts.	The	first	part	provides	an	overview	of	the	
sepsis	research	community	actors	and	events.	The	second	part	more	explicitly	
analyses	the	knowledge	systems	within	the	research	community	by	applying	the	Soft	
Knowledge	Systems	and,	where	possible,	the	Clinical	Mindlines	theories’	lenses.	The	
third	part	uses	these	data	to	answer	the	research	questions	within	the	research	
community.		
107	
	
5.1.1. Sepsis	Story	
Sepsis	has	been	around	for	a	very	long	time.	The	condition	appears	in	Homer’s	works	
and	was	first	given	a	name	by	Hippocrates	(Funk	et	al.,	2009).	Despite	centuries	of	
awareness,	the	precise	cause	and	what	circumstances	precede	a	patient’s	maladapted	
response	to	infection	remains	unknown.	As	recently	as	1989	Bone	and	colleagues	
found	it	necessary	to	publish	a	piece	declaring	that	sepsis	was	indeed	“a	valid	clinical	
entity”	(Bone	et	al.,	1989,	p.	389).	It	is	only	in	recent	decades	that	the	biomedical	and	
clinical	research	community	have	come	together	in	a	concerted	effort	to	address	a	
confusing	array	of	sepsis	definitions	and	recommendations.		
Bone’s	Consensus	Conference	
The	definition	for	sepsis	has	gone	through	three	consensus-based	iterations,	Sepsis-1,	
Sepsis-2,	and	Sepsis-3.	Sepsis	definitions	and	Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign-related	
guideline	developments	were	first	spearheaded	by	members	from	two	North	
American	medical	specialist	societies,	the	Society	for	Critical	Care	Medicine	(SCCM)	
and	the	American	College	of	Chest	Physicians	(ACCP).	They	gathered	together	in	
Chicago	in	1991	for	the	first	Consensus	Conference	for	sepsis.	Chaired	by	Roger	Bone,	
35	experts	seeded	an	alliance	and	began	a	collaborative	effort	that	continues	to	this	
day.	The	1991	Consensus	Conference	marked	the	first	attempt	to	draw	together	
otherwise	disconnected	experts	with	intersecting	interests,	many	of	whom	were	well-
established	academic	writers	in	a	growing	body	of	sepsis	research	literature.	
Attendees	were	affiliated	with	a	variety	of	prestigious	medical	schools,	universities,	
and	hospitals	as	well	as	a	handful	of	pharmaceutical	and	device	companies.	Bone	and	
colleagues	produced	the	seminal	consensus-based	definitions	for	sepsis	(eventually	
referred	to	as	“Sepsis-1”)	as	well	as	the	first	set	of	sepsis	practice	guidelines.	These	
materials	were	published	together	in	a	single	12-page	document	(1992).		
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Bone	et	al.’s	publication	(1992)	
proposed	a	descriptive	definition	
of	sepsis	based	on	observable	
clinical	phenomena	present	in	
septic	patients.	They	said	that	the	
physical	manifestations	were	the	
result	of	Systematic	Inflammatory	
Response	Syndrome,	or	SIRS.	SIRS	was	based	on	four	criteria	(see	SIRS	Criteria,	Box	5-
1).	The	consensus-based	definition	stated	that	when	two	or	more	SIRS	criteria	fell	
outside	of	normal	parameters	and	there	was	a	confirmed	or	suspected	infection,	the	
patient	was	septic.	As	a	result,	the	SIRS	definition	itself	provided	four	quantifiable	
criteria	that	could	be	used	as	an	early	warning	score.	Severity	scores	are	a	quantified	
set	of	variables	drawn	from	a	patient’s	physical	measurements	that	predict	how	sick	a	
patient	is.	These	early	alert	tools	(given	various	names,	including	scoring	systems),	are	
now	common	place	in	health	services,	but	at	that	time	were	only	beginning	to	emerge	
in	the	critical	care	setting.	Additionally,	the	experts	set	out	further	definitions	that	
identified	a	continuum	of	sepsis	severity.	The	stages	moved	from	a)	SIRS	to	b)	sepsis,	
which	progressed	to	c)	severe	sepsis	(signs	of	organ	dysfunction),	and	on	to	d)	septic	
shock	(continued	organ	dysfunction	despite	treatment)	(see	later	Summary	Table	of	
Sepsis	Terms,	Table	5.1).	
The	International	Sepsis	Forum	
The	next	step	in	the	development	of	a	sepsis-focused	research	network	took	place	in	
1997	with	the	formation	of	the	International	Sepsis	Forum	(ISF).	The	ISF	was	described	
as	a	“multidisciplinary	organization	made	up	of	international	opinion	leaders	in	the	
field	of	sepsis”	(Marshall	et	al.,	2010,	p.	276).	The	coalition	was	comprised	of	the	
Society	for	Critical	Care	Medicine	(SCCM)	and	their	European	counterparts,	the	
European	Society	of	Intensive	Care	Medicine	(ESICM),	and	involved	various	individuals	
from	Bone’s	earlier	meeting.	The	ISF	was	funded	by	commercial	parties	in	order	to	
build	collaboration	between	industry	and	the	academy,	and	“capitalise	on	
SIRS	Criteria	
Temperature	 	 >38°C	or	<36°C	
Heart	Rate	 	 >90	beats/min	
Respiratory	Rate	 >20	breaths/min	
WBC	Count	 >12K/mm3	or	<4k/mm3	
or	10%	immature	band	
forms	
	
Box	5-1	SIRS	Criteria	
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advancements	to	reduce	the	burden	of	sepsis	worldwide”	
(internationalsepsisform.com,	accessed	17	March	2017).		
The	first	task	of	the	ISF	was	to	review	and	update	Bone	et	al.’s	definitions	and	
guidelines	(Matot	&	Sprung,	2001).	In	a	2001	supplemental	issue	of	ESICM’s	journal,	
Intensive	Care	Medicine	(ICM),	the	ISF	authors	affirmed	the	SIRS-based	definition	of	
sepsis.	While	they	acknowledged	that	SIRS	had	“certain	problems”	(Matot	&	Sprung,	
2001,	p.	S5),	subsequent	research	had	not	yielded	a	more	useful	framework.	Thus,	the	
Sepsis-1	definition	remained	intact.	The	ICM	supplement’s	further	eight	articles	
updated	and	expanded	Bone	et	al.’s	material	(Sprung,	Bernard	&	Dellinger,	2001),	
totalling	134	pages	of	content.	
Until	this	point	the	tasks	of	determining	definitions	and	developing	guidelines	were	
done	in	tandem.	However,	following	the	International	Sepsis	Forum’s	2001	
supplement,	further	efforts	were	segmented	into	two	related	but	distinct	work	
streams.	One	focused	on	definitions,	whilst	the	other	addressed	guidelines.	The	ESICM	
and	SCCM	jointly	presided	over	both	definitions	and	guidelines	work,	with	some	
individual	actors	engaged	in	both	initiatives.	
Further	Efforts	to	Agree	Definitions	
To	date	there	have	been	two	further	consultations	to	reconsider	sepsis	definitions.	
The	first	was	sponsored	by	five	professional	societies.	In	addition	to	the	SCCM	and	
ESICM,	the	American	College	of	Chest	Physicians,	the	American	Thoracic	Society,	and	
the	Surgical	Infection	Society	joined	the	effort.	The	International	Sepsis	Definitions	
Conference	met	in	late	2001	and	observed	that	the	SIRS	definitions	had	been	widely	
adopted	around	the	world.	And	yet,	“there	was	impetus	from	experts	in	the	field	to	
modify	[them]”	(Levy	et	al.,	2003,	p.	530).	Competing	editorials	demonstrated	a	stiff	
difference	in	expert	opinion.	Vincent	(1997)	penned	an	article	titled,	“Dear	SIRS,	I’m	
sorry	to	say	that	I	don’t	like	you”	in	the	SCCM’s	journal	Critical	Care	Medicine	(CCM).	
Dellinger	and	Bone	responded	with	a	CCM	piece	of	their	own	headed,	“To	SIRS	with	
love”	(1998).	In	the	end,	the	conference	attendees	decided	to	keep	the	SIRS-based	
definitions.	As	a	compromise	they	added	an	expanded	list	of	diagnostic	criteria	(Levy	
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et	al.,	2003)	that	was	later	distinguished	as	“Sepsis-2”.	However,	the	lack	of	major	
revision	was	considered	important	to	the	Sepsis-2	authors:	“The	fact	that	no	new	
definitions	for	sepsis	are	introduced	in	this	conference	report	is	noteworthy”	(Levy	et	
al.,	2003,	p.	537)	given	some	actors’	considerable	dissatisfaction	with	SIRS-related	
definitions	(Abraham	et	al.,	2000).	
In	2016	a	further	Sepsis-3	Definitions	Task	Force	markedly	shifted	sepsis	definitions	by	
removing	all	connection	to	SIRS	criteria.	Citing	considerable	scientific	advances,	the	
ESICM	and	SCCM	partnership	reassembled	to	examine	the	sepsis	definitions.	In	
contrast	to	the	last	gathering,	the	Task	Force	determined	that	SIRS	had	outlived	its	
usefulness.	“The	Bone	paradigms	have	served	a	useful	purpose	but	are	now	outdated”	
(Singer,	2017,	p.	41).	The	Task	Force	sought	to	uncouple	the	definition	from	visible	
symptoms	that	could	be	seen	at	the	bedside	(Coopersmith	&	Deutschman,	2017).	In	a	
2016	JAMA	publication,	32	worldwide	specialist	societies	agreed	to	discard	SIRS	as	the	
basic	definition	for	sepsis,	endorse	a	new	definition	and	eliminate	‘severe	sepsis’	as	a	
part	of	the	sepsis	continuum	(Singer	et	al.,	2016).	In	SIRS’s	place,	the	Sepsis-3	
definition	was	explained	as,	“a	life-threatening	organ	dysfunction	caused	by	a	
dysregulated	host	response	to	infection”	(Singer	et	al.,	2016,	p.	805).	Relatedly,	a	new	
early	warning	score	system	replaced	the	SIRS	criteria.	Instead,	the	Sepsis-related	
Organ	Failure	Assessment	score	(SOFA),	developed	by	the	ESICM	(Vincent	et	al.,	1996;	
Vincent	et	al.,	1998),	was	the	tool	they	endorsed	for	diagnosing	sepsis.	
Definitions	for	sepsis	continued	to	prove	an	unsettled	topic	amongst	the	research	
community	(Gary	et	al.,	2016).	While	Vincent,	along	with	others,	succeeded	in	their	
drive	to	redefine	sepsis	separately	from	SIRS	(Balk,	2014;	Vincent	&	Moreno,	2010;	
Vincent	et	al.,	2013),	the	decision	to	overturn	SIRS	was	met	with	a	new	set	of	critics.	A	
range	of	authors	pointed	out	that	while	SIRS	might	be	imprecise,	it	had	been	
implanted	in	practices	around	the	world.	Indeed,	from	their	perspective,	using	SIRS	
had	worked	to	increase	awareness	of	and	reduce	deaths	from	sepsis.	They	warned	of	
the	dangers	of	changing	the	definition	and	related	tools	in	the	absence	of	urgent	need		
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(Angus,	2016;	Cortez-Puch	&	Hartog,	2016;	Rodriguez	et	al.,	2017;	Simpson,	2016;	
Sprung	et	al.,	2017).	
Further	Guidelines	Efforts:	Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign	
Meanwhile,	sepsis	guideline	development	also	continued	in	a	dedicated	work	stream.	
In	2002,	the	SCCM,	ESICM,	and	International	Sepsis	Forum	launched	the	Surviving	
Sepsis	Campaign	(SSC).	The	founders	set	forth	specific	goals	in	the	Barcelona	
Declaration.	The	Declaration	called	on	“health	care	professionals,	governments,	
health	care	agencies	and	the	public”	to	recognise	the	“urgent	need”	(SSC	website,	
accessed	5	January	2018)	for	building	awareness	and	providing	guidance	in	order	to	
reduce	the	burden	of	sepsis	by	25%	within	5	years	(Slade	et	al.,	2003).	The	Surviving	
Sepsis	Campaign	functioned	as	the	quality	improvement	arm	of	the	SCCM	and	ESICM	
with	the	purpose	of	assessing,	summarising,	and	mobilising	sepsis	evidence	in	order	to	
save	lives	(Dellinger	et	al.,	2004;	Levy	et	al.,	2004).	Under	the	rubric	of	the	SSC,	they	
produced	four	sets	of	guidelines:	in	2004	(Dellinger	et	al.,	2004);	2008	(Dellinger	et	al.,	
2008);	2012	(Dellinger	et	al.,	2013);	and	most	recently,	in	2016	(Rhodes	et	al.,	2017).	
Soon	after	formation,	the	SSC	partnered	with	the	Institute	for	Healthcare	
Improvement	(IHI).	Despite	the	wide	dissemination	of	earlier	sepsis	guidelines,	use	in	
the	care	setting	had	proven	disappointing	(Marshall	et	al.,	2010).	A	SCCM/ESICM	
survey	of	critical	care	specialists	suggested	that	sepsis	remained	largely	unrecognised	
and,	as	a	result,	untreated	(Poeze	et	al.,	2004).	The	IHI	organisation	specialised	in	
quality	improvement	and	patient	safety.	They	advocated	for	the	standardisation	of	
care	through,	among	other	quality	improvement	techniques,	the	development	of	care	
bundles.	Care	bundles	simplified	clinical	practice	guidelines	into	a	set	of	defined	tasks.	
Typically	including	three	to	seven	steps,	care	bundles	were	promoted	as	a	way	to	
standardise	and	audit	care	provision,	ensuring	the	‘transfer	of	evidence’	to	care	
delivery	(Dellinger	&	Townsend,	2013;	Damiani	et	al.,	2015).	Furthermore,	IHI	held	
that	bundles	were	synergistic	practices	and	all	tasks	must	be	completed	within	the	
designated	time	frame	in	order	to	be	effective	(Resar	et	al.,	2005).		
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The	SSC-based	research	knowledge	network	continued	to	grow	as	more	specialist	
societies	joined	the	collaboration.	Eleven	organisations	participated	in	the	2004	set	of	
guidelines.	Sixteen	organisations	participated	and	endorsed	the	2008	materials,	30	
organisations	joined	together	by	2012,	and	in	2016,	the	total	specialist	societies	
sponsoring	and	endorsing	the	guidelines	expanded	again	to	involve	36	organisations	
(see	Appendix	F,	Growth	of	Sponsoring	and	Endorsing	Organisations).	
However,	in	addition	to	growth,	the	SSC’s	work	was	also	marked	by	controversy	
(Finfer,	2010;	Marshall	et	al.,	2010).	After	the	2004	guideline	publication,	a	string	of	
editorials	posed	serious	questions	about	the	Campaign’s	funding	by	companies	with	
commercial	interest	in	sepsis	(Landucci,	2004;	Eichacker	et	al.,	2006;	Singer,	2006)	and	
recommended	use	of	bundles	(Eichacker	et	al.,	2006;	Singer,	2006).	Relatedly,	the	
articles	questioned	the	seemingly	selective	inclusion	of	research	materials	as	well	as	
the	interpretation	of	the	evidence	in	the	creation	of	recommendations.	For	these	
reasons	the	Infectious	Diseases	Society	of	America	(IDSA),	a	highly	influential	
professional	society,	did	not	endorse	the	2004	set	of	guidelines	(Landucci,	2004).	By	
2008,	IDSA	was	not	alone.	Two	prior	collaborators	withdrew	their	endorsement	for	
the	2008	materials	(the	American	Thoracic	Society	and	Australian	and	New	Zealand	
Intensive	Care	Society).	While	“strongly”	supporting	SSC	intentions,	the	Australian	and	
New	Zealand	Intensive	Care	Society	“reluctantly”	questioned	SSC’s	interpretation	of	
evidence	(Hicks	et	al.,	2008).		
A	particular	area	of	concern	for	these	actors	was	a	new	medication	created	by	a	
pharmaceutical	company	that	funded	the	SSC.	The	medication	was	costly	and	had,	in	
their	view,	a	weak	evidence	base	to	support	the	strong	recommendation	it	was	given	
in	the	guidelines.	“Clearly,	‘Best	Evidence’	is	a	dynamic	construct	and	some	of	the	less	
well	supported	2008	Guidelines	may	become	acceptable”	(Hicks	et	al.,	2008,	p.	149).	It	
later	became	clear	that	these	organisations’	cautions	were	well-founded.	The	
medication,	a	lingering	flash	point	of	criticism,	was	rescinded	from	the	market	due	to	
dangers	of	excessive	bleeding.		
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In	response	to	these	and	other	robust	criticisms,	the	International	Sepsis	Forum	
formally	withdrew	as	a	SSC	collaborator	(Marshall	et	al.,	2010).	A	founding	member	of	
the	SSC,	they	departed	in	2008	“to	avoid	any	misconceptions	about	industry	
involvement”	(survivingsepsis.org	website,	accessed	10	March	2017).		
More	recently,	a	further	dispute	has	centred	on	the	time	allocation	given	for	bundle	
completion,	with	particular	concern	about	the	timing	of	antibiotic	administration.	The	
sepsis	bundles	have	been	revised	with	each	new	set	of	guidelines.	Initially	there	were	
two	bundles,	a	6-hour	resuscitation	bundle	and	a	24-hour	management	bundle	
(Dellinger	et	al.,	2008).	In	2016,	the	time	to	complete	the	bundle	was	reduced	to	1	
hour.	The	time	frame	known	as	the	“golden	hour”	(Kumar	et	al.,	2006,	p.	1594)	for	
sepsis	care	was	introduced	in	a	research	publication	by	Kumar	and	colleagues	(2006).	
Their	work	showed	a	stepwise	decrease	in	survival	by	7.6%	for	each	hour	an	antibiotic	
was	delayed	(see	Figure	5-1,	Kumar	graph).	The	golden	hour	was	a	part	of	prior	
guidelines,	but	had	not	been	incorporated	into	the	bundles.	
Subsequent	attempts	to	
replicate	Kumar’s	work	have	not	
shown	the	same	relationship	
between	antibiotic	
administration	and	survival.	Nor	
have	they	produced	the	
symmetrical,	linear	graph	
(Puskarich	et	al.,	2011;	Sterling	
et	al.,	2015).	Yet	the	most	recent	
update	to	the	SSC	bundle	
reduced	the	time	to	complete	the	tasks	to	one	hour	(Levy	et	al.,	2018).	Masur,	the	
chief	of	Critical	Care	Medicine	for	the	US	National	Institutes	of	Health	and	named	
author	on	earlier	SSC	guidelines,	co-wrote	a	Position	Statement	on	behalf	of	IDSA	
(2017)	saying	that	the	1-hour	time	scale	for	antibiotic	administration	was	a	prime	
reason	that	IDSA	did	not	support	the	2016	SSC	guidelines.	IDSA	has	been	accompanied	
Figure	5-1	Kumar	graph,	from	Kumar	et	al.	(2006)	p.1592	
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by	a	vocal	opposition	made	up	of	a	subset	of	the	US	medical	community	(see	
https://emcrit.org/pulmcrit/ssc-petition	and	https://first10em.com/petition-to-retire-
the-surviving-sepsis-campaign-guidelines).	As	a	result,	various	standard-setting	bodies	
have	delayed	the	incorporation	of	the	new	bundle.	The	SCCM	has	responded.	They	
posted	a	statement	on	their	website	saying:	
The	Society	of	Critical	Care	Medicine	(SCCM)	and	the	American	College	
of	Emergency	Physicians	(ACEP)	acknowledge	concerns	expressed	
about	the	recently	released	Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign	(SSC)	Hour-1	
bundle	and	the	appropriateness	of	implementation	in	the	United	
States.	Both	organizations	understand	the	importance	of	prompt	and	
optimal	sepsis	diagnostics	and	treatment.	SCCM	and	ACEP	along	with	
other	involved	international	experts	are	organizing	a	meeting	as	soon	
as	possible	to	carefully	review	the	recommendations,	and	provide	
guidance	on	bundle	implementation	and	care	of	potentially	septic	
patients	who	present	to	emergency	departments	in	the	United	States.	
We	recommend	that	hospitals	not	implement	the	Hour-1	bundle	in	its	
present	form	in	the	United	States	at	this	time.	(survivingsepsis.org,	
accessed	28	December	2018)	
In	sum,	the	story	of	the	Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign	research	community	thus	far	can	
be	characterised	by	both	continuity	as	well	as	growth.	From	an	early	collaboration	
between	two	North	American	professional	societies,	the	most	recent	set	of	guidelines	
names	36	organisations.	These	organisations	represent	countries	from	every	inhabited	
continent	on	the	globe.	In	addition	to	mobilising	across	geographic	boundaries,	the	
SSC	also	addressed	professional	divides.	Nurse	and	microbiologist	professional	
societies	joined	the	medical	groups	beginning	in	2004.	In	2016,	a	patient	
representative	was	added	to	the	guidelines	committee.		
Meanwhile,	there	has	been	a	stability	of	membership.	Three	faculty	that	took	part	in	
Bone’s	1991	meeting,	Dellinger,	Marshall,	and	Sprung,	remain	active	authors	today.	
Further	collaborators	(Angus,	Bernard,	Gerlach,	Levy,	and	Vincent)	joined	the	SSC	
work	soon	after	and	are	signatories	on	the	most	recent	guideline	documents.	
Furthermore,	this	continuity	of	individual	actors	represents	the	partnership	between	
key	collective	actors,	namely	the	Society	for	Critical	Care	Medicine	and	the	European	
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Society	for	Intensive	Care	Medicine.	The	SCCM	and	ESICM	societies	provide	the	
leadership	and	(latterly)	the	funding	for	the	Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign.	
The	SSC	has	endeavoured	to	knit	together	a	diverse	array	of	specialist	knowledge.	
Marshall	(1997a)	observed	that	sepsis-related	research	appeared	in	at	least	43	
separate	journals,	covering	seven	distinct	disciplines.	The	incorporation	of	many	
related	disciplines	is	partly	indicated	by	the	growing	amount	of	sepsis	research	
content	included.	Where	Bone	and	colleagues	cited	45	references	contributing	to	
their	work	in	1992,	by	2016	the	SSC	guideline	committee	listed	655	relevant	articles,	
which	did	not	include	further	digital	content.		
Nevertheless,	it	is	also	apparent	that	partnering	with	a	full	range	of	interested	parties	
has	been	laden	with	challenges.	The	SSC’s	affiliation	with	industry	brought	censure.	
Some	viewed	the	SSC’s	materials	as	tainted	by	the	connection.	Despite	the	SSC’s	
efforts	to	untangle	the	network	and	separate	from	their	commercial	partners,	a	
residue	of	doubt	remains	due	to	their	prior	association.	How	the	SSC	addressed	these	
(and	other)	concerns	provides	clues	as	to	ways	they	have	overcome	the	boundaries	
that	have	stood	in	the	way	of	developing	and	sharing	their	knowledge.		
Thus	far,	this	section	has	identified	key	research	community	actors	and	provided	an	
overview	of	key	events	that	brought	them	together	from	different	geographic,	
disciplinary	and	professional	bodies.	The	chapter	now	turns	to	further	analyse	the	SSC	
community’s	knowledge	systems	by	looking	at	their	organising	processes	and	the	
materials	they	used	to	forge	consensus	and	the	knowledge	they	drew	upon	along	the	
way.	It	then	addresses	how	the	SSC	mobilised	to	share	their	knowledge	with	other	
communities.		
5.1.2. Understanding	Knowledge	Systems	
This	section	provides	further	analysis	of	the	research	knowledge	network	content	with	
a	more	explicit	use	of	Soft	Knowledge	Systems	to	focus	on	three	parts	of	the	
knowledge	system:	1)	how	the	actors	organised;	2)	the	processes;	and	3)	the	materials	
they	used	to	accomplish	their	shared	task.	Additionally,	where	possible	in	the	data,	
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the	section	draws	out	the	various	kinds	of	knowledge	involved	in	the	mobilisation	
process	and	shows	the	Clinical	and	Collective	Mindlines	of	the	actors	in	the	network.		
Bone	1992	
Bone	and	colleagues’	(1992)	Consensus	Conference	document	provided	a	limited	
account	of	how	the	attendees	organised.	They	did	point	out	that	this	was	the	first	
time	their	professional	organisations	had	assembled	to	coordinate	a	sepsis	effort.	
Only	one	face-to-face	meeting	was	mentioned;	however,	the	document	did	note	the	
positions	of	a	“Conference	Chairman”	(Bone)	and	seven	“Session	Chairmen”.	The	
remaining	27	attendees	were	listed	as	“Faculty”.	And	while	their	specific	tasks	are	not	
explained,	the	segmentation	suggests	the	eight	chairmen	held	additional	organising	
responsibilities	and,	importantly,	they	comprised	the	named	authors	on	the	joint	1992	
publication.	The	article	appeared	simultaneously	in	both	the	sponsoring	organisations’	
(American	College	of	Chest	Physicians	and	the	Society	for	Critical	Care	Medicine)	
journals	(Chest	and	Critical	Care	Medicine,	respectively).	
The	Chicago	meeting	brought	together	not	just	distinct	professional	societies,	but	
actors	from	different	locales,	roles,	and	a	wide	range	of	specialisations.	The	list	of	
attendees	showed	that	they	came	from	geographically	dispersed	areas	across	North	
America.	Titles	revealed	they	were	a	combination	of	medical	school	administrators,	
researchers,	practicing	clinicians,	and	six	attendees	were	employed	by	industry	(e.g.	
Genelabs	Technologies	Inc.	and	Roerig/Pfizer	Pharmaceuticals).	Their	areas	of	
specialist	knowledge	were	also	wide	ranging,	including	pharmacy,	surgery,	medicine,	
infectious	diseases,	and	emergency	medicine,	as	well	as	pulmonary,	respiratory	and	
critical	care.	A	considerable	diversity	of	knowledge	domains	were	represented.	By	
contrast,	there	was	little	professional	(or	gender)	diversity.	Nearly	all	present	held	
M.D.	degrees.	The	two	deviations	were	from	pharmaceutical	companies	and	held	a	
Pharm.D.	and	a	Ph.D.	
Overall,	the	makeup	of	the	research	knowledge	network	displayed	a	diverse	array	of	
epistemic	backgrounds	from	a	range	of	locations.	Normally	separate	actors	were	
brought	together.	The	processes	for	accomplishing	their	tasks	and	building	the	
117	
	
consensus-based	content	was	not	disclosed.	However,	there	are	clues	that	the	
makeup	of	the	committee	influenced	the	materials’	content.	As	mentioned	earlier,	
quantifiable	scoring	systems	had	only	just	entered	the	health	arena	(Bouch	&	
Thompson,	2008).	The	first	scoring	system	was	created	by	W.A.	Knaus	to	rapidly	
predict	the	severity	of	illness	(the	APACHE	score).	Knaus	was	one	of	the	seven	Session	
Chairmen.	The	1992	publication	advocated	for	the	use	of	quantified	measures	(i.e.	a	
scoring	system)	to	identify	patients	at	risk	for	sepsis,	at	least	potentially	because	
Knaus	was	involved	in	the	materials	production.	
The	purpose	of	the	materials	was	two-fold.	Firstly,	to	provide	an	expert-approved	set	
of	recommendations	for	practicing	clinicians.	“We	expect	that	the	broad	definitions	
proposed	in	this	report	will	improve	our	ability	to	make	early	bedside	detection	of	the	
disease	possible”	(Bone	et	al.,	1992,	p.	1644).	The	second	intent	was	to	assist	the	
sepsis	research	community.	Bone	et	al.	(1992)	said	that	the	growing	research	field	was	
fragmented	and	the	lack	of	agreed	terms	was	“an	additional	source	of	confusion…To	
eliminate	confusion	in	communication…by	standardizing	terms…[allowed	for]	the	
ability	to	compare	protocols	and	evaluate	therapeutic	interventions”	(p.	1645).	Thus,	
the	newly	developed	materials	were	envisioned	to	meet	the	needs	of	both	
practitioners	and	researchers.		
Indeed,	Bone	and	colleagues	called	for	alignment	in	what	they	saw	as	a	symbiotic	
relationship	between	the	research	and	practice.	The	authors	drew	a	direct	
relationship	between	research	and	practice	outcomes.	“An	improved	understanding	of	
these	mechanisms	will	lead	to	improved	therapeutic	management…This	issue	of	
different	terminology,	if	it	is	not	soon	addressed,	could	potentially	hinder	future	
advances	in	the	treatment	of	this	syndrome”	(Bone	et	al.,	1992,	p.	1646-8).	Earlier	
bedside	detection	of	sepsis	would	in	turn	inform	research	work.	Each	community	
informed	the	work	of	the	other.	The	research	and	practice	communities	needed	to	
work	interdependently	in	order	to	bring	knowing	and	their	respective	practices	
together.		
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Intertwined	within	this	view	of	shared	responsibility	between	actors	were	mixed	views	
of	knowledge	as	well	as	how	knowledge	is	shared.	Until	the	end,	the	document	
focused	exclusively	on	explicit	sources	of	information:	definitions,	scoring	systems,	
and	recommendations.	Numerous	times	in	the	document,	Bone	et	al.	stated	that	with	
the	alignment	of	information,	the	necessary	knowledge	could	be	harnessed,	which	
would	in	turn	result	in	progress	for	patients,	clinicians,	and	researchers.	Relatedly,	
with	the	publication	came	the	expectation	that	the	dissemination	of	information	
would	both	reach	and	be	applied	by	the	practice	community.	And	yet,	the	last	
paragraphs	of	the	article	conveyed	that	they	did	not	think	information	transfer	alone	
was	sufficient	for	improvement.	In	order	to	apply	their	recommendations	properly,	
they	proposed	“the	placement	of	physicians	with	expertise	in	the	diagnoses…to	
guide…These	physicians	should	be	readily	available…on-site	expertise	is	preferable”	
(p.	1653).	Bone	and	colleagues	thought	that	to	better	mobilise	specialist	knowledge,	
direct	interaction	and	expert	guidance	would	help.	
The	1991	meeting	and	resulting	article	(1992)	have	had	a	profound	influence	on	
subsequent	sepsis	initiatives.	Their	work	established	the	starting	point.	Meeting	
participants	such	as	R.	Phillip	Dellinger,	John	C.	Marshall,	and	Charles	L.	Sprung	led	
collaborative	work	for	decades	to	come.	
International	Sepsis	Forum	1997	
The	International	Sepsis	Forum	was	an	important	collective	actor	in	the	sepsis	
knowledge	network	because	the	organisation	marked	a	key	intersection	between	
Bone’s	consensus	conference	and	future	Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign	work.	Of	the	17	
“international	experts	and	opinion	leaders”	(Sprung	et	al.,	2001,	p.	S1)	listed	as	ISF	
sepsis	guideline	authors,	four	participated	in	Bone’s	1991	gathering	(Bernard,	
Dellinger,	Marshall,	and	Sprung).	And	along	with	a	further	five	(Abraham,	Cohen,	
Calandra,	Carlet,	and	Vincent,	refer	to	Appendix	E),	9	of	17	ISF	actors	continued	to	
collaborate	in	further	endeavours.	Indeed,	Marshall	et	al.	(2010)	made	clear	that	the	
Forum	provided	the	foundation	for	the	Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign.		
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In	addition	to	functioning	as	a	linking	organisation,	the	ISF	also	marked	a	geographical	
branching	out	of	the	research	knowledge	network.	The	ISF	expanded	beyond	North	
America	to	include	researchers	and	practitioners	in	Europe.	Dellinger	and	Bone	(1998)	
viewed	the	spread	as	useful	for	propelling	sepsis	work	forward.	They	said	“The	rapid	
transition	to	global,	as	opposed	to	national,	collaborative	efforts	will	facilitate	success	
of	future	consensus	projects”	(p.	179).	They	considered	more	actors	in	the	knowledge	
network	as	an	asset.		
And	yet	at	the	same	time	the	ISF-based	research	network	appeared	to	contract	in	
terms	of	the	specialisations	involved.	The	ISF	described	their	membership	as	
“healthcare	professionals	in	critical	care	and	infectious	disease	committed	to	
improving	the	understanding	and	clinical	management	of	patients	with	severe	sepsis”	
(Sprung	et	al.,	2001,	p.	S1).	The	stated	specialisations	narrowed	to	encompass	only	
critical	care	and	infectious	diseases.	There	were	fewer	authors	involved	in	the	ICM	
supplement.	The	ISF	publications	listed	17	names	as	compared	to	Bone’s	earlier	total	
of	35	participants.		
Nevertheless,	the	ISF	explicitly	stated	they	were	continuing	and	updating	Bone	and	
colleagues’	work	by	revisiting	the	sepsis	definitions	and	developing	a	set	of	detailed	
consensus-based	guidelines.	Two	sources	(Sprung	et	al.,	2001;	Marshall	et	al.,	2010)	
described	how	the	ISF	organised	their	system	processes	and	tools	in	fuller	detail	than	
Bone	et	al.	had.	The	ISF’s	organising	system	is	particularly	important	as	it	established	
the	committee	structures	and	processes	used	for	product	development	in	subsequent	
work	by	the	Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign	over	the	following	decades.	
As	explained	in	the	supplement’s	introduction	(Sprung	et	al.,	2001),	the	ISF	
established	a	Steering	Committee.	These	members	(Sprung,	Bernard	and	Dellinger)	
provided	oversight	and	final	edits	on	the	definitions	and	guidelines	publications.	Nine	
subgroups	were	formed	each	focusing	on	a	specific	area	(e.g.	Definitions,	
Hemodynamics	or	Infection),	led	by	one	or	two	senior	experts	(Marshall	et	al.,	2010).	
Each	subgroup	conducted	a	systematic	literature	review	of	their	clinical	remit	using	
Sackett’s	(1989)	levels	of	evidence.	They	summarised	the	data	into	recommendations,	
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and	then	presented	drafts	at	a	full	committee	meeting	for	discussion.	Based	on	the	
feedback	they	received,	the	subgroups	made	edits	to	their	respective	documents.	
Another	ISF	member	reviewed	the	revised	materials	before	a	final	appraisal	by	one	of	
the	Steering	Committee	members.		
The	description	provides	a	window	into	what	were	regular	interactions	between	
network	members.	Sprung	et	al.	(2001)	referred	to	it	as	“a	sustained	effort”	(p.	S1).	
The	group	met	over	the	course	of	years,	gathering	together	for	at	least	four	face-to-
face	meetings.	How	the	group	reached	consensus	was	not	disclosed,	but	they	said	
that	“the	recommendations	represent	the	groups	[sic]	assessment	of	the	evidence-
based	medicine	literature	together	with	clinical	practice	and	personal	experience”	
(Sprung	et	al.,	2001,	p.	S1).	The	authors	acknowledged	that	for	devising	and	using	the	
information	other	forms	of	knowledge	were	required.	Judgement,	based	on	clinical	
experience,	played	a	role.	However,	this	broader	view	of	knowledge	was	qualified.	
They	went	on	to	explain	that	it	was	because	some	clinical	areas	lacked	RCT	studies,	
they	(and	practitioners)	needed	to	“use	their	judgement	in	interpreting	these	
recommendations”	(Sprung	et	al.,	2001,	p.	S2).		
Finally,	this	network	engaged	in	research	activities	explicitly	in	order	to	reach	the	
practice	community.	“We	believe	this	supplement	will	be	an	extremely	helpful	source	
of	practical	information	for	the	clinician”	(Sprung	et	al.,	2001,	p.	S2).	The	ISF	
conducted	workshops	and	lecture	series	to	promote	these	evidence	based	practices.	
And	yet	for	all	the	contributions	the	ISF	made	to	the	broader	sepsis	knowledge	
systems,	the	involvement	of	industry	funding	increasingly	attracted	heavy	criticism	
(Marshall	et	al.,	2010).		
Further	Definitions	Committees	
The	Sepsis-2	Definitions	Conference	included	29	participants	representing	five	
professional	organisations.	The	two	conference	co-chairs	represented	SCCM	(Levy)	
and	ESICM	(Ramsay).	Following	the	ISF	process,	they	formed	subgroups	to	focus	on	a	
particular	clinical	area	(Levy	et	al.,	2003).	Subgroups	“corresponded	electronically”	(p.	
531)	before	the	entire	committee	came	together	in	person.	At	the	conference,	a	
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subgroup	spokesperson	reported	their	groups’	deliberations	to	the	full	committee.	A	
dedicated	writing	committee	collated	materials	and	feedback,	which	they	shared	with	
the	group.	Further	materials	and	subsequent	revisions	were	made	“via	telephone	
conferences,	email,	and	live	discussions”	(Levy	et	al.,	2003,	p.	531).		
The	process	by	which	committee	members	made	joint	decisions	was	not	reported.	
However,	the	final	report	makes	evident	that	there	was	“considerable	debate”	(Levy	
et	al.,	2003,	p.	536).	The	group	had	convened	with	the	belief	that	a	new	definition	
might	be	warranted.	In	the	end,	it	was	the	consensus	of	the	group	that	the	needs	of	
the	bedside	clinician	for	a	stable	SIRS-based	definition	outweighed	the	challenges	it	
presented	to	clinical	trials	researchers.	The	ESICM	(in	their	journal,	ICM)	and	SCCM	(in	
CCM)	jointly	published	the	conference	materials.	
The	Sepsis-3	Definitions	Task	Force	was	convened	by	the	ESICM	and	SCCM.	They	said	
that	the	definitions	for	sepsis	had	been	in	place	for	decades	and	Bone	et	al.’s	work	
needed	re-examination.	The	organisations	once	again	each	nominated	a	co-chair	who	
jointly	led	the	effort	(Shankar-Hari	et	al.,	2016).	Singer	(for	ESICM)	and	Deutschman	
(for	SCCM)	selected	a	further	17	members	for	the	task	force	based	on	their	expertise	
in	“sepsis	pathobiology,	clinical	trials,	and	epidemiology”	(Singer	et	al.,	2016,	p.	801).	
Thus,	inclusion	was	based	on	group	affiliation	and	specialist	knowledge.	
Once	the	process	of	selecting	actors	was	completed,	their	processes	were	dedicated	
to	materials	production.	The	task	force	set	about	reviewing	the	literature	and	
engaging	in	a	consensus-building	procedure	to	generate	updated	materials.	Shankar-
Hari	et	al.	(2016)	reported	that	the	team	conducted	a	“systematic	review	and	meta-
analysis”	(p.	775)	to	populate	content	for	a	Delphi	process.		
The	Delphi	method	elicited	and	combined	the	judgements	of	task	force	members.	The	
“Delphi	is	a	multiple	iteration	survey	technique	that	enables	anonymous	systematic	
refinements	of	expert	opinion	with	the	aim	of	arriving	at	a	combined	or	consensual	
position”	(Bowles,	1999,	p.	32).	The	method	was	deemed	useful	as	a	way	to	negotiate	
agreement	amongst	the	task	force	in	the	face	of	their	diverging	views.	There	were	
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three	rounds	of	surveys	with	accompanying	written	discussion	and	“questionnaire	
items	were	accepted	if	agreement	exceeded	65%”	(Shankar-Hari	et	al.,	2016,	p.	776).	
The	task	force	said	that	they	desired	consensus	but	realised	that	complete	agreement	
was	unlikely.	“Pragmatic	compromises	were	necessary”	(Singer	et	al.,	2016,	p.	807).	
Indeed,	one	long-standing	member	of	the	sepsis	research	community	(and	signatory	
on	the	final	Sepsis-3	definitions	document),	spoke	directly	to	the	difficult	negotiations.	
Angus	(2016)	said	that	there	was	“vigorous	debate;	opinions	were	not	unanimous,	and	
the	subsequent	reaction	of	the	broader	community	reflects	many	of	the	same	points	
of	contention”	(p.	14).	In	order	to	move	forward,	he	said	“intentional	compromise”	(p.	
15)	was	necessary	and	all	parties	needed	to	“stop	claiming	sepsis	is	currently	
‘knowable’”	(p.	15).	
Further	to	the	three	Delphi	surveys	and	additional	email	correspondence,	the	group	
met	together	face-to-face	four	times	in	a	one-year	span.	The	resulting	materials,	with	
wholly	new	definitions	and	scoring	systems,	were	then	circulated	to	relevant	
international	professional	societies	for	peer	review	and	endorsement.	Thirty-two	
organisations	from	across	the	world	supported	the	work	(see	Appendix	G).		
However,	some	societies	declined	to	endorse	the	Sepsis-3	definition,	including	the	
American	College	of	Chest	Physicians,	an	original	organising	member	for	the	two	prior	
definitions	(Bone	et	al.,	1992;	Levy	et	al.,	2003),	the	Infectious	Disease	Society	of	
America,	and	the	American	College	of	Emergency	Physicians.	Publication	titles	
illuminated	the	disagreement:	“New	sepsis	criteria.	A	change	we	should	not	make”	
(Simpson,	2016);	“To	SIRS	with	love—An	open	letter”	(Sprung	et	al.,	2017);	and	“New	
definition	of	sepsis	and	septic	shock:	What	does	it	give	us?”	(Rodriguez	et	al.,	2017).	
Harris	(2017)	pointed	out	that	“not	only	did	the	Sepsis-3	taskforce	continue	the	[Bone	
et	al.]	1991	tradition	of	combining	expert	opinion	with	empirical	data	but	also	the	
wider	critical	care	community	has	immediately	responded	with	an	empiric	evaluation”	
(p.	848).	
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Guideline	Committees	of	the	Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign	
The	SSC	Guideline	Committees	for	2004,	2008,	2012,	and	2016	largely	followed	the	
International	Sepsis	Forum’s	familiar	pattern	of	organising.	They	appointed	two	co-
chairs	drawn	from	ESICM	and	SCCM,	assembled	the	committee’s	members,	divided	
into	subgroups	based	on	clinical	domain	and	selected	a	Steering	Committee.	Each	
subgroup	met,	gathered	recently	published	materials,	assessed	the	quality	of	
evidence,	agreed	on	updated	recommendations,	and	reported	their	work	to	the	full	
committee.	After	several	iterations	and	once	sufficient	agreement	between	members	
had	been	obtained,	they	consolidated	the	materials	for	publication.	As	a	further	
indicator	of	their	collective	effort,	the	final	sets	of	guideline	materials	were	published	
in	both	the	ESICM	and	SCCM’s	respective	journals.	
The	process	of	assessing	research	content	evolved	over	time.	Sprung	et	al.	(2001)	
merely	stated	that	they	used	Sackett’s	(1989)	“evidence-based	methodology”	(p.	S1).	
For	the	2004	edition,	the	SSC	provided	a	further	explanation	saying	they	used	
Sackett’s	material	to	guide	the	development	of	a	“modified	Delphi	methodology”	for	
grading	recommendations	(2004,	p.	858).	After	receiving	extensive	of	criticism	
(Eichacker,	2006;	Landucci,	2004;	Singer,	2006),	a	new,	more	in-depth	process	was	
developed	for	the	2008	set	of	guidelines	in	conjunction	with	evidence-based	
methodology	experts	from	McMaster	University	(Guyatt	et	al.,	2008a;	Guyatt	et	al.,	
2008b).		
A	separate	paper	provided	an	account	of	the	SSC’s	updated	process	for	reaching	
decisions	“when	consensus	is	elusive”	(Jaeschke	et	al.,	2008,	p.	327).	They	developed	
and	used	a	method	called	Grading	of	Recommendations	Assessment,	Development	
and	Evaluation	or	GRADE.	Jaeschke	et	al.	(2008)	reflected	that	guideline	committees	
had	grown	in	size	responding	to	the	need	of	bringing	a	diverse	array	of	expert	views	
into	the	process:		
The	resulting	large	and	diverse	panels	present	challenges	for	decision	
making,	such	as	ensuring	that	all	participants	have	a	voice	and	can	
influence	the	results	of	the	debate,	ensuring	transparency,	dealing	with	
disagreement,	achieving	consensus,	and	resolving	situations	in	which	
consensus	is	not	possible	(p.	327).	
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And	without	a	formal	decision-making	process,	they	said,	group	interactions	could	be	
dominated	“by	individuals	with	powerful	personalities	and	intimidating	reputations”	
(Jaeschke	et	al.,	2008,	p.	327).		
Hence,	the	SSC	developed	the	GRADE	grid	(see	Figure	5-2)	as	a	method	to	provide	a	
structural	process	to	address	these	challenges.	They	used	the	grid	in	conjunction	with	
a	Delphi	survey.	They	explained	that	the	Delphi	method	provided	a	way	to	
independently	gather	views.	An	anonymised	summary	of	survey	results	was	circulated	
that	included	the	rationales	provided	by	each	respondent	for	their	choices.	Another	
round	of	the	survey	was	sent	and	each	participant	was	asked	to	respond	taking	into	
consideration	the	reasoning	provided	by	their	(unknown)	expert	colleagues.	
Eventually,	they	said,	the	responses	generally	converged	to	a	view	that	the	group	
could	support.	
	
Figure	5-2	GRADE	Grid,	Jaeschke	et	al.	(2008)	p.	328	
The	second	group	process	Jaeschke	et	al.	(2008)	described	was	the	nominal	group	
technique.	The	nominal	group	technique	was	used	during	face-to-face	meetings	and	
provided	all	members	the	“equal	opportunity	to	speak”	(p.	328)	allowing	for	the	
expression	of	different	views.	To	build	consensus,	a	summary	of	divergent	positions	
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was	drafted.	Attendees	privately	ranked	their	choices	in	order	of	most	to	least	
acceptable.	For	both	the	Delphi	and	nominal	group	methods,	the	process	continued	
until	agreement	was	reached	or	responses	did	not	change.	
The	acceptable	threshold	for	consensus	changed	over	time	as	well.	In	2004,	Dellinger	
et	al.	said	that	the	committee’s	goal	was	“total	consensus”	(p.	860).	By	2008,	80%	
agreement	was	sufficient	where	at	least	half	of	the	committee	voted.	The	level	of	
agreement	was	not	recorded	in	the	2012	materials	other	than	to	say	that	“strong	
agreement	existed	among	a	large	cohort	of	international	experts”	(Dellinger	et	al.,	
2012,	p.	167).	The	statement	in	the	2016	materials	reported	“substantial	agreement”	
(Rhodes	et	al.,	2017,	p.	488)	with	an	80%	threshold	out	of	at	least	three-quarters	of	
members	voting.	
The	SSC	put	in	place	a	formal	and	permanent	knowledge	network	for	professional	
societies	with	intersecting	interests	in	sepsis.	The	first	consensus	conference	chaired	
by	Bone	was	an	ad	hoc	event.	But	the	SCCM	and	the	American	College	of	Chest	
Physicians	did	not	put	a	plan	in	place	for	continuing	their	collaboration	and	updating	
the	materials.	Next,	the	International	Sepsis	Forum	continued	the	work	by	bringing	
together	various	academic	and	industry	actors	for	collaboration,	but	related	
professional	bodies	were	not	(officially	at	least)	a	part.	Thus,	the	SSC	took	what	had	
been	a	periodic	partnership	and	established	a	sustained	collaborative	effort	that	
focused	on	the	revision,	production,	dissemination	and	use	of	sepsis	guideline	
materials.		
Bundles	were	an	important	materials-based	part	of	the	knowledge	system,	firstly	
because	they	demonstrate	the	influence	of	IHI	as	an	actor	in	the	knowledge	network.	
For	sepsis,	bundles	were	a	by-product	of	the	collaborative	effort	between	the	clinical	
experts	within	the	professional	organisations	(SCCM	and	ESICM)	and	IHI	(Dellinger	et	
al.,	2004,	2008).	Illustrating	the	combination	of	expertise	necessary	for	creating	ways	
to	change	clinical	behaviour,	authors	from	SCCM,	ESICM	and	IHI	published	a	piece	in	
SCCM’s	specialist	journal	entitled	“Sepsis	change	bundles:	converting	guidelines	into	
meaningful	change	in	behavior	and	clinical	outcome”	(Levy	et	al.,	2004).	
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Secondly,	bundles	were	also	a	point	of	contention.	Singer	(2006)	questioned	the	
validity	of	bundles	and	said	that	the	SSC	was	“in	cahoots”	with	IHI.	Marik	et	al.	(2013)	
also	disagreed	with	the	bundle	concept.	Marik	et	al.	(2013)	found	the	lack	of	flexibility	
in	bundle	compliance	“alarming”	(p.	375).	Amongst	other	concerns	“there	is	no	
scientific	data	to	support	[the	all-or-nothing]	notion”	(p.	375)	and	was	potentially	
dangerous	if	applied	as	directed	to	every	patient.	He	pointed	to	the	SSC’s	prior	error	in	
strongly	recommending	a	medication	that	lacked	sufficient	scientific	proof.	Dellinger	
and	Townsend	(2013)	defended	bundles.	They	said	that	bundles	minimised	the	
unacceptable	variance	of	care	provided	to	patients	and	helped	clinicians	provide	
evidence-based	care.	The	belief	was	that	converting	guidelines	into	a	distilled	set	of	
actions	would	remedy	the	long	and	“tortuous	process…of	transfer[ing]	research	from	
the	bench	to	the	bedside”	(Levy	et	al.,	2004,	p.	S595).	Indeed,	bundles	have	been	held	
up	as	the	tool	that	simplifies	the	complex	problem	of	shifting	research	into	practice.	
Thus,	bundles	have	provided	a	simplified	and	reductionist	version	of	knowledge.		
Despite	the	lack	of	evidence	for	bundles,	Resear	and	colleagues,	in	their	2012	IHI	
White	Paper,	reason	that	it	is	the	coordination	and	communication	required	amongst	
the	healthcare	team	to	accomplish	the	bundle,	rather	than	the	clinical	intervention	
itself,	that	has	brought	about	the	improvement	results.	If	this	is	the	case,	it	means	
that	rather	than	a	biomedical	solution,	the	bundles	have	provided	an	impetus	for	
team	collaboration.	Bundle	implementation	requires	the	coordinated	efforts	of	
medical,	nursing,	and	laboratory	staff	at	minimum.	They	must	work	interdependently	
to	accomplish	the	tasks	for	a	mutual	target.	Rather	than	the	clinical	intervention	or	
evidence	for	sepsis,	it	is	the	increased	social	interaction	of	the	team	that	benefits	the	
patient.		
Finally,	some	point	out	that	the	continuous	shift	to	simplified,	protocol-ised	care	(in	
these	step-wise	guides	such	as	bundles)	inhibits	the	development	of	clinical	
judgement	(Engebretsen	et	al.,	2016).	Determined	nevertheless,	SSC	and	IHI	offer	
continued	assurances	for	the	value	of	bundles-based	care.	Despite	the	lack	of	
supporting	evidence,	the	recent	2016	guideline	committee	states	that	“the	
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implementation	of	a	core	set	of	recommendations	(“bundle”)	has	been	the	
cornerstone	of	sepsis	performance	improvement”	(Rhodes	et	al.,	2017,	p.	493).		
Regardless	of	periodic	strife,	the	Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign	successfully	mobilised	
their	knowledge.	They	reached	beyond	the	bounds	of	their	research	community,	
informing	and	influencing	the	policy	and	practice	domains.		
5.1.3. Mobilising	Knowledge	in	the	Research	Network	
This	section	brings	together	themes	that	emerged	from	using	Soft	Knowledge	Systems	
and	Clinical	Mindlines	across	these	data.	Specifically,	this	section	identifies	the	social	
and	epistemic	boundaries	within	the	research	community’s	knowledge	systems	and	
answers	how	these	boundaries	were	addressed.	
The	story	of	the	SSC	research	knowledge	network	presents	a	series	of	familiar	names.	
These	include	Bone,	Dellinger,	Levy,	Marshall,	and	Vincent.	There	were	dedicated	
individual	and	collective	actors	in	this	community	as	they	banded	together	within	the	
SCCM	and	ESICM	organisations.	They	worked	to	build	a	coordinated	effort	to	address	
problems	around	sepsis	care	rather	than	rely	on	a	separate	and	thereby	disjointed	
transmission	of	information	to	make	a	difference.		
These	actors	provided	vision,	took	the	initiative,	coordinated	and	consolidated	their	
efforts.	They	organised	regular	meetings	to	mitigate	geographic	separations	and	
eventually	included	experts	from	every	continent.	In	between	meetings,	they	utilised	
other	channels	to	support	ongoing	communication.	They	were	active	rather	than	
passive	collaborators.	They	arranged	actors,	set	up	processes,	and	produced	
materials.	They	developed	a	knowledge	system.		
Individual	and	collective	actors	were	both	important	in	the	knowledge	system.	One	
example	is	highlighted	in	a	memorial	dedication	to	Roger	Bone.	John	Marshall	(1997b)	
wrote	that	Bone	was	“a	visionary”	whose	“ideas	transformed	clinical	research	in	
sepsis”	(p.	9)	as	a	researcher	and	organising	leader	of	the	research	community.	“He	
led	a	revolution…He	was	a	prolific	and	articulate	writer,	a	passionate	and	demanding	
thinker,	whose	ideas	were	at	once	profound,	unsettling,	urgent,	and	courageous”	(p.	
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9).	Roger	Bone	provided	influential	and	instrumental	leadership	that	reverberated	
within	the	literature	of	the	sepsis	research	community.	Other	individuals,	such	as	RP	
Dellinger,	M	Levy,	J	Marshall,	J-L	Vincent,	among	others,	took	up	the	baton.	They	led	
further	sepsis	guideline	committees	and	publications	in	2004,	2008,	2012	and	2016,	
and	their	names	continue	to	appear	on	sepsis-related	publications	today.	
However,	these	individual	actors	were	accorded	a	wider	platform	for	sharing	their	
knowledge	via	the	structures	of	their	collective	actor	organisations.	The	SSCM	and	
ESICM,	in	their	joint	work	under	the	SSC	umbrella,	provided	specialist	organisation	
legitimacy	to	the	Campaign.	One	indicator	of	the	level	of	collaboration	between	the	
two	societies	is	the	joint	SSC	publication	strategy.	Since	2004,	guidelines	along	with	
guideline-related	publications	are	in	each	society’s	journal	with	a	notification	saying,	
“This	article	is	being	simultaneously	published	in	Critical	Care	Medicine	and	Intensive	
Care	Medicine.”	
The	influence	of	individuals	upon	collective	materials	can	be	seen	as	well.	For	
example,	the	influence	of	individual	actors’	knowledge	on	the	collective	SSC	materials	
could	be	seen	with	Knaus	and	the	inclusion	of	early	scoring	systems	for	sepsis	in	1992.	
The	eventual	change	to	Sepsis-3	definition	can	at	least	in	part	be	attributed	to	
Vincent’s	creation	of	the	SOFA	tool	(credited	in	some	materials	to	the	ESICM,	of	which	
he	was	president).	And	Kumar,	the	leader	of	the	SSC	Guidelines	Antibiotics	subgroup,	
kept	the	‘golden	hour’	of	antibiotic	delivery	in	the	2016	materials	despite	the	lack	of	
further	replication	studies.	The	individual	actors	involved	in	the	knowledge	network	
influenced	the	collective	actors’	knowledge	(i.e.	collective	mindline)	as	represented	in	
the	knowledge	outputs.	
The	SSC	membership	also	had	a	continuity	of	actors.	The	named	authors	on	definition	
and	guideline	documents	covering	nearly	30	years	indicate	a	long-term	commitment	
by	many.	There	is	a	repetition	of	names	and	many	actors	were	involved	in	both	the	
Definitions	Taskforce	and	International	Guidelines	Committee	(as	both	groups	are	
populated	from	members	of	the	SCCM	and	ESICM)	(see	Appendix	E	for	Table	of	SSC	
Actors).	
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One	example	is	the	2001	Definitions	Conference	membership	(the	meeting	that	
resulted	in	the	Sepsis-2	definition,	see	Levy	et	al.,	2003).	Of	27	conference	
participants,	20	had	either	participated	in	Bone’s	original	meeting,	were	members	of	
the	International	Sepsis	Forum,	were	members	of	future	Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign	
committees,	or	all	three.	The	overlap	was	substantial.	However,	based	on	the	same	
documentary	sources,	the	SSC	was	not	a	closed	group.	Each	publication	involved	new	
people,	some	of	whom	went	on	to	provide	continuity	at	future	meetings	and	in	future	
publications.	The	SSC,	as	a	knowledge	network,	was	inclusive,	invited	wide	
involvement	and	grew	from	a	collaboration	between	two	organisations	to,	most	
recently,	36	organisations	(see	Appendix	F	for	Growth	of	Sponsoring	and	Endorsing	
Organisations	for	SSC	Guidelines).	
And	yet,	the	SSC’s	inclusiveness	was,	at	times,	problematic.	The	presence	of	
pharmaceutical	companies	in	the	knowledge	network	raised	concerns.	Many	feared	
that	pharmaceutical	funding	and	representation	influenced	the	experts’	judgement	
and	thereby	their	recommendations.	The	2008	guidelines	presented	an	illustration	of	
actor	involvement	that	at	the	minimum	appeared	to	shape	knowledge.	Eli	Lily	had,	at	
that	point,	funded	up	to	90%	of	SSC’s	activities	in	the	form	of	an	unrestricted	grant.	
The	SSC’s	strong	recommendation	for	their	new	medication	came	despite	it	having	
only	one,	single-centre	trial	to	support	its	effectiveness.	That	trial	was	paid	for	by	Eli	
Lily	as	part	of	the	original	proof	of	efficacy	necessary	for	regulatory	approval.	This	
scenario	illustrates	the	relationship	between	actors,	their	connections	in	a	knowledge	
network,	that	in	turn	influence	how	they	collectively	think	as	seen	in	the	materials	
they	produce.		
This	controversy	suggests	that	some	within	the	wider	SSC	research	community	
believed	that	connection	to	the	pharmaceutical	industry	(and	its	financial	support)	
influenced	behaviour.	Eichacker	et	al.’s	(2006)	concern	was	that	biases	formed	as	a	
result	of	working	together.	By	collaborating	with	commercial	members,	the	resulting	
relationships	would	influence	the	experts’	interpretation	of	the	evidence	and	resulting	
guidelines.	The	concern	was	an	indicator	that	they	believed	the	social	milieu,	the	
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professional	relationships,	influenced	the	evidence	product.	The	basis	of	these	
accusations	was	that	partnering	with	commercial	actors,	thus	including	members	in	
the	knowledge	network	who	had	competing	and	ulterior	goals,	influenced	the	
collective	knowledge	such	that	the	evidence	assessment	process	and	the	resulting	
materials	were	tainted.	
Connecting	via	regular	meetings	and	other	forms	of	contact	were	part	of	sustaining	
the	relationships	within	the	network.	And	the	SSC,	as	individuals	and	organisations,	
connected	often.	A	sampling	of	face	to	face	meetings	mentioned	in	the	publications	
includes	Chicago	(in	1991),	Paris	(in	1997),	Brussels	(in	2000),	Barcelona	(in	2002),	
Amsterdam	(in	2003),	London	(in	2003),	Berlin	(in	2011),	Puerto	Rico	(2013),	Honolulu	
(2017).	Smaller	groups	met	together	in	subcommittee	meetings.	The	SSC	literature	
mentions	“teleconferences”,	and	by	the	2004	guideline	document	there	were	regular	
“electronic-based	discussions”	(Dellinger	et	al.,	2004,	p.	858)	that	took	place	amongst	
small	subsets	as	well	as	the	full	committee.		
The	mix	of	meetings,	phone	calls,	and	email	addressed	the	geographical	barriers	that	
separated	the	actors.	Furthermore,	the	ongoing	contact	developed	long-standing	
partnerships	and	professional	friendships.	Dellinger	(2015)	acknowledged	his	
gratitude	for	their	shared	work	saying:	
I	thank	Mitchell	Levy,	MD,	Sean	Townsend,	MD,	and	Christa	Schorr,	RN,	
MSN,	for	their	input	on	this	Foreword,	but	even	more	importantly	for	
the	incredible	journey	we	have	shared	together,	along	with	our	
European	SSC	leadership	colleagues,	over	the	last	11	years	with	the	
Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign	(Dellinger,	2015b,	p.	1789).		
Similarly,	Marshall	et	al.	(2010)	credited	the	SSC’s	success	to	“the	remarkable	
dedication	of	a	diverse	international	group	of	practitioners	to	engaging	in	such	a	
process	of	change”	(Marshall	et	al.,	2010,	p.	279).	
To	coordinate	the	diverse	international	specialists’	knowledge	required	developing	
and	executing	a	plan	to	address	the	geographic	and	epistemic	boundaries.	Prior	to	the	
first	meeting	between	SCCM	and	the	American	College	of	Chest	Physicians	in	1991,	
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actors	were	working	and	producing	materials	for	sepsis	but	they	were	not	
coordinating	their	work	or	considering	the	ways	their	work	might	affect	each	other.	In	
this	way,	their	dispersed	knowledge	equated	to	knowledge	in	disarray.	It	took	an	
organising	initiative	to	meet	together	and	address	the	fragmentation	hampering	both	
research	and	practice	activities.		
The	SSC	put	in	place	knowledge	systems	for	overcoming	boundaries.	The	leadership	
structure,	subcommittees,	evidence	assessment	processes,	consensus	building	
processes,	materials	production	and	continuous	communication	depict	many	forms	of	
structural	engagement.	The	guideline	endorsement	process	also	works	to	address	
epistemic	boundaries.	The	SSC	asked	colleague	organisations	to	provide	peer	review,	
feedback,	and,	if	appropriate,	join	the	consortium	for	mobilising	the	support	and	
promotion	of	the	materials.	Conversely,	the	organisations	that,	at	varying	points,	
decided	that	they	could	not	endorse	the	publications’	content,	underscored	a	
boundary	issue	as	well.	Infectious	Diseases	Society	of	America	(IDSA),	for	example,	
rejected	the	involvement	of	industry	stakeholders	in	the	guideline	body	in	2008.	IDSA	
observed	a	misalignment	of	goals	between	industry	and	the	other	stakeholders	
represented	in	the	guidelines.	It	was	IDSA’s	view	that	the	knowledge-based	
recommendations	inappropriately	represented	their	epistemic	position	and	declined	
to	add	the	organisation’s	name	to	the	list	of	sponsors.	
Indeed,	these	processes	involved	“considerable	debate”	(Levy,	et	al.,	2003,	p.	536)	
and	“passionate	disagreement”	(Marshall,	et	al.,	2010,	p.	276).	Marshall	and	
colleagues	(2010)	describe	the	SSC	community	this	way:	“The	story	of	its	[SSC’s]	
origins,	successes,	and	failures	bears	a	resemblance	to	a	work	of	classic	theatre—part	
comedy,	part	high	drama,	both	set	against	a	backdrop	of	tragedy—the	continuing	toll	
of	deaths	from	one	of	the	leading	causes	of	preventable	death	around	the	globe”	(p.	
276).	The	SSC	knowledge	system	included	the	full	gamut	of	human	engagement.	
A	primary	goal	of	the	SSC	organisation	was	to	build	consensus	between	actors	who	
held	a	wide	range	of	specialist	expertise	to	produce	knowledge-based	materials	for	
dissemination.	Singer	et	al.	(2016)	said	that	the	GRADE	and	nominal	group	processes	
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involved	“iterative	discussions”	to	reach	“expert	consensus”	(p.	802).	Angus	was	
blunter:	“The	[Sepsis	Definitions]	task	force	reached	its	recommendations	after	
vigorous	debate;	opinions	were	not	unanimous,	and	the	subsequent	reaction	in	the	
broader	community	reflects	many	of	the	same	points	of	contention.	Debate	is	
welcomed,	but	one	disconnect	is	the	certainty	with	which	some	views	have	been	
expressed,	despite	the	widely	acknowledged	uncertainties	plaguing	sepsis”	(Angus,	
2016,	p.	14).	In	other	words,	gathering	expert	actors’	opinions	happened	within	the	
messy	muddle	of	human	interactions.		
The	SSC	discussed,	listened,	debated	and	negotiated	internally,	but	there	are	many	
signs	that	they	also	responded	to	external	critiques.	The	International	Sepsis	Forum,	
an	academic	and	business	partnership,	withdrew	from	the	SSC	alliance.	The	SSC	
funding	shifted	to	a	separate,	non-industry	related,	source.	They	increased	
transparency	of	funding	structures	in	their	publications.	They	brought	in	the	GRADE	
methodology	to	address	concerns	about	evidence	assessment.	They	may	even	have	
sought	out	their	critics.	For	example,	Singer	published	an	article	in	2006	entitled	“The	
Surviving	Sepsis	guidelines:	evidence-based…or	evidence-biased?”.	The	piece	spoke	of	
“dodgy	advice”	(Singer,	2006,	p.	244)	and	pointed	to	the	lack	of	evidence	to	support	
bundles.	Because,	he	said,	the	SSC	was	“in	cahoots	with	the	Institute	for	Healthcare	
Improvement”	(Singer,	2006,	p.	245).	A	decade	later,	Singer	took	part	in	the	guideline	
development	(Dellinger	et	al.,	2017)	and	was	the	co-chair	and	lead	author	for	the	
Sepsis-3	(newest)	definition	publication	(Singer	et	al.,	2016).	Given	that	bundles	are	
still	a	part	of	the	SSC	guidelines,	and	Singer	went	from	critic	in	2006	to	co-chairing	a	
publication	a	decade	later	in	2016,	his	stance	appears	to	have	shifted.	Lastly,	the	
SCCM	responded	to	concerns	and	placed	a	moratorium	on	their	recommendation	for	
the	implementation	of	the	1-hour	bundle	in	the	US	context.		
The	development	of	evidence-based	guidelines	is	an	interactional	process	and	
includes	difficult	social	exchanges.	Indeed,	Marshall,	Dellinger,	and	Levy	pointed	out	
that	disagreement	and	conflict	bring	value	to	the	evidence	sifting	process.	“Such	
controversy	is	not	only	inevitable,	but	invaluable	to	a	process	that	reflects	the	
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continuing	evolution	of	knowledge	and	the	attempt	to	apply	that	knowledge	optimally	
to	patient	care”	(Marshall	et	al.,	2010,	p.	279).	Tensions	are	part	of	the	social	
interactions	that	accompany	the	production	and	dissemination	of	evidence	for	sepsis.		
Many	diverse	areas	of	knowledge	were	necessary.	Sepsis	as	a	clinical	entity	involves	
many	diverse	specialisations	including	“basic	scientists	whose	backgrounds	include	
immunology,	cell	biology,	microbiology	and	biological	chemistry,	and…clinicians	
whose	expertise	ranges	from	surgery	to	pulmonology	to	intensive	care	medicine	to	
infectious	diseases	(Marshall,	1997b,	p.	5).	Because	many	actors’	knowledge	is	
important,	the	study	of	sepsis	suffers	from	fragmentation	as	a	result	of	complexity	
surrounding	the	disease.		
Angus	et	al.	(2016)	agreed.		
One’s	values	and	priorities	shape	in	important	ways	how	one	judges	
the	performance	of	a	particular	classification	scheme.	Broadly	
speaking,	a	disease	or	syndrome	classification	scheme	helps	four	
purposes:	clinical	care,	basic	and	clinical	research,	epidemiology	and	
surveillance,	and	quality	improvement	and	audit.	Even	with	perfect	
access	to	information,	practitioners	of	each	of	these	different	
applications	may	favor	different	classification	schemes.	For	example,	an	
immunologist	would	likely	give	greater	weight	to	a	scheme	that	divided	
individuals	based	on	host	immune	response	patterns.	Such	a	scheme	
would	also	be	useful	to	clinicians	if	therapies	were	based	on	select	
immune	responses.	But	because	current	treatments	are	initiated	
largely	in	response	to	nonspecific	clinical	features,	clinical	diagnostic	
criteria	are	likely	rated	more	important	by	the	clinician.	Furthermore,	
the	clinician	seeks	a	disease	classification	that	can	be	applied	
prospectively	to	guide	treatment	decisions.	In	contrast,	an	
epidemiologist	may	favor	a	scheme	that	most	accurately	parses	cases	
from	non-cases,	even	if	that	scheme	included	postmortem	findings	
(Angus	et	al.,	2016,	p.	e115).	
In	other	words,	while	different	areas	of	knowledge	were	important,	the	weight	of	
importance,	or	‘value’,	given	to	these	different	forms	of	knowledge	was	often	linked	
to	profession	and	role.	Given	the	range	of	actors	in	the	SSC,	the	diverse	bases	of	
knowledge,	all	with	a	concomitant	range	of	views,	agreeing	a	course	of	action	took	
negotiation.	
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5.1.4. Conclusion	
In	conclusion,	the	ways	that	the	SSC	(and	related	actors)	mobilised	knowledge	was	by	
overcoming	social	and	epistemic	boundaries.	These	practices	exemplify	what	I	have	
termed	‘shepherding’.	Rather	than	accept	existing	boundaries	that	hampered	the	
mobilisation	of	sepsis	knowledge,	the	SSC	actively	sought	out	a	range	of	stakeholders	
to	join	the	knowledge	network.	They	recognised	that	a	condition	such	as	sepsis	
required	the	involvement	of	diverse	specialisations	and	professions.	Along	the	way	
they	made	decisions	that	proved	highly	contentious.	But	they	also	sought	to	increase	
transparency	and	manage	the	conflicts	of	interest.	They	tended	and	listened	to	
concerns.	Sometimes	they	vigorously	defended	their	positions.	Other	times,	they	
responded	and	adjusted.	They	were	tenacious.	And	some	recorded	that	their	
continuous	labour	together	resulted	in	a	hard-won	comradery.		
Creating	structural	systems	to	address	boundaries	was	important;	however,	the	
structures	did	not,	in	and	of	themselves,	resolve	the	boundaries	that	arose	between	
actors	in	the	network.	Resolving	tensions	at	epistemic	and	social	boundary	points	was	
both	structural	and	relational	work.	
Furthermore,	the	explicit,	‘research-based’	knowledge	that	emerged	from	this	
network	was	not	singular	or	straight-forward.	These	data	show	that	their	knowledge	
was	complex	and	evolved	over	time.	Members	active	in	the	network	shaped	and	
influenced	their	collective	epistemic	outputs.	Amongst	these	actors,	knowledge	was	
constructed,	created	and	refined	through	a	careful	tending	process.	In	other	words,	
the	interaction	between	individual	and	collective	mindlines	was	evident	in	the	
research	network.	
Mobilising	knowledge	in	the	research	knowledge	network	involved	a	combination	of	
the	more	controllable	aspects	(i.e.	providing	system	structures)	and	emergent	aspects,	
such	as	the	less	controllable	interactions	between	actors.	The	organisation	of	actors,	
the	processes,	and	materials	provided	a	platform	for	engagement.	And	yet,	these	
knowledge	systems	did	not	in	and	of	themselves	bring	about	epistemic	agreement	
between	diverging	views.	The	interactions	between	actors	that	were	less	easily	
135	
	
depicted,	the	disagreements	and	negotiations	glimpsed	in	the	documentary	sources	
alongside	the	periodic	signs	of	professional	regard	and	friendship,	provided	hints	that	
knowledge	was	mobilised	in	the	messy	social	arena	of	the	knowledge	network.	
Furthermore,	there	were	glimpses	in	these	data	that	various	members	tended	and	
nurtured	the	interpersonal	interactions	to	promote	productivity.	
The	chapter	now	turns	to	consider	the	actors,	events	and	knowledge	systems	that	
constitute	the	policy	part	of	the	knowledge	network.	
5.2. The	Policy	Network:	NHS	Scotland’s	Sepsis	Collaborative	
The	remainder	of	the	chapter	focuses	on	the	policy	community,	namely	the	Scottish	
Patient	Safety	Programme’s	Sepsis	Collaborative.	This	section	has	three	parts.	The	first	
part	provides	an	overview	of	the	sepsis	policy	community	actors	and	events.	The	
second	part	analyses	the	knowledge	systems	using	Soft	Knowledge	Systems	and,	
where	possible,	the	Clinical	Mindlines	lenses.	The	third	part	draws	out	the	themes	
illuminated	using	the	theory-based	analysis.	The	following	content	was	distilled	from	
journal	publications,	grey	literature,	organisational	websites,	interviews	with	a	
national	policy	advisor	and	Aurora’s	staff,	and	observations	at	multiple	policy-led	
meetings.		
5.2.1. NHS	Scotland’s	Sepsis	Story	
NHS	Scotland’s	sepsis	story	began	soon	after	the	devolution	of	health	care	to	the	
nation	in	1999.	Two	governmental	reports	(one	in	England	and	one	in	Scotland)	were	
released	concerning	deteriorating	patients.	The	separate	critical	care	studies	directed	
attention	to	the	problem	of	undiagnosed	sepsis	in	hospital	wards	across	the	UK.	The	
Comprehensive	Critical	Care	Report	(NHS	England,	2000)	and	Better	Critical	Care	
Report	(NHS	Scotland,	2000)	supported	the	concerns	of	the	Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign	
research	community.	The	reports	said	that	hospitalised	patients	were	at	risk	of	
deterioration	from	sepsis	whilst	admitted	in	the	hospital.	Because	deterioration	was	
often	undetected,	sepsis	was	not	diagnosed,	and	as	a	result	intervention	by	critical	
care	specialists	came	too	late.		
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NHS	England	and	NHS	Scotland	responded	differently	to	the	reports.	NHS	England	
decided	to	develop	critical	care	outreach	teams	(CCOTs).	The	rationale	for	using	
CCOTs	was	that	identifying	and	treating	sepsis	draws	on	forms	of	knowledge,	namely	
specialist	experience	and	expertise,	that	those	outside	the	critical	care	context	may	
not	have.	As	explained	in	Chapter	3,	CCOTs	are	made	up	of	highly	specialised	clinicians	
(most	commonly	nurses)	who	are	adept	at	managing	patients	with	immediate,	life-
threatening	problems.	An	outreach	team	are	regularly	present	outside	the	ICU	and	
extend	critical	care	support	throughout	a	hospital	by	bringing	their	expertise	to	
patients	and	staff	when	emergency	situations	arise.	
NHS	Scotland	decided	instead	to	focus	on	ways	to	help	existing	staff	on	the	wards	
better	detect	patient	deterioration.	Rather	than	specialist	intervention	teams,	NHS	
Scotland	encouraged	the	use	of	early	warning	systems	by	incorporating	these	data	
and	trigger	score	calculations	into	the	patient	
observation	chart.	A	handful	of	different	early	
warning	tools	existed	and,	at	that	time,	each	board	
selected	the	tool	that	best	suited	them.		
Another	development	has	profoundly	influenced	
sepsis	care	practices	in	Scotland.	Two	UK	critical	
care	physicians	developed	a	bundle	(Sepsis	6)	to	
treat	sepsis	outside	the	ICU	setting	(Robson	&	Daniels,	2008;	Daniels	et	al.,	2011).	
Sepsis	6	was	a	further	simplification	of	the	2008	SSC	guidelines’	6-hour	bundle,	though	
specifically	tailored	for	non-specialists.	The	bundle	combined	six	tasks	(see	Box	5-2)	
and,	unlike	the	SSC	bundles	of	the	day,	utilised	Kumar	et	al.’s	(2006)	golden	hour	for	
bundle	completion.	
In	2008,	the	then	health	secretary,	Nicola	Sturgeon,	hired	the	Institute	for	Healthcare	
Improvement	(IHI)	and	established	the	Scottish	Patient	Safety	Programme	(SPSP).	
According	to	the	SPSP	website,	NHS	Scotland	was	the	first	health	service	in	the	world	
to	adopt	a	systematic,	nationwide	approach	to	improving	patient	safety.	As	part	of	the	
SPSP,	the	Sepsis	Collaborative	was	formed	in	January	2012	and	officially	concluded	in	
Sepsis	6	Bundle	
1) Start	High	Flow	Oxygen	
2) Take	Blood	Cultures	
3) Give	Antibiotics	
4) Give	Fluid	Bolus	
5) Measure	Lactate	Level	
6) Measure	Hourly	Urine	
	
Box	5-2	Sepsis	6	Bundle	
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December	2014.	The	Sepsis	Collaborative	used	IHI’s	Model	for	Improvement	and	
Breakthrough	Collaborative	Model	structure	(Tarrant	et	al.,	2015).	The	goal	of	the	
Sepsis	Collaborative	was	to	reduce	harm	and	mortality	from	sepsis	and	the	focus	of	
the	improvement	project	was	on	early	detection	and	timely	treatment	of	sepsis.	The	
Collaborative	used	early	warning	scores	to	identify	sepsis	and	adopted	the	Sepsis	6	
bundle	as	the	quality	improvement	method	to	treat	sepsis.		
In	2012,	the	Royal	College	of	Physicians	(RCP)	published	a	report	saying	that	“the	
multiplicity	of	early	warning	systems	used	in	different	hospitals	in	the	UK	[was]	
causing	a	lack	of	consistency	in	detecting	deterioration	of	patients’	conditions	and	
[called]	for	urgent	medical	help”	(RCP,	2012,	p.	vii).	The	RCP	report	presented	a	
standardised	observation	scoring	system	and	related	chart	for	use	in	hospitals	
throughout	the	UK	called	the	National	Early	Warning	System	(NEWS).	The	Sepsis	
Collaborative	decided	to	adopt	the	NEWS	chart	and	related	early	warning	score	
system	as	the	recommended	method	of	identifying	an	acutely	unwell	patient.	And	as	
of	2018,	all	14	regional	boards	in	Scotland	have	adopted	NEWS	(McGregor,	2018).	
The	impact	of	the	Sepsis	Collaborative	for	sepsis	care	throughout	the	country	appears	
encouraging.	NHS	Scotland	audit	data	shows	that	there	has	been	a	21%	reduction	in	
sepsis	mortality	compared	to	the	baseline	data	taken	early	in	2012;	and	an	11.2%	drop	
in	the	hospital-based	mortality	ratio	in	that	same	time	period	(McGregor,	2018).		
5.2.2. Understanding	Knowledge	Systems	
This	section	now	turns	to	provide	more	in-depth	analysis	of	the	policy	network.	As	
employed	earlier,	a	Soft	Knowledge	Systems	view	was	taken	to	focus	on	how	actors	
were	arranged	and	the	processes	and	materials	they	used	to	mobilise	their	
knowledge.	Furthermore,	where	possible,	these	data	were	scrutinised	for	various	
forms	of	knowledge	that	were	used	by	actors	in	this	sector.	
Scottish	Patient	Safety	Programme	
The	SPSP	brought	together	a	range	of	collective	actors	including	NHS	Scotland,	
Scottish	Government,	the	Institute	for	Healthcare	Improvement	(IHI),	NHS	Quality	
Improvement	Scotland,	professional	bodies,	and	patient	representatives	(Rooney	&	
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Leitch,	2010).	The	SPSP	was	a	coalition	of	stakeholders	designed	to	reduce	adverse	
events	and	improve	patient	safety	by	using	“evidence-based	tools	and	techniques	in	
defined	areas	of	clinical	practice”	(Rooney	&	Leitch,	2010,	p.	99).	The	‘tools	and	
techniques’	were	IHI’s	Model	for	Improvement	(quality	improvement	techniques)	and	
collaborative	structures	(IHI,	2003).	Each	collaborative	focused	on	a	specific	clinical	
area	that	was	“ripe	for	improvement”	and	not	using	the	“best	scientific	knowledge”	
(IHI,	2003,	p.	3).	IHI	described	the	Breakthrough	Series	Model	(i.e.	using	collaborative	
structures)	as	the	way	they	facilitated,	coordinated,	and	built	professional	connections	
so	that	“organizations	can	easily	learn	from	each	other	and	from	recognized	experts”	
(IHI,	2003,	p.	1).	
The	IHI/SPSP	Collaboratives	assembled	together	clinical	experts,	ideally	at	least	a	
dozen	separate	multidisciplinary	healthcare	teams,	and	quality	improvement	
methodologists	(Kilo,	1998).	Collaborative	members	met	together	face-to-face	at	
‘learning	sessions’	where	they	devised	and	agreed	upon	plans	and	“shared	their	
experiences	in	overcoming	barriers	and	creating	solutions”	(Haraden	&	Leitch,	2011,	
p.	757).	In	between	meetings,	the	healthcare	teams	would	return	to	their	organisation	
and	implement	the	quality	improvement	strategies	and	collect	data	for	monthly	
progress	reports.	There	were	further	monthly	calls	with	representatives	from	each	
area,	the	national	clinical	leads,	and	policy	leaders.	Additional	supports	were	
provided,	such	as	a	collaborative	website	for	sharing	tools	and	resources.	NHS	
Scotland	funded	new	patient	safety	staff	positions	within	the	health	board’s	clinical	
governance	departments	to	support	the	increased	administration	of	the	SPSP	
performance	measurement	system.	
Indeed,	data	collection	was	an	early	challenge	that	had	to	be	addressed	in	the	new	
safety	initiative.	The	SPSP	called	for	different	kinds	of	data	to	be	collated	in	addition	to	
existing	NHS	Scotland’s	data	reporting	requirements.	A	publication	describing	the	
SPSP	process	said:	
There	was	sizable	overlap	between	the	patient	safety	program	and	the	
work	of	other	national	organizations	whose	mission	it	was	to	create	
safe	and	high-quality	care.	This	often	resulted	in	different	definitions	
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and	measures	for	the	same	clinical	outcome… To	solve	this	problem,	
the	patient	safety	program	leadership	had	to	work	closely	with	expert	
clinicians	to	agree	on	definitions.	The	Scottish	Patient	Safety	
Programme	leadership	team	met	bimonthly	with	stakeholders	to	align	
the	new	program’s	focus,	clinical	changes,	measures,	and	definitions	
with	existing	national	programs	(Haraden	&	Leitch,	2011,	p.	756).	
The	‘evidence’	that	the	IHI	and	NHS	Scotland	relied	upon,	in	this	case	the	definitions	
of	diseases	and	the	related	data	needed	for	measuring	progress,	differed.	The	SPSP	
had	to	address	the	misalignment	between	interpretations	of	the	research.	In	an	
interview	a	national	policy	advisor	explained,	
“Part	of	the	debates	were	around	operational	definitions.	The	two	most	
contentious	parts	[for	sepsis]	were	monitoring	fluid	output	and	
measuring	lactate.	The	reasons	those	were	so	contentious,	and	keeping	
in	mind	I	was	on	the	national	group	and	having	these	conversations,	
various	groups	were	trying	to	propose	if	you’re	septic,	you	get	
catheterised.	I’m	saying,	‘I	am	not	taking	that	back	to	[my	health	
board].	That	goes	against	everything	we’re	trying	to	do	for	[another	
patient	safety	initiative].”	(NHS	Scotland	policy	advisor)	
Thus,	agreeing	and	aligning	the	evidence-based	materials	was	done	in	negotiation	
between	the	policy-based	SPSP	leadership,	the	clinical	lead	experts,	and	practice-
based	clinicians.	
In	an	interview,	Hannah,	a	training	and	development	officer	at	Aurora,	explained	the	
alignment	of	the	SPSP’s	and	existing	NHS	Scotland’s	data	systems	this	way:	
“The	Patient	Safety	Programme	came	along	and	suddenly	we	have	a	
huge	data	burden	because	we	have	measures	on	both	sides	of	the	
camp…it	was	on	two	systems	at	one	point.	We	then	managed	to	get	it	
onto	one	system.	Because	it	felt	like	there	were	two	camps	in	the	
government	that	weren’t	talking	to	each	other…so	we	were	
campaigning	to	Jason	Leitch	every	time	I	saw	him.	It	would	be	much	
more	helpful	if	this	was	united.	Eventually	that	came	on	board,	and	they	
heard	us.”	(Hannah)	
Moreover,	the	Sepsis	Collaborative	gathered	together	not	only	practitioners	engaged	
in	the	same	work	elsewhere	in	the	country,	but	also	provided	a	point	of	contact	with	
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high-profile	policy-level	staff.	Jason	Leitch	heard	them,	and	the	burdensome	data	
collection	system	requirements	were	modified.		
Another	example	of	contact	between	practitioners	and	policymakers	was	noted	in	the	
same	interview	with	Hannah,	she	said,	
“She	[Nicola	Sturgeon]	was	the	link	for	IHI	and	actively	supported	
implementation	across	Scotland.	I	think	that	has	been	a	very	helpful	
thing	for	coordinating	Scotland	to	be	driving	improvement	at	every	
health	board.	From	that	perspective,	the	government	funded	a	national	
facilitators	network.”	(Hannah)	
NHS	Scotland	policymakers	and	leaders,	such	as	Nicola	Sturgeon	and	Jason	Leitch,	
were	available	and	accessible	to	the	health	boards.	And	more	than	being	accessible,	
they	were	responsive	to	the	needs	of	local	practitioners.	Furthermore,	the	SPSP	
brought	together	a	geographically	dispersed	practitioner	workforce	alongside	policy	
leaders.	
Sepsis	Collaborative	
The	Sepsis	Collaborative	addressed	all	aspects	of	the	health	boards’	knowledge	
systems,	the	arrangement	and	organisation	of	actors,	the	processes,	and	the	
materials.	Professor	Kevin	Rooney	was	the	Sepsis	Collaborative	lead	clinical	expert.	
Each	of	Scotland’s	14	regional	health	boards	formed	a	team	of	key	stakeholders.	The	
teams	included	physicians,	nurses,	relevant	allied	health	professionals,	training	and	
development,	as	well	as	members	of	the	clinical	governance	staff.	All	boards	sent	
team	members	to	Collaborative	learning	sessions	to	meet	face-to-face	with	their	
colleagues	from	around	the	country,	the	expert	clinical	faculty,	and	quality	
improvement	experts.	
The	Sepsis	Collaborative	held	five	learning	sessions	over	two	years,	supplemented	by	
monthly	WebEx-based	meetings.	At	Collaborative	meetings	they	set	evidence	based	
goals,	talked	with	other	practitioners	and	exchanged	ideas.	In	between	meetings	they	
applied	the	agreed-upon	improvement	methods	and	compiled	their	performance	
measurement	data	for	further	discussion	at	the	next	joint	learning	session.	Additional	
communication	channels	were	established	using	a	newly	developed	web	portal,	email	
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and	WebEx	conferences.	And	the	collaborative	faculty	made	site	visits	to	each	board	
once	a	year.		
Within	the	Collaborative	processes	and	materials	there	were	mixed	expectations	of	
conformity	and	allowance	for	local	variation.	For	example,	the	Collaborative	agreed	
upon	the	performance	measures,	such	as	Sepsis	6	compliance.	Each	board	was	
expected	to	collect	and	report	compliance	with	the	Sepsis	6	bundle	on	a	monthly	basis	
to	the	NHS	Scotland	audit	body.	Yet	the	policymakers	did	not	mandate	the	early	
warning	systems	or	charts	that	each	board	used.	The	Collaborative	promoted	the	
benefits	of	NEWS	at	learning	sessions,	but	allowed	each	board	to	make	the	decision	of	
what	scoring	system	they	would	use.	Field	notes	from	a	meeting	in	November	2014	
reported	that	“two	of	the	boards	recently	transitioned	to	using	NEWS.”	A	half	hour	of	
the	meeting	was	given	to	these	boards	describing	their	“success	stories.”	Hannah,	
from	Aurora,	explained	it	this	way:	“So	there	is	a	whole	galvanization	from	the	
government	perspective,	but	you’re	very	much	as	a	board	left	to	work	out	how	you’re	
going	to	do	things	yourself”	(Hannah).	
The	leadership	of	the	Collaborative	encouraged,	but	did	not	dictate,	that	all	boards	
use	the	NEWS	early	warning	system	and	chart.	With	some	materials,	there	was	a	
mandated	standardisation,	whereas	with	other	materials,	the	national	policies	were	
flexible.	
An	evaluation	of	the	Sepsis	Collaborative	reported,		
The	collaborative	provided	multiple	routes	for	sharing	learning,	the	
most	effective	of	which	seemed	to	be	providing	time	for	interactions	
between	teams	from	different	boards	at	learning	sessions.	Participants	
highly	valued	learning	from	others’	successes	and	having	an	
opportunity	to	discuss	challenges.	They	also	valued	access	to	expert	
faculty	at	learning	sessions	(Tarrant	et	al.,	2015,	p.	10).	
In	addition	to	learning	from	other	boards	and	clinical	experts,	the	evaluation	stated	
that,	“Participants	also	felt	the	learning	sessions	were	useful	in	that	they	enabled	
those	involved…within	the	board	to	get	together,	away	from	the	demands	of	clinical	
duties,	and	take	time	to	discuss	progress	and	plan	for	future	activities”	(Tarrant	et	al.,	
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2015,	p.	10).	Hannah	agreed:	“You	all	get	together	and	share	the	learning	and	the	
tools.	And	share	stories,	case	studies	of	how	things	are	going	and	how	you’ve	made	
improvement	or	not”	(Hannah).	
The	Collaborative	enabled	time	amongst	co-workers	to	exclusively	focus	and	reflect	
upon	their	sepsis	work.	The	space	for	sustained,	face-to-face	contact	was	seen	as	
important.	The	other	points	of	contact,	such	as	the	WebEx	calls	and	web	portal,	
“while	more	convenient,	the	mediated	nature	of	IT-based	learning	and	sharing	
opportunities	meant	that	they	were	not	always	as	effective	as	face-to-face	forums”	
(Tarrant	et	al.,	2015,	p.	10).	
Furthermore,	the	evaluation	report	stated	that	the	site	visits	from	expert	faculty	were	
not	universally	well-received.	
Participants	described	ambiguity	around	the	purpose	of	site	visits.	They	
could	be	effective	in	raising	the	profile	of	local	collaborative	work,	
provide	an	opportunity	for	celebration,	and	act	to	re-enthuse	and	
motivate	people.	But	they	were	also	sometimes	seen	as	a	means	
through	which	the	faculty	held	site	teams	to	account	for	their	progress,	
potentially	creating	tension	with	other	purposes	–	for	example,	
inhibiting	frankness	in	discussing	problems	and	deciding	how	they	
might	be	remedied	(Tarrant	et	al.,	2015,	p.	10).	
From	practitioners’	perspective,	not	all	contact	between	actors	from	different	
communities	was	helpful.	The	critical	tone	by	policy-level	faculty	erected	walls	and	
inhibited	communication	between	these	actors.		
A	contrast	to	perceived	heavy-handed	engagement	with	Collaborative	faculty	was	
observed	at	a	face-to-face	meeting	in	May	2016.	This	meeting	involved	approximately	
100	people	from	health	boards	around	the	country.	A	new	sepsis	definition	(i.e.	
Sepsis-3,	see	Singer	et	al.,	2016)	had	been	recently	released	by	the	Society	of	Critical	
Care	Medicine	and	European	Society	of	Intensive	Care	Medicine.	The	publication	
endorsed	the	SOFA	score.	This	new	material	from	the	research	community	was	
unsettling	for	the	Collaborative.	Over	the	prior	few	years	a	great	deal	of	effort	had	
been	poured	into	encouraging	each	of	Scotland’s	health	boards	to	use	the	NEWS	early	
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warning	scoring	system.	Field	notes	from	the	meeting	recorded	that	the	clinical	lead	
said,	“he,	only	somewhat	jokingly,	considered	closing	himself	in	a	dark	closet	for	
days.”	The	primary	reason,	Professor	Rooney	said,	for	the	meeting	“was	to	take	the	
temperature	of	those	responsible	for	sepsis	care	in	their	areas	and	come	to	consensus	
for	a	Scotland-based	perspective.”		
Professor	Rooney	wanted	a	response	to	Singer	et	al.’s	(2016)	proposed	definitions	
that	all	present	in	the	room	would	sign.	Over	the	course	of	the	day	a	Scotland-based	
“Sepsis	Position	Statement”	was	constructed.	To	reach	full	consensus,	a	first	iteration	
statement	crafted	by	policy-based	actors	was	projected	on	the	large	screen	at	the	
front	of	the	room.	Attendees	were	asked	to	consider	the	content.	Then	Professor	
Rooney	read	the	statement	line	by	line.	After	each	line,	he	stopped	and	requested	
feedback	and	suggested	edits.	Many	different	people	proposed	adjustments.	
Throughout	the	process,	the	clinical	lead	pressed	for	views,	gave	time	for	each	person	
present	to	speak,	and	when	concerns	were	raised	that	could	potentially	derail	the	
consensus	building	process,	he	often	did	not	take	the	response	himself.	Instead,	he	
asked	for	others	in	the	room	to	provide	their	views	of	agreement	or	disagreement.	
They	negotiated	and	rewrote	the	statement	sentence	by	sentence.	After	each	
rewritten	paragraph,	Professor	Rooney	asked	the	room	to	raise	their	hands	if	they	
could	support	the	content.	The	voting	continued	until	a	final	statement	was	agreed.	
SPSP	released	the	statement	on	24	May	2016.	
The	field	journal	notations	indicated	what	was	at	stake.	Many	believed	that	the	
research	community	content	(published	in	JAMA)	must	be	reckoned	with.	One	person	
stated	that	the	registrars	and	junior	doctors	would	be	aware	of	it,	and	to	remain	
credible,	they	must	“keep	up	with	the	evidence,”	while	others	expressed	what	was	
described	as	a	“wait	and	see”	perspective.	They	did	not	want	to	hastily	shift	to	what	
they	considered	as	yet	unproven.	Rather	they	wanted	other	health	systems	to	test	it	
out,	and	determine	whether	the	new	definition	and	assessment	tool	held	up	under	
wider	scrutiny.	There	was	a	tension	between	being	up	to	date	with	the	research	and	
not	being	unduly	hasty.		
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In	these	discussions	the	clinical	lead	clearly	stated	his	views	but	invited	alternative	
perspectives.	He	listened	to	and	managed	the	interactions	between	attendees.	This	
observed	example	comports	with	the	evaluation	document,	which	said:		
The	expertise	and	skills	of	the	faculty,	and	the	personalities	and	
commitment	of	the	national	clinical	leads,	were	also	seen	as	key	by	
participants	and	stakeholders	alike.	Participants	felt	that	working	as	
part	of	a	national	collaborative…provided	recognition	for	local	efforts.	
...The	learning	sessions	were	used	as	opportunities	for	senior	leaders	to	
present	accounts	of	their	own	failures	and	their	learning,	and	
participants	were	encouraged	to	share	their	failures	with	others	
(Tarrant	et	al.,	2015,	p.	9).	
The	policy	leaders	shared	in	the	experiences	of	the	hospital	communities.	
These	policy	actors	related	to	practitioners	and	treated	their	knowledge	as	
important	in	the	national	knowledge	system.	
5.2.3. Mobilising	Knowledge	in	the	Policy	Network	
This	account	shows	that	the	Collaborative	tied	together	actors	from	the	policy,	
practice	and	even	the	research	community	via	IHI	and	the	Singer	et	al.	(2016)	
publication.	Furthermore,	the	Sepsis	Collaborative	established	professionally	diverse	
work	teams	within	each	board.	They	required	the	health	boards	to	construct	local	
teams	made	up	of	a	variety	of	specialisations,	professions,	and	roles,	where	every	
actor’s	knowledge,	i.e.	clinical	mindline,	would	be	included.	Intensive	care	doctors	and	
nurses	were	teamed	up	with	Emergency	Department	staff,	microbiology,	and	
administrative	staff,	such	as	clinical	governance	and	training	and	development	
personnel.	In	this	way,	normally	occurring	social	and	epistemic	separations	were	
addressed,	at	least	to	the	degree	that	they	were	expected	to	meet	together	and	
devise	a	local	action	plan.		
Policymakers	appear	to	have	been	flexible	and	allowed	each	region	to	organise	
processes	and	use	materials	that	suited	them.	NHS	Scotland	led	but	did	not	dictate	all	
aspects	of	the	knowledge	system.	NHS	Scotland	proposed	strategies	(e.g.	early	
warning	systems)	but	allowed	for	variation.	An	early	example	is	explained	in	the	next	
chapter,	when	Aurora	chose	to	take	advantage	of	national	funding	for	specialist	staff	
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and	the	creation	of	a	critical	care	outreach	team.	Each	board	was	allowed	to	decide	if	
and	when	to	adopt	the	NEWS	system.		
The	policy	community	explicitly	facilitated	building	consensus.	Thus,	resulting	
materials	came	from	collective	input	that	integrated	the	judgement	of	individual	
participants.	And	consensus	was	developed	via	regular	contact,	including	face-to-face	
meetings.	The	moderate	size	of	Scotland	assisted	national	organising	efforts.	Most	
health	boards	were	able	to	meet	together	face-to-face.	This	contributes	to	a	
geographic	advantage	in	the	Scottish	context,	as	the	health	community	knows	one	
another.	This	also	facilitates	tighter	practice-based	knowledge	networks	that	have	
direct	access	to	policymakers.	Furthermore,	there	were	indications	that	the	qualities	
of	relationships	between	policymakers	and	health	board	practitioners	(and	between	
health	boards)	helped	to	support	higher	performing	sepsis	practices	throughout	the	
country.	In	other	words,	the	Collaborative	leadership	did	not	often	demand	or	shame,	
but	tried	to	woo	the	boards.	They	applied	careful	social	pressure	to	encourage	the	
shift	to	NEWS	tool.	
5.2.4. Conclusion	
In	conclusion,	there	were	commonalities	between	the	Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign	and	
the	SPSP	Sepsis	Collaborative.	Firstly,	key	individual	actors	initiated	an	active	effort	to	
organise	stakeholders	to	improve	sepsis	practice.	To	do	so,	they	were	inclusive	and	
gathered	and	collected	actors	from	a	variety	of	professional	and	disciplinary	roles.	
Secondly,	both	the	SSC	and	Sepsis	Collaborative	devised	processes	and	materials	to	
build	and	share	their	knowledge	within	their	networks.	They	listened	and	responded	
to	contrasting	points	of	view.	And	by	doing	so,	they	addressed	the	social	boundaries	
that	separate	actors	in	a	knowledge	network.	Thus,	shepherding	practices	were	
evident	in	the	policy	community	as	well.	Furthermore,	the	consensus	building	process	
brought	together	actors’	formal,	informal,	tacit	and	experiential	ways	of	knowing	
(their	individual	mindlines)	in	order	to	shape	their	collective	mindlines.		
These	data	reveal	the	knowledge	systems	that	these	communities	put	in	place	to	
mobilise	their	knowledge.	And	yet,	these	accounts	also	provide	indicators	that	how	
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these	actors	interacted,	the	relationships	between	actors,	also	played	a	role	in	
overcoming	boundaries	and	mobilising	knowledge.	These	interactions	are	explored	
more	fully	in	the	hospital	context	in	Chapter	6.		
5.3. Sepsis	Specific	Terminology	
By	way	of	summarising,	the	following	section	provides	in	table	format	the	outputs	
found	in	the	preceding	research	and	policy	networks	data.	There	are	sets	of	
recommendations,	early	warning	schemas,	etc.,	and	this	information	once	agreed	
upon	within	the	SSC	and	the	Sepsis	Collaborative	networks,	was	then	distributed	to	
‘research-users’	in	hospital	contexts.	These	explicit	forms	of	knowledge	about	sepsis	
can	be	segmented	into	three	main	areas:	what	defines,	identifies,	and	treats	the	
condition.	Table	5-1	summarises	the	clinical	content	introduced	in	this	chapter	and	
provides	the	key	terms	needed	moving	forward	to	the	practice-based	context	in	the	
next	chapter.	
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Table	5-1,	Summary	of	Sepsis-Related	Terms	and	Acronyms	
Defining	Sepsis	
SIRS	 Systemic	Inflammatory	Response	Syndrome	that	
focuses	on	4	physical	criteria	(temperature,	heart	rate,	
respiratory	rate	and	white	blood	cell	count)	of	the	
patient.	
Sepsis-1	
	
Based	upon	a	systemic	inflammatory	response	to	
infection	(SIRS)	when	2	or	more	SIRS	measurements	
fall	outside	of	desired	parameters	AND	a	confirmed	or	
suspected	infection,	a	diagnosis	of	sepsis	is	given.	
Published	in	1992.	
						(Severe	sepsis)	 In	addition	to	above,	signs	of	organ	dysfunction	are	
present	or	a	marked	shift	in	mental	status.	
						(Septic	shock)	 Persistent,	life-threatening	organ	dysfunction	despite	
initial	treatment.	
Sepsis-2	 A	revision	of	Sepsis-1	based	on	SIRS	criteria	but	
includes	an	expanded	list	of	signs	and	symptoms.	
Published	in	2003.	
						(Severe	sepsis)	
						(Septic	shock)	
Definitions	of	severe	sepsis	and	septic	shock	remain	
largely	the	same	as	Sepsis-1	above.	(E.g.	Added	
elevated	lactate	reading	to	indicate	severe	sepsis	and	
severely	elevated	lactate	reading	for	shock.)	
Sepsis-3	 Life-threatening	organ	dysfunction	caused	by	the	
body’s	response	to	a	confirmed	infection.	Sepsis-3	
discards	SIRS-based	criteria	and	instead	requires	signs	
of	organ	dysfunction	based	on	SOFA	criteria	in	order	
to	be	considered	sepsis.	Published	in	2016.		
						Sepsis	3	(Severe	sepsis)	 Category	of	severe	sepsis	eliminated	in	Sepsis-3.	Signs	
of	organ	dysfunction	now	required	for	initial	sepsis	
diagnosis.	
						Sepsis	3	(Septic	shock)	 Those	unresponsive	to	initial	treatment,	whose	organs	
continue	to	malfunction	and	require	continuous	
treatment	to	maintain	sufficient	blood	pressure.	
Identifying	Sepsis	
Patient	Observation	Charts	 Bedside	monitoring	tool	used	to	record	patient	data,	
such	as	blood	pressure,	temperature,	etc.	
Early	Warning	Scores	 Quantitative	risk	calculation	scores	based	on	
measurements	routinely	collected	via	patient	
observation	charts.	Also	called	‘track	and	trigger	
tools’.	
SIRS	score	 An	early	warning	score	based	on	patient	observation	
measures	drawn	from	Systemic	Inflammatory	
Response	Syndrome-based	definition	of	sepsis.		
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NEWS	 National	Early	Warning	Score	developed	by	the	Royal	
College	of	Physicians	for	the	NHS	
SOFA	 Sepsis-related	Organ	Failure	Assessment	score	
developed	by	the	European	Society	for	Intensive	Care	
Medicine	
qSOFA	 “Quick”	SOFA	score	for	use	outside	of	the	critical	care	
setting	
Treating	Sepsis	
SSC	International	
Guidelines	
International	consensus-based	guidelines	for	the	
treatment	and	management	of	sepsis	patients.	
Produced	in	2004,	2008,	2012	and	2016.	
Sepsis	bundles	 A	distillation	of	Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign	treatment	
guidelines	to	a	small	set	of	practices	to	be	completed	
together.	For	critical	care	settings.	
Sepsis	6	 A	bundle	of	six	treatments	to	be	completed	in	1	hour.	
For	non-specialist	clinicians	used	outside	the	critical	
care	setting.	Developed	and	presently	used	primarily	
in	the	UK.	
Sepsis	sticker	 Documentation	within	patient	record	that	verifies	
Sepsis	6	was	completed	
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6. Chapter	6—The	Practice	Network		
Heart	failure	is	a	common	way	that	a	person	dies	from	sepsis.	In	2000	Aurora	General	
Hospital	had	465	cardiac	arrest	alerts.	By	2012	that	number	had	dropped	to	22.	The	
purpose	of	this	chapter	is	to	explore	how	Aurora	mobilised	their	knowledge	to	achieve	
this	decline.	To	do	so	this	chapter	has	three	sections.	The	first	describes	the	story	of	
sepsis	care	at	Aurora	over	the	last	three	decades	drawn	from	participant	interviews,	
documentation	provided	to	me,	as	well	as	my	own	observations	over	the	year	I	spent	
at	Aurora.	The	next	section	expands	and	analyses	these	data	using	the	Soft	Knowledge	
Systems	and	Clinical	Mindlines	theories	as	lenses	to	explore	the	ways	that	actors	
organised	within	their	knowledge	network	and	the	knowledges	they	drew	upon	that	
facilitated	the	mobilisation	of	sepsis	knowledge.	Lastly,	the	conclusion	focuses	on	the	
interactions	between	actors	that	enabled	knowledge	to	mobilise	within	this	
community.	
In	keeping	with	the	practices	of	the	community	(and	how	I	addressed	staff	members),	
Table	6-1	identifies	key	actors	within	Aurora,	listing	the	senior	medical	staff	with	titles,	
while	the	rest	of	the	staff	are	represented	using	a	first	name	pseudonym.	
Table	6-1	Key	Actors	at	Aurora	General	Hospital	
Name	 Position	 Role	
David	 ICU	Outreach	Team	nurse	 Team	lead	
Kelly	 ICU	Outreach	Team	nurse	 	
Jackie	 ICU	Outreach	Team	nurse	 	
Leann	 ICU	Outreach	Team	nurse	 	
Martha	 Clinical	Governance	 	
Sue	 Clinical	Governance		 Team	lead	
Dr	Lewis	 ICU	doctor	 Retired	medical	lead	
Dr	Adams	 ICU	doctor	 Present	medical	lead	
Dr	Jones	 Microbiologist	 	
Mr	King	 A&E	doctor	 Medical	lead	
Hannah	 Training	and	Development	 	
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6.1. Aurora’s	Sepsis	Story	
This	first	section	provides	a	narrative	account	of	how	Aurora	organised	and	became	a	
high-performing	hospital	with	respect	to	sepsis	care.	As	in	the	last	chapter,	the	story	is	
crafted	to	introduce	the	key	actors	and	share	the	events	that	shaped	this	community’s	
sepsis	care	provision.		
Aurora	General	Hospital	was	a	forerunner	within	Scotland	in	addressing	the	problem	
of	deteriorating	patients.	In	the	1980s	and	1990s,	Dr	Lewis	(then	the	medical	lead	over	
Aurora’s	ICU)	witnessed	patient	after	patient	being	rushed	from	a	medical	or	surgical	
ward	into	the	ICU	due	to	multi-organ	failure	after	days	of	unnoticed	deterioration	in	a	
hospital	bed.	From	observations	made	by	multiple	participants,	it	was	deemed	that	
the	patients	were	too	far	along	the	sepsis	pathway	for	the	critical	care	specialists	to	
help.	Consequently,	it	was	their	belief	that	had	the	patient’s	decline	been	recognised	
earlier,	and	brought	to	the	ICU	for	treatment,	the	ICU	team	might	have	had	a	chance	
to	save	their	life.		
Dr	Lewis	began	to	devise	strategies	to	solve	the	problem	of	recognising	a	deteriorating	
patient	and	reasoned	that	the	strategic	use	of	the	bedside	observation	chart	was	key	
to	saving	patients’	lives.	In	this	era,	standard	practice	was	to	have	a	collection	of	
charts	attached	to	a	clipboard	for	each	patient:	one	for	tracking	respiratory	activity,	
one	for	bowel,	another	for	fluid	administration,	etc.	Dr	Lewis	suspected	that	the	
fragmentation	of	information	inhibited	the	ward	staff’s	ability	to	monitor	and	properly	
see	the	holistic	picture	of	a	patient,	and	this	slowed	their	recognition	of	a	patient	in	
decline.	To	address	the	problem,	he	sought	to	simplify	and	reduce	the	quantity	of	
charts.		
In	the	late	1980s,	in	conjunction	with	his	medical	and	nurse	colleagues	in	the	ICU,	Dr	
Lewis	devised	and	trialled	a	consolidated	chart	within	their	unit.	When	patients	were	
moved	from	the	ICU	to	other	wards	within	Aurora	not	under	his	medical	authority,	the	
new	chart	went	with	them.	Eventually,	most	patients	throughout	the	hospital	were	
monitored	using	Dr	Lewis’s	chart,	unless	the	patient’s	consultant	requested	otherwise.	
However,	despite	the	use	of	a	combined	chart,	patients	were	still	arriving	at	the	ICU	
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too	late	to	help:	“But	it	wasn’t	doing	what	it	should	do.	You	would	still	get	people	that	
had	[not	passed	urine]	for	two	or	three	days	coming	through	the	system”	(Dr	Lewis).		
In	response	the	ICU	team	revised	the	consolidated	chart	by	adding	a	simple	colour	
component.	In	this	way,	under	Dr	Lewis’s	direction,	they	devised	a	visual	trigger	tool	
with	a	view	to	help	ward	staff	more	clearly	see	a	patient	at	risk.	For	example,	if	a	
patient’s	temperature	was	above	or	below	a	normal	range,	the	number	was	recorded	
in	a	yellow	box	as	opposed	to	the	normal	white	box.	Trigger	tools	such	as	this	were	
not	yet	commonplace.	Dr	Lewis	explained	in	an	interview	that	his	ideas	stemmed	from	
Shoemaker’s	research	publications	in	the	late	1970’s	that	advocated	focusing	on	
patients	that	met	high	risk	parameters.	Dr	Lewis	found	Shoemaker’s	views	convincing.	
And	yet,	despite	the	incorporation	of	a	visual	trigger,	patients	continued	to	arrive	to	
the	ICU	too	late	to	help.	
In	an	interview,	Dr	Lewis	recalled	discovering	Bone	et	al.’s	(1992)	paper	defining	SIRS,	
and	the	progression	from	SIRS	to	organ	dysfunction,	to	organ	failure,	and	finally	to	
death.	In	the	mid	1990s	he	once	again	worked	with	his	ICU	staff	to	incorporate	the	
SIRS	criteria	into	the	colour	coded	chart	and	expected	that	would	finally	ensure	the	
early	identification	of	deteriorating	patients.	However,	to	the	ICU’s	surprise,	the	
problem	continued:		
“Getting	people	to	use	it	the	way	it	was	supposed	to	be	used,	i.e.	go	
through	the	whole	lot,	do	the	charting,	recognise	it	was	an	abnormal	
result,	call	the	right	people,	and	enact	the	right	resuscitation,	was	
difficult	and	very	sporadic.”	(Dr	Lewis)	
The	ICU	staff	decided	the	problem	must	be	a	knowledge	deficit	(“an	educational	
issue”).	To	address	this,	members	of	the	ICU	provided	training	throughout	the	hospital	
on	how	to	use	the	chart	and	what	to	do	in	response.	“It	should	have	worked.	[The	
timely	identification	of	sepsis]	showed	an	uplift,	and	then	faded	off	again...we	were	
scratching	our	head”	(Dr	Lewis).	
As	noted	in	the	last	chapter,	in	2000	two	UK	critical	care	reports,	one	for	Scotland	and	
one	for	England,	observed	this	was	a	widespread	problem.	The	independent	reports	
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both	showed	that	across	the	country,	patients	were	often	not	faring	well	in	wards	and	
arriving	too	late	to	the	ICU	to	recover.	In	response,	NHS	England	funded	the	roll	out	of	
Critical	Care	Outreach	teams,	whereas	NHS	Scotland	chose	a	chart-based	early	
recognition	system.	However,	Aurora	already	had	a	chart-dependent	system	in	place	
for	nearly	a	decade	and	there	were	still	465	cardiac	arrest	alerts	that	year.	Early	
recognition	based	on	charts	had	not	sufficiently	addressed	the	problem.	Aurora	
decided	instead	to	utilise	funding	by	the	Scottish	Chief	Nursing	Office	for	specialist	
nurses,	and	put	in	place	a	Critical	Care	Outreach	service.		
In	2001	David	was	selected	to	start	an	Outreach	service.	As	an	ICU	senior	charge	nurse	
he	had	been	a	trusted	part	of	the	ICU	for	many	years	and	had	been	involved	in	earlier	
efforts	of	trialling	the	charts	and	training	Aurora’s	staff	on	their	usage.	David	sought	
out	well-regarded	Outreach	programmes	in	England	to	model	and	learn	from,	and	
visited	to	“collect	intelligence…to	see	what	was	working	and	use	it”	(David).	Initially,	as	
the	solitary	member	of	the	Outreach	service,	he	covered	Monday	to	Friday	from	9	am	
until	5	pm	where	his	responsibilities	were	fourfold.	Firstly,	he	provided	an	additional	
layer	of	monitoring	for	patients	discharged	from	the	ICU	to	a	ward.	David	explained	in	
an	interview	that	this	was	a	manageable	workload	and	these	patients	were	at	higher	
risk	of	rapid	deterioration.	
Secondly,	a	referral	process	was	put	in	place.	When	a	hospitalised	patient	registered	a	
SIRS	score	of	two	or	higher,	the	ward	staff	were	instructed	to	page	the	Outreach	
service	who	would	come	and	conduct	an	immediate	assessment.	For	example,	nurses	
on	the	wards	regularly	record	a	patient’s	vital	information	on	the	bedside	chart.	If	a	
patient’s	heart	rate	was	above	90	or	below	60	beats	per	minute,	that	counted	as	one	
point	on	the	SIRS	scale.	If	the	patient	also	appeared	confused,	that	brought	the	SIRS	
score	up	to	two.	Before	the	Outreach	referral	system,	“they	may	not	see	the	
importance	of	that,	so	[the	nurse]	may	not	report	it	up”	(David)	to	the	senior	clinical	
staff	for	a	more	thorough	assessment.	The	new	referral	system	added	on	a	specific	
response,	paging	Outreach,	as	a	further	layer	to	Aurora’s	existing	track	and	trigger	
system.		
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Thirdly,	an	open	invitation	was	offered	to	any	hospital	staff	member	that	had	patient	
of	concern.	They	were	encouraged	to	page	Outreach,	who	would	reliably	respond	and	
provide	an	immediate	consultation.	David	would	arrive	promptly,	listen	to	the	ward	
staff’s	concerns,	and	assess	the	immediate	and	ongoing	needs	of	the	patient.	Using	his	
decades	of	critical	care	expertise,	he	would	gauge	whether	the	patient	was	septic	or	
not,	and	as	well	as	whether	the	patient	warranted	‘escalation’.	Escalation	means	
being	moved	from	the	regular	ward	to	a	higher	level	unit	such	as	the	High	
Dependency	Unit	or	ICU	where	staff	ratios	are	higher	and	monitoring	is	more	
aggressive	than	can	be	done	on	a	regular	medical	or	surgical	ward.	
Lastly,	David	established	a	quarterly	Study	Day	set	within	the	hospital	for	all	nursing	
staff.	The	stated	purpose	was	to	provide	training	on	how	to	identify	and	rescue	a	
deteriorating	patient.	To	encourage	wide	ownership,	David	sought	out	specialists	from	
various	areas	in	the	hospital	to	teach	on	the	course.	“I	had	[respiratory	therapy]	do	a	
respiratory	assessment,	a	physician	doing	pneumonia,	and	anaesthetist	doing	
therapeutic	fluids,	another	anaesthetist	doing	blood	gas	analysis,	and	I	did	sepsis”	
(David).	David	explained	that	the	Study	Day	was	well	received	and	he	was	encouraged	
to	expand	the	training	to	include	students,	doctors,	and	physical	therapists.	“It	grew	
and	grew”	and	now	is	multi-professional	as	well	as	multidisciplinary.		
Despite	the	limited	availability	of	resources,	Aurora	chose	to	expand	the	Outreach	
service.	Kelly	joined	David	in	2005,	and	two	years	later,	Jackie	and	Leann	were	added.	
The	Outreach	team	extended	their	cover	to	12	hour	shifts	each	day	of	the	week.	The	
reason	was	that	once	the	Outreach	service	was	in	place	to	support	the	SIRS-based	
early	warning	system,	Aurora’s	audit	data	saw	marked	improvement.	There	was	a	
decline	of	all	forms	of	organ	support	provision	(e.g.	fewer	patients	requiring	
ventilation	or	kidney	dialysis),	fewer	emergency	ICU	admissions	during	the	night	shift,	
patients’	overall	length	of	stay	in	the	ICU	went	down,	and,	most	importantly,	patient	
mortality	decreased.	Furthermore,	the	team	grew	because	the	consultants	in	
particular	saw	the	value	of	it:	“They	had	someone	to	go	to,	and	say,	‘Can	you	keep	an	
eye	on	this	one?’…They	knew	they	had	a	safety	net.	And	they	really	appreciated	it”	(Dr	
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Lewis).	Each	team	member	independently	noted	that	the	consultant	staff	sought	
Outreach	out	when	they	had	a	patient	of	concern.	The	consultants	depended	upon	
them.		
“They	[the	consultants]	see	the	benefits	of	the	service.	I	mean,	who	
wouldn’t	like	somebody	experienced	coming	around	to	see	their	
patients	that	aren’t	as	well?	We’re	keeping	an	eye	on	them.”	(Kelly)	
With	the	increase	of	Outreach	staff	hours,	their	responsibilities	expanded	to	include	
rounds	through	all	inpatient	wards	three	times	per	day.	Each	team	member	
commented	(and	I	observed)	that	while	walking	through	the	hallways	and	bays,	in	
addition	to	checking	on	patients	that	had	previously	been	referred	and	those	recently	
discharged	from	the	ICU,	they	chatted	to	nurses,	doctors	and	porters,	whilst	looking	
attentively	through	windows	and	into	side	rooms	to	see	who	occupied	each	bed.	And	
if,	for	example,	a	patient’s	posture	did	not	seem	right,	they	investigated	further.	
When	the	Scottish	Patient	Safety	Programme	began	in	2008,	Aurora	had	an	early	
warning	system	supported	by	the	Outreach	team	in	place.	The	continued	decrease	of	
cardiac	arrest	calls	within	the	hospital	signalled,	along	with	other	indicators,	that	this	
approach	provided	consistently	positive	outcomes	for	their	patients.	Moreover,	90%	
of	patients	with	sepsis	were	able	to	remain	on	the	ward,	managed	by	the	ward	staff	
with	support	from	the	Outreach	team,	reversing	the	last	minute,	and	often	deadly,	
rush	to	the	ICU.	
“Just	having	a	tracking	system	didn’t	work.	We	had	tried	it.	It	didn’t	
work.	We	put	in	education	around	it,	and	it	still	didn’t	work.	Not	until	
we	put	in	the	Outreach	team,	which	was	the	person	support	to	the	ward	
staff,	the	juniors	and	nurses	in	particular,	on	the	ward,	in	real	time,	who	
could	actually	be	the	first	port	of	call	to	go	to,	the	friendly	face,	plus	the	
educator.	That’s	when	it	worked.”	(Dr	Lewis)	
In	2012,	some	20	years	after	Dr	Lewis’s	initial	efforts,	the	Scottish	Patient	Safety	
Programme	turned	to	focus	on	improving	preventable	deaths	from	sepsis	by	
establishing	the	Sepsis/VTE	Collaborative.	This	nationwide	effort,	described	in	Chapter	
5,	drew	attention	to	Aurora’s	accomplishments	in	preventing	and	treating	sepsis.	
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Drawing	on	the	Institute	for	Healthcare	Improvement’s	Breakthrough	Series	Model	
(described	in	the	last	chapter),	a	wider	range	of	Aurora’s	staff	augmented	the	
Outreach	Team	with	formal	responsibilities	for	the	deteriorating	patient.	A	wider	
range	of	people	took	on	an	active	role	and	the	Deteriorating	Patient	Group	was	
formed.	Members	of	the	Deteriorating	Patient	Group	included	(see	Table	6-2)	those	
with	clinical	responsibilities	(such	as	the	Outreach	Team,	the	clinical	lead	from	the	ICU	
[Dr	Lewis	and,	later,	Dr	Adams]	and	the	Emergency	Department	[Mr	King],	
microbiology	[Dr	Jones],	and	every	unit’s	senior	charge	nurse)	and	hospital	
administration	(such	as	the	Associate	Director	of	Nursing,	members	of	the	Clinical	
Governance	department,	Aurora’s	medical	director,	training	and	development,	and,	
periodically,	Aurora’s	Chief	Executive).	The	group	met	fortnightly	and	attendance	
varied	from	meeting	to	meeting.	For	example,	when	the	Chief	Executive	attended,	
notice	was	sent	ahead	of	time,	and	as	a	result	the	senior	charge	nurses	would	come	as	
well,	but	otherwise,	the	Outreach	team	and	the	Clinical	Governance	staff	were	the	
mainstays	of	the	meetings.		
Table	6-2,	Deteriorating	Patient	Group	Members	
Clinical	Members:	 Hospital	Administration	Members:	
Critical	Care	Outreach	Team	 Clinical	Governance	
Intensive	Care	Unit	Medical	Lead	 Assistant	Director	of	Nursing	
Emergency	Department	Medical	Lead	 Training	&	Development	
Senior	Charge	Nurses,	All	Wards	 Chief	Executive	(occasionally)	
Microbiology	 	
	
At	the	national	level,	the	Sepsis	Collaborative	initiative	coalesced	around	bringing	the	
Sepsis	6	bundle	(the	treatment	response	for	those	diagnosed	with	sepsis)	into	all	
hospitals	across	Scotland.	At	Aurora,	members	of	the	Deteriorating	Patient	Group	
used	the	meetings	to	revise	the	patient	observation	chart	to	include	Sepsis	6.	A	wide	
range	of	hospital	training	activities	were	organised	to	integrate	Sepsis	6	throughout	
the	hospital’s	protocols,	provide	clinical	support	for	accomplishing	all	six	steps	
(including	the	support	of	Outreach)	and	track	all	documentation	that	demonstrated	
compliance	for	national	records	(by	Clinical	Governance).	Sue,	the	lead	for	the	Clinical	
Governance	team,	focused	on	converting	the	chart,	while	Martha,	Clinical	
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Governance’s	patient	safety	coordinator,	provided	continuous	reminders	to	all	
relevant	clinical	units	to	complete	documentation	on	the	sepsis	sticker.	
In	2014,	the	senior	hospital	management	of	Aurora	transitioned	to	a	new	Chief	
Executive	and	Associate	Director	of	Nursing.	Both	the	Chief	Executive	and	nursing	
director	came	from	other	health	boards	within	Scotland	and	with	them	came	different	
perspectives	on	and	priorities	about	Aurora’s	existing	SIRS-based	chart.	As	noted	in	
the	last	chapter,	NHS	Scotland’s	leadership	strongly	advocated	but	did	not	mandate	
using	the	National	Early	Warning	System	(NEWS)	over	SIRS.	However,	the	new	
executives	determined	that	Aurora	would	change	their	chart	to	conform	with	the	
nationally	standardised	NEWS-based	format.	
A	further	transition	within	this	time	was	that	Dr	Lewis	retired	from	full-time	work	
(though	he	continued	to	provide	locum	shifts).	He	handed	his	clinical	lead	
responsibilities	over	to	Dr	Adams.	Dr	Adams	trained	at	Aurora	and	was	a	part	of	the	
ICU	when	they	incorporated	the	SIRS	criteria	into	the	patient	observation	chart	and	
later	when	the	Outreach	team	was	put	in	place.	“The	reason	I	came	here	was	because	
Dr	Lewis	was	doing	it	differently	than	anybody	else”	(Dr	Adams).	Dr	Adams	explained	
that	if	hospital	systems	“are	not	well-designed,	well-conceived	and	well-managed,	
then	the	ICU	becomes	nothing	more	than	expensive	palliative	care	units”.	He	sought	to	
continue	the	systems	Dr	Lewis	had	put	in	place	where	the	chart	triggered	the	early	
identification	of	a	patient	at	risk	of	decline,	and	the	Outreach	team	provided	specialist	
support	to	ensure	proper	care	was	administered	in	a	timely	manner.	“It’s	all	about	
early	intervention,	early	action,	to	prevent	deterioration…that’s	the	philosophy	I	
inherited.	That’s	the	philosophy	we	continue	to	use.”		
Throughout	2015	the	bimonthly	Deteriorating	Patient	Group	meeting	was	primarily	
dedicated	to	the	design	and	implementation	of	a	NEWS	chart	and	system	for	Aurora	
(as	recorded	in	my	field	notes	and	accumulated	meeting	agendas).	Administrative	
members	of	the	group	advocated	and	supported	the	change.	Those	holding	clinical	
roles,	however,	questioned	the	move	to	a	new	early	warning	system	and	related	
chart.	Many	of	the	clinical	members	had	been	centrally	involved	in	the	progress	
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achieved	of	preventing	and	treating	sepsis	within	Aurora	over	the	prior	20	years.	Thus,	
these	members	expressed	uneasiness	and	concern	about	changing	from	a	SIRS	chart	
that	was	accepted	and	effective	in	their	context.	The	transition	to	a	NEWS-based	chart	
“scares	us…it	will	be	an	enormous	transition	for	the	guys	in	the	wards”	(Kelly).	Both	
Drs	Lewis	and	Adams,	as	the	former	and	existing	clinical	lead	of	critical	care,	
commented	that	this	was	a	potentially	dangerous	decision	to	shift	from	a	system	they	
knew	worked	well	to	an	unknown.	“There	has	been	a	huge	anxiety	from	us	in	critical	
care	with	the	change	from	SIRS	to	NEWS	scoring”	(Dr	Adams).	
“[The	change]	appears	just	to	tick	a	box	when	it	actually	might	mean	
that	patients	don’t	get	recognised	as	quick	or	will	be	put	at	risk	in	the	
changeover	is	more	a	problem	for	me...it’s	been	working	well	since	
2000	[when	the	Outreach	service	was	incorporated].	And	we’ve	shown	
year	on	year	improvements.”	(Dr	Lewis)	
Jackie	observed	that	within	the	existing	nursing	and	medical	staff	“there’s	going	to	be	
some	resistance”.	“Some	of	the	[clinical	staff]	are	questioning	why	we	are	changing	
something	that’s	working	for	us”	(Leann).	The	SIRS-based	system	was	established,	
known,	and	trusted.	Yet,	despite	their	concerns,	the	responsibility	fell	heavily	upon	
the	Outreach	team	to	ensure	that	the	transition	went	smoothly	and	“to	make	sure	
that	patients	don’t	suffer”	(Kelly).	Dr	Adams	affirmed	Kelly’s	view	in	a	separate	
interview	saying,	“Now	we’re	trusting	the	Critical	Care	Outreach	Team	system	to	cover	
the	potential	gaps	that	NEWS	creates.	It’s	about	the	culture.	It’s	about	when	you	call	
for	help,	help	arrives.”	The	chart	had	to	change	but	the	response	and	support	by	
Outreach	would	not.	
Although	the	purpose	of	changing	to	the	NEWS	chart	was	to	align	with	the	national	
standard,	some	leeway	was	granted	to	tailor	the	chart	to	local	needs.	By	the	beginning	
of	2015,	the	Deteriorating	Patient	Group	meeting	was	largely	dedicated	to	negotiating	
the	content	of	their	new	observation	chart.	Field	notes	from	one	meeting	observed	
the	differing	and,	at	times,	conflicting	priorities	by	members	of	the	Deteriorating	
Patient	Group.	“It	appears	to	be	a	difficult	process	of	re-crafting	their	[observation]	
chart.	Everyone	has	their	own	priorities	and	are	advocating	for	their	needs.”	
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After	extended	deliberations	over	many	months,	a	chart	was	agreed	upon.	Two	nurses	
were	seconded	to	provide	shift-by-shift	training	throughout	the	hospital.	A	‘go	live’	
date	was	set	for	early	November.	At	the	last	minute,	the	changeover	was	delayed	for	
a	few	weeks	at	what	was	later	described	as	a	tense	and	difficult	Deteriorating	Patient	
Group	meeting.	Some	of	the	medical	staff	were	not	satisfied	that	the	staff	had	
received	sufficient	instruction.	
The	long-awaited	and	often	feared	transition	elicited	a	sense	of	fatigue	regarding	the	
extended	change	process.	A	field	journal	notation	from	late	in	November	observed	
that:		
The	nurses	[on	the	wards]	are	now	saying	that	they	just	want	to	get	the	
shift	to	the	new	observation	chart	over	with.	They’ve	had	a	bit	more	
time	to	get	used	to	it,	have	heard	from	transitory	staff	that	the	chart	is	
doable	and	useable	at	other	hospitals,	and	they	just	want	to	get	on	
with	it.	They’re	feeling	less	anxious	and	more	comfortable,	as	well	as	
weary	of	the	process.	
In	early	December	the	move	was	made.	Alison,	a	High	Dependency	Unit	nurse,	
described	the	first	night	they	switched	to	the	NEWS	score	and	chart.	She	calculated	
the	NEWS	score	but	“I	had	no	idea	what	that	meant…It	was	just	a	number	with	no	
meaning	attached	to	it.”	To	accommodate,	Alison	shared	that	she	calculated	the	
NEWS	score	and	then	converted	that	to	the	familiar	SIRS	score.	And	after	a	few	weeks	
of	using	a	two-step	interpretive	process,	she	no	longer	needed	to	use	SIRS	in	order	to	
understand	NEWS.	
Overall,	many	stated	the	chart	transition	had	gone	well	and	was	not	nearly	as	bad	as	
they	had	feared.	They	had,	however,	found	the	chart	did	not	include	some	important	
information	for	detecting	sepsis	(e.g.	urine	output	and	periphery	perfusion).	Also,	in	
their	opinion,	the	NEWS	score	was	both	far	more	complicated	to	calculate	than	SIRS	
and	did	not	capture	a	relative	scale	of	importance	well.	For	example,	a	patient	given	
oxygen	was	allocated	a	set	score	regardless	of	whether	the	amount	of	oxygen	being	
delivered	was	minimal	or	high.	During	the	rounds,	I	witnessed	Outreach	completing	
the	NEWS	calculations	on	more	than	one	chart	(“that’s	not	been	done”	Jackie).	As	a	
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result,	the	Outreach	team	said	that	they	had	to	draw	more	extensively	on	their	clinical	
judgement	to	determine	whether	a	high	NEWS	score	was	‘really’	sick	or	not.		
By	early	2016,	with	the	new	chart	in	place	for	three	months,	revisions	were	underway	
once	again	within	the	Deteriorating	Patient	Group	meetings.	The	clinical	staff	were	
insisting	that	urine	output	be	put	back	on	the	chart.	Sue	pointed	out	that	this	deviated	
from	the	primary	objective	of	establishing	a	Scotland-wide	observation	tool	and	
potentially	negated	all	of	their	effort.	Kelly	and	Leann	said	that	they	had	tried	the	
chart,	but	“I’m	afraid	we’re	firm	on	this”	(Kelly).	To	further	their	point,	Leann	and	Kelly	
pointed	out	that	another	board	had	put	urine	output	back	on	their	chart.	“I’m	afraid	
she	shot	herself	in	the	foot	when	she	showed	me	the	Highlands’	chart,	and	they	were	
recording	urine.”	In	the	end,	they	were	modifying	the	tool	to	meet	their	clinical	needs,	
and	despite	Sue’s	protestations,	the	observation	chart	was	changing.	A	compromise	
was	struck:	they	would	be	using	NEWS,	but	additional	data	would	be	routinely	
collected	moving	forward.	
In	summary,	what	we	see	in	Aurora’s	account	can	be	characterised	in	three	pivotal	
movements.	To	begin,	the	problem	of	sepsis	was	primarily	of	concern	to	the	ICU	staff.	
With	Dr	Lewis	leading	the	effort,	the	ICU	devised	and	employed	various	early	warning	
type	strategies	to	enhance	the	hospital	staff’s	knowledge	around	patients	at	risk	of	
deterioration.	However,	the	document-based	systems	did	not	bring	about	the	sought	
after	results.	In	the	second	movement,	experienced	actors	shared	their	knowledge	via	
human	contact	using	the	outreach	strategy.	Rather	than	sequester	sepsis	expertise	in	
the	ICU,	David,	and	later	Kelly,	Jackie	and	Leann,	linked	directly	with	those	engaged	at	
the	point	of	care.	In	this	way	the	responsibility	for	sepsis	moves	beyond	the	ICU,	
through	the	Outreach	team,	to	the	wards.	The	Outreach	staff	members	worked	
alongside	clinicians	in	the	wards,	and	by	connecting	actors	and	their	knowledge	
brought	a	relational	systems-based	connection	that	effectively	reduced	the	burden	of	
sepsis	at	Aurora.	In	the	final	movement,	responding	to	a	Scotland-wide	initiative,	
additional	actors	within	the	hospital	took	on	direct	responsibility	for	aspects	of	sepsis	
care.	Clinical	governance,	training	and	development,	and	others	joined	the	ICU	and	
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Outreach	staff	in	the	Deteriorating	Patient	Group	and	further	widened	responsibility	
for	sepsis	within	the	hospital.	Each	movement	represents	a	widening	locus	of	
responsibility	and	thus	a	broadening	of	inclusion	in	the	sepsis	knowledge	network.	
6.2. Understanding	Knowledge	Systems	
6.2.1. Section	Introduction	
To	further	develop	Aurora’s	knowledge	network	content	using	Soft	Knowledge	
Systems,	this	section	now	turns	to	examine	three	parts	of	the	knowledge	system:	1)	
how	the	actors	were	organised	and	arranged;	2)	the	processes;	and	3)	the	materials	
they	used	to	accomplish	their	shared	task.	Additionally,	using	Clinical	Mindlines,	the	
section	displays	the	many	sources	and	ways	of	knowing	that	played	a	part	in	
mobilising	sepsis	knowledge.		
In	so	doing,	this	section	answers	the	research	questions	following	the	three	time	
frames	identified	above.	As	a	reminder,	the	research	questions	are:		
RQ:	How	is	knowledge	mobilised	within	and	between	the	research,	policy	and	practice	
communities	for	clinical	practice?	
Sub-RQ	1:	What	are	the	sources,	forms	and	ways	of	knowing	involved	in	
mobilising	research-based	knowledge	in	practice?	
Sub-RQ	2:	How	are	knowledge	systems	(actors,	processes,	and	materials)	
organised	for	mobilising	knowledge?	
6.2.2. Early	ICU	Efforts—Creating	Early	Warning	Alerts	
There	was	unanimous	agreement	amongst	the	participants	that	the	central	actors	
credited	with	first	raising	the	problem	and	spearheading	Aurora’s	sepsis	effort	were	
the	ICU	staff	and	Dr	Lewis	in	particular.	The	ICU	staff	in	the	1980s	and	1990s	included	
those	who	later	emerge	as	important	individual	actors.	David	and	Kelly	were	part	of	
the	nursing	team,	and	Dr	Adams,	eventually	a	consultant	and	then	clinical	lead,	
trained	as	a	Senior	House	Officer	under	Dr	Lewis.	
The	physical	distribution	of	actors	in	Aurora’s	knowledge	network	was	set	according	
to	their	specialist	knowledge	and	subsequent	function	and	was	therefore	a	form	of	
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epistemic	segmentation	as	well.	For	example,	the	critical	care	staff	were	located	in	the	
ICU.	At	times,	this	physical	divide	of	knowledge	resulted	in	suffering	for	patients	and	
families.	For	many	years,	Dr	Lewis,	Kelly,	and	David	explained,	they	were	regularly	
frustrated	that	the	ward	staff	did	not	identify	septic	patients	until	they	were	in	multi-
organ	failure	and	their	critical	care	skills	were	rendered	useless.	Because	the	patients	
arrived	too	late,	they	were	unable	to	use	their	knowledge	and	save	them.		
As	ICU	staff	they	had	the	specialist	training	and	experience	and	thus	held	primary	
responsibility	for	critically	ill	patients.	The	ICU	was	set	apart	behind	access-only	
barriers	separated	from	the	medical	and	surgical	wards.	Other	than	patient	hand-offs	
to	or	from	the	ICU,	there	was	minimal	contact	between	the	units.	The	ICU	had	its	own	
coffee	break	room	within	the	ward	that	kept	the	staff	close	to	their	patients.	When	
patients	throughout	the	hospital	became	extremely	unwell	and	required	urgent	
treatment,	they	were	transferred	to	the	ICU	where	the	hospital’s	critical	care	
specialists	were	located	to	receive	care.	In	traversing	the	physical	space	from	a	ward	
to	the	ICU,	the	patients	also	entered	a	different	epistemic	area.	The	multiplicity	of	
charts	in	place	for	monitoring	pulmonary,	cardiac,	gastrointestinal,	etc.	systems,	was	
yet	a	further	indicator	of	the	fragmentation	of	knowledge-based	responsibilities.		
Furthermore,	the	ICU	staff’s	centralised	location	provided	the	ability	to	observe	that	
sepsis	was	a	hospital-wide	problem.	More	than	that,	these	practitioners	had	the	
ability	and	the	knowledge	to	see	that	a	last	minute	rush	to	the	ICU	could	have	been	
avoided.	
“I	was	fed	up	seeing	patients	arrive	into	ITU	too	late.	I	mean,	why	didn’t	
we	know	about	this	patient	2	days	ago?”	(Kelly)	
The	implicit	protocol	for	identifying	sepsis	was	left	to	the	generalist	ward	staff	to	
comprehend	that	a	problem	was	mounting	based	on	their	contact	with	patients	and	
the	recorded	observations.	The	next	step	in	the	process	depended	on	the	professional	
level	and	role	of	the	staff	person.	Nurses	were	to	contact	either	the	junior	doctor	or	
registrar	responsible	for	the	patient.	Similarly,	junior	doctors	were	to	contact	the	
162	
	
registrar	or	consultant.	If	the	medic	in	charge	agreed	with	their	concerned	
assessment,	they	could	then	reach	then	out	to	the	ICU	for	help.	
“Whereas	consultants	are	happy	to	ring	up	ITU,	it	took	a	LOT	for	the	
juniors	and	the	nurses	to	jump	ship	and	not	just	go	to	their	normal	
pathway	but	to	come	to	ITU	and	say	‘I	have	a	patient	who’s	triggering	
your	chart’.”	(Dr	Lewis)	
Often	the	actors	with	the	least	authority	in	the	hospital’s	knowledge	network	were	
the	ones	most	often	in	contact	with	patients.	Others	also	pointed	out	that	there	were	
challenges	for	junior	staff	to	act	on	their	concerns.	
“I	think	is	all	about	remit.	The	nurses	don’t	feel	that	they	can	go	above	
the	ward	doctor.	They	feel	that	they	can’t	phone	the	consultant.	I	think	
that’s	just	a	historical	thing.”	(Kelly)	
“You	speak	to	most	nurses	and	they’ll	have	an	anecdote,	a	story	where	
they	felt	not	enough	was	being	done.”	(David)	
In	this	time	frame,	the	tool	went	through	three	increasingly	refined	efforts	at	the	
instigation	of	Dr	Lewis	and	the	ICU	staff:	first	compiling	and	streamlining	many	charts	
into	one;	second	adding	coloured	zones	to	further	underscore	an	abnormal,	and	
potentially	problematic,	reading;	and	third,	incorporating	the	SIRS	criteria.	Each	
iteration	was	done	to	help	the	ward	staff	focus	on	the	patient	observation	data	that	
the	ICU	believed	were	most	important.		
The	third	tool	modification	integrated	Bone	et	al.’s	(1992)	SIRS	criteria	in	the	chart.	
The	criteria	provided	a	numerical	score	that	indicated	a	level	of	illness.	In	the	ICU	staff	
view,	the	early	warning	score	gave	the	ward	nurses	“some	data	power”	(David).	David	
continued	to	explain	in	an	interview:	
“If	you	want	a	doctor’s	attention,	give	them	numbers.	They	grew	up	
with	numbers,	you	need	to	get	them	a	number,	so	they	can	process.	
And	if	they’re	really,	really	busy,	and	they’ve	got	5	phone	calls	saying	
I’m	concerned	about	this	patient,	the	person	that	phones	and	says,	they	
look	like	they	have	severe	sepsis,	that	one	will	get	their	attention.	So	we	
need	to	speak	the	same	language.”	(David)	
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However,	even	after	the	SIRS	score	was	introduced,	the	protocols	depended	on	the	
ward	staff	contacting	the	ICU.	
“Actually	getting	people	to	use	it	the	way	it	was	supposed	to	be	used,	
i.e.	go	through	the	whole	lot,	do	the	charting,	recognise	it	was	an	
abnormal	result,	call	the	right	people,	and	enact	the	right	resuscitation,	
was	difficult	and	very	sporadic	and	we	went	through	a	few	formats	and	
changes	to	the	chart.”	(Dr	Lewis)	
“We	know	that	things	don’t	happen	because	people	are	a	bit	scared	to	
act	sometimes.”	(Dr	Jones)	
The	patient	observation	chart	was	a	communal	document	and	information	conduit	
between	units.	It	provided	the	relevant	patient	indicators	that	all	staff,	no	matter	the	
unit,	depended	upon.	And	yet	“recognising	an	abnormal	result”	required	the	ability	to	
interpret	the	data.	Calling	“the	right	people”	entailed	communication	between	actors	
across	professions,	specialisations,	geography,	and	tenure.	The	use	of	the	patient	
observation	chart	was	liable	to	failure	at	multiple	points.	
In	this	time	frame	the	problem	was	framed	as	a	knowledge	deficit	where	the	
‘knowledge’	deficit	was	actually	an	‘information’	deficit	resulting	from	the	inefficient	
presentation	of	patient	data.	As	a	result,	Aurora	did	not	address	the	system’s	
arrangement	of	actors	or	the	protocols	for	mobilising	knowledge	between	actors.	
Instead,	they	recrafted	the	information	tracking	and	sharing	tool.		
The	ICU	believed	that	their	ward	colleagues	held	the	knowledge	they	needed	but	
required	assistance	seeing	the	information.	The	underlying	belief	was	that	ward	staff	
would	be	able	to	understand	and	interpret	the	potential	implications	of	the	patient	
information	captured	on	the	chart	in	the	same	way	those	in	the	ICU	could.	Thus,	the	
knowledge	mobilisation	strategy	to	help	others	know	and	change	their	behaviours	
focused	exclusively	on	adjusting	the	materials	for	clearer	information	transmission.		
Similarly,	the	protocol	in	place	for	sepsis	was	predicated	upon	the	assumption	that	
communication	between	various	health	professionals	and	units	was	a	simple	and	
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unproblematic	interactional	process.	Instead,	medical	staff	were	at	times	difficult	to	
reach	and	dismissed	the	concerns	of	nurses.	
“You	would	have	the	nurse	saying,	‘I	was	concerned	about	the	blood	
pressure,’	but	the	doctor	said	‘Just	watch	it.’	And	that	happened	all	the	
time.	That	junior	doctor	maybe	doesn’t	want	to	call	their	senior,	
because	there	is	still	a	bit	of	that	culture.	But	they’re	not	really	sure	
what	to	do	about	it.”	(David)	
“The	junior	doctors	are	very	busy	and	don’t	always	appreciate	how	sick	
patients	are.”	(Kelly)	
There	was	limited	mention	of	connection	to	the	research	and	practice	communities	
over	this	time	period.	Dr	Lewis	and	Dr	Adams	referred	to	specialist	focused	
professional	meetings	they	attended.	David	and	Leann	both	commented	in	interviews	
that	Dr	Lewis	regularly	read	medical	journals.	Through	one	of	these	channels,	Dr	Lewis	
discovered	Bone	et	al.’s	article	(1992)	and	SIRS.	
“The	Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign	(which	came	from	America,	not	IHI)	
started	in	2000.	They	were	the	first	ones	to	say	this	is	how	we	define	
sepsis...They	were	using	the	same	criteria	that	Bone	had	used	for	my	
SIRS.	It	was	exactly	the	same.	I	was	there	already,	fortuitously,	
whatever,	but	the	Surviving	Sepsis,	I	already	had	a	chart	which	ideally	
could	identify	sepsis,	severe	sepsis,	septic	shock.	It	was	already	there.	It	
affirmed	what	I	was	already	doing.”	(Dr	Lewis)	
Dr	Lewis	not	only	found	Bone	et	al.’s	(1992)	piece,	but	he	integrated	it	into	Aurora’s	
system	to	guide	their	practice.	A	publication	of	the	collective	actor	(that	later	
developed	into	the	Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign)	had	a	significant	impact	on	this	
practice	community.	Similarly,	the	UK	policy	community’s	sepsis-related	publications	
in	2000	heightened	awareness	and	resulted	in	key	government	funding	for	specialist	
nurses.	They	were	aware	that	Outreach	services	were	in	place	elsewhere	in	the	UK	
and	that	some	were	reporting	good	outcomes.	SIRS	and	the	nurse	Outreach	service	
(explored	below	in	detail)	made	up	fundamental	parts	of	Aurora’s	sepsis	knowledge	
systems.	These	originated	from	the	research	and	policy-related	communities.	
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The	knowledge	in	practice	problem	represented	in	this	time	period	centres	around	the	
differences	of	specialisation	between	the	ICU	and	ward	staff.	The	critical	care	
specialists	believed	they	knew	how	to	identify	the	precursors	to	severe	sepsis	whilst	
their	non-specialist	colleagues	did	not.	
“I’m	sure	people,	like	nurses	on	the	ward,	just	didn’t	know	how	big	a	
killer	it	was	to	start	with,	how	many	people	died	from	sepsis.”	(Kelly)	
“Our	system	was	broken.	You	would	see	patients	and	they	had	been	
hypotensive	and	unwell	for	maybe	48	hours…[The	ward	staff]	may	not	
see	the	importance	of	[a	patient’s	temperature	and	heart	rate],	so	they	
may	not	report	it	up…they’ll	think,	‘we’ll	just	watch	it’.”	(David)	
Initially	the	ICU	staff	reasoned	that	those	with	monitoring	responsibilities	were	both	
unaware	of	the	serious	risk	of	sepsis	and	unable	to	properly	track	key	indicators	of	
concern	because	the	disjointed	information	on	multiple	charts	obscured	their	ability	
to	identify	a	deteriorating	patient.	However,	even	when	the	information	was	
accentuated	and	they	had	a	SIRS	score	to	assist,	too	often	the	ward	staff	were	unable	
to	interpret	the	data	with	appropriate	urgency.		
“Sometimes	you	would	see	a	chart	where	for	hours	they	had	beautifully	
documented	someone’s	demise.	The	[blood	pressure]	comes	down	and	
down	and	down,	urine	output	disappears,	but	they	just	kept	on	
documenting	it.”	(David)	
Despite	the	first	consensus	definition	of	sepsis	and	the	accordingly	refined	materials	
“getting	them	to	do	all	the	right	things	all	the	time	didn’t	work.	Left	scratching	our	
heads”	(Dr	Lewis).	
Dr	Lewis	eventually	came	to	realise	that	the	disciplinary/specialist	differences	were	
not	readily	overcome.	In	an	interview	Dr	Lewis	pointed	out	that:		
“Intensivists	are	often	working	according	to	different	diagnostic	criteria	
than	other	physicians…We	have	a	very	immediate	mind	set.	We	are	not	
neurologists.	We	are	not	GPs.	We	are	not	dealing	in	a	different	time	
frame.	We	are	not	the	best	people	to	want	to	look	at	long,	slowly	
developing	illnesses.	You	know,	our	attention	span	might	not	be	long	
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enough…	We	have	the	ability	to	act	on	less	than	sufficient	data.	We	are	
having	to	play	the	odds	all	the	time.”	(Dr	Lewis)	
Each	discipline’s	perspective	is	driven	by	background,	educational	emphasis,	and	
perhaps	even	temperament	that	attracted	them	to	their	specialisation.	In	a	separate	
interview,	Dr	Jones	agreed	and	explained	that	different	specialties	conceptualise	
illness	differently,	based	on	their	training	and	function.	As	a	microbiologist,	he	said	
that	he:	
“thinks	in	terms	of	specific	conditions	and	specific	germs.	Whereas	
critical	care	come	at	it	from	more	of	an	angle	of	sepsis	is	a	physiological	
response	and	dealing	with	that	rather	than	sepsis	is	an	infection	that	
needs	to	be	treated.”	(Dr	Jones)	
The	depth	of	experience	and	professional	role	also	played	an	important	role.	Each	
actor’s	knowledge	was	further	linked	to	their	profession	and	level	of	seniority	in	that	
role.	Martha	explained	in	an	interview	that	it	was	often	the	student	nurses	who	took	
the	patient	observations.	This	division	of	labour	enabled	the	more	experienced	nurses	
to	focus	on	the	less	routine	work.	The	result	was	a	division	of	both	the	types	of	
specialised	knowledge	and	levels	of	proficiency.	In	this	way,	the	sepsis	protocol	was	
misaligned	because	the	staff	carrying	out	the	observations	tasks	were	those	with	the	
least	amount	of	experience	as	well	as	those	least	heeded	in	the	knowledge	network.	
By	contrast,	Dr	Lewis	credited	his	years	of	critical	care	experience	as	a	major	
contributor	to	his	knowledgeability.	“All	I	have	is	experience	and	outcomes	on	my	
side.”	He	laughs	and	continues,		
“I’ve	been	doing	it	longer	and	I’ve	been	getting	the	success.	Actually,	
there’s	always	a	time	when	you	can	say,	‘The	data	isn’t	helping	me	
make	this	decision,	but	deep	down	I	know	this	is	the	right	decision.”	(Dr	
Lewis)	
Because	Dr	Lewis’s	career	began	when	critical	care	as	a	discipline	was	in	its	infancy	
(see	Reynolds	&	Tansey,	2011)	he	did	not	have	an	extensive	scientific	literature	to	
build	upon.	
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“We	didn’t	have	the	protocols,	we	didn’t	have	the	textbooks,	we	had	
nothing.	We	just	had	basic	physiology	and	some	knowledge	about	how	
agents	acted	and	we	had	to	plot	our	course	for	the	patient.”	(Dr	Lewis)	
He	continued	his	explanation	of	how	his	specialist	knowledge	developed	using	a	
commonly	used	analogy.	
“Anaesthetics	and	critical	care	are	often	familiarised	to	flying	an	
aeroplane.	Bush	pilots	in	uncharted	territory	would	plot	their	way	by	
the	stars,	by	the	weather,	by	familiarity,	whatever,	how	the	air	felt	to	
him…and	he	had	a	better	chance	than	a	less	experienced	person…It	
goes	with	the	old	adage	of	the	inter-war	pilots	navigating	by	the	seat	of	
our	pants	and	the	stars.	And	because	our	intrinsic	knowledge	and	feel	
for	things,	we’re	getting	the	right	answers	much	quicker.	But	it’s	not	
something	you	can	export	easily.”	(Dr	Lewis)	
Dr	Lewis	attributed	his	expertise	to	years	of	work	and	trial	and	error,	which	resulted	in	
an	“intrinsic	knowledge	and	feel	for	things,”	a	well-developed	clinical	intuition	that	
guided	his	work.		
However,	beyond	developing	complex	clinically-focused	knowledge,	Dr	Lewis	was	
adept	at	advancing	the	knowledge-based	systems	within	Aurora.	He	was	determined	
that	he	and	his	staff	get	patients	in	time	to	use	their	knowledge.	They	viewed	the	
chart	as	the	key	to	unlocking	ward	staff’s	awareness	and	set	about	retooling	the	form.	
Dr	Adams	and	David	reported	that	Dr	Lewis	involved	the	ICU	team	to	help	their	non-
critical	care	colleagues	be	able	to	identify	a	patient	developing	sepsis.	Dr	Adams	
commented	in	an	interview	that	as	a	registrar	under	Dr	Lewis,	he	helped	to	devise	and	
test	the	SIRS-based	chart.	David	also	noted	in	an	interview	that	he	helped	revise	
charts	and	trained	the	non-ICU	staff	in	their	use.	Dr	Lewis	drew	not	just	on	his	fellow	
consultant’s	expertise,	but	those	with	less	experience	and	from	a	different	profession	
by	involving	junior	medics	and	skilful	nursing	staff	as	well.	Tool	development	was	an	
inclusive	process.	
While	Dr	Lewis	had	the	structural	authority	to	direct	the	staff,	protocols	and	materials	
within	the	parameters	of	ICU,	his	responsibility	did	not	extend	outside	the	walls	of	the	
ICU.	In	order	to	reach	beyond	his	own	specialist	area	and	coordinate	elsewhere	in	
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Aurora’s	knowledge	network,	he	had	to	negotiate	with	and	obtain	the	agreement	
from	his	medical	colleagues	and	hospital	management.	As	Dr	Lewis	explained	in	an	
interview:	
“Because	I	was	the	head	of	the	ICU,	they	understood	where	I	was	
coming	from.	I	didn’t	actually	say	you	need	to	get	rid	of	your	other	
charts.	I	just	said,	any	sick	patient	coming	into	the	hospital,	they	go	on	
this	chart	until	their	consultant	says	this	chart	is	not	a	requirement.	
Once	the	consultant	body	realised	they	had	control	of	it,	then	it	became	
the	standard	chart	for	the	whole	hospital.”	(Dr	Lewis)	
In	this	way,	Dr	Lewis	did	not	infringe	upon	his	colleagues’	professional	autonomy.	
Instead	he	worked	around	it.	Based	on	his	institutional	position	and	authority,	as	well	
as	what	he	perceived	as	his	colleagues’	mutual	value	of	providing	good	care	for	their	
patients,	he	provided	a	new	tool.	Furthermore,	Dr	Lewis	was	patient	by	allowing	time	
for	staff	to	adjust	and	see	the	benefits	of	the	new	chart.	He	gave	other	units	the	
opportunity	to	become	familiar	with	the	chart	and	allowed	for	its	incremental	
acceptance.		
In	addition	to	being	patient,	Dr	Lewis	was	inclusive.	He	welcomed	the	input	of	many	
staff	(not	just	doctors)	during	the	chart’s	development.	Similarly,	the	earlier	quote	
regarding	intra-professional	variation	showed	that	Dr	Lewis	acknowledged	that	the	
other	units	in	the	hospital	system	held	expertise	needed	for	a	hospital	to	fulfil	its	
service	mandate.	He	said	that	just	as	critically	ill	patients	would	not	get	the	care	they	
needed	in	the	wards,	less	urgent	patients	would	not	get	the	care	they	needed	in	the	
ICU.	This	mutual	respect	was	held	by	others	on	the	ICU	staff	as	well.	
Kelly	said,		
“It’s	just	what	you’re	used	to.	In	[the	High	Dependency	Unit]	they’re	
used	to	certain	procedures,	traches,	vents,	etc,	but	if	they	[with	their	
specialised	knowledge]	went	to	the	stroke	unit,	they’d	be	like,	‘whoa’.	
But	then	the	opposite	would	happen.	The	stroke	unit	have	their	
expertise	in	stroke,	so	it	depends	on	what	you	do	with	regularity.	It	
works	both	ways.”	(Kelly)	
Similarly,	Leann	said,	
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“If	we	don’t	know	something,	we	don’t	claim	to	know	it.	We	would	get	
back	up.	And	we	utilise	all	the	other	sort	of	specialist	practitioners,	
nurses,	whatever	they	would	be.”	(Leann)	
These	ICU	practitioners	understood	the	limitations	of	their	own	expertise,	respected	
that	other	actors’	knowledges	and	roles	were	outside	of	their	own	realm	of	expertise,	
and	accepted	the	inevitable	division	of	knowledge	that	results	from	specialisation.	
Furthermore,	they	expressed	that	whilst	they	held	knowledge	relevant	to	sepsis,	the	
other	units	held	knowledge	they	did	not.	They	valued	the	differences	in	knowledge	
within	an	interdependent	health	system.	
Nevertheless,	there	were	times	when	Dr	Lewis	applied	pressure.	In	an	interview	Dr	
Lewis	gave	an	example	from	a	meeting	of	the	hospital’s	consultants.	He	said	if	another	
patient	arrived	to	the	ICU	when	“all	the	information	is	right	there	in	front	of	you”	he	
would	report	them	for	substandard	care.	
“A	little	bit	of	hardball	had	to	be	played,	especially	to	my	consultant	
colleagues.	Even	when	they’d	accepted	the	chart,	and	it	was	out	there.	
And	we	still	got	people	that	were	[not	passing	urine]	for	3	days.	And	
there	it	was,	beautifully	documented	and	not	done.	I	must	say…	we	had	
the	system	then	that	the	hospital	was	small	enough	all	consultants	
could	attend	a	meeting	on	the	Wednesday	afternoon.	We	were	all	
there.	I	had	it	on	the	agenda.	Yet	again.	I	have	two	patients.	Look	at	
these	charts.	I’ve	photocopied	them.	The	charts	show	they	were	[not	
passing	urine]	for	well	over	48	hours	and	then	we	get	called	when	
they’re	in	their	terminal	decline	from	renal	failure	and	cardiac	failure.	I	
said,	‘You	all	know	this	is	wrong.	You’ve	all	got	the	charts	there.	The	
next	one	of	these	I	get,	I’m	going	to	say	to	the	GMC,	‘This	was	
incompetent	care.’	And	they	said,	‘You	can’t	say	that!’	And	I	said,	‘You	
tell	me	why	it	isn’t.	You	have	the	knowledge.	You	have	the	data.	You	are	
looking	at	the	patient	and	didn’t	act	on	it.	What	is	competent	about	
that?’	(*He	snaps*)	Next	time,	no	problem.	Masses	of	interest!!…Now	
whether	or	not	I	actually	would	have	done	is	another	matter,	but	the	
fact	is,	I	was	pointing	out	to	them,	how	can	I	as	a	doctor	say	this	person	
died	for	reasons	other	than	medical	incompetence?”	(Dr	Lewis)	
While	Dr	Lewis	critically	prodded	a	group	in	public,	correcting	individuals	was	done	in	
private.	He	gave	two	examples	in	an	interview.	
170	
	
“‘Actually,	you	missed	the	boat.	What	do	you	expect	me	to	do	24	hours	
too	late?	I	mean,	you	had	all	the	markers	here.’	You	sometimes	have	to	
be	robust	with	that,	in	a	private	environment	where	they’re	not	losing	
face	to	colleagues.”	(Dr	Lewis)	
	“The	SHO,	early	registrar	will	say,	‘Oh,	I	did	this	and	this	and	this’.	You	
have	to	very	gently	say,	‘Why	do	you	think	I’m	going	to	say	up	to	ITU	
now?	‘What	were	you	thinking	of?	Why	were	you	thinking	that?	How	do	
you	interpret	that?’	Look	at	the	whole	picture.	What	am	I	seeing	that	
you’re	not	seeing?	You	have	to	educate	them	without	humiliation.”	(Dr	
Lewis)	
In	summary,	over	this	time	frame	the	knowledge	system-based	strategies	to	help	
others	know	and	change	their	behaviours	focused	primarily	on	adjusting	the	
communally	shared	tools.	The	central	individual	actor	in	the	knowledge	network	was	
Dr	Lewis.	The	collective	actor	was	the	ICU.	To	develop	the	patient	observation	chart,	
they	used	their	reasoning	abilities	to	devise	a	shared	tool.	They	drew	on	their	
specialist	knowledge	from	a	combination	of	their	training,	years	of	experience,	and	
research	publications.		How	the	knowledge	network	assembled	these	forms	of	
knowledge,	how	they	went	about	connecting	these	domains,	and,	importantly,	how	
they	mobilised	their	knowledges	for	use	within	Aurora,	was	embedded	in	the	social	
interactions	between	the	system	actors.	To	develop	and	revise	the	charts,	Dr	Lewis	
was	inclusive,	drawing	on	a	range	of	actors’	knowledges	and	experiences.	To	share	
their	knowledge	with	others	entailed	a	bold	yet	gentle	course.	And	to	get	the	charts	
into	wide	use	required	they	be	alert	to	issues	such	as	professional	autonomy,	as	well	
as	carefully	building	and	releasing	tension.		
6.2.3. Incorporating	Outreach	on	the	Wards	
Aurora	had	reworked	their	system’s	patient	information	document	and	yet	the	tool	
did	not	contain	or	share	the	knowledge	necessary	for	improving	sepsis	care.	In	this	
second	movement	they	turned	to	reassemble	actors	in	the	network	structure	and	put	
in	place	new	processes.	The	key	actors	expanded	beyond	the	confines	of	the	ICU.	The	
Outreach	service	and	ward	staff	became	active	parts	of	Aurora’s	sepsis	knowledge	
network	as	well.	
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The	establishment	of	an	Outreach	service	reconfigured	the	contact	between	actors.	
Former	charge	nurses	were	now	largely	outside	of	the	ICU,	providing	one-on-one	help,	
training	courses,	and	looking	after	patients	elsewhere	in	the	hospital.	And	yet	
Outreach	maintained	their	structural	ties	with	the	ICU.	Their	office	space	was	located	
in	and	shared	with	senior	ICU	clinicians.	Equally	important,	when	elsewhere	they	had	
the	“back-up	of	the	senior	critical	care	clinicians,	which	they	know	they	always	do.	
They	are…	doing	it	in	our	stead,	and	that	we	know	that	they’re	doing	it	in	our	stead”	
(Dr	Lewis).	David	said	in	an	interview	that	he	rarely	needed	to	draw	on	their	authority,	
but	at	times	it	proved	helpful.	“If	someone	challenges	this,	‘Why	do	we	need	
potassium	checked	daily?’	‘Because	we	do.	It’s	important.’	‘I	don’t	see	the	point.’	‘Well,	
the	consultant	in	anaesthesia	wants	it	checked	daily.’	I	can	use	that	as	support”	
(David).	
Relatedly,	the	link	between	Outreach	and	the	ICU	consultants	was	important	not	only	
for	addressing	resistance	from	other	medics.	The	Outreach	specialists’	direct	access	to	
ICU	consultants	established	a	new,	direct	communication	conduit	for	ward	nurses	that	
stepped	past	the	traditional	professional	and	specialisation	boundaries.		
“A	nurse	in	the	ward	who	is	concerned	about	a	patient,	their	first	point	
of	contact	is	a	[Foundation	Year	1]	doctor.	They’re	turning	to	a	doctor	
who	it’s	maybe	their	first	day	in	the	ward	as	a	doctor.	When	I’m	
concerned…my	first	point	of	contact	is	a	consultant	anaesthetist.	And	
that	is	an	important,	a	crucial	difference.”	(David)	
Kelly	also	noted	that	the	traditional	chain	of	communication	dictated	that	nurses	talk	
first	to	the	junior	doctors.		
“They	wouldn’t	think	they	had	the	authority	to	pick	up	the	phone	and	
call	the	registrar.	But	we’re	not	scared	to	pick	up	the	phone	and	call	the	
consultant.	I	mean	we,	I	suppose	it’s	just	the	relationship	we	have	with	
them.	We	know	that	if	someone’s	sick	and	we’re	not	getting	what	we	
would	like	to	get	from	it,	a	decision,	or	someone	to	see	the	patient,	then	
we	go	higher	until	you	get	to	the	top.”	(Kelly)	
In	this	way	Outreach	had	both	the	authority	of	the	ICU	as	well	as	a	direct	line	of	
communication	that	side-stepped	and	rewired	some	of	the	boundaries	between	
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professions	and	specialist	units.	Outreach	had	the	relationships	that	allowed	them	to	
bring	their	knowledge	to	bear	and	work	around	the	hierarchies	that	slowed	the	early	
identification	and	treatment	of	septic	patients.	
In	an	interview	Leann	said	that	for	these	very	reasons	she	thought	the	consultant	
body	was	initially	reluctant	to	put	in	place	an	Outreach	service.	“[Outreach]	would	
belong	to	[ICU]	and	why	was	[the	ICU]	thinking	their	nurses	needed	to	come	down	and	
interfere	in	their	role”	(Leann).	Dr	Adams	agreed	that	there	was	some	resistance.	“The	
cynics	would	say	it’s	a	bit	of	a	back	door	into	the	ITU…a	bit	undermining…Why	are	
Outreach	involved?...But	that	is	by	far	and	away	the	exception	rather	than	the	rule”	
(Dr	Adams).	
Putting	Outreach	in	the	wards	was	perceived	by	some	as	the	ICU	overstepping	their	
remit,	while	others	were	concerned	about	the	implication	of	the	service	and	their	own	
competence.	Overcoming	these	concerns	with	the	structural	rearrangement	was	
borne	by	David.	From	his	recollection,	while	most	wards	welcomed	his	presence,	
some	senior	nurses	raised	questions,	“‘Why	do	we	need	you	to	come	in?	We	didn’t	
have	you	before,	why	do	we	need	you	now?’”	David	reported	that	he	responded	by	
saying,	“You’re	experienced…maybe	you	don’t	[need	help],	but	another	nurse	would	
actually	welcome	a	bit	of	support.”		
And	yet	as	the	Outreach	team	grew,	acceptance	from	the	hospital	staff	was	an	
individual	process	that	had	to	be	earned	by	each	new	member.	Leann	said,		
“I	found	when	I	started	this	role	that	David	was	a	hard	act	to	follow.	
Everybody	knew	David,	he’d	been	there	for	years	and	he’d	proved	his	
wealth	of	knowledge	and	his	right	to	be	there.	But	even	when	I	started	
in	the	post,	you	have	to	build	up	those	relationships	for	yourself…I	did	
have	to	prove	my	worth.”	(Leann)	
As	new	staff	joined	the	hospital	these	relationships	had	to	be	built	person	by	person.	
“Once	they	get	to	know	us,	I	suppose	you	don’t	trust	someone	as	soon	
as	you	meet	them.	But	I	think	as	soon	as	we’ve	built	up	that	relationship	
with	them,	and	maybe	after	we’ve	helped	them	once.	After	we’ve	had	a	
difficult	situation,	and	we’ve	helped	them	once	then	the	next	time,	
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they’ll	say,	‘Oh.’	They	recognise	that	you	can	help.	I	suppose	that	trust	
does	build	up	pretty	quickly.”	(Jackie)	
“New	consultants	that	come,	you	need	to	build	up	that	relationship	with	
them	before	they	use	you	as	such.	They’re	not	really	sure	of	your	role	
and	what	you’re	actually,	how	useful	you	can	be.”	(Leann)	
I	asked	Dr	Adams	if	his	perception	was	that	his	medical	colleagues	throughout	the	
hospital	trusted	the	expertise	of	the	Outreach	team.	He	replied	that	“The	way	around	
[reservations	of	Outreach	by	medical	staff]	is	the	vast	majority	of	the	nurses	find	help	
from	the	Outreach	team,	and	so	whatever	happens,	Outreach	still	get	called,	Outreach	
still	get	involved.”	Leann	agreed	saying,	“Only	with	the	very	experienced	nurses	were	
we	viewed	as	a	threat.	Most	of	them	are	very,	very,	their	resources	are	so	pushed	that	
they’re	so	glad	there	is	someone	there	to	help.”		
Further	affirmation	was	documented	in	a	print	publication.	A	consultant	head	of	
service	stated	that	“Critical	Outreach	means	that	if	any	of	my	patients	are	showing	
significant	signs	of	deterioration…there	is	a	reliable	way	of	being	identified,	assessed	
and	treated	by	the	expert	team	of	Nurses...Critical	Care	Outreach	is	a	way	of	putting	
into	practice	all	the	recommendations	that	have	come	from	studying	unnecessary	
mortality	and	morbidity	in	hospital	patients,	the	ability	to	rapidly	assess	people	who	
are	deteriorating	and	the	ability	to	stabilise	them	as	quickly	as	possible	and	if	
necessary	transfer	them	to	an	intensive	care	setting.”	
However,	the	Outreach	team’s	relationship	with	registrar	level	doctors	was	more	
variable.	
“I	think	resistance,	I’ve	seen	much	more	resistance	from	probably	
registrars,	the	dual	grade	doctors.	Junior	doctors	really	appreciate	our	
help	and	advice.	They	become	our	friends.	David	has	a	good	
relationship	with	all	the	junior	doctors.	He	quite	often	takes	them	under	
his	wing,	does	a	lot	of	teaching.	They	become	our	friends.	The	
consultants	know	who	we	are,	know	our	experience	trust	us	completely.	
And	sometimes	will	quite	often	phone	on	a	Friday	afternoon	and	say	
‘I’m	just	a	tiny	bit	worried	about	this	patient	could	you	just	have	a	look	
over	the	weekend’	and	they’ll	be	home	thinking,	that’s	fine,	they’ll	have	
a	look.	But	the	registrars	I	think,	they’re	at	a	level	where	they	think,	I	
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don’t	need	you.	I	find	that	mostly.	David,	Kelly,	Leann	and	I	have	all	
spoken	about	this,	and	we	agree	that	it’s	the	middle	grade	of	registrar.	
They’ll	argue	with	you	a	bit,	that	they	don’t	agree,	or	they	don’t	think	
whatever	you	say,	they’ll	say,	no,	just	leave	it.	I	don’t	want	that	just	
now.	I	think	they’re	maybe	that’s	all	part	of	building	their	own	
confidence,	and	clinical	ability.		I	would	say	we	get	most	resistance	from	
them.”	(Jackie)	
In	a	recorded	conversation	after	an	interview	Leann	and	Kelly	affirmed	this	view.	They	
stated	that	“You’ll	often	get	that	with	a	registrar,	‘Well,	I	don’t	need	a	nurse	as	a	
backup.”	They	continued	to	explain	how,	eventually,	they	overcome	the	view	that	
Outreach	is	not	a	useful	support.	
“We	get	a	registrar	that	comes	from	[a	major	medical	centre]	and	
they’re	not	particularly	keen	on	Outreach.	We	can	all	sort	of	judge,	we	
can	all	say,	they	won’t	utilise	us.	They	don’t	need	us.	And,	again,	then	
they	get	the	one	case	where	they	weren’t	able	to	come,	and	we’ve	dealt	
with	it.	And	they’re	eternally	grateful,	and	then	they	will	utilise	us.”	
(Leann	and	Kelly)	
As	noted	earlier,	with	Outreach’s	new	functional	position	in	the	knowledge	network	
came	four	new	processes.	Firstly,	they	monitored	patients	that	had	been	discharged	
from	the	ICU.	In	addition	to	having	a	higher	risk	of	deterioration,	because	the	ICU	had	
already	been	responsible	for	these	patients’	care	they	reasoned	that	there	would	be	
fewer	concerns	about	the	ongoing	involvement	of	an	ICU-related	staff	member.	
Secondly,	they	instituted	a	referral	process	for	patients	who	triggered	an	early	
warning	score.	Dr	Lewis	reflected	that	formalising	the	Outreach	service’s	support	
within	Aurora’s	protocols	enabled	the	ward	nurse	or	junior	doctor	“to	come	to	us…and	
not	be	told	it	doesn’t	matter	by	a	trainee…Whereas	consultants	are	happy	to	ring	up	
ICU,	it	took	a	lot	for	the	juniors	and	the	nurses	to	jump	ship.”	Furthermore,	Dr	Lewis	
believed	that	nurses	felt	more	comfortable	going	to	another	nurse,	and	“that’s	why	[a	
nurse-based]	Outreach	made	sense”	(Dr	Lewis).	
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Thirdly,	in	addition	to	the	formal	referral	system,	Dr	Lewis	sought	the	agreement	of	
his	senior	medical	colleagues	to	offer	an	open	invitation	for	staff	to	call	for	a	patient	
assessment	by	Outreach.		
“One	of	the	key	points	that	I	got	established	with	the	consultants	at	the	
beginning	was	that	it	was	acceptable	if	their	team	wasn’t	responding	
appropriately,	either	negatively	or	just	didn’t,	then	it	was	acceptable	
that	Outreach	would	be	informed	as	well	so	that	the	patient	didn’t	
suffer.	And	they	were	highly	delighted	with	that…It’s	never	been,	‘let’s	
exclude	the	team’,	it’s	always	been	‘let’s	take	away	the	barriers	from	
the	people	who	can	make	the	decisions	finding	out	about	it.	And	some	
of	the	barriers	are	nurses,	because	they	just	don’t	feel	empowered.	We	
empower	them.	The	Outreach	team	has	empowered	nurses,	especially	
experienced	nurses,	but	all	nurses	to	ring	up.”	(Dr	Lewis)	
The	intent	was	that	Outreach	would	be	reliable	and	willing	to	listen	to	every	person’s	
concerns.	Dr	Lewis	explained	that,	“If	you’re	not	getting	what	you	need	from	one	
team,	there	is	another	team	that	will	always	respond	and	support	you.”	And	to	the	
Outreach	staff	he	said,	“Make	sure	it’s	a	positive	experience.	Always	thank	them.	If	
you	turn	them	off,	they	will	never	call	you	again”	(Dr	Lewis).		
In	this	way,	the	new	protocol	relied	upon	the	mutuality	between	staff.	And,	together,	
these	three	new	system	protocols	helped	address	regular	communication	challenges.	
As	Jackie	explained	in	an	interview:		
“It’s	lovely	to	be	able	to	go	and	help.	You	can	tell,	the	nurse	in	the	ward,	
they	don’t	know	what	to	do.	Someone’s	urine	output’s	dreadful,	and	
they’ve	told	the	doctor,	and	nothing’s	been	done.	You	know	as	a	junior	
staff	nurse	I	would	have	loved	to	have	Outreach.	I	remember	what	that	
was	like…We	had	nobody	else	to	tell	apart	from	a	junior	doctor	as	a	
junior	staff	nurse.	So,	I	would	have	loved	to	have,	to	be	able	to	phone	
Outreach	and	somebody	comes	and	helps	me,	and	you	know	it’s	going	
to	get	sorted	out.”	(Jackie)	
The	worth	of	the	Outreach	service	to	nurses	was	evident	during	my	observations	as	
well.	Many	times	whilst	I	was	on	the	ward	nurses	approached	me	to	explain	their	
gratitude	for	Outreach,	saying	how	much	they	valued	their	help	and	support.	And	
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while	the	original	idea	of	Outreach	was	to	support	the	ward	nurses	the	service	helped	
the	less	experienced	medics	as	well.		
“Surprisingly	one	of	the	groups	we’ve	supported	as	much	and	
sometimes	more	than	nursing	colleagues	is	the	junior	doctors.	It	
releases	the	pressure.	I	hadn’t	predicted	that…In	the	early	days,	
especially	those	on	their	first	ever	wards	it’s	an	immense	responsibility	
and	we	really	should	do	everything	we	possibly	can	to	support	them.”	
(David)	
Leann	agreed	saying,	“Our	workload	increases	phenomenally	in	August	when	the	
doctors	change.	We’re	called	all	the	time.”	
Outreach	not	only	provided	expert	help	and	access	for	less	experienced	staff,	but,	as	
Leann	explained	in	an	interview,	a	charge	nurse	had	recently	commented	that	the	
Outreach	service	was	helpful	to	her	because	“there’s	quite	often	patients	I’m	worried	
about,	and	I	just	need	a	review,	and	I	can’t	get	one,	but	if	you	come	along	you	seem	to	
get	a	senior	review	straight	away.”		
The	Outreach	mechanism	put	in	place	a	safe,	knowledgeable	source	to	call	when	
uncertain.	But	more	than	that,	the	medical	staff	paid	attention	when	Outreach	was	
involved.	Jackie	and	Kelly	both	identified	this	phenomenon.	Jackie	relayed	that	the	
nurses	on	the	ward	tell	her	that,	“‘When	you	come,	I	know	it’s	going	to	be	sorted	out	
because	the	doctors	listen	to	you’”	(Jackie).		
Similarly,	Kelly	said,	
“It	actually	still	happens,	we	occasionally	get	people	phoning	up	saying,	
‘The	doctors	aren’t	listening	to	me.	Would	you	come	along	and	see	this	
patient	because	I’m	not	happy	with	them.’	And	I’m	not	sure	why	the	
doctors	don’t	listen…but	when	we	go	to	the	ward	and	say,	so-and-so’s	
not	well,	then	they	pay	attention…They	think	that	if	I’m	involved,	then	
the	patient	must	be	sick.	But	why	they	didn’t	believe	the	nurse	in	the	
first	place,	I	don’t	know.”	(Kelly)	
Each	of	the	Outreach	staff	separately	shared	that	consultants	rely	on	them	to	provide	
another	layer	of	protective	care.	For	example,	David	explained	(documented	in	the	
field	notes)	that	many	consultants	use	the	Outreach	team	as	a	“safety	net,	a	safety	
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mechanism.”	“At	5:00pm	on	a	Friday	when	consultants	from	various	wards	are	going	
home	they’ll	call	up	[Outreach]	and	say	keep	an	eye	on	these	patients	over	the	
weekend.	They	understand	the	valuable	resource	that	Outreach	can	be.”	Leann	shared	
in	an	interview	that,	“It’s	not	that	[the	patient]	needed	specific	treatment.	It’s	a	safety	
net.	They	have	potential	to	deteriorate,	and	please	ensure	should	they	deteriorate	that	
you	intervene.”	The	safety	net	for	both	the	medics	and	patients	is	that	with	Outreach	
being	aware	of	patients	of	particular	concern,	time	will	be	saved	if	the	patient	does	
begin	to	deteriorate.	Continuing	her	explanation,	Leann	said,		
“That’s	through	a	trust	and	relationship	thing.	That’s	not	a	
formal…there’s	nothing	formal	saying,	saying	CCOT	should	keep	track	of	
at-risk	patients.	There	are	medical	staff	there	taking	care	of	the	
patients.	But	they	value	us	as	a	safety	net.	And	I	suppose	they	know	
we’re	here,	we’re	skilled	in	the	wards.	You	could	have	a	locum	doctors	
on	who	haven’t	known	the	patient,	haven’t	been	involved	in	their	care.	
That	relationship,	it’s	taken	time	to	develop	that	relationship	with	
consultants.”	(Leann)	
Dr	Lewis	was	aware	that	consultants	depended	on	the	Outreach	staff	as	well.	He	said	
they	were	“delighted	with…the	security	they	got	from	being	able	to	ring	up	someone	
like	David,	‘Can	you	keep	an	eye	on	them.	If	they	deteriorate	can	you	let	me	know’”	(Dr	
Lewis).	
Late	into	the	evening	during	one	site	visit,	Kelly	was	called	to	the	Renal	Outpatient	
ward	to	assess	a	patient.	After	talking	with	the	patient,	the	renal	nurse	on	duty,	and	
reviewing	the	patient’s	chart,	Kelly	decided	to	page	the	consultant	even	though	they	
had	left	for	the	day.	Later,	during	a	recorded	conversation	I	asked	about	the	extra	step	
of	communication.	She	responded	saying,		
“We	actually	have	a	quite	good	relationship	with	the	renal	physicians	
because	they	know	we’re	here,	looking	out	for	their	patients	and	if	
there’s	anybody	with	an	[Acute	Kidney	Injury]	on	the	ward,	or	any	of	
their	dialysis	patients	that	arrived	on	the	ward,	we	make	sure	they’re	
contacted,	because	that’s	not	the	first	thing	the	medics	think	
about…They	like	[knowing	about]	their	patients	in	their	own	specialty.”	
(Kelly)	
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This	illustrates	that	Outreach	activities	provide	a	further	information-sharing	link	that	
holds	the	actors	within	the	system	together.	There	was	wide	agreement	that	the	
Outreach	provided	a	safety	net	for	nurses,	junior	doctors,	consultants.	But	they	
helped	patients	and	carers	as	well.	In	a	pamphlet	describing	the	Outreach	team,	an	
Emergency	Department	staff	nurse	is	quoted	saying	“the	team	provide…good	
continuity	of	care	for	patients	and	their	families	when	patients	are	transferred	from	
the	Emergency	Department	to	the	ward.”	
Further	patient	testimonials	about	the	Outreach	service	had	been	collected	and	said:		
The	term	Critical	Care	Outreach	was	unfamiliar	to	me	but	the	reality	of	
the	care	we	received	at	[Aurora]	made	a	huge	difference	to	our	overall	
experience.		
With	the	advice	I	was	given	by	the	Critical	Care	Team	I	felt	confident	to	
go	home	to	recover	and	to	prepare	myself	for	my	operation	seven	
weeks	later.	
We	may	not	have	been	aware	of	what	the	Critical	Care	Outreach	
programme	involved,	but	the	impact	of	this	innovative	programme	was	
absolutely	vital	to	us.	It	is	the	little	things	that	can	make	all	the	
difference	to	patients	and	close	family	which	is	why	the	structured	
approach	to	CCO	works	so	well.	
What	these	comments	demonstrate	is	that	Outreach	nurses	also	provided	a	
reassuring	stability	of	care	for	patients	and	their	families	as	they	moved	through	
various	units	in	the	hospital.	Ultimately,	patients	were	safer.	Compared	to	when	
patients	would	come	to	the	ICU	days	after	their	organs	were	showing	signs	of	distress,	
“If	we	find	someone	that’s	been	unwell	for	3	hours	now,	we’re	getting	annoyed”	
(David).	
Finally,	the	Outreach-run	Study	Day	was	a	high	dependency	skills	course	that	was	
open	for	all	staff	to	attend.	This	was	a	traditional	information	sharing	event,	but	
brought	nursing	and	medical	staff	from	throughout	the	hospital	together.	Moreover,	
the	day	built	relationships	and	trust.	As	the	primary	trainers,	Outreach	could	meet	
new	staff	and	demonstrate	their	willingness	to	help	and	support.	The	hospital-wide	
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training	headlined	the	service’s	knowledgeability.	The	day	also	provided	an	even	
wider	point	of	contact	and	introduced	newcomers	as	most	new	staff	attended.	The	
training	events	established	their	credibility	in	the	knowledgeable	teaching	and	
coaching	role,	and	provided	the	opportunity	to	be	in	contact,	get	familiar	and	build	
comfort	as	they	heard	first-hand	Outreach’s	goal	to	support	all	staff	before	they	are	in	
a	position	to	call	Outreach	and	ask	for	help.	This	familiarity,	David	stated	in	an	
interview,	assisted	with	supporting	the	referral	system.	This	was	because	most	staff	
knew	him	and	had	to	opportunity	to	interact	with	him	before	asking	for	help.	
Furthermore,	David	reflected	that	over	the	last	15	years	he	had	trained	many	of	the	
nurses	that	now	hold	charge	and	senior	charge	nurse	positions	within	the	hospital.	
Furthermore,	David	used	the	Study	Days	curriculum	to	build	goodwill.	He	would	invite	
many	different	clinicians,	from	a	variety	of	disciplines.	“I	had	[respiratory	therapy]	do	
respiratory	assessment,	a	physician	doing	pneumonia,	an	anaesthetist	doing	
therapeutic	fluids,	anaesthetist	doing	blood	gas	analysis,	I	did	sepsis,	we	did	
neurological	assessment.”	More	than	bringing	together	actors	from	different	areas,	he	
sought	out	ways	to	address	their	needs.	David	gave	an	example	of	the	gastrointestinal	
doctors.	They	wanted	to	promote	their	scoring	tool	to	ward	staff	in	order	to	screen	for	
bleeds.	“But	the	message	wasn’t	getting	out	for	people	to	use	this	score.”	He	included	
a	section	in	the	programme	covering	their	tool.	He	explained	that	“it’s	also	good	if	
there’s	something	in	it	for	them	as	well”	(David).	
The	new	protocols	further	addressed	the	boundaries	between	actors	for	knowledge	
mobilisation.	As	the	Outreach	team	expanded,	the	open	invitation	was	augmented	by	
thrice	daily	ward	rounds.	They	were	able	to	spend	time	walking	the	wards	and	the	
casual	contact	helped	provide	yet	deeper	familiarity.	The	formal	protocols	combined	
with	the	ward	rounds	continued	to	enhance	Outreach’s	ability	to	share	their	specialist	
knowledge,	but	also	opened	the	opportunity	for	learning	from	their	colleagues	about	
concerning	patients.		“There’s	a	lot	of	corridor	consultations.	There’s	a	lot	of	meeting	
someone	‘I’m	just	going	to	tell	you	about	a	patient’.”	(David).	
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Knowledge	was	more	than	information	located	on	a	tool.	Aurora	implicitly	reframed	
the	knowledge	in	practice	problem	and	provided	a	knowledge-filled	human	resource	
to	help	the	least	experienced	and	those	whose	concerns	were	sometimes	dismissed.	
And	in	the	exchange	processes,	Outreach	developed	to	become	a	resource	for	all	
professions,	specialisations,	and	at	all	levels	of	experience.		
Links	to	the	Knowledge	Network	
Mention	of	connection	to	the	research	and	practice	communities	remained	fairly	
limited	in	this	timeframe	with	three	exceptions.	Firstly,	Dr	Lewis	and	Dr	Adams	
explained	separately	that	they	were	aware	of	various	specialist	team	configuration	
possibilities.	In	addition	to	Critical	Care	Outreach,	there	were	Medical	Emergency	or	
Rapid	Response	Team	structures.	“Such	as	in	New	South	Wales.	I’ve	spoken	to	people	
that	have	worked	there,”	said	Dr	Adams.	“They	go	in,	provide	treatment,	make	the	
decisions,	talk	with	the	family,	and	go	away	again.	It	is	a	complete	waste	of	time	and	
resource	and	it	took	years	to	show	a	difference	in	outcome.”	Instead,	he	said,	
“Outreach	is	a	nursing	resource	that	goes	and	facilitates,	and	allows	the	right	thing	to	
happen	using	the	resources	that	are	there.	And	allows	the	right,	the	additional	
resources	to	be	applied	to	the	problem.”	
Secondly,	the	governmental	reports	highlighted	that	many	patients	were	dying	
unnecessarily	from	sepsis	throughout	the	UK	health	system.	These	catalysed	a	
response	at	the	national	level	in	both	NHS	England	and	Scotland.	Additional	financial	
resources	from	policymakers	were	allocated	to	address	the	problem.	And	while	these	
documents	raised	awareness	for	much	of	the	country,	they	legitimised	the	work	that	
Aurora,	Dr	Lewis	and	the	ICU	staff	in	particular,	had	been	doing	for	many	years.	
Furthermore,	the	funding	and	political	validation	enabled	Aurora	to	reorganise	their	
local	knowledge	network	forming	an	Outreach	service.	
Thirdly,	in	addition	to	the	SIRS	criteria	the	Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign	continued	to	
publish	guidelines	formulated	from	research.	“They	came	out	and	gave	some	good	
ideas	around	what	end	organ	system	dysfunction,	how	you	could	categorise	those,	and	
we’ve	used	those	and	incorporated	those	into	our	severe	sepsis	things”	(Dr	Lewis).	
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However,	the	research	content	on	its	own	was	not	sufficient,	especially	for	diagnosing	
sepsis.	For	example,	in	an	interview	Jackie	recalled	a	time	she	was	asked	to	review	a	
patient	with	an	infected	leg	from	an	orthopaedic	ward	who	had	triggered	a	high	SIRS	
score.		
“I	saw	him.	His	face	was	red.	He	was	sweating.	He	was	kind	of	a	little	
bit	out	of	it.	He	was	confused.	He	was	only	a	man	in	his	sort	of	50s	and	
he	was	really	unwell.	His	BP	was	low.	At	first	glance	you	thought,	gosh	
he’s	really	septic.	But	when	I	opened	his	drug	cardex,	I	knew	his	kidneys	
were	struggling	and	his	kidneys	had	been	knocked	off	a	bit.	Weren’t	
working	that	well.	When	I	opened	his	cardex	he’d	had	opiate	after	
opiate	after	opiate.	It	wasn’t	sepsis,	he	was	completely	opiate	toxic,	but	
nobody	had	really	looked.”	(Jackie)	
She	was	taking	in	far	more	details	than	SIRS	categories.	Her	knowledge	included	
knowing	what	sepsis	looked	like,	but	also	how	to	evaluate	and	see	it	was	not	sepsis.	
Relatedly,	Kelly	pointed	out	that	sometimes	“the	patient	looks	really	unwell	even	
though	the	data	isn’t	capturing	it.	The	bottom	of	the	bed	tells	us	they’re	going	to	crash	
and	burn.	And	99.9%	of	the	time	we’re	right”	(Kelly).	When	asked	where	this	sense	
comes	from,	Kelly	replied,	
“I	think	time.	I	suppose	once	you’ve	seen	one	person	having	a	condition,	
you	remember,	oh,	that’s	like	so-and-so,	I	wonder	if	this	is	what’s	going	
on	here.	It	looks	the	same,	the	same	things	seem	to	be	happening.	Over	
time	you	definitely	draw	on	your	experiences.”	(Kelly)	
Another	example	of	various	forms	of	knowledge	working	in	concert,	to	provide	a	
mindline	‘check’,	was	when	Kelly	called	the	renal	consultant.	She	was	aware	that	she	
was	not	a	specialist	trained	in	renal	care,	and	was	cautious	that	her	lack	of	specialist	
knowledge	might	have	ramifications	of	which	she	was	unaware.	Documented	in	my	
field	notes,	she	said	that	her	“gut”	told	her	everything	was	okay,	but	that	she	still	
needed	further	confirmation	from	the	clinician	with	ultimate	responsibility.	
Another	reflection	recorded	in	my	research	journal	further	substantiates	that	the	
harmonising	of	different	forms	of	knowledge	is	important	for	high-performing	care.	
After	my	first	interview	with	David.	I	wrote,	“[I]	observed	to	him	that	he	is	working	
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from	intuition,	knowing	the	people	involved,	knowing	the	place,	the	organisation,	
resources	outside	organisation,	and	is	proactive	in	finding	those	resources	to	continue	
to	nurture	their	success.	He	agreed.”	
Clinical	acumen	was	indeed	essential	for	Outreach	nurses.	“We	have	always	gone	for	
ICU	sisters,	because	the	key	thing	for	Outreach	is	you’ve	got	to	be	able	to	spot	at	20	
yards	a	sick	patient”	(Dr	Lewis).	But	he	also	stressed	that	a	more	holistic	knowledge	
was	required.	“Clinical	expertise	and	inbuilt	confidence.	They	must	be	able	to	overrule	
an	aggressive	middle	grader.	Or	even	a	consultant	to	say	I’m	backing	my	own	clinical	
experience.	Doctors	are	trained	to	stand	up	for	their	clinical	judgement,	but	nurses	are	
not	trained	to	do	it.”		
Kelly	agreed	saying,		
“From	a	critical	care	background	we’re	maybe	astute	at	recognising	
when	patients	are	sick	even	when	they	don’t	look	sick.	There	are	certain	
physiological	things	that	we	know	aren’t	right.	I	suppose	that’s	our	
specialist	knowledge	from	our	critical	care	background	that	makes	it	
good	to	go	out	to	the	wards	and	share	our	skills.”	(Kelly)	
“You	also	need	to	use	your	judgement.	Sometimes	the	SIRS	score	is	masked	by	
something,	beta	blockers,	steroids,	and	even	paracetamol	can	mask	a	patient’s	real	
temperature.	SIRS	data	helps,	but	you	still	have	to	have	clinical	judgement.”	(Leann)		
Jackie	gave	an	example	of	gaining	confidence	to	speak	based	on	her	judgement	that	
came	as	a	result	of	a	very	difficult	situation:		
“I	was	called	to	see	a	patient	who	was	quite	sick”	and	was	about	to	
be	transferred	to	a	nearby	major	medical	centre.	“The	nurse	came	
up	to	me	and	said,	‘Jackie,	the	ambulance	crew	is	here	to	take	
her…but	she	looks	terrible’.”	Jackie	agreed	and	thought	the	patient	
should	be	closely	monitored.	But	the	ICU	registrar	who	provided	
the	consultation	disagreed.	The	registrar	was	“just	kind	of	snippy.	
She	said,	‘She	looks	the	same	as	what	she’s	looked.	Looking	at	her	
chart,	nothing	much	has	really	changed.	Just	let	us	get	her	to	[the	
specialist	hospital].’”	Jackie	responded,	“‘Her	[oxygen	saturation	
has]	dropped,	you	know,	she	looks	terrible.’”	The	registrar	called	the	
consultant.	To	the	registrar	“he	said,	‘I	trust	your	judgement,	‘just	
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get	her	to	[the	specialist	hospital].’	And	the	junior	doctor	said,	
‘yeah,	let’s	just	get	her	to	[the	specialist	hospital]’.	The	ambulance	
crew	said,	‘It’ll	take	us	40	minutes	on	a	blue	light.’…	I	was	standing	
there	thinking,	‘I	don’t	think	this	is	right’…They	got	a	really	junior	
staff	nurse	to	go	with	her.	I	don’t	really	think	she	picked	up	she	was	
deteriorating	on	the	way	there.	As	they	went	into	the	renal	unit,	she	
died…It	all	sort	of	blew	up.	Do	you	know?	It	really	affected	me,	
because	I	was	thinking	I	don’t	think	this	is	right.	I	should	just	have	
said	‘this	is	not	right’...Because	of	that	case,	I	have	no	hesitation.	I	
suppose	that’s	made	me	more	so	sort	of	determined	to	sort	of	pass	
that	message	along	to	other	nurses.	It’s	human	factors	isn’t	it.	It’s	
part	of	human	factors.	Speak	up.”	(Jackie)	
The	tragic	result	taught	her	to	have	confidence	in	her	intuition	that	something	was	
amiss.	
Thus	far	we	have	seen	that	choosing	the	‘right’	personnel	for	Outreach	involves	being	
a	highly	experienced,	confident	critical	care	specialist	nurse.	But	more	than	epistemic-
related	aptitudes,	skilful	interpersonal	abilities	were	also	necessary.	Dr	Adams	pointed	
out	in	an	interview,	“There	has	been	a	history	of	taking	critical	care,	charge	nurses,	
senior	nurses	out	into	Outreach.	But	you	have	to	be	careful	which	ones	do	it.	David	is	a	
fantastic	politician.	He	can	communicate	exceptionally	well.	And	because	of	that	
[Outreach	is]	a	success”	(Dr	Adams).	
The	individual’s	productive	relational	skills	were	proved	necessary	when	a	nurse	was	
brought	in	to	provide	maternity	care	cover	within	Outreach.	In	a	conversation	with	
Kelly	and	Leann	they	explained,	
“Even	though	she	was	a	[local]	girl,	she’d	been	trained	into	a	different	
way	of	relating	that	did	not	work	here…She	rubbed	everybody’s	back	up	
because	of	the	way	she	behaved.	She	had	the	city	attitude	to	things,	I	
don’t	have	to	talk	to	you	in	the	corridor.	In	fact,	that’s	exactly	what	we	
do.	We	say	hello	to	everybody.”	(Kelly	and	Leann)		
They	went	on	to	explain,		
“I	think	there	was	a	lot	of…she	didn’t	have	the	relationship	that	she	was	
there	to	help.	She	had	the	old	Rapid	Response	Cardiac	Arrest	team	go	in	
and	shout,	‘Why	hasn’t	this,	and	this	and	this	been	done?’,	which	led	to	
a	lot	of	complaints	coming	back	as	to	why	did	[the	ICU]	think	that	
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sending	someone	to	check	up	or,	which	is	not	at	all	what	we	want	to	do.	
We’re	a	safety	net	to	assist	and	make	sure	things	are	happening.	I	don’t	
think	people	perceive,	they	like	people	checking	up	on	them.	You	get	
very	defensive,	don’t	you?”	(Kelly	and	Leann)	
They	summed	up,	“She	just	didn’t	fit.	She	was	a	nice	girl,	but	she	just	didn’t	
fit.”	
The	primary	reason	the	highly	experienced	maternity	cover	nurse	did	not	fit	was	
because	she	kept	herself	separate	and	functioned	using	blame.	At	Aurora,	the	
Outreach	staff	depended	on	building	and	maintaining	good	professional	relationships.	
She	was	less	personable,	which	hampered	her	ability	to	share	and	use	her	knowledge.	
Yet,	remaining	even-keeled	and	amiable	was	not	always	easy.	The	Outreach	team	
members	did	feel	very	frustrated	at	times.		
“You	need	to	really	be	careful,	and	not	fall	out	with	people,	or	be	too	
stroppy,	because	then	they’re	not	going	to	phone	you	or	they’re	going	
to	be	scared	to	approach	you	again.	I	mean,	David	has	always	
promoted	that	as	well.	There’s	a	way	of	saying	things	gently,	‘Oh	you	
may	have	done	their	[observations]	more	often’	without	being	overly	
judgemental,	and	damaging	relationships…	because	that	wouldn’t	be	
productive	for	anybody,	for	the	patient	or	the	staff	relationships.”	
(Jackie)	
From	David’s	perspective,	diplomacy	skills	were	of	utmost	importance	for	the	
Outreach	role.		
“Diplomacy	is	second	only	to	clinical	competence”	(David).	This	section	has	already	
described	times	where	David	diplomatically	soothed	senior	nurses’	concerns	around	
perceived	professional	insult.	He	was	attentive	to	the	social	dynamics,	pressures,	and	
tensions	and	sought	ways	to	alleviate	them.	In	this	way,	more	than	being	a	nurse,	
having	specialist	critical	care	training,	and	extensive	experience,	the	qualities	of	the	
individual	were	important.	They	needed	to	have	clinical	competence	as	well	as	
political,	negotiating,	and	communication	skills.	
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And	while	Outreach	staff	were	largely	non-confrontational,	they	would	have	difficult	
conversations	when	necessary.	When	a	critical	incident	occurred,	they	would	talk	with	
the	ward	sister.	“We	would	take	it	to	them,	not	as	an	accusing,	but	as	a	learning	thing.	
This	happened,	how	can	we	stop	it	happening	again?”	(Kelly).	Thus,	the	Outreach	
team	did	give	uncomfortable	feedback	and	tell	a	nurse	or	the	supervisor	that	
something	was	missed,	but	they	sought	not	to	be	harsh	or	criticise.		
Indeed,	Leann	gave	an	example	where	pursuing	a	tension-filled	conversation	
established	further	credibility.	She	said	that	early	in	her	Outreach	position	she	came	
across	a	patient	that	she	believed	needed	to	be	moved	to	the	ICU.	She	spoke	with	the	
patient’s	consultant	who	made	it	clear	that	he	was	not	interested	in	hearing	her	view.		
“He	left	the	room.	And	I	thought	actually	I	can’t	let	this	go.	I	really	think	
this	patient	should	be	in	ICU.	So,	I	went	out	to	the	corridor	behind	him	
and	pleaded	my	case,	excuse	me,	I	just	wonder	if	we	could	discuss	this	
further.	I	really	think,	and	I	gave	my	case.	And	he	apologised.	That’s	
fine.	I	didn’t	realise	that…Ever	since	then,	we’ve	had	a	completely	
different	relationship.	It	was	almost	like	I	proved	myself	and	my	ability.	
And	one	time	I	phoned	because	I	felt	a	locum	registrar	wasn’t	doing	
what	we	normally	have	done	in	this	hospital.	He	said,	put	the	registrar	
on.	And	he	said	‘Do	whatever	it	is	Leann	from	Outreach	tells	you.’”	
(Leann)	
And	yet,	while	Outreach	had	confidence	in	their	own	views,	they	also	deferred	to	
other	specialties.	
“I	don’t	go	into	the	[cardiac	ward]	and	claim	to	be	able	to	treat	any	of	
their	cardiac	patients	as	well	as	they	can.	They’re	all	cardiac	nurses.	I	
would	think	nothing	of	phoning	them	and	saying,	‘Look,	can	I	get	a	wee	
hand.	I’ve	got	somebody’s	whose…It’s	knowing	your	limitations	and	
your	area	of	expertise”	(Leann).		
Leann	went	on	to	point	out	the	central	role	of	professional	relationships	bringing	
together	their	variety	and	diversity	of	skills.	“If	we	don’t	know	something,	we	don’t	
claim	to	know	it.	We	would	get	back	up.	We	utilise	all	the	other	specialist	practitioners,	
nurses,	whatever	they	might	be.”	She	had	an	awareness	of	her	own	knowledge-based	
limitations	and	found	that	extending	requests	for	help	to	other	actors	built	good	will	
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and	appreciation.	Furthermore,	these	actions	built	trust,	which	enabled	knowledge	to	
flow	both	ways.	
The	Outreach	staff	also	deferred	to	the	consultant	body.	“The	consultant,	you	kind	of	
think,	they’re	much	more	experienced,	it’s	their	patient,	and	they	have	the	final	say	in	
what	happens”	(Kelly).	Even	when	they	disagreed,	in	the	final	analysis	the	consultant	
was	responsible.	As	seen	in	Kelly’s	interchange	with	the	renal	consultant,	it	was	
ultimately	the	consultant’s	patient,	their	credibility,	and	their	responsibility.	I	later	
observed	a	conversation	where	Jackie	asked	Kelly	what	she	did	when	a	medic	did	not	
listen.	I	recorded	in	my	field	notes	that	Kelly	responded	that	you	do	your	best,	you	
document	your	concerns,	but	as	nurses	they	had	to	remember	that	with	the	medics’	
responsibility	they	had	the	authority	to	provide	the	final	say.	At	times	she	disagreed	
and	tried	to	dissuade	the	doctor	in	charge,	but	ultimately	recognised	and	accepted	the	
limitations	of	her	professional	role.		
But	the	Outreach	team’s	deference	was	not	just	for	highly	knowledgeable	colleagues.	
In	a	later	recorded	exchange	with	Kelly,	she	explained	how	she	tailors	her	advice	
depending	on	the	experience	and	role	of	the	recipient.		
“If	a	student	nurse	was	referring	a	patient	to	me,	I	wouldn’t	necessarily	
expect	her	to	know	as	much	detail.	I’d	want	her	to	know	the	basic	
details	but	not	about	the	processes	that	are	going	on	that’s	making	this	
patient	sick.	Whereas	a	staff	nurse	I	would	hope	that	she	would.	And	
then	the	FY1	I	would	think,	hopefully	thinking	on	the	same	par	as	me.	
And	then...”	(Kelly)	
She	paused.	I	interjected	asking	how	a	foundational	year	doctor	could	be	on	par	with	
a	nurse	of	25	years.	She	laughed,	“Okay,	they’re	a	little	bit	below	me.	But	I	don’t	like	to	
make	them	think	I	know	more	than	them.	They’re	a	doctor.”	I	restated	asking,	“They’re	
growing	in	ability	and	confidence?”	“Absolutely!”	she	replied.	
My	field	notes	noted:	
Again,	[Kelly’s]	careful	and	sensitive	in	her	stepping.	Not	using	her	
experience	and	knowledge	as	a	status/power	tool.	And	views	it	as	her	
part	of	her	responsibility	to	build	up	[junior	doctors’]	confidence	and	to	
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treat	them	as	their	capabilities	will	(hopefully)	one	day	deserve.”	Later	
in	reference	to	another	foundational	year	doctor	she	said,	“‘You	would	
think,	I	mean	he’s	an	FY1,	he	is	going	to	be	an	excellent	doctor.	He	is	an	
excellent	doctor’.		
Kelly	saw	it	as	part	of	her	job	to	help	the	junior	medics	develop	their	skills.	It	was	part	
of	her	role	to	help	them	become	doctors.	
In	order	to	help	all	staff	develop	their	knowledge,	Outreach	emphasised	a	learning	
rather	than	a	shame	culture.	Leann	explained	in	an	interview	that	after	many	years	as	
an	ICU	nurse,	she	had	forgotten	the	pressures	and	demands	that	nurses	faced	on	the	
ward.	When	a	treatment	had	not	been	completed	for	a	patient	in	a	timely	manner,	“I	
was	going	in	all	guns	blazing:	‘Why	on	earth	has	this	not	been	given?	That’s	not	
appropriate.	And	this	needs	to	happen.’	A	few	times	David	had	to	pull	me	aside	and	
say,	‘That’s	not	helpful’	(Leann).	David	reminded	her	that	care	needed	to	be	taken	in	
dealing	with	problems	such	that	the	communication	channel	between	the	Outreach	
team	and	the	ward	staff	was	intact.	
David	worked	diligently	to	help	his	team	establish	and	maintain	productive	
professional	relationships.		
“It’s	working	together.	If	a	nurse	refers	a	patient	and	they	come	to	
Intensive	Care,	it’s	always	good	just	to	say,	‘Thanks	very	much	for	that	
referral.	You	were	on	that	really,	really	quickly.’	That	means	a	referral	
again.	We	are	non-punitive	non-judgemental,	and	even	though	you	
want	to	have	a	moan	sometimes,	it’s	a	golden	rule.	I’ve	said	that	to	
each	team	member	that’s	come.	Never,	ever	criticise	someone	for	a	
referral,	or	they’ll	never	refer	again.	It’s	back	to	just	having	good	
working	relationships.”	(David)	
During	ward	rounds,	the	ward	nurses	were	often	alert	when	Outreach	entered	their	
area.	The	nurses	would	walk	over	and	ask	if	they	had	overlooked	a	patient	in	distress.	
Outreach	worked	to	reassure	them.	But	more	than	providing	reassurance,	the	
Outreach	staff	frequently	took	the	opportunity	to	converse	(have	a	work-related	
‘blether’)	with	the	ward	staff.	In	just	one	example	drawn	from	the	field	notes:	“[A	
ward	nurse]	stopped	me	when	Kelly	and	Jackie	were	in	a	room	checking	on	patients.	
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She	wanted	to	explain	how	much	she	values	having	Outreach	as	a	resource.	If	she’s	
concerned	that	‘something	isn’t	right’,	she’ll	pull	Outreach	aside	and	talk	through	her	
concerns	and	have	them	check	on	the	patient.”	
In	summary,	in	contrast	with	the	last	time	frame,	over	this	period	the	system	changes	
involved	new	and	shifting	actors	and	processes	for	providing	sepsis	care.	The	
knowledge	network	expanded	to	include	more	individual	and	collective	actors.	Whilst	
Dr	Lewis	and	the	ICU	staff	remained	important	players,	the	Outreach	team	took	on	
the	central	role	for	mobilising	sepsis	knowledge.	The	ward	staff	became	part	of	the	
active	knowledge	system	rather	than	the	recipients.	And	by	involving	a	fuller	range	of	
actors,	a	richer	array	of	knowledge	was	engaged	as	well.	In	addition	to	Dr	Lewis’s	tacit	
knowledge,	those	with	less	authority,	but	more	patient	contact,	were	able	to	develop,	
share,	and	use	their	knowledge.	Furthermore,	reorganising	the	actors	in	the	
knowledge	network	and	establishing	new	care	processes	that	crossed	specialty,	
geographic,	professional,	and	epistemic	boundaries	was	accomplished	by	social	
means.	Outreach,	in	particular,	but	various	actors	tended	to	and	nurtured	professional	
relationships	that	crossed	boundaries.	They	worked	to	neutralise,	minimise,	and	
manoeuver	around	tensions.	The	vital	interdependency	between	actors	in	the	system	
helped	support	positive	interactions	and	helped	a	wider	range	of	knowledge	to	be	
heard.	But	also	the	determination	of	various	individuals	to	cultivate	and	maintain	
goodwill	enabled	Aurora’s	knowledge	network	to	flourish	in	mobilising	their	
knowledge.	
6.2.4. Expanding	Hospital-Wide:	Deteriorating	Patient	Group		
The	inception	of	the	Sepsis	Collaborative	in	2012	marked	a	substantive	expansion	of	
Aurora’s	knowledge	network.	Once	again	Aurora,	this	time	along	with	the	other	13	
territorial	health	boards,	recalibrated	their	sepsis	structures.	The	nationwide	effort	
brought	changes	to	the	organisation	of	actors,	processes,	and	materials	in	Aurora’s	
system.	
While	the	Outreach	team	and	ICU	remained	central	stakeholders,	staff	holding	official	
responsibilities	for	sepsis	expanded	beyond	clinical	practitioners	to	those	with	
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administrative	roles.	Because	the	Scottish	Patient	Safety	Programme	placed	an	
emphasis	on	data	collection	at	least	two	members	of	the	Clinical	Governance	team	
(Sue	and	Martha)	were	hired	to	manage	patient	safety	performance	measures.	They	
joined	the	Training	and	Development	department,	and	senior	hospital	executives	
alongside	additional	clinical	areas	such	as	the	Emergency	Department,	Microbiology,	
and	senior	charge	nurses	from	each	ward	to	make	up	the	Deteriorating	Patient	Group	
(see	earlier	Table	6-2).		
The	Deteriorating	Patient	Group	expanded	the	actors	holding	sepsis	responsibilities	to	
include	those	in	non-clinical	roles.	But	many	began	as	health	practitioners.	Sue,	
Martha	(from	the	Clinical	Governance	unit)	and	Hannah	(from	the	Training	and	
Development	unit)	were	formerly	nurses.	In	separate	interviews	each	explained	that	
their	background	training	and	experience	informed	their	present	roles.	Alternatively,	
the	new	Chief	Executive	did	not	have	a	clinical	background	but	was	“a	finance	person”	
(Hannah)	who	depended	on	the	senior	medical	staff	for	clinical	insight.	
Further	key	personnel	changes	occurred	over	this	time	period	as	well.	Actors	in	senior	
positions,	who	had	been	in	place	for	decades,	departed.	Dr	Lewis	retired	from	full-
time	work	and	handed	his	lead	role	in	the	ICU	over	to	Dr	Adams.	A	new	Chief	
Executive	and	Assistant	Director	of	Nursing	also	took	up	posts	in	Aurora.		
In	addition	to	new	senior	management	staff	in	the	hospital,	the	Sepsis	Collaborative	
brought	a	new	makeup	of	the	knowledge	network.	In	a	shift	from	primarily	ICU-held	
responsibility,	the	Deteriorating	Patient	Group	reviewed,	devised,	agreed	and	
implemented	all	formal	policies,	protocols,	and	tools	related	to	sepsis.	The	group	met	
between	one	and	two	hours	every	two	weeks	in	order	to	coordinate	their	local	
efforts.	Martha,	the	patient	safety	coordinator,	explained	the	work	of	the	
Deteriorating	Patient	Group	in	an	interview:		
“This	is	huge.	We’ve	had	to	arrange	meetings	for	every	fortnight…It’s	
quite	a	structured	meeting…Initially,	it	was	how	we	would	introduce	the	
sepsis	program.	And	how	we	were	progressing,	and	how	we	would	
spread	it.	We	had	to	discuss	successes	and	discuss	why	we	were	having	
difficulties.”	(Martha)	
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The	Deteriorating	Patient	Group	meetings	became	the	place	where	actors	discussed	
plans,	considered	alternatives,	sorted	consensus	and	held	one	another	accountable	
for	accomplishing	the	goals	of	the	Sepsis	Collaborative.	Furthermore,	the	
Collaborative	necessitated	new	processes	and	materials	that	reshaped	Aurora’s	high-
performing	knowledge	system.	The	Outreach	team	and	referral	process	remained	in	
place,	however,	new	treatment,	audit,	training,	and	diagnostic	processes	were	
introduced.	The	integration	of	the	Sepsis	6	treatment	bundle	into	the	hospital’s	
systems	was	a	priority.	As	explained	in	the	last	chapter,	the	six	bundle	steps	needed	to	
be	completed	within	one	hour	of	suspecting	sepsis.	
Kelly	explained	that	the	new	treatment	bundle	was	sometimes	difficult	for	staff	on	the	
wards.		
“I	think	[Sepsis	6]	was	a	big	ask,	because	if	you’ve	found	someone	who	
was	septic,	I	think	they	felt	they	had	to	drop	everything	and	concentrate	
on	that	person.	Whereas	they	had	another	seven	people	that	were	still	
need	a	commode	and	drips	are	going.	There	are	other	things	going,	and	
to	then	dedicate	an	hour	to	this	one	patient	was	actually	a	bit	
frightening.	You	know	exactly	what	you	need	to	do.	Yes,	I	think	it	was	a	
daunting	job	for	them.”	(Kelly)	
Outreach	was	able	to	provide	support	for	the	ward	staff	to	complete	Sepsis	6	within	
the	required	time	frame.	
Dr	Jones’	view	was	that	the	benefits	of	the	Collaborative	and	bundle	at	Aurora	were	
two-fold.	Firstly,	they	brought	additional	support	for	the	Outreach	team’s	efforts.	
“When	the	[Sepsis	Collaborative]	and	the	sepsis	bundle	came	along	it	
was	great	because	it	gave	the	Outreach	and	critical	care	people,	they	
could	then	go	to	the	rest	of	the	hospital	and	say,	look,	this	is	what	we’ve	
been	doing	and	now	this	is	what	we	should	all	be	doing.	It	gave	them	an	
easy	way	to	get	other	people,	gave	an	excuse	to	corner	other	people	
into	doing	it.”	(Dr	Jones)	
Secondly,	the	bundle	provided	specific	steps	for	all	clinical	staff	to	concentrate	on.	
“Teams	like	to	perform	well…having	a	target,	having	a	set	of	sort	of	
specific	goals,	is	a	lot	easier	to	follow	than	some	more	complicated	
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algorithm	or	weighing	up	different	sorts	of	things.	I	think	if	you’ve	got	
some	things	where	it’s	reasonable	to	think	that	doing	them	will	make	a	
difference	if	you	can	put	them	into	something	that	makes	a	simple	
target	for	people	to	do,	then	there’s	a	fair	chance	of	getting	them	
done.”	(Dr	Jones)	
A	Sepsis	Sticker	documented	whether	or	not	Sepsis	6	was	completed	and	in	a	timely	
manner	(see	Figure	6-1).	Martha	
referred	to	herself	as	“the	Sepsis	Lady”.	
It	was	her	job	to	ensure	the	Sepsis	
Sticker	was	used	by	all	units	in	the	
hospital.	From	these	recordings	
materials	she	produced	consolidated	
run	charts	that	demonstrated	
compliance	(or	the	lack	thereof).	
Achieving	95%	of	the	target	equated	
success.	“Because	the	SPSP	programme	
stipulates	[95%]	to	achieve	
excellence…The	Model	for	Improvement	says	that	if	something’s	been	done	
[successfully]	for	nine	consecutive	points,	it	is	embedded”	(Martha).	
The	run	charts	provided	a	visible	sign	of	success.	During	an	interview	with	Dr	King	
(clinical	lead	of	A&E),	he	drew	attention	to	the	A&E	charts	posted	on	the	wall	of	their	
main	corridor.	He	was	proud	of	the	unit’s	regular	100%	success	rate	and	said	that	
displaying	the	audit	data	helped	to	keep	his	staff	motivated.	
However,	the	new	Sepsis	Collaboration	documentation	processes	also	proved	
challenging.	Martha	said	she	spent	significant	amounts	of	time	reminding	staff	to	
complete	the	Sepsis	6	sticker.	Even	(later)	when	the	tool	was	integrated	into	the	
patient	observation	chart,	“some	staff	ignore	it	even	though	it	is	on	the	back	of	the	
chart.	They	don’t	look	there	at	all”	(Martha).	
The	most	substantive	change	in	this	time	frame	for	Aurora	centred	on	the	patient	
chart.	Whereas	incorporating	the	Sepsis	6	treatment	protocol	fit	neatly	into	Aurora’s	
Figure	6-1	Sepsis	Sticker	
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existing	systems,	the	new	Chief	Executive	decided	that	the	hospital	would	move	to	the	
National	Early	Warning	Score	diagnostic	charting	system.	No	longer	would	Aurora	use	
the	SIRS	scoring	system	that	had	worked	so	well	for	them.	Instead,	he	charged	the	
Deteriorating	Patient	Group	with	bringing	the	hospital	into	alignment	with	other	
boards	in	Scotland.	The	chart	redesign,	staff	retraining,	and	rollout	occurred	over	the	
year	of	data	collection,	and	was	the	principal	focus	of	the	Deteriorating	Patient	Group	
meetings.	
“There’s	a	new	chart	they	want	us	to	use	nationally	in	Scotland.	And	
while	I’m	hanging	on	to	[SIRS]	for	the	moment	because	it’s	worked	for	
us,	you’ve	got	to	look	to	the	future.	And	with	another	hat	on,	I	know	
that	standardisation	and	reducing	variation	is	the	best	thing.	Doctors	
and	nurses	in	[a	nearby	board]	will	use	one	chart	and	come	here	and	
use	a	different	system.	So	we	will	cross	over.”	(David)	
Perspectives	on	the	new	chart	amongst	Deteriorating	Patient	Group	members	
appeared	divided.	Those	with	outward,	health	system	focused	roles	supported	the	
change.	In	addition	to	the	Chief	Executive	and	Assistant	Director	of	Nursing,	Hannah	in	
the	training	and	development	unit	said	that	the	shift	was	“a	helpful	thing	from	the	
government	to	move	to	the	NEWS.”	While	crediting	Dr	Lewis	for	Aurora’s	well-known	
success	around	sepsis	care,	she	went	on	to	say	that,	“We	were	kind	of	an	island	of	
excellence…Things	can	feel	like,	‘we’re	okay’.”	As	a	result,	Hannah	said	the	change	to	a	
NEWS-based	chart	had	been	difficult	for	the	clinical	staff	to	accept.	She	said	that	they	
needed	“a	culture	shift,	from	the	‘we’re	fine’	mentality	for	[the	clinicians]	to	agree	that	
we	need	to	be	in	line	with	everybody	else.”	She	explained	that	they	were	concerned	
about	the	(then	pending)	shift	to	NEWS	“because	they	don’t	think	it’s	broken	at	the	
moment,	but	there	is	recognition	[due	to	the	SPSP]	that	we	can’t	do	this	on	our	own,	
and	it	will	be	helpful.	Because	the	doctors	rotate,	and	Scotland’s	a	very	small	country.”	
Moreover,	Sue,	the	team	leader	for	clinical	governance,	had	a	different	view	of	SIRS	
and	Aurora’s	sepsis	success	from	every	clinician	I	spoke	with.	“I	would	debate	whether	
[sepsis	care]	has	been	successful	here.	We	haven’t	got	utopia.	I’m	a	lone	voice	saying	
that,	but	I	just	don’t	believe	we	have	utopia.”	At	Deteriorating	Patient	Group	
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meetings,	Sue	regularly	provided	contrasting	perspectives.	One	reason	for	her	
differing	perspectives	was	that	her	role	and	responsibilities	were	geared	toward	NHS-
system	wide	compatibility.	“My	role	has	been	to	gather	information	from	other	health	
boards,	nationally,	to	provide	[those	with	direct	treatment	responsibilities]	with	ideas.”		
Meanwhile,	Leann	expressed	the	worries	of	clinical	staff	saying,	
“The	NEWS	score	just	looks	very,	very	busy	and	very	complex	[in	
comparison	to	SIRS].	You	just	wonder	how	well	it’s	going	to	be	filled	out.	
That’s	why	particular	are	very,	very	twitchy	about	changing	to	the	
NEWS.	Why	are	we	changing	something	that’s	working	for	us.	But	
nationally,	obviously,	they’re	saying	we	need	to	standardise.”	(Leann)	
More	succinctly,	Dr	Adams	said,	“The	national	efforts	have	been	welcomed	and	feared,	
because	if	it’s	not	broken,	don’t	fix	it.”	
Despite	their	reservations,	the	Outreach	team	dedicated	their	efforts	to	help	the	
changeover.	Kelly,	in	an	interview	said,	“Unfortunately,	well	not	unfortunately,	it’s	
about	to	change,	our	chart	system,	which	will	be	a	big	challenge.	But	we’re	up	for	
it…because	we’ve	got	to	go	national.”	Later	that	day	in	my	field	notes	I	observed	that	
“It	seemed	like	she	caught	herself.	It’s	clear	she	disagreed	with	the	decision	to	shift	
from	SIRS	to	NEWS,	but	is	now	trying	to	be	supportive	and	move	forward.”	Almost	a	
year	later	Kelly	was	more	definitive.	In	a	conversation	described	in	the	field	notes:	
“She’s	having	to	use	NEWS	despite	not	trusting	the	trigger	to	work	as	well	as	SIRS.	I	
said	that	you	didn’t	have	a	choice,	but	had	to	make	the	best	out	of	it.	She	replied,	
‘That’s	exactly	the	case.’”		
This	period	saw	a	robust	connection	between	Aurora	and	the	wider	knowledge	
network.	The	Sepsis	Collaborative	meetings	increased	the	interconnectedness	
between	practitioners	in	Scotland.	Between	2012	and	2014	most	members	of	the	
Deteriorating	Patient	Group	attended	the	face	to	face	meetings,	and	participated	in	
the	monthly	WebEx	calls.	The	Collaborative	website	provided	a	place	to	share	
research,	policy	and	practice	information	with	one	another.		
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Sue	gave	an	example	of	how	the	SPSP	built	a	community	of	peers	with	her	Clinical	
Governance	counterparts.		
“I	have	networks.	There’s	one	of	me	at	every	health	board,	so	we’re	
always	chatting.	‘Has	anybody	got	this,	anybody	got	that?’	So,	we’re	
always	kind	of	sharing	ideas…we	have	quarterly	meetings	face-to-face,	
but	we	email	each	other	all	the	time.”	(Sue)	
The	NHS’s	Scottish	Patient	Safety	Programme	(SPSP)	was	guided	by	the	Institute	for	
Healthcare	Improvement	(IHI).		And	IHI’s	formal	link	with	the	Surviving	Sepsis	
Campaign	(SSC)	meant	their	research	was	highlighted	as	a	resource	for	boards.	“SPSP	
was	the	real	driver	of	[Sepsis	6],	and	the	SSC”	(Kelly).	Leann	agreed.	“The	SSC…they	
were	sort	of	the	first	people	that	gave	you	a	sort	of	diagnosis.	So	they	were	up	there	
pioneering.	There	was	no	diagnosis	for	sepsis.	There	was	nothing.	So	what	we	did	was	
things	that	SSC	advocated.”	
Kumar	and	colleagues’	(2006)	work	was	a	key	example.	David	explained,	“We	always	
knew	that	the	earlier	you	give	antibiotics	the	better.	We’ve	always	known	this.	We	
weren’t	calling	it	Sepsis	6	but	we	knew	if	someone	was	septic	and	hypertensive,	that	
was	bad.	The	sooner	you	started	treating	that	the	better.”	But	the	resonance	of	Kumar	
et	al.’s	(2006)	work	was,	at	least	in	part,	due	to	the	visible	simplicity	contained	in	a	
widely	presented	chart:	
“Kumar	brought	out	a	paper	in	last	few	years,	there’s	a	lovely	graph	on	
it,	which	shows,	it’s	almost	linear,	that	survival	from	antibiotics,	and	as	
it	comes,	as	the	survival	goes	down,	and	he	actually	worked	out	that	for	
every	hour	you	delay	antibiotics,	mortality	goes	up	7.6%.	It’s	a	beautiful	
wee	graph.”	(David)		
Kumar	et	al.’s	graph	was	the	single	most	referred	to	piece	of	research	literature	
throughout	all	interviews,	presentations,	and	conversations.	It	was	mentioned	by	
every	doctor	I	interviewed	as	well	as	each	member	of	the	Outreach	team.	However,	
when	probed	about	the	reason	for	the	one-hour	time	frame	in	the	Sepsis	6	bundle,	no	
one	linked	Kumar’s	graph	as	the	supporting	evidence.	When	asked,	Martha	instead	
spoke	of	her	reliance	upon	knowledgeable	figures	in	the	knowledge	network.	
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“Professor	Rooney…they’ve	done	all	the	research.	It’s	actually	evidence	based	stuff.	
And	it	has	been	proven	to	work…even	WHO	is	involved	with	it.”	However,	Dr	Jones	and	
Kelly	gave	pragmatic	reasons	for	supporting	Sepsis	6:	
“Getting	the	antibiotics	in	probably	is	the	most	evidence	based	for	
improving	the	outcome…People	think	they’re	all	reasonable	things	to	
do.	You’re	getting	everything	done	that	might	reasonably	have	a	
chance	to	help	the	patient.”	(Dr	Jones)	
“The	evidence	for	this	being	a	good	bundle,	I	think,	it’s	fairly	basic	stuff.	
When	you	think	that	that’s	what	you	would	do…It’s	logical.	There	kind	
of	is	solid	science	behind	it.	And	the	number	of	times	it	doesn’t	actually	
fit	that	that’s	the	thing	you	should	do,	is	very,	very	rare,	because	you	
won’t	do	your	patient	any	harm	in	doing	these	things	in	the	first	
instance.	It’s	more	likely	that	you’ll	do	them	a	power	of	good.”	(Kelly)	
Leann	was	more	emphatic	about	the	value	of	Sepsis	6.	“The	most	important	thing	is	
that	early	recognition	saves	lives	and	implementation	of	Sepsis	6.	It’s	the	gold	
standard	treatment	and	saves	lives.”	Her	explanation	for	why	she	saw	Sepsis	6	as	the	
gold	standard	was	based	on	Aurora’s	performance	outcomes.	“It’s	the	data	isn’t	it.	
You	need	to	know	reducing	mortality,	reducing	length	of	stay.	There’s	lots	of	studies	
that	prove	the	earlier	you	get	antibiotic	delivery,	you’re	reducing	mortality”	(Leann).	
Only	Dr	Jones	revealed	that	he	had	heard	murmurs	at	a	conference	that	Kumar	et	al.’s	
research	might	not	be	as	authoritative	as	it	seemed.		
“The	graph	that	gets	shown…is	possibly	a	bit	dubious…it’s	possibly	not	
as	squeaky	clean	as	you	might	think.	But	it’s	almost	too	good	to	be	true,	
isn’t	it?	It’s	a	very	powerful	kind	of	image,	isn’t	it?	We	haven’t	got	that	
kind	of	graph	for	giving	oxygen	or	giving	fluids.”	(Dr	Jones)	
Indeed,	Dr	Lewis	was	aware	that	the	bundle	concept	was	not	based	on	research	
findings	but	rather	their	own	local	outcomes.	
“Bundles	work.	We	know	bundles	work.	If	you	apply	bundles	rigidly,	you	
will	show	an	improvement.	What	no	one	can	tell	me	is	whether	it’s	
actually	the	elements	of	the	bundle	or	the	fact	that	you’ve	just	applied	a	
bundle	and	therefore	everyone	is	working	in	as	much	team	harmony	as	
you	can	manage.	Because	we	all	know	it,	before	the	bundle,	yes	we	
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thought	we	did	that,	but	when	we	actually	measured	it,	you	got	those	4	
[steps]	80%	of	the	time,	we	never	got	the	whole	bundle	right.	So	you	do	
the	whole	100%	and	all	of	a	sudden	your	infection	rates	fall.	But	we	
know	that	if	you	then	take	bits	out	of	that	bundle,	the	infection	rates	
don’t	rise	again.”	(Dr	Lewis)	
During	this	time	frame	both	the	policy	and	research	communities	were	actively	
delivering	their	knowledge-based	resources	(in	the	form	of	updated	guidelines,	
revised	bundles,	and	the	SPSP	initiatives)	to	the	practice	communities.	And	yet	the	
nursing	Outreach	staff	looked	to	the	consultant	body	to	take	the	lead	on	discovery	
and	assessment	of	the	materials.	During	an	interview	when	I	asked	the	source	of	the	
scientific	research	material	they	used,	Kelly	replied,	
“Probably	just	whoever	has	the	biggest	brain	in	ICU	[and]	thinks	here’s	
this	paper,	‘They	say	this,	I	think	we	should	try	this.’	They	normally	
would	take	it	to	the	[Deteriorating	Patient]	meeting.	And	if	nobody	
shouts	and	says,	‘Oh	no,	we’re	not	doing	that!’	then	they	would	have	
the	consensus.”	(Kelly)	
Aurora	was	a	high-performing,	research	evidence-using	organisation	as	a	collective,	
not	as	individuals.	Based	on	their	professional	role	and	position	of	authority,	the	
medical	staff	were	expected	to	remain	current	in	their	disciplinary	area.	When	new	
material	was	provided	to	the	Deteriorating	Patient	Group,	the	other	professions	were	
able	to	provide	their	perspectives.	And	the	Outreach	staff	were	aware	of	some	of	the	
controversies	existing	in	the	research	network.	For	example,	Kelly	called	Activated	
Protein	C	“the	very	expensive	wonder	drug”	that	later	was	withdrawn.	And	Leann	
pointed	to	“all	those	studies	by	that	German	that	said	colloid	this,	colloid	that,	and	
then	it	transpires	it	was	all	fabricated	and	biased.”	But	not	every	member	of	the	
Deteriorating	Patient	Group	needed	to	be	reading	the	specialist	literature	and	able	to	
assess	and	critique	the	methodology.	Nevertheless,	the	group	decided	together	in	
consultation	if	and	how	their	systems	would	be	adjusted.	In	this	way,	they	relied	on	
one	another	to	bring	their	areas	of	expertise	to	bear.	
None	of	the	ward	nurses	I	spoke	with	queried	the	evidence	for	Sepsis	6	(or	SIRS).	They	
said	that	the	knowledge	they	drew	on	was	based	on	their	training,	the	perspectives	of	
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their	immediate	work	colleagues,	and	their	prior	experience.	One	example	came	from	
Alison,	a	High	Dependency	Unit	nurse.	On	a	visit	soon	after	the	chart	transition	took	
place,	she	described	the	first	night	they	switched	to	the	NEWS	score	and	chart.	She	
said	her	fellow	nurses	on	duty	expressed	uncertainty	similar	to	hers.	To	
accommodate,	Alison	explained	that	she	first	calculated	the	NEWS	score	and	then	
converted	that	to	the	familiar	SIRS	score.	And	after	a	few	weeks	of	using	a	two-step	
interpretive	process,	she	no	longer	needed	to	use	SIRS	in	order	to	understand	NEWS.	
In	this	example,	Alison	correlated	meaning	based	on	her	experience	to	build	sense	of	
the	NEWS	score.	The	knowledge	needed	to	find	her	way	forward	was	built	using	prior	
experience	and	creative	experimentation	for	using	the	new	protocol	and	chart.		
The	early	warning	scores	provided	a	simple	form	of	communication	between	doctors	
and	nurses.	Relatedly,	Dr	Lewis	wondered	whether	the	value	of	bundles	lay	in	the	
cross-professional,	multi-unit	coordination	required	to	get	the	bundles	done.	“Is	it	
actually	what	you’re	doing	or	just	the	way	you’re	doing	it?…Is	it	just	that	you’ve	got	
everyone	singing	from	the	same	hymn	sheet?”	(Dr	Lewis).	In	this	way,	both	early	
warning	scores	and	bundles	established	a	shared	language	and	engagement	in	order	
to	overcome	divides.	
And	yet,	the	deeper	integration	with	the	practice	and	policy	communities	came	at	a	
cost	for	Aurora.	Changing	Aurora’s	knowledge	systems	highlighted	some	tensions	
between	units.	For	example,	Clinical	Governance’s	priorities	were	largely	externally	
focused	toward	areas	of	concern	to	NHS	Scotland	and	audit	reporting	bodies.	The	
prior	hospital	executive	structure	could	take	credit	for	Aurora’s	sepsis	success.	But	the	
new	Chief	Executive	and	Assistant	Director	of	Nursing	came	from	a	different	board	
and	did	not	have	ownership	in	the	success	of	the	SIRS-	and	Outreach-based	system.	
They	had	experience	with	different	processes	that	had	been	successful	elsewhere,	
such	as	the	AIMS	Training	rather	than	the	Outreach-led	Study	Days.	They	brought	
different	views	about	what	systems	to	use,	such	as	the	national	chart	rather	than	SIRS.	
One	staff	member	observed	that	a	standardised	NEWS	chart	might	meet	the	needs	of	
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the	workforce	around	Scotland,	“but	not	for	us”.	Aligning	communities	does	not	
necessarily	equate	to	aligned	benefits.	
In	an	interview,	Dr	Lewis	predicted,	based	on	what	he	had	learned	from	efforts	over	
the	last	decades,	that	returning	to	rely	on	an	early	warning	protocol	and	revamping	a	
knowledge	sharing	tool	was	not	enough.		
“The	point	is,	what’s	happening	out	there	is	they’re	exporting	the	
monitoring	system.	Are	they	exporting	the	education?	Are	they	
exporting	the	Outreach?	No.	We	tried	a	lot	in	the	early	days	to	find	
other	systems	that	aren’t	going	down	the	Outreach	pathway.	There	are	
other	systems	not	called	Outreach,	but	something	similar,	but	didn’t	
really	have	a	monitoring,	a	trigger	system	but	did	have	a	call	system	but	
it	was	bits	of	the	puzzle,	but	didn’t	actually	put	the	whole	puzzle	
together…That’s	my	problem	with	the	current	system.	The	government	
thinks	it’s	the	NEWS	chart.	I	know	full	well	it’s	not	the	NEWS	chart	
that’s	going	to	make	the	full	difference.	It	won’t	even	make	a	difference	
if	you	put	the	education	into	it.	It	will	only	make	a	difference	if	you	put	
in	that	third	element.	Which	is	a	ward	based	insight	and	resource.”	(Dr	
Lewis)	
Aurora’s	knowledge	network	knew	from	experience	that	putting	knowledge-based	
materials	in	place	was	insufficient.	A	more	holistic	knowledge	was	needed.	Relational	
connections	between	actors	holding	different	roles	and	responsibilities	is	what	helped	
knowledge	to	be	successfully	mobilised.	And	as	Dr	Adams	explained,	“Now	we’re	
trusting	the	Outreach	system	to	cover	the	potential	gaps	that	NEWS	creates.”	
The	interdependence	of	Aurora’s	knowledge	network	reveals	how	they	addressed,	
minimised,	and	mobilised	around	boundaries.	A	variety	of	actors	helped	to	nurture	
the	processes	and	professional	relationships,	which	in	turn	stabilised	their	knowledge	
systems	in	the	midst	of	change.	
For	example,	Sue,	the	Clinical	Governance	lead,	saw	her	role	as	an	organiser	in	the	
NEWS	chart	development,	as	the	person	standing	between	the	standardisation	and	
customisation	process.		
“I	have	been	facilitating	it	more	than	making	decisions	on	it.	In	this	role	
I	have	to	be	quite	careful…the	Outreach	team,	the	doctors,	the	nurses	
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who	are	working	in	the	ward	every	day,	I	have	to	let	them	make	the	
decision	what	the	chart’s	going	to	look	like.”	(Sue)	
She	was	aware	that	the	chart	represented	a	marked	shift	for	frontline	staff.	And	while	
she	was	an	advocate	for	its	adoption,	sensitivity	was	required.	
Likewise,	David	believed	that	maintaining	an	awareness	that	all	members	of	the	
knowledge	network	were	engaged	in	a	process	of	learning	and	change	cultivated	a	
productive	and	healthy	environment.	
“I	think	there’s	probably	still	some	people	want	blood	when	something	
goes	wrong.	There	can	be	a	knee-jerk	reaction	to,	right,	who’s	at	fault,	
who	did	this.	But	I	think	slowly	but	surely	people	are	learning	that	
that’s,	unless	it’s	wilful,	reckless	behaviour,	or	repeated	stupidity	with	
no	attempts	to	improve,	people	don’t	come	to	work	to	harm	people.	We	
all	do	our	best.	And	when	someone	gets	it	wrong,	we	all	get	it	wrong,	
we	all	get	it	wrong.	It’s	about	learning	from	it.	The	further	you	move	
away	from	blame,	the	quicker	people	will	acknowledge	when	
something	goes	wrong.	That’s	the	direction	it’s	got	to	be.	Throw	up	
your	hands	and	say,	‘I	got	this	wrong’.	I	want	you	to	learn	from	this.	I	
think	we’re	moving	in	that	direction…It’s	all	about	culture,	it’s	all	about	
culture.”	(David)	
Other	actors	provided	soft	nudges	to	encourage	the	completion	of	tedious	but	
necessary	tasks.	Leann	observed	in	an	interview	that	Martha,	the	clinical	governance	
assistant,	had	been	instrumental	in	getting	the	ward	staff	to	complete	the	required	
documentation.	“Martha	goes	into	the	wards	every	morning,	‘please	remember	
SIRS…Sepsis	6…sticker’.	She’s	tried	various	different	modes.	Even	tried	taking	sweeties	
in	every	Friday…pure	bribery.	It’s	constant	reinforcement”	(Leann).	Martha	found	
creative	and	kind	ways	to	encourage	the	staff	to	get	their	job	done.		
Sue’s	views	on	a	variety	of	issues	provided	distinct	and	at	times	contrary	perspectives	
at	Deteriorating	Patient	Group	meetings.	As	she	was	in	regular	contact	with	clinical	
governance	staff	at	other	boards,	she	relayed	information	about	ways	other	hospitals	
in	the	country	were	managing,	for	example,	the	inclusion	of	pain	scoring	tools	on	their	
patient	observation	charts.	While	Sue	provided	a	conduit	to	practices	elsewhere,	she	
also	held	strong	views	that,	at	times,	contrasted	with	others	in	the	meeting.	And	she	
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was	willing	to	support	unpopular	ideas.	For	example,	whilst	others	were	concerned	
and	highly	reticent	to	bring	in	the	standardised	Scotland-wide	NEWS	chart	to	Aurora,	
she	was	a	strong	advocate.	When	other	members	of	the	group	proposed	
modifications	to	the	standardised	version,	she	challenged	them.	In	this	way	Sue	
affected	how	ideas	were	discussed	in	meetings.	Each	person	had	to	be	prepared	to	
provide	well-considered	reasons	to	support	their	ideas.	As	a	result,	Sue’s	questions	
minimised	the	risk	of	succumbing	to	agreement	too	easily.		Because	of	Sue’s	
willingness	to	share	alternate	perspectives,	any	new	processes	and	materials	at	the	
Deteriorating	Patient	Group	underwent	a	refining	process	that	might	have	otherwise	
been	missed.	
6.3. Mobilising	Knowledge	in	the	Practice	Network	
Over	the	course	of	these	three	time	periods,	the	organisation	of	actors	and	the	links	
between	actor	groups	grew	in	size	and	evolved	in	form.	Initially,	Aurora	relied	on	
individual	actor	initiative	to	call	the	ICU.	Then,	in	the	form	of	the	Outreach	team,	
Aurora	put	in	place	a	resource	that	included	regular	casual	contact.	Finally,	the	
involvement	of	many	more	actors	brought	formal	contact	in	the	form	of	biweekly	
meetings	and	quarterly	participation	in	the	national	Sepsis	Collaborative.		
The	organisational	assumptions	about	who	held	the	necessary	knowledge	and	the	
strategies	for	mobilising	necessary	knowledge	resources	also	evolved.	To	begin,	
Aurora	assumed	that	all	health	professionals	had	the	requisite	knowledge	for	
identifying	and	treating	sepsis.	Each	health	care	professional	held	the	epistemic	
resources	on	their	own.	In	later	years,	Aurora	drew	on	the	interdependency	tied	to	
the	distribution	of	knowledge	between	actors	in	the	network.		
Yet	these	data	show	that	it	was	difficult	to	cross	social	boundaries	(professionally	from	
nurse	to	doctor,	geographically/proximally	from	unit	to	unit)	even	when	there	was	an	
epistemic	need.	In	an	interview,	Craig,	a	ward	nurse	of	19	years,	explained	that	when	
he	was	an	inexperienced	nurse	he	was	apprehensive	about	talking	with	medics.	“Now	
I	can	approach	doctors,	though	I	used	to	be	afraid	to	ask	for	help.”	This	unease	was	
not	reserved	to	nursing	staff.	Dr	Jones	said	that	in	“my	own	personal	experience	of	
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things	taking	a	while	to	sink	in	because	you	were	a	bit	reluctant	to	make	that	call	in	
the	first	place.”	Dr	Jones’s	view	was	that	the	referral	system	and	the	Outreach	team	
helped	provide	confidence	in	times	of	uncertainty.	
A	level	of	harmony	between	actors	and	their	knowledge	was	necessary,	and	still	their	
collaboration	did	not	come	easily.	The	various	boundaries	between	actors	were	
addressed	by	both	individual	and	collective	actors.	“Now	let’s	be	totally	honest,	we	
might	not	have	achieved	anything	like	what	we’ve	achieved	if	it	hadn’t	been	for	
someone	like	David.	Very,	very	person	dependent.	We	might	not	have	achieved	if	we	
hadn’t	had	someone	like	me.	I	mean,	I	think	the	whole	system	is	very	extremely	person	
dependent”	(Dr	Lewis).	In	other	words,	every	ICU	has	a	medical	lead	and	charge	
nurses.	Many	hospitals	in	NHS	England	have	Outreach	Services.	But	very	few	have	
accomplished	what	Aurora	has.	Individual	and	collective	actors	worked	together	in	
this	context	to	construct	high	performing	sepsis	care	context.	
The	interactional	practices	by	various	actors	in	the	knowledge	network	enabled	the	
whole	community	to	mobilise	their	knowledge.	Furthermore,	the	interactions	that	
helped	facilitate	knowledge	mobilisation	were	distributed	throughout	the	knowledge	
network.	While	some	of	the	actors	were	in	positions	of	authority,	such	as	Dr	Lewis,	
others,	such	as	Martha,	were	not.	
The	moderate	size	of	the	hospital	helped	address	geographic	boundaries	and	the	lack	
of	contact	with	others.	“In	a	small	hospital	everyone	knows	each	other.	And	that’s	got	
a	lot	of	benefits.	There’s	a	lot	of	corridor	consultations,	there’s	a	lot	of	meeting	
someone	‘I’m	just	going	to	tell	you	about	a	patient’”	(David).	Knowing	one	another	
helped	minimise	the	social	boundaries	between	actors.	“Everybody	knows	everybody	
and	that	definitely	helps	the	job	that	we	do.	Because	they’re	not	scared	to	contact	us	
about	anything.	They	don’t	feel	embarrassed	or	silly	about	phoning”	(Kelly).	While	a	
closer	proximity	made	contact	easier,	the	Outreach	team	established	a	sense	of	safety	
for	all	staff	in	asking	for	help.	More	than	merely	knowing	the	staff,	the	Outreach	staff	
were	attentive.	Even	when	they	faced	difficult	circumstances	or	personalities,	they	
made	a	continuous	effort	to	listen.		
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The	referral	system	put	in	place	a	structural	dependence,	a	mutual	reliance,	between	
the	ward	staff	and	Outreach,	to	share	their	knowledge.	Rather	than	relying	on	the	
inherent	kindness	of	Outreach	staff,	the	Outreach	staff	needed	the	ward	nurses.	The	
Outreach	team	did	not	know	if	a	patient	was	unwell	unless	the	ward	staff	told	them.	
Even	their	ward	rounds	depended	on	nurses	completing	the	charts	and	calculating	the	
early	warning	score.	“They’re	the	starter.	They	need	to	be	doing	their	job	properly	
before	we	can”	(Kelly).	As	a	result,	even	when	difficulties	arose,	it	was	understood	that	
tending	the	long-term	relationship	with	the	ward	staff	was	paramount	and	needed	to	
be	maintained.	Providing	ready,	affirming	feedback	for	the	ward	nurses	was	based	on	
more	than	goodwill,	the	referral	system	hinged	on	nurses’	willingness	to	call	
Outreach.		
And	nurturing	the	relationships	in	the	knowledge	systems	required	a	continual	effort.	
As	David	explained,		
“It’s	working	together.	If	a	nurse	refers	a	patient	and	they	come	to	
Intensive	Care,	it’s	always	good	just	to	say,	‘Thanks	very	much	for	that	
referral.	You	were	on	that	really,	really	quickly.’	That	means	a	referral	
again.	We	are	non-punitive	non-judgemental,	and	even	though	you	
want	to	have	a	moan	sometimes,	it’s	a	golden	rule.	I’ve	said	that	to	
each	team	member	that’s	come.	Never,	ever	criticise	someone	for	a	
referral,	or	they’ll	never	refer	again.	It’s	back	to	just	having	good	
working	relationships.”	(David)	
The	geographic,	professional,	social	and	epistemic	boundaries	resulted	from	necessary	
segmentation	in	training,	expertise,	and	function.	Indeed,	boundaries	were	the	by-
product	of	important	differentiation	in	training	processes	and	functions.	And	yet	the	
actors	in	Aurora’s	knowledge	network	did	not	eradicate	the	boundaries	in	order	to	
mobilise	knowledge	for	sepsis	care,	rather	they	respected	the	divisions	whilst	
shepherding	the	relational	connections	that	facilitated	the	establishment	and	
coordination	of	different	knowledge-based	protocols	and	materials	as	needed.	
6.4. Conclusion		
This	chapter	has	presented	and	analysed	the	Aurora	practice	community	using	Soft	
Knowledge	Systems	and	observed	the	complexities	of	knowledge	with	a	Clinical	
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Mindlines	lens.	Using	these	theories,	this	chapter	found	that	mobilising	knowledge	
began	with,	but	was	not	assured	by,	setting	knowledge	systems	in	place.	Indeed,	
these	knowledge	systems	actors,	processes	and	materials	depended	on	the	relational	
practices	between	actors	to	address	social	and	epistemic	tensions.		
Relational	practices	enabled	the	system	to	‘work’	and	mobilise	knowledge.	
Furthermore,	the	professional	relationships	were	cultivated	not	just	by	those	in	roles	
of	authority,	but	by	many	actors	in	the	knowledge	network.	The	practices	and	
relationships	described	above	are	demonstrative	of	what	I	have	termed	‘shepherding’.		
Furthermore,	relationships	between	actors	interconnect	and	shape	their	knowledge.	
For	example,	their	training	and	years	of	experience	influence	their	shared	values,	
which	in	turn	shape	local	norms	and	routines	in	the	course	of	determining	how	to	use	
explicit	forms	of	knowledge	such	as	guidelines.	This	description	of	knowledge	and	
knowledge	networks	is	informed	by	Clinical	Mindlines	theory.	This	is	a	communal,	yet	
also	individual	process.	In	this	way,	individual	and	collective	mindlines	develop	via	
relationships	and	within	the	milieu	of	social	interactions.	
This	chapter	has	also	explored	the	multifaceted	weave	of	many	forms	of	knowledge	
that	enabled	this	community	to	use	their	sepsis-based	knowledge	to	benefit	patients.	
Just	as	different	actors	provided	differing	views,	which	both	informed	and	shaped	
their	collective	sepsis	activities,	actors’	mindlines	worked	in	tandem	and	tension	as	
well.	Intuition,	or	‘gut	feelings’,	past	experiences,	contextual	values	and	procedures,	
patient	concerns,	and	the	sepsis	research	evidence	all	worked	together	for	
interpreting	the	most	beneficial	way	to	apply	their	knowledge-in-this-practice-in-this-
context-for-this-patient.	In	other	words,	the	tensions	between	many	sources	of	
knowledge	contributed	to,	rather	than	impeded,	high	performing	care.		
The	next	chapter	will	explore	how	these	three	overlapping,	intersecting	networks	
mobilised	their	knowledge	for	sepsis	care	provision.	The	chapter	will	then	discuss	how	
these	findings	contribute	to	the	academic	conversation	around	the	knowing	in	
practice	dilemma.	
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7. Chapter	7—Discussion	
Human	interaction	is	the	engine	that	drives	research	into	practice	
(Jonathan	Lomas)	
7.1. Introduction	
Chapters	5	and	6	presented	and	analysed	data	from	a	sepsis	knowledge	network	
made	up	of	interconnected	actors	from	across	research,	policy,	and	practice	contexts.	
The	purpose	of	this	chapter	is	to	bring	together	these	findings,	discuss	the	
contributions	of	this	thesis,	and	provide	reflections	on	the	work.	This	chapter	is	
organised	in	three	sections.	Firstly,	the	chapter	summarises	the	study	aims	and	
methods,	and	connects	the	key	findings	from	Chapters	5	and	6	in	order	to	answer	the	
overarching	research	question.	Secondly,	the	chapter	discusses	the	empirical	and	
theoretical	contributions	of	this	study	in	relation	to	the	healthcare	knowledge,	
knowledge	systems	and	knowledge	mobilisation	literatures.	Finally,	the	chapter	
reflects	on	the	implications,	methods,	limitations	and	potential	avenues	for	future	
research.	
7.2. Summary	of	the	Study	Aims,	Methods	and	Findings	
This	thesis	focuses	on	the	development	and	connection	of	knowledge	within	and	
across	the	healthcare	research,	policy	and	practice	communities.	This	study	is	
important	because	when	knowledge	is	not	mobilised,	or	is	not	mobilised	rapidly	
enough,	care	that	could	prevent	or	alleviate	unnecessary	suffering	is	not	provided.	In	
addition,	ineffective	medical	practices	remain	in	use	and	result	in	wasted	resources	
and	unnecessarily	poor	outcomes	for	patients.		
Using	knowledge	mobilisation	to	frame	the	study,	the	aim	of	this	thesis	was	to	enrich	
our	understanding	of	how	knowledge	was	developed,	shared	and	used	by	and	
between	researchers,	policymakers	and	practitioners.	The	exploration	was	then	
guided	by	an	overarching	question	drawn	from	the	research	problem:	How	is	
knowledge	mobilised	within	and	between	the	research,	policy	and	practice	
communities	for	clinical	practice?	After	considering	the	knowledge	and	knowledge	
mobilisation	literature,	the	overarching	question	was	refined	by	two	further	sub-
questions:	(1)	What	are	the	sources,	forms	and	ways	of	knowing	involved	in	mobilising	
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research-based	knowledge	in	practice?	(2)	How	are	knowledge	systems	(actors,	
processes,	and	materials)	organised	for	mobilising	knowledge?	These	questions	
addressed	issues	of	complex	epistemic	and	social	dynamics	that	appeared	in	the	
literature	to	inhibit	the	mobilisation	of	knowledge.	A	qualitative	case	study	was	
selected	as	a	productive	way	to	explore	the	knowledge-driven	interconnections	within	
a	‘whole	network’.	Specifically,	this	meant	that	the	project	examined	the	knowledge	
systems	of	an	interconnected	research	network	(the	Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign),	a	
policy	network	(NHS	Scotland’s	Sepsis	Collaborative)	and	a	practice	network	(Aurora	
General	Hospital).		
This	study	found	that	there	were	inter-relational	practices	that	addressed	the	social	
and	epistemic	boundaries	within	and	between	networks.	I	argue	that	the	term	
‘shepherding’	combines	these	inter-relational	practices	together	and	renders	them	
visible.	‘Shepherding’	then	is	a	collection	of	practices	that	describes	the	nurturing	of	
social	and	epistemic	boundaries	at	the	micro-interaction	level.	Shepherding	practices	
cultivate	the	development,	sharing	and	use	of	knowledge,	for	it	is	interactions	at	the	
actor-to-actor	level	that	influence	the	harmonisation	(or	damage)	of	social	and	
epistemic	boundaries.	The	development	and	mobilisation	of	knowledge	are	
intertwined	social	processes.	These	social	processes	involve	binding	together	different	
forms	of	knowing	(tending	knowledge)	as	well	as	relevant	actors	and	communities	
(tending	the	knowers).		
An	analysis	of	the	Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign	network	suggested	that	shepherding	
practices	accompanied	their	structural	organising	efforts.	The	purpose	of	the	SSC	was	
two-fold:	firstly,	to	raise	awareness,	challenge	and	prod	existing	sepsis	practices;	and	
secondly,	to	actively	build	an	inter-organisational	structure	to	facilitate	and	coordinate	
the	widely	spread	domains	of	sepsis	knowledge.	Signs	of	shepherding	were	detected	
in	the	inclusive	nature	of	the	network.	The	1991	meeting	brought	together	a	range	of	
disciplinary	specialists	from	one	continent.	As	the	network	evolved,	they	sought	out	
specialist	societies	representing	every	part	of	the	world	to	be	involved	and	provide	
input.	Nursing	professional	societies	joined	the	effort.	Publications	spanning	the	last	
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25	years	bear	witness	to	a	stable	set	of	individual	actors,	whilst	also	welcoming	the	
involvement	of	new	participants,	some	of	whom	took	on	leadership	responsibilities.	
The	European	Society	of	Intensive	Care	Medicine	(ESICM)	and	Society	for	Critical	Care	
Medicine	(SCCM)	provided	a	platform	for	bringing	international	professional	bodies	
together.	In	addition,	their	facilitation	of	effective	collaboration	evidenced	in	
simultaneous	SSC	journal	outputs	was	a	sign	of	shepherding.	
Further	indicators	of	shepherding	can	also	be	seen	in	the	ways	that	the	SSC	responded	
to	concerns	as	disagreement	and	conflict	arose.	Some	parts	of	the	network	believed	it	
was	inappropriate	to	include	commercial	partners	in	their	collective	work	based	on	
the	view	that	the	actors	involved	shape	their	collective	knowledge	and	thereby	their	
outputs.	To	address	this	concern,	the	SSC	parted	ways	with	the	International	Sepsis	
Forum	(an	original	partner).	They	eliminated	industry-related	funding.	And	they	
sought	to	reassure	the	wider	knowledge	network	of	their	‘objectivity’	by	increasing	
the	transparency	of	evidence	assessment	and	consensus-building	processes.	
The	SSC	had	to	mediate	disagreement.	There	has	been	considerable	debate	over	the	
best	parameters	for	defining	(SIRS	or	SOFA),	diagnosing	(early	warning	scores),	and	
treating	(bundles)	sepsis.	To	address	their	differing	views,	they	regularly	met	together	
in	person,	which	was	supplemented	by	other	channels	of	contact.	Care	was	taken	to	
ensure	that	softer	voices	were	not	drowned	out	by	powerful	personalities	as	seen	in	
the	adoption	of	a	Delphi	process	and	nominal	group	technique.	Even	the	Infectious	
Diseases	Society	of	America’s	rejection	of	the	most	recent	2016	guidelines	highlighted	
“numerous	amicable	discussions”	(IDSA,	2017,	p.	2)	and	the	hope	to	be	able	to	
continue	to	collaborate	in	the	future.	Thus	the	SSC	tended	to	the	reception	of	
materials	by	other	researchers,	policymakers	and	practitioners.	At	times	the	SSC	
responded	with	a	vigorous	response	to	epistemic	challenges.	Other	times,	they	
modified	and	adjusted	to	accommodate	diverse	views.	
While	the	documentary	sources	from	the	Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign	could	not	provide	
direct	observation	of	their	interactions	such	as	was	available	in	the	other	networks,	
these	data	nevertheless	provided	hints	that	shepherding	practices	supported	actor	
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engagement.	The	longevity	of	the	SSC	further	attests	to	relational	work	supporting	
their	ongoing	knowledge	mobilisation	efforts.	Furthermore,	the	SSC	story	showed	that	
‘evidence’	(in	the	form	of	guidelines)	was	created,	formed,	interpreted	and	moulded	
into	material	outputs	emerging	from	a	process	of	ongoing	social	interactions	between	
actors.		
The	Sepsis	Collaborative	findings	provided	additional	glimpses	of	shepherding	
practices	in	the	policy	community.	The	Collaborative	sought	to	actively	coordinate	
sepsis	care	throughout	Scotland.	While	disagreement	was	less	apparent	in	these	data	
than	with	the	SSC,	the	Collaborative	involved	aligning	separate	actors	that	had	
overlapping	responsibilities	for	quality	improvement	within	governmental	bodies	in	
addition	to	all	regional	health	boards	in	the	country.	Given	a	similar	lack	of	consensus	
in	the	research	network,	the	Sepsis	Collaborative	also	had	different	clinical	definitions	
and	related	measures.	They	recognised	the	discontinuity,	and	to	find	common	ground,	
they	had	to	“work	closely”	(Haraden	&	Leitch,	2011,	p.	756)	together.		
The	Collaborative	showed	a	blend	of	fixed	and	flexible	stances.	They	mandated	that	
each	board	include	a	mix	of	professional	disciplines.	And	they	required	regular	
collection	and	reporting	of	performance	data.	Yet,	they	were	also	responsive	to	
concerns	regarding	the	duplication	and	burden	of	data	collection.	They	strongly	
encouraged	(and	at	meetings	tried	to	entice)	boards	to	adopt	the	National	Early	
Warning	Score-based	chart	and	tool,	but	did	not	demand	it.	In	this	way,	they	
respected	a	measure	of	regional	autonomy.	
Furthermore,	the	boards	reported	that	Collaborative	leaders	were	accessible	and	
approachable.	Leitch	and	Rooney	were	named	as	policy	leaders	who	were	safe	to	air	
different	perspectives	with	and	share	concerns.	The	five	learning	sessions	were	
intended	to	encourage,	motivate	and	build	connections	between	actors.	Additional	
methods	of	contact	(e.g.	an	online	hub)	were	provided	to	help	sustain	further	
exchanges.	As	Hannah	explained,	NHS	Scotland	funded	and	facilitated	a	network	that	
linked	sepsis	practitioners	from	across	the	country	together	with	clinical	experts.	And	
the	network	structure	was	used	to	seek	out	the	views	of	Scotland’s	sepsis	
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practitioners	when	the	new	Sepsis-3	definition	was	released.	Care	was	taken	to	hear	
many	actors’	opinions	and	disagreement	was	acceptable.	Through	a	careful,	stepwise	
negotiation	process,	they	produced	a	consensus-based	statement.	In	these	actions,	
the	Sepsis	Collaborative	also	showed	that	their	knowledge	systems	were	nurtured	by	
shepherding	practices.	
The	findings	from	Aurora	General	Hospital	were	replete	with	examples	of	shepherding	
practices.	In	the	practice	context	there	were	many	social	and	epistemic	boundaries.	
Some	examples	include	boundaries	between	general	and	specialist	units	(e.g.	the	ICU,	
renal	unit	and	general	wards),	between	doctors	and	nurses,	between	doctors	(and	
nurses)	of	differing	seniority	and	responsibility	(e.g.	junior	and	consultant	doctors),	
and	between	position-related	responsibilities	(e.g.	clinical	governance,	hospital	
management	and	practicing	clinicians).	Rather	than	accept	ongoing	patient	harm,	this	
network	was	proactive	and	experimental	in	seeking	out	ways	to	organise	their	sepsis	
knowledge	systems.	In	the	process,	Dr	Lewis,	and	later	David,	found	ways	to	draw	on	
many	actors’	knowledge	to	(re)create	charts	and	provide	training.	They	bent	toward	
inclusivity	rather	than	exclusivity.		
Moreover,	shepherding	practices	included	seeking	out	and	emphasising	common	
values	to	establish	a	shared	basis	of	understanding	between	different	groups.	Putting	
in	place	such	agreements	set	the	stage	for	cohesiveness	later	when	challenges	arose.	
One	example	was	when	Dr	Lewis	obtained	his	senior	medical	colleagues’	agreement	
that	a	lack	of	medical	response	to	patient	suffering	was	not	to	be	tolerated.	Thus	
when	a	ward	nurse	contacted	Outreach	for	help,	they	were	not	chastised.		
The	inbuilt	dependence	between	the	ward	nurses	and	Outreach	staff	also	helped	to	
encourage	positive	interactions.	Outreach	team	members	knew	that	dependably	
responding	to	calls,	and	reassuring	and	supporting	ward	staff	would	build	and	
maintain	trust	between	them.	This	also	entailed	tolerating	a	measure	of	
‘imperfection’.	Outreach	were	highly	skilled	and	experienced	nurses.	Unless	there	was	
an	urgent	reason,	they	did	not	draw	attention	to	skills	less	than	their	own.	Outreach	
tried	to	remember	the	many	challenges	the	ward	nurses	faced	and	provide	help	
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rather	than	criticism.	Building	trust	was	a	person-by-person	process	that	could	not	be	
taken	for	granted.	Trust	required	active	maintenance.		
And	yet,	if	a	patient	was	at	risk,	they	did	not	retreat	from	engaging	in	uncomfortable	
conversations.	Dr	Lewis	corrected	individuals	privately	and	challenged	inadequate	
care	provision.	The	Outreach	staff	pursued	and	prodded	medical	staff	even	after	being	
dismissed.	Martha	coaxed.	Sue	questioned.	However,	these	actors	also	recognised	
that	different	knowledge,	abilities	and	priorities	were	required	by	various	actors	
carrying	different	roles	in	the	network.	Respect	accompanied	negotiation.	Indeed,	
shepherding	in	this	context	most	often	worked	by	accepting	and	(often)	deferring	to	
existing	boundaries	between	actors.	For	example,	Dr	Lewis	provided	a	consolidated	
chart	but	did	not	challenge	his	colleagues’	autonomy,	leaving	them	to	decide	what	
was	needed	for	their	patient.	Kelly	sought	to	build	junior	medics’	professional	
confidence	rather	than	undermine	it	by	pointing	to	her	superior	skills.	These	kinds	of	
interactions	supported	and	strengthened	the	knowledge	systems	within	Aurora	and	
were	particularly	relevant	at	the	points	of	tension.		
Tending	epistemic	and	social	boundaries	included	both	buffering	and	easing	tensions	
between	actors	but	also	involved	creating	productive	tensions	as	well.	There	were	
commonalities	between	these	three	networks.	Each	had	areas	of	friction.	There	were	
strongly	held	and	diverse	views	where	building	consensus	entailed	adjustments	and	
compromises.	At	various	points,	the	SSC,	Sepsis	Collaborative	and	Aurora	each	took	
the	initiative	to	establish	a	plan	and	build	ties	between	actors.	And	yet,	within	each	
network,	there	was	also	an	element	of	serendipity,	trial	and	error,	and	
experimentation.		
Face-to-face	contact	provided	the	opportunity	for	deepening	professional	
relationships	that	could	be	supported	by	less	direct	means	away	from	meetings.	For	
NHS	Scotland	and	Aurora,	their	smaller	size	relative	to	their	health	system	peers	aided	
the	ability	to	know	one	another	personally,	pointing	to	the	importance	of	relational	
interactions	for	strengthening	knowledge	systems.		
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Contact	between	the	research,	policy	and	practice	networks	had	elements	of	
intentionality	and	chance.	Broad	research	dissemination	methods,	namely	journal	
publications	and	continuing	professional	development	meetings,	in	this	case	filtered	
down	to	and	influenced	their	sepsis	practices,	for	example,	Bone	et	al.’s	(1992)	article	
and	Critical	Care	Outreach	Team	information.	However,	only	a	few	of	Aurora’s	actors	
were	specifically	attuned	to	research	network	materials.	All	practitioners	within	
Aurora	did	not	keep	abreast	of	the	latest	developments.	Dr	Lewis,	or	whomever	was	
“the	biggest	brain,”	said	Kelly,	provided	the	conduit.	In	this	way,	the	Aurora	was	
‘evidence-based’	not	on	an	individual	basis,	but	together	as	a	collective.	
While	Clinical	Mindlines	and	Soft	Knowledge	Systems	theories	do	not	explicitly	focus	
on	leadership,	these	data	indicate	that	the	shepherding	of	knowledge	was	intertwined	
within	the	leadership	structures	and	activities	in	each	of	the	research,	policy	and	
practice	networks.	The	longevity	of	actors	in	executive	roles,	the	inclusive	leadership	
practices	that	embraced	wide	participation,	and	the	cultivation	of	environments	that	
provided	a	safe	place	for	engagement	all	contributed	to	the	development	of	contexts	
where	knowledge	could	successfully	mobilise.	And	yet,	shepherding	was	not	solely	a	
leadership	practice.	These	data	have	shown	that	during	times	of	disagreement	
members	of	the	Outreach	team	helped	to	mediate	between	actors,	including	those	at	
a	more	senior	level	within	the	hospital.	Indeed,	David	worked	to	repair	relationships	
with	nurses	that	were	damaged	by	his	medical	supervisors.	Another	example	was	
seen	in	Martha’s	sustained	efforts	to	ease	communication	flows	between	different	
units.	Aurora’s	knowledge	mobilisation	success	can	be	attributed	to	actions	by	
members	throughout	the	organisation’s	network.		
In	sum,	the	term	‘shepherding’	is	intended	to	capture	and	describe	a	set	of	practices	
rather	than	a	role.	Shepherding	practices	cultivated,	challenged,	influenced,	
negotiated	and	shaped	knowledge	between	actors.	Boundaries	were	addressed,	
tensions	were	managed	(to	either	build	up	tensions	or	to	soothe	them),	and	
resistance	was	(sometimes)	abated.	Connections	between	actors	were	sought	out,	
built,	tended,	nurtured,	negotiated,	and,	when	necessary,	mended.	Shepherding	
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practices	challenged	existing	views,	provided	the	opportunity	to	modify	their	
understanding,	and	allowed	the	re-binding	of	different	forms	of	knowledge.	
Additionally,	shepherding	practices	encouraged	and	nurtured	an	interconnected	
network	of	actors	for	mobilising	their	knowledge.		
In	this	thesis	I	showed	that	knowledge	mobilisation	was	a	boundary-tending	process,	
and	that	individual	and	collective	knowing	were	continually	emerging	social	processes.	
Furthermore,	in	this	thesis	I	contend	that	these	social	processes	were	aided	by	
structural	knowledge	systems	and	yet	these	structures	were	not	sufficient.	Namely,	
knowledge	was	shepherded	in	the	muddle	of	human	interactions	(Greenhalgh	&	
Papoutsi,	2018).		
7.3. Study	Contributions	
The	key	contributions	of	this	study	are	threefold.	Empirically	it	provides	a	rich	and	
detailed	account	of	interconnected	knowledge	and	the	social	interactions	that	
contribute	to	the	mobilisation	of	that	knowledge	in	sepsis	care	in	Scotland.	
Theoretically,	the	study	demonstrates	the	successful	use	of	Soft	Knowledge	Systems	
(SKS)	and	Clinical	Mindlines	(CM)	as	a	combined	‘relational	knowledge	systems’	lens	to	
better	understand	knowledge	mobilisation	processes.	Furthermore,	this	work	extends	
the	academic	literature	that	explores	the	diversity,	complexity,	and	interconnectivity	
of	knowledge	for	practice	by	emphasising	the	role	of	social	interactions	in	supporting	
knowledge	networks.	These	areas	of	contribution	are	discussed	in	turn.		
7.3.1. Empirical	Contributions	
The	empirical	contributions	of	this	thesis	are	covered	according	to,	firstly,	the	nature	
of	knowledge	and	knowledge	use	literature	from	Chapter	2,	secondly,	the	organising	
knowledge	systems	literature	from	Chapter	3,	and	finally,	the	reconsideration	of	the	
research	problem	(and	overarching	question)	identified	in	Chapter	1	in	light	of	this	
work.	
Nature	of	Knowledge	Literature	
The	complex	nature	of	knowledge	was	borne	out	in	this	research	study	and	was	
particularly	evident	in	the	hospital	setting.	The	Outreach	staff	depended	on	many	
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forms	of	knowledge	including	explicit	and	tacit	forms	(Polanyi,	1966)	of	their	own	and	
of	others	(i.e.	individual	and	collective	forms	of	knowledge,	Cook	&	Brown,	1999)	to	
assess	patient	well-being.	Their	own	observations	(for	example,	‘the	slump’	or	the	
‘end	of	the	bed’	test),	their	years	of	experience	(‘I’ve	seen	this	before’),	their	ability	to	
touch	a	patient’s	ankle	and	discern	if	blood	circulation	was	adequate,	concerns	of	
ward	nurses	(‘something	isn’t	right’)	were	used	in	combination	with	the	data	recorded	
on	the	patient	chart	to	decide	what	actions	on	behalf	of	a	patient	should	be	taken.	
They	could	envision	various	possibilities.	They	knew	where	to	go	and	whom	to	contact	
to	get	further	information	if	these	various	streams	of	knowledge	‘felt’	unaligned.	They	
had	confidence	in	their	skills	and	professional	judgement.	Their	medical	and	nursing	
colleagues	had	confidence	in	their	clinical	competence	and	professional	judgement.	If	
one	source	of	input	appeared	to	contradict	another,	the	Outreach	person	continued	
to	reach	for	more	ways	of	knowing	until	they	were	satisfied	there	was	an	answer	for	
their	‘whole’	knowledge,	or	their	‘whole’	mindline	(Gabbay	&	le	May).	In	this	way,	
their	different	forms	of	knowledge	did	not	function	in	isolation	but	rather	in	
cooperation	with	the	others.	And	the	tensions	between	different	forms	of	knowledge	
were	useful.		
Such	dualities	and	tensions	between	different	forms	of	knowledge	were	prevalent	in	
the	healthcare	knowledge	literature	(Crilly	et	al.,	2010;	Ferlie	et	al.,	2012a;	Greenhalgh	
2002;	2010).	By	contrast,	this	study	illustrates	that	these	tensions	between	different	
forms	of	knowledge	play	a	useful	and	productive	role	in	professional	practice.	When	
tensions	between	explicit	and	tacit	forms	of	knowing	emerge,	a	closer	examination	
could	be	warranted.		
As	such,	the	importance	of	tensions	between	different	forms	of	knowledge	affirms	the	
literature	that	problematizes	reductionistic	perspectives	on	knowledge,	and	those	
scholars	that	consider	explicit	forms	alone	as	‘trustworthy’	and	sufficient	for	
professional	practice	(Dopson	et	al.,	2003;	Gabbay	&	le	May,	2011;	Miles	et	al.,	2007).	
To	the	contrary,	an	array	of	sources	(e.g.	prior	training,	experience,	context-based	
values,	early	warning	scores)	drawing	from	various	kinds	of	knowledge	(explicit,	tacit,	
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individual	and	collective)	function	in	productive	tension	and	thus	serve	as	protective	
and	beneficial	forms	of	checks	and	balances.	
And	yet,	these	data	also	show	that	there	are	risks	with	an	easy	alignment	of	differing	
forms	of	knowledge.	For	example,	Kumar	et	al.’s	(2006)	graph	(in	Chapter	5)	
established	a	research-informed	urgency	for	1-hour	treatment	that	joined	neatly	with	
practitioners’	experiences	of	observing	the	benefits	of	providing	antibiotics.	Even	after	
subsequent	attempts	to	replicate	Kumar’s	work	were	not	successful,	policy-driven	
requirements	held	hospitals	in	Scotland	accountable	for	meeting	a	1-hour	time	frame.	
And	practitioners	at	Aurora	worked	diligently	to	deliver	the	Sepsis	6	bundle	(that	
includes	antibiotic	administration)	in	less	than	one	hour.	
Tending	and	responding	to	tensions	between	forms	of	knowledge	can	be	explained	as	
a	kind	of	self-shepherding.	However,	tuning	out	or	setting	aside	potential	
incongruities	(or,	conversely,	overly	simplistic	congruities)	without	consideration	
carries	risks,	especially	in	providing	patient	care.	Similarly,	listening	to	and	exploring	
(rather	than	ignoring)	the	epistemic	tensions	in	group	settings	(such	as	
multidisciplinary	teams)	recognises	the	importance	of	many	perspectives	for	averting	
unneeded	problems.		
In	addition	to	highlighting	the	value	of	many	forms	of	knowledge,	this	study	also	raises	
to	prominence	the	developmental	nature	of	knowledge.	Individuals	influence	
collective	knowledge	and,	reciprocally,	collective	knowledge	shapes	an	individual’s	
knowledge.	Examples	of	individuals	who	affected	collective	forms	of	knowledge	were	
WA	Knaus,	who	brought	scoring	systems	to	the	first	set	of	sepsis	guidelines,	and	J-L	
Vincent,	who	advocated	for	discarding	the	SIRS	score	in	favour	of	the	European	
Society	for	Intensive	Care	Medicine’s	preference,	the	SOFA	score.	Their	research	
redirected	not	just	the	SSC’s	materials,	but	reached	the	policy	and	practice	settings	as	
well.	The	new	SOFA-based	definition	of	sepsis	left	every	sepsis-related	researcher,	
policymaker,	and	practitioner	with	a	decision	of	how	to	respond.	The	Sepsis	
Collaborative	weighed	and	considered	their	collective	response	and	agreed	to	
maintain	existing	knowledge	systems	until	further	evidence	was	available.		
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This	view	of	knowledge	as	‘continually	under	development’	raises	an	alternative	
perspective	regarding	Nonaka	et	al.’s	(2008)	view	that	tacit	forms	of	knowing	can	be	
made	explicit	in	the	process	of	knowing.	Perhaps	rather	than	defy	Polanyi’s	definition	
of	‘tacit’	(that	which	cannot	be	articulated	as	it	is	situated	within	and	belongs	to	the	
knower),	Nonaka’s	work	speaks	more	to	the	developmental,	ever-changing	nature	of	
knowledge.	
There	are	conflicting	views	about	the	objective	nature	of	evidence	(Gabbay	&	le	May,	
2011).	The	SSC’s	guidelines	process	presented	in	this	work	provides	empirical	support	
for	the	view	that	evidence,	and	especially	evidence	consolidated	into	guidelines,	are	
socially	constructed	interpretations	that	are	influenced	by	the	actors	involved.	‘Expert	
opinions’	could	also	be	entitled	‘epistemically	informed	interpretations’.	
The	new	Sepsis-3	definition	provides	an	example	of	how	explicit	forms	of	information	
are	interpreted	differently	in	different	contexts.	In	other	words,	the	SSC’s	new	
definition	challenged	the	Sepsis	Collaborative’s	epistemic	boundary.	In	response,	the	
Collaborative	determined	not	to	adjust,	but	keep	existing	knowledge	systems	in	place	
for	now.	The	interactions	between	individual	and	collective	forms	of	knowledge	
reveals	a	dynamic	interplay	between	the	two.	Knowledge	is	always	in	flux,	growing,	
and	reforming.	Knowledge	in	this	example	did	not	‘transfer’	intact	from	one	network	
to	another.	The	research-based	information	did	provoke	the	policy	context,	and	yet	
for	a	myriad	of	socially-situated	reasons,	they	determined	to	retain	the	NEWS	score	
(Cook	&	Brown,	1999;	Brown	&	Duguid,	2001).		
Knowledge	Use	Literature	
In	relation	to	the	knowledge	use	literature,	this	study	highlights	the	unpredictability	of	
linear,	relational	and	systems-based	strategies	for	encouraging	knowledge	use	(Best	&	
Holmes,	2010).	Even	as	linear	and	rational	models	neglect	the	complexities	of	both	
knowledge	and	the	complexity	of	social	contexts,	surprisingly,	sometimes	the	
simplistic	distribution	model	proves	effective.	These	data	have	shown	that	academic	
publications	and	guidelines	can	indeed	‘reach’	practitioners	at	times	through	
traditional	means	of	dissemination.	Similar	to	Olson	and	Tooman’s	(2012)	study	of	the	
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role	of	didactic	education	and	behaviour	change,	Dr	Lewis	found	the	Bone	et	al.	(1992)	
publication	and	drew	on	the	content	to	begin	Aurora’s	trial	and	error	process	of	
experimentation	for	addressing	sepsis	care	in	their	hospital.	The	article,	while	only	
one	input,	nevertheless	provided	timely	illumination	and	inspiration,	and	contributed	
a	key	part	of	knowledge	to	Aurora’s	sepsis	story.	
Graham	et	al.’s	(2006)	Knowledge	to	Action	model	depicts	an	active,	multi-step	
cyclical	process	built	upon	a	relational	model	that	shapes	knowledge	use.	However,	
connectivity	alone	did	not	ensure	that	knowledge	was	put	into	action.	Because	the	
Outreach	team	members	were	in	regular	contact	with	ward	staff,	the	Outreach	nurse	
who	provided	maternity	cover	was	present	in	the	wards.	But	despite	the	contact,	the	
nature	of	her	interactions	inhibited	her	ability	to	share	her	knowledge	and	support	the	
development	and	use	of	sepsis	knowledge	on	the	wards.	Finally,	these	findings	
suggest	that,	for	systems-based	knowledge	use	strategies,	building	alignment	
between	different	actors’	epistemic	goals	in	the	health	system	will	rely	upon	
establishing	mutual	respect	and	genuine	reciprocity.	These	qualities	are	worked	out	in	
interactions	between	network	actors	and	highlight	the	importance	of	shepherding	
practices.	
Knowledge	Systems		
The	literature	on	teams	and	networks	revealed	underlying	assumptions	about	how	
these	structures	support	knowledge	mobilisation.	Furthermore,	the	empirical	
literature	showed	that	even	when	spatial	and	geographic	divides	were	addressed,	
social	boundaries	continued	to	inhibit	the	development	and	sharing	of	knowledge	
between	actors.	Boundaries	were	prevalent	within	as	well	as	between	communities.		
Where	this	literature	highlights	the	challenges	resulting	from	professional	and	
disciplinary	collaboration	(Ferlie	et	al.,	2005;	Powell	&	Davies,	2012),	this	study	
showed	that	shepherding	practices	address	these	tensions.	Furthermore,	whilst	
interactions	between	actors	within	networks	(Stein-Parbury	&	Liaschenko,	2007;	
Zwarenstein	et	al.,	2013)	and	between	networks	(Currie	et	al.,	2013;	Fitzgerald	&	
Harvey,	2015)	were	often	messy	and	difficult,	as	a	point	of	contrast,	my	research	
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emphasises	that	boundaries	(the	differentiation	between	actors)	play	an	important	
role	in	teams	and	networks.	Shared	training,	experiences,	spaces	and	roles	can	and	do	
cultivate	connectivity,	shared	values,	and	belonging.	Within	the	diverse	knowledge	
ecology	encompassed	by	researchers,	policymakers,	practitioners,	doctors,	nurses,	
allied	health	professionals,	ancillary	staff,	managers	and	patients,	each	provide	a	
partial	knowledge.	Boundaries	often	arise	out	of	necessary	segmentation.	Thus,	
boundaries	are	only	problematic	where	and	when	they	inhibit,	rather	than	strengthen,	
the	development	and	flow	of	knowledge	for	use.	
This	study	observed	that	nurses	often	provide	the	helpful	linchpin	between	
stakeholder	groups.	The	experience	and	disciplinary	expertise	of	Outreach	nurses	
helped	support	interactions	with	some	medics,	and	yet	their	nursing	role	kept	them	
part	of	their	own	‘tribe’.	This	allowed	for	a	certain	level	of	fluidity	between	groups	
that	the	Outreach	team	was	able	to	capitalise	upon,	in	part,	by	their	shepherding	
practices.	As	corroborated	by	findings	from	Ferlie	et	al.	(2005)	and	Olson	et	al.	(2010),	
shifting	primary	responsibility	to	professions	other	than	physicians	better	supported	
the	spread	of	innovation.	In	this	study,	physician	initiation	was	helpful,	and	physician	
support	was	essential.	However,	for	mobilising	and	embedding	sepsis-based	
knowledge	with	stakeholders	throughout	Aurora,	the	non-medical	staff	orchestrated	
the	work	by	engaging	with	all	professions.	
Success	in	this	case	did	not	appear	to	be	the	result	of	one	or	even	several	parts	of	the	
knowledge	system	in	isolation.	For	example,	it	was	a	combination	of	the	patient	
monitoring	chart,	the	Outreach	team	structure,	the	early	warning	scoring	system,	how	
they	were	used,	the	interactions	they	prompted	and	the	qualities	of	these	interactions	
that	contributed	to	success	in	their	practice.	In	turn,	these	knowledge	systems	were	
enabled	by	various	other	factors,	such	as	the	relatively	small	size	of	the	hospital	and	
the	stability	of	key	actors	at	Aurora.	Moderate	group	size	appears	to	help	mobilise	
knowledge.	The	smaller	sized	health	system	within	Scotland	also	appeared	to	aid	the	
building	of	relationships	in	the	wider	context.	Geographic	boundaries	were	more	
easily	crossed.	Actors	saw	one	another	in	corridors	and	lunchrooms,	perhaps	
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overlapped	in	their	training,	and	attended	specialist	meetings	of	a	moderate	size.	
These	contacts	provided	opportunities	for	connecting	and	getting	to	know	one	
another	(Bailie	et	al.,	2018).	
However,	building	trust	is	the	result	of	more	than	mere	contact.	Following	
Edmondson	(2012),	shepherding	includes	creating	psychologically	safe	environments	
for	all	actors	to	develop,	grow	and	share	their	knowledge.	These	data	provide	
empirical	examples	that	depict	building	and	maintaining	a	safe	space	as	an	ongoing,	
regularly	nurtured	process,	especially	as	new	actors	join	the	network.	Edmondson	
equated	psychological	safety	as	a	willingness	to	speak	up.	This	study	extends	the	
psychological	safety	concept.	Part	of	building	safe	contexts	also	involves	knowing	
when	to	be	quiet	and	bide	your	time,	knowing	when	to	push	for	what	your	experience	
and	knowledge	say	is	needed,	and	when	to	wait.	One	example	was	the	regular	intake	
of	new	registrars.	The	Outreach	team	learned	not	to	threaten	the	registrars’	
professional	standing,	but	wait	until	their	clinical	acumen	saved	the	registrars	from	
professional	harm	(not	to	mention	the	patient).	They	waited	until	their	actions	could	
prove	they	were	on	the	registrars’	‘side’,	and	not	a	threat.		
Knowledge	Mobilisation	Literature		
The	knowledge	mobilisation	literature	points	to	trust	as	a	necessity	for	knowledge	
sharing	(Bailie	et	al.,	2018;	Fitzgerald	&	Harvey,	2015;	Scarbrough	et	al.,	2014).	This	
thesis	provides	a	range	of	empirical	descriptions	depicting	how	shepherding	practices	
build	trust	between	actors	for	mobilising	knowledge.		
Returning	to	the	overall	question,	how	was	knowledge	mobilised	between	different	
actor	groups,	here	are	several	observations	for	consideration.	Firstly,	‘success’,	as	
presented	in	this	study,	cannot	be	explained	without	acknowledging	the	role	of	key	
individual	and	collective	actors.	Their	shepherding	of	knowledge	and	practice	over	
time	included	responding	to	opportunities,	addressing	conflicting	priorities,	applying	
epistemic	tension	and	soothing	social	tensions.	Shepherding	involved	actively	working	
to	maintain	relationships	(Ferlie	et	al.,	2005)	and	“continuous	joint	work”	(Kislov,	
2014,	p.	310).		
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This	thesis	exposed	the	insufficiency	of	relying	on	knowledge	systems	alone	to	
mobilise	knowledge.	The	qualities	of	engagement	between	actors	within	the	networks	
played	an	important	role	in	whether	knowledge	was	mobilised	or	not.	Similarly,	
relying	on	explicit	forms	of	knowledge	alone	was	insufficient	for	realising	knowledge	
use	in	practice.	The	different	forms	and	domains	of	knowledge	were	intertwined	
rather	than	segmented	and	detached.	
Knowledge	mobilisation	involves	both	the	structural	organisation	of	knowledge	
systems	and	the	relational	activities	between	actors.	In	other	words,	knowledge	is	
mobilised	within	systems-based	structures	(teams	and	networks	and	the	processes	
and	the	materials	they	use).	However,	to	understand	how	knowledge	is	mobilised	
within	these	structures	we	must	look	to	the	muddle	of	human	interactions.	
7.3.2. Theoretical	Contributions		
This	work	employed	a	two	theoretical	lenses,	Clinical	Mindlines	(Gabbay	&	le	May,	
2011)	and	Soft	Knowledge	Systems	(SKS)	(Engel,	1997).	As	explained	earlier	in	Chapter	
4,	the	two	theories	were	well	suited	to	a	study	of	knowledge	mobilisation	because	
they	adhere	to	an	interpretive	understanding	of	knowing	and	because	both	are	
concerned	with	how	knowledge	develops	and	spreads	for	professional	practice.	
Furthermore,	each	theory	complements	the	other.	Clinical	Mindlines	provided	a	rich	
explanation	of	what	knowledge	‘is’,	whilst	Soft	Knowledge	Systems	provided	a	way	to	
operationalise	a	study	about	knowledge	in	practice.	In	other	words,	SKS	focused	on	
the	links	between	knowledge	sources	and	mindlines	focused	on	the	content	of	those	
sources.	As	a	result,	this	research	benefitted	from	using	both	as	a	‘dual	lens’.	
Additionally,	Clinical	Mindlines	drew	attention	to	the	epistemic	tensions	within	the	
study,	and	SKS	highlighted	the	social	tensions	between	actors	in	the	knowledge	
network.		
Various	scholars	have	called	for	better	ways	to	conceptualise,	analyse	and	address	the	
knowledge	in	practice	problem	(Greenhalgh	&	Papoutsi,	2018;	Holmes	et	al.,	2017).	
While	complexity	is	clearly	challenging	to	operationalise,	Soft	Knowledge	Systems	
provided	a	useful	tool	for	two	reasons.	SKS	was	able	to	capture	established	and	
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emergent	ties	between	actors,	as	well	as	the	knowledge-laden	processes	and	
materials	they	used.	Furthermore,	the	knowledge	network	concept	in	SKS	was	flexible	
in	that	it	could	include	actors	from	research,	policy	and	practice.	Thus	one	theoretical	
contribution	of	this	work	was	the	ability	to	explore	a	‘whole’	network	as	opposed	to	a	
reduced	subset	of	actors.	Using	SKS	allowed	for	the	study	of	an	array	of	actors	‘in	situ’	
as	opposed	to	constructed	networks	(such	as	CLAHRCs	in	Chapter	3).	And,	in	this	way,	
Soft	Knowledge	Systems	aligned	well	with	Clinical	Mindlines	because	a	wider	reservoir	
of	knowledge	sources	could	be	included.	
A	central	part	of	theorising	is	observing	patterns	and	developing	a	concept	(Llewellyn,	
2003).	Shepherding-type	practices	are	frequently	mentioned	in	the	knowledge	
mobilisation	literature,	but	as	yet,	no	unifying	construct	has	been	offered.	
‘Shepherding’	renders	these	interactions	visible,	and	provides	a	starting	point	for	
more	careful	theoretical	scrutiny	and	conceptual	development.	
In	this	vein,	Clinical	Mindlines	(Gabbay	&	le	May,	2011)	and	Soft	Knowledge	Systems	
(Engel,	1997)	were	put	under	the	microscope.	This	study	further	strengthens	Clinical	
Mindlines	as	a	robust	explanatory	theory	of	professional	knowledge.	Far	more	than	
‘consulting	colleagues’,	mindlines	metaphorically	represents	the	multifaceted	and	
‘living’	dynamic	of	human	knowledge	(Wieringa	&	Greenhalgh,	2015).	Many	different	
forms	and	sources	of	knowledge	are	involved	in	mobilising	research-based	forms	for	
practice.	This	study	further	reinforces	mindlines	theory	in	not	only	the	acute	care	
setting,	but	offers	glimpses	of	mindlines	at	work	in	the	policy	and	research	settings	as	
well.		
Furthermore,	this	work	suggests	that	knowledge	outputs,	such	as	guidelines	and	
patient	observation	charts,	are	momentary	and	static	expressions	of	a	collective	
mindline.	The	negotiating	and	consensus	building	processes	result	in	a	snapshot	of	
collective	knowledge.	And	as	each	of	the	knowledge	outputs	underwent	continuous	
revision,	each	new	publication	momentarily	codified	a	collective	mindline.	As	products	
are	explicit,	they	cannot	represent	the	whole	of	a	collective	mindline,	but	even	what	it	
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cannot	express	influences	what	can	be	expressed,	even	as	a	mindline	cannot	be	fully	
documented	and	transferred.		
7.4. Study	Reflections	
To	conclude,	the	following	sections	reflect	on	the	study’s	implications,	methods,	and	
limitations	and	addresses	potential	avenues	for	future	research.	
7.4.1. Implications	
This	study	elicits	various	considerations	that	are	relevant	for	research,	policy	and	
practice	contexts.	First,	it	is	worth	noting	that	in	this	case	of	successful	knowledge	
mobilisation,	each	network	did	something.	They	observed	a	problem;	they	had	
aspirations	for	change;	and	they	deployed	resources	for	action.	And	yet,	while	there	
was	planning	involved,	there	was	also	an	element	of	serendipity.		
Second,	knowledge	mobilisation	initiatives	need	to	consider	the	epistemic	and	social	
boundaries	involved.	Consider	the	knowledge	systems	–	what	kinds	of	boundaries	do	
these	systems	hope	to	overcome?	Anticipate	the	spatial,	professional,	intra-
professional,	organisational	and	inter-organisational	boundaries.	And	consider	the	
social	lubrication	mechanisms,	in	other	words,	the	interactions	between	actors	that	
either	help	or	hinder	the	functioning	of	those	knowledge	systems.	What	are	ways	that	
might	soften	or	manoeuvre	around	problematic	boundaries?	More	consideration	
tends	to	focus	on	the	architecture	of	the	knowledge	system,	but	relational	
architecture	needs	tending	as	well.	Do	not	underestimate	the	importance	of	informal	
engagement.	Focus	on	creating	conditions	for	relationships	to	grow	and	support	long-
term	connections.	Similarly,	actively	facilitate	formal	and	informal	contact	between	
actors.	Tea,	coffee,	and	lunch	breaks	build	the	bonds	of	trust	that	can	help	relieve	
tensions	in	the	workplace.	Good	will	cannot	be	forced,	but	it	can	be	nurtured.	
Third,	exclusive	reliance	on	explicit	forms	of	knowledge	is	not	an	advancement	of	
knowledge.	It	simply	misunderstands	how	our	‘whole’	knowledge	mobilises	for	
research	use.	Relatedly,	as	Dopson	et	al.	(2008)	argue,	the	context	for	mobilising	
knowledge	cannot	be	viewed	as	a	separate	‘variable’	for	examination,	but	rather	a	
dynamically	interconnected	and	multidimensional	part	of	the	‘whole’	network.	Fourth,	
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mobilising	knowledge	is	not	a	one-time	achievement	but	rather	an	ongoing	and	long-
term	process	of	regular	experimentation.	An	experimental	and	developmental	
perspective	is	essential	given	the	complexity	of	knowledge	and	of	social	contexts.	
Finally,	in	situations	where	the	desired	direction	of	change	is	contested	or	as	of	yet	
unclear,	concentrate	on	facilitating	meaningful	and	shared	dialogue	between	actors.	
Periodic	face-to-face	contact	appears	to	help.		
7.4.2. Methodological	Reflections	
Over	the	course	of	carrying	out	the	study,	I	adapted	the	study	in	two	significant	ways.	
Firstly,	I	made	adjustments	to	the	case	study	design.	I	initially	envisioned	a	
comparative	case	study	of	multiple	practice	sites	as	the	most	reliable	way	to	build	a	
richer	understanding	of	complex	and	interconnected	knowing.	Then,	early	during	data	
collection,	one	hospital,	Aurora,	offered	increasingly	extensive	access	as	trust	
developed	quickly	with	the	participants	at	this	site.	I	began	to	regularly	shadow	their	
workdays.	This	provided	a	degree	of	engagement	within	the	case	that	I	had	not	
thought	possible	as	I	was	able	to	walk	alongside	key	practitioners	in	their	work.	I	was	
able	to	witness	how	sepsis	care	was	provided	throughout	the	hospital.	Furthermore,	I	
was	able	to	get	to	know	staff,	hear	both	their	formal	views	and	informal	reflections,	
and	witness	the	social	interactions	between	staff	of	numerous	units	at	Aurora	in	real	
time.	Therefore,	I	took	advantage	of	this	unanticipated	level	of	access	and	availed	
myself	of	the	open	invitation	to	spend	time	at	this	hospital.		
Second,	I	began	to	understand	that	‘research	use’	was	not	a	narrow	practice-based	
knowledge	problem,	but	rather	a	process	that	unfolds	within	and	between	the	
research,	policy	and	practice	communities.	This	recognition	reshaped	the	boundaries	
of	the	case.	Sepsis	researchers,	and	especially	the	research	community	represented	by	
the	Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign,	as	well	as	the	NHS	Scotland	policy	community	and	the	
national	Sepsis	Collaborative	were	key	actors	alongside	the	clinical	practitioners	at	
Aurora.		
There	were	different	theories	available	as	lenses,	for	example,	Communities	of	
Practice	(Wenger,	1998)	and	Promoting	Action	on	Research	Implementation	in	Health	
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Services	(PARIHS)	framework	(Kitson	et	al.,	1998).	Both	theories	focus	on	knowledge	
and	knowledge	use	and	could	have	been	suitable	choices.	However,	these	theories	
have	an	existing	body	of	work,	and	heeding	the	call	from	Best	and	Holmes	(2010)	to	
consider	systems-based	strategies	for	mobilising	knowledge,	I	chose	Soft	Knowledge	
Systems	instead,	in	part	because	it	employs	a	systems-based	view	of	actors	and	how	
they	organise	for	sharing	and	using	their	knowledge.		
Positionality	
My	positionality	as	researcher	was	integral	to	this	qualitative	study.	I	was	engaged	on	
a	learning	journey	alongside	a	willing	group	of	people,	not	conducting	research	on	
them	(Stake,	2000;	Wolcott,	2009).	Wolcott	emphatically	states	that,	“Recognizing	the	
critical	nature	of	the	observer	role	and	the	influence	of	his	or	her	subjective	
assessments	in	qualitative	work	makes	it	all	the	more	important	to	have	readers	
remain	aware	of	that	role…for	qualitative	research,	it	should	be	the	rule	rather	than	
the	exception”	(2009,	p.	17).		
I	experienced	various	challenges	around	potentially	‘going	native’.	I	have	spent	well	
over	a	decade	as	a	health	services	researcher,	and	in	the	past	when	visiting	sites,	I	was	
part	of	a	research	team.	In	this	project	I	was	a	solo	researcher.	By	temperament,	I	
enjoy	engaging	with	people	and	learning	about	their	work.	Furthermore,	Aurora	had	
been	identified	by	policy	experts	as	a	high-performing	hospital	around	sepsis	care.	
This	was	a	form	of	appreciative	inquiry	and	I	knew	I	was	there	to	learn.	Indeed,	not	
having	clinical	training	meant	I	was	not	in	a	position	to	assess	Aurora’s	clinical	
practices	as	an	‘insider’	of	the	health	professional	world.	Thus,	in	the	course	of	data	
collection,	I	listened	and	watched	the	staff	at	Aurora	go	about	their	duties,	and	I	found	
it	very	difficult	not	to	be	impressed.	I	did	not	have	a	research	partner	to	review	and	
analyse	the	data	collection	process	alongside	me	to	help	temper	my	positive	(or	
negative)	views.		
However,	the	physical,	social,	and	(eventual)	temporal	distance	enabled	me	to	
develop	a	more	dispassionate	and	critical	perspective	alongside	my	appreciative	
mindset.	While	the	relationships	that	formed	over	my	time	in	the	field	remain	
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important	to	me,	I	had	to	engage	fully	with	my	responsibilities	as	an	academic.	As	a	
result,	examples	of	resisting	the	urge	to	‘go	native’	are	seen	in	my	descriptions	of	
conflict	between	actors	and	less	than	perfect	practice.	
There	were	further	challenges	along	the	way.	For	example,	one	difficulty	that	I	had	
not	anticipated	(as	my	prior	experience	was	situated	in	a	different	country)	was	the	
difficulty	of	preserving	the	anonymity	of	actors	in	the	course	of	conducting	qualitative	
research	in	Scotland.	In	the	comparatively	smaller	world	of	healthcare	in	the	UK,	and	
especially	in	the	patient	safety	community	of	Scotland,	the	actors	know	or	know	of	
one	another.	At	Scottish	Patient	Safety	meetings,	for	example,	when	I	would	explain	
that	I	was	talking	with	high-performing	hospitals	in	relation	to	sepsis	care,	the	most	
common	response	was	to	name	Aurora.	Once	I	realised	this,	I	asked	my	primary	
contact	if	he	felt	comfortable	if	I	did	not	conceal	that	their	hospital	was	part	of	my	
data	set.	He	agreed.	However,	to	protect	the	individual	identity	of	participants	as	
much	as	possible,	my	materials	include	a	pseudonym	for	the	hospital	as	well	as	
participants.		
Furthermore,	because	the	Institute	for	Healthcare	Improvement	is	an	American	
company	and	was	a	key	partner	in	the	Scottish	Patient	Safety	Programme,	I	was	
concerned	that	my	nationality	might	pose	a	problem	and	inhibit	candid	explanations	
about	IHI’s	involvement	in	NHS	Scotland.	While	I	remain	uncertain	about	whether	or	
not	this	was	a	problem,	the	IHI	organisation’s	part	in	the	research	findings	proved	
largely	supplemental.	
Another	concern	was	the	imbalance	of	data	from	each	network.	Because	the	
knowledge	mobilisation	framing	came	later	after	the	primary	data	collection	in	the	
analysis	process,	I	had	less	data	from	the	NHS	Scotland	policy	context	than	either	
Aurora	or	the	Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign	and	related	organisations.	Had	I	realised	that	
I	would	frame	the	knowledge	network	as	bringing	together	the	‘separate	
communities’,	I	would	have	sought	more	direct	access	at	the	policy-level.	
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7.4.3. Future	Research	
This	section	identifies	two	opportunities	for	future	research.	The	first	involves	further	
work	employing	Clinical	Mindlines	(Gabbay	&	le	May).	I	would	like	to	explore	the	
possibility	of	identifying	a	more	detailed	schematic	of	collective	mindline.	To	do	so,	I	
would	use	the	Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign-related	guideline	documents	beginning	with	
Bone	et	al.	(1992)	until	the	most	recent	Rhodes	et	al.	(2017)	alongside	named	author	
publications	for	a	longitudinal	review	and	comparison.	Based	on	my	work	to	date	in	
this	literature,	it	might	be	possible	to	identify	the	influencing	mark	of	individual	actors	
in	a	collective	output.	Thus,	it	might	be	possible	to	trace	the	influence	of	actors	in	
collective	knowledge	outputs	over	time.		
A	second	piece	of	work	would	explore	the	relationship	between	shepherding	and	
structural	authority.	Within	this	case,	shepherding	practices	were	a	distributed	
activity.	Are	there	different	kinds	and	categories	of	shepherding	that	align	with	an	
actor’s	professional	role?	In	this	study,	mid-level	managers	were	often	key	
intermediaries.	It	would	be	interesting	to	consider	shepherding	in	light	of	the	
literature	on	knowledge	intermediaries	and	middle	management.	Are	intermediaries	
useful	because	of	their	place	in	an	organisational	structure	or	because	of	how	they	
interact	with	other	actors?	Is	shepherding	related	to	power-sharing?	Further	work	
would	try	and	tease	out	the	intersection	of	relational	capabilities	alongside	different	
structural	positions.		
7.5. Conclusion	
Sepsis	presents	a	difficult	puzzle	for	mobilising	knowledge	within	and	between	the	
research,	policy	and	practice	communities.	And	yet	sepsis	is	not	unique	in	medicine.	
The	nature	of	scientific	study	means	that	explicit	research-based	information	is	
continually	advancing,	pruning	and	refining	what	is	known.	These	data	have	shown	
that	this	state	of	constant	emergence	(incubation)	is	relevant	to	other	contexts	of	
knowledge	as	well.	Individuals	and	collectives	have	new,	informing	experiences.	
Actors	in	the	knowledge	network	develop	and	change.	As	a	result,	the	whole	of	the	
knowledge	system	is	under	continual	development.	Furthermore,	harmonising	these	
ever-changing	sources	of	knowing	is	not	easy.		
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This	work	found	that	knowledge	is	carefully	curated	(through	social	interactions)	in	
order	to	connect	knowledge	from	different	domains	and	to	support	the	mobilisation	
of	new	actionable	understandings	for	care.	Tensions	regarding	both	what	knowledge	
‘is’,	as	well	as	the	social	system	in	which	knowledge	is	employed,	are	negotiated	
and	nurtured	by	social	practices	that	I	have	termed	‘shepherding’.	Shepherding	
practices	are	those	that	tend	to	the	social	interactions	that	support	the	mobilisation	of	
knowledge,	and	they	are	in	evidence	throughout	the	distributed	areas	of	research,	
policy	and	practice.	In	concluding,	this	thesis	argues	that	–	because	knowledge	is	
complex	and	emergent,	and	because	mobilising	knowledge	is	an	ongoing	social	
process	–	a	developmental	perspective	needs	to	be	taken	as	the	normative	frame	for	
the	‘knowing	in	practice’	problem.	
Main	Contributions:	
• empirically	it	provides	a	rich	and	detailed	account	of	interconnected	
knowledge	and	the	social	interactions	that	contribute	to	the	mobilisation	of	
that	knowledge	in	sepsis	care	in	Scotland;		
• theoretically,	this	work	extends	the	academic	literature	that	explores	the	
diversity,	complexity,	and	interconnectivity	of	knowledge	for	practice	by	
emphasising	the	role	of	social	interactions	in	supporting	knowledge	networks;	
and	the	study	demonstrates	the	successful	use	of	Soft	Knowledge	Systems	
(SKS)	and	Clinical	Mindlines	(CM)	as	a	combined	‘relational	knowledge	systems’	
lens	to	better	understand	knowledge	mobilisation	processes.		
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Appendix	B—In-depth	Interview	Guide	
	
Introduction	 • Summary	of	the	study;	purpose	and	format	of	
interview			
• Consent	form		
Demographic	and	
background	information	
• Profession?	E.g.	Nurse,	doctor,	etc.	
• Specialisation?	E.g.	Critical	care	
• How	long	have	you	been	practicing?	
• How	long	in	this	organisation?	
• Current	position?	How	long?	
Explore	the	process/history	
of	the	improvement	project	
• Can	you	describe	how	this	project	got	started?	Why	
did	it	start?		
• Why	focus	on	this	particular	problem?	How	did	you	
know	there	was	a	problem?	
• Problem	definition--	
• What	did	you	do?	When?	Describe	the	process	and	
stages	of	implementation	that?	
Explore	roles—division	of	
tasks	
• Who	did	what?	
• When?		
Explore	how	the	actors	
organised	to	achieve	success	
• Can	you	describe	the	various	formal	coordination	
efforts?		
• Were	there	formal	project	groups?		
• If	yes,	who	was	involved?	Did	the	project	team	evolve?	
• When	did	they	begin	to	meet?	
Who	was	involved	and	
when?	Explore	relationships	
inside	and	outside	the	
organisation.	
[Collaboration]	
• Who	was	on	the	team?	Who	were	the	central	people	
involved	in	this	project’s	success?		
• Who	were	other	key	colleagues	involved	in	this	effort?	
• External	colleagues?	
• Internal	groups?	
• External	collaborations?	Organisations?	Regulatory	
bodies?	
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Explore	relational	flow	of	
information	and	ideas	
[Collaboration]	
• Do	these	various	people	and	groups	interconnect?	If	
so,	how?	
Explore	the	sources	and	
kinds	of	knowledge	they	
drew	upon	in	various	stages	
of	the	project	
implementation	
[Acquiring]	
• Internal	data?		
• External	sources?	
• Research-based	“EB”	material?	
• Context-based	knowing?	
• Prior	experience?	
• Clinical	judgement/intuition?	
• Reasoning?	
• Any	surprising	contributions	come	along?	
Explore	social	context	 • Hospital	culture	
• Longevity	of	people	involved	in	intervention?	
• Leadership	(of	varying	types):	formal	structure.	Who	is	
your	supervisor?	Organisational	reporting	structure—
how	did	your	supervisor	and	the	org	structure	
support/not	support	this	effort?	
Explore	social	and	contextual	
barriers	and	facilitating	
strategies	
• Were	there	barriers	that	had	to	be	overcome?	
• Were	there	people	within	the	organisation	less	
inclined	to	make	these	changes	(even	if	they	have	later	
come	around)?	
• How	did	you/others	go	about	obtaining	buy-in?		
• What	strategies	and	resources	did	you	draw	upon?	
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Explore	communication	
channels—formal	and	
informal	
[Sharing]	
[Connectivity]	
• Who	do	you	generally	go	to	for	advice?	Did	you	go	to	
different	people	for	different	aspects	of	advice?	
• Were	there	internal/organisational	meetings?	Of	what	
frequency?	
• Important	conversations	that	took	place	outside	of	
meetings?	
• Were	there	important	connections/communications	
that	helped	overcome	barriers?	
• Outside	meetings,	conferences,	collaborations,	
workshops?	
• Are	there	work	and/or	personal	friendships	that	have	
affected	the	flow	of	information?	
• Role	models?	
What	formative	learning	
accumulated	through	the	
practical	experience		
• What	advice/tips	would	you	give	to	a	colleague	in	
another	hospital?		
• What	was	essential	to	make	this	work?	
Other	issues	 • Why	do	you	think	this	projected	succeeded?	
• Any	additional	comments?		
• Is	there	anyone	else	from	this	organisation	or	from	
another	organisation	that	we	should	be	talking	to?		
Closing	remarks	 • Thank	participant	and	advise	them	of	the	timescale	for	
the	study		
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Appendix	C—Follow	Up	Interview	Guide	
	
CCOT:	
1. CCOT	staff	meetings?	
2. The	CCOT	team	log—purpose,	when	did	it	begin?	How	is	it	used?	
3. How	do	you	know	how	well	you’re	doing	around	sepsis?	Internal	tracking?	
Outside	audit	bodies?	
4. Interpreting	data:		
a. How	do	you	have	to	interpret	data	differently	with	NEWS	than	you	did	
with	SIRS?	
b. Patient	information—labs,	etc.,	what	do	you	do	with	these	pieces	of	
information?	
5. Seeing—being	able	“to	see”	a	sick	patient	(or	not)	isn’t	the	same	for	all	nurses.	
Can	you	describe	this	kind	of	knowledge?	What	sources	(internally,	externally)	
are	you	drawing	on?	
6. If	you	are	stuck/uncertain,	what	do	you	do?	Where	do	you	go?	To	whom	do	
you	go?	
7. How	do	you	know	what	sources	of	information	to	trust?	
a. Of	the	many	kinds	of	information	you	hear	and	see	regularly—do	you	
trust	it?	Eg	Run	reports?	Kumar	article?	Audit	data?	Other?	
8. Are	there	some	sources	you	don’t	trust,	but	have	to	“use”	anyway?	How	do	
you	do	that?	Do	you	use	it	differently?	
9. How	is	information	that	you	trust	affected	if	it’s	coming	from	a	sources	you	
don’t	trust?	(Whether	an	inexperienced	nurse,	or	FY1?	Or	governmental	body?	
Others?)	
10. Do	you	use	National	Education	Scotland	(NES)?	They	have	a	Knowledge	into	
Action	Knowledge	Network.	(Policies,	guidelines,	apps,	journals,	tools)	
11. What	are	the	social	pressures	you	deal	with	(related	to	sepsis	care)?	
12. Are	there	political	pressures?	
	
Nurses:	[What	do	you	have	to	know	and	take	into	account	to	provide	sepsis	care	for	
your	patients?]	
1. How	did	you	learn	about	the	sepsis	protocol	here	at	this	hospital?	
a. Break	it	down	for	me:	what	is	simple	in	terms	of	recognizing	and	
treating	sepsis?	When	does	it	get	complicated?	
2. Seeing—being	able	“to	see”	a	sick	patient	(or	not)	isn’t	the	same	from	person	
to	person.	Can	you	describe	this	kind	of	knowledge?	What	sources	(internally,	
externally)	are	you	drawing	on?	(Experience	seems	to	play	a	role—you’ve	
observed	it	before.)	
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3. If	you	are	stuck/uncertain,	what	do	you	do?	Where	do	you	go?	To	whom	do	
you	go?	
4. How	do	you	handle	at	risk	patients	when	CCOT	is	not	on	duty?	What’s	the	
difference	in	terms	of	how	you	manage	when	CCOT	is	on	versus	off?	Do	you	
have	to	draw	on	different	resources?	
	
Clinical	governance:	
1. New/updated	reports?	
2. Any	other	reports	or	documents	related	to	sepsis	care?	
3. How	are	we	doing	after	bringing	in	the	new	chart?	
4. What	materials	are	for	internal	use	only?	What	goes	to	the	national	auditing	
body?		
5. Are	there	other	reporting	places/bodies?	
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Appendix	D—Key	Documents	for	Definitions	and	Guidelines	
	
Year	 Names	of	people	involved	 Article	
1992	 Bone,	Balk,	Cerra,	Dellinger,	Fein,	
Knaus,	Schein,	Sibbald,	Abrams,	
Bernard,	Biondi,	Calvin,	Demling,	
Fahey,	Fisher,	Franklin,	Gorelick,	
Kelley,	Maki,	Marshall,	Merrill,	
Pribble,	Rackow,	Rodell,	Sheagren,	
Silver,	Sprung,	Straube,	Tobin,	
Trenholme,	Wagner,	Webb,	Wherry,	
Wiedemann,	Wortel	
Definitions	for	Sepsis	and	Organ	
Failure	and	Guidelines	for	the	Use	of	
Innovative	Therapies:	American	
College	of	Chest	Physicians/Society	
of	Critical	Care	Medicine	Consensus	
Conference	in	Sepsis	published	
simultaneously	in	Critical	Care	
Medicine	and	Chest	
2001	 Sprung,	Bernard,	Dellinger;		
Pérez,	Arndt,	Abraham,	Carlet,	
Vincent,	Martin,	Jimenez,	Marshall,	
Bochud,	Glauser,	Calandra,	Llewelyn,	
Cohen,	Matot	
Supplement	of	Intensive	Care	
Medicine	containing	the	ISF	
recommendations	for	the	
management	of	patients	with	severe	
sepsis	and	septic	shock	
2003	 Levy,	Fink,	Marshall,	Abraham,	
Angus,	Cook,	Cohen,	Opal,	Vincent,	
Ramsay;	Balk,	Bernard,	Bion,	Carcillo,	
Carlet,	Dhainaut,	Evans,	Fry,	Gerlach,	
Lowry,	Malangoni,	Matuschak,	
Parillo*,	Reinhart,	Sibbald,	Sprung,	
Weil	
2001	SCCM/ESICM/ACCP/ATS/SIS	
International	Sepsis	Definitions	
Conference,	(joint	publication)	in	
Critical	Care	Medicine	and	Intensive	
Care	Medicine	
2004	 RP	Dellinger,	Carlet,	Masur,	Gerlach,	
Calandra,	Cohen,	Gea-Banacloche,	
Keh,	Marshall,	Parker,	Ramsay,	
Zimmerman,	Vincent,	Levy;	Beale,	
Bennett,	Bochud,	Brun-Buisson,	
Cordonnier,	EP	Dellinger,	Finch,	
Fourrier,	Hazelzet,	Jorgensen,	Maki,	
Murphy,	Opal,	Parrillo,	Rhodes,	
Sprung,	Torres,	Trzeciak,	Vender,	
Bonten,	Carcillo,	Cariou,	Dhainaut,	
Finfer,	Harvey,	Hollenberg,	Maier,	
Marini,	Nitsun,	Sevransky,	Szokol,	
Vinsonneau	
Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign	
guidelines	for	management	of	
severe	sepsis	and	septic	shock,	(joint	
publication)	in	Critical	Care	Medicine	
and	Intensive	Care	Medicine	
2008	 Dellinger,	Levy,	Carlet,	Bion,	Parker,	
Jaeschke,	Reinhart,	Angus,	Brun-
Buisson,	Beale,	Calandra,	Dhainaut,	
Gerlach,	Harvey,	Marini,	Marshall,	
Ranieri,	Ramsay,	Sevransky,	
Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign:	
International	guidelines	for	
management	of	severe	sepsis	and	
septic	shock:	2008	
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Thompson,	Townsend,	Vender,	
Zimmerman,	Vincent	
2013	 Dellinger,	Levy,	Rhodes,	Annane,	
Gerlach,	Opal,	Sevransky,	Sprung,	
Douglas,	Jaeschke,	Osborn,	Nunnally,	
Townsend,	Reinhart,	Kleinpell,	Angus,	
Deutschman,	Machado	Rubenfeld,	
Webb,	Beale,	Vincent,	Moreno	
Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign:	
International	guidelines	for	
management	of	severe	sepsis	and	
septic	shock,	2012	
Simultaneously	published	in	CCM	
and	ICM	(2013)	
2016	 Singer,	Deutschman,	Seymour,	
Shankar-Hari,	Annane,	Bauer,	
Bellomo,	Bernard,	Chiche,	
Coopersmith,	Hotchkiss,	Levy,	
Marshall,	Martin,	Opal,	Rubenfeld,	
van	der	Poll,	Vincent,	Angus	
The	Third	International	Consensus	
Definitions	for	Sepsis	and	Septic	
Shock	(Sepsis-3)	in	JAMA	
2017	 Rhodes,	Evans,	Alhazzani,	Levy,	
Antonelli,	Ferrer,	Kumar,	Sevransky,	
Sprung,	Nunnally,	Rochwerg,	
Rubenfeld,	Angus,	Annane,	Beale,	
Bellinghan,	Bernard,	Chiche,	
Coopersmith,	De	Backer,	French,	
Fujishima,	Gerlach,	Hidalgo,	
Hollenberg,	Jones,	Karnad,	Kleinpell,	
Koh,	Costa	Lisboa,	Machado,	Marini,	
Marshall,	Mazuski,	McIntyre,	
McLean,	Mehta,	Moreno,	Myburgh,	
Navalesi,	Nishida,	Osborn,	Perner,	
Plunkett,	Ranieri,	Schorr,	Seckel,	
Seymour,	Shieh,	Shukri,	SQ	Simpson,	
Singer,	Thompson,	Townsend,	van	
der	Poll,	Vincent,	Wiersinga,	
Zimmerman,	Dellinger	
Surviving	Sepsis	Campaign:	
International	guidelines	for	
management	of	sepsis	and	septic	
shock:	2016	
Simultaneously	published	in	CCM	
and	ICM	(2017)	
	
Names	listed	in	order	given	on	publications	and	include	all	conference	participants	
listed	as	well	as	authors.	Names	are	italicised	for	their	first	appearance	if	they	appear	
again	later	in	the	list.	Thereon,	names	are	underlined	to	emphasise	multiple	
appearances.	*Dr	Parrillo’s	name	was	misspelled	on	the	2003	definitions	document.	
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Appendix	E—SSC	Actors	(by	SSC	Publication	Participation)	
	
Name	 Number	of	
Occurrences	
	Publication	Year	
Abraham	 2	 2001,	2003	
Angus	 5	 2003,	2008,	2013,	2016,	2017	
Annane	 3	 2013,	2016,	2017	
Balk	 2	 1992,	2003	
Beale	 4	 2004,	2008,	2013,	2017	
Bernard	 5	 1992,	2001,	2003,	2016,	2017	
Bion	 2	 2003,	2008,		
Bochud	 2	 2001,	2004,		
Bone	 1	 1992,	and	extensive	prior	supporting	
clinical	literature	
Brun-Buisson	 2	 2004,	2008,		
Calandra	 3	 2001,	2004,	2008	
Carcillo	 2	 2003,	2004	
Carlet	 4	 2001,	2003,	2004,	2008	
Chiche	 2	 2016,	2017	
Cohen	 3	 2001,	2003,	2004	
Coopersmith	 2	 2016,	2017	
Dellinger	 6	 1992,	2001,	2004,	2008,	2013,	2017	
Deutschman	 2	 2013,	2016	
Dhainaut	 3	 2003,	2004,	2008	
Gerlach	 5	 2003,	2004,	2008,	2013,	2017	
Guyatt	 	 2008,	2013,	2017	
Harvey	 2	 2004,	2008	
Jaeschke	 2	 2008,	2013,	2017	
Kleinpell	 2	 2013,	2017	
Levy	 6	 2003,	2004,	2008,	2013,	2016,	2017	
Machado	 2	 2013,	2017	
Maki	 2	 1992,	2004	
Marini	 3	 2004,	2008,	2017	
Marshall	 7	 1992,	2001,	2003,	2004,	2008,	2016,	
2017	
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Masur	 1	 2004,	2008	(listed	in	
acknowledgement	as	consultant),	
2017	(IDSA	statement)	
Moreno	 2	 2013,	2017	
Nunnally	 2	 2013,	2017	
Opal	 4	 2003,	2004,	2013,	2016	
Osborn	 2	 2013,	2017	
Parker	 2	 2004,	2008	
Parrillo	 2	 2003,	2004,	extensively	in	supp	clin	lit	
Ramsay	 3	 2003,	2004,	2008	
Ranieri	 2	 2008,	2017	
Reinhart	 3	 2003,	2008,	2013	
Rhodes	 3	 2004,	2008,	2013,	2017	
Rubenfeld	 3	 2013,	2016,	2017	
Sevransky	 4	 2004,	2008,	2013,	2017	
Seymour	 2	 2016,	2017	
Sibbald	 2	 1992,	2003,	supporting	clinical	lit	
Singer	 2	 2016,	2017	
Sprung	 6	 1992,	2001,	2003,	2004,	2008,	2013,	
2017,	ext	sup	lit	
Thompson	 2	 2008,	2017	
Townsend	 3	 2008,	2013,	2017	
Van	der	Poll	 2	 2016,	2017	
Vincent	 7	 2001,	2003,	2004,	2008,	2013,	2016,	
2017	
Zimmerman	 3	 2004,	2008,	2017	
	
The	lead	author	and	corresponding	year	for	each	of	the	documents	are	bolded.	(All	
names	were	checked	multiple	times.	Parrillo	was	misspelled	on	the	header	for	the	
2003	definitions	document.	The	names	Evans	and	Webb	appear	twice,	but	are	
different	people.)	
The	table	is	not	intended	to	be	exhaustive,	rather	the	goal	is	to	demonstrate	and	
sketch	the	regularity	of	involvement	over	the	last	two	decades	by	members	of	what	
became	the	SSC	community.	There	is	a	continuity	of	involvement	by	many	members,	a	
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consistent	inclusion	of	new	collaborators	that	then	endure	for	future	iterations	of	
these	key	documents.		
Bone	is	included	as	the	1991	consensus	conference	and	1992	publication	are	
foundational	for	subsequent	work.	He	was	also	a	prolific	author	in	the	sepsis	research	
literature	1980s,	a	driving	force.	See	memorial	dedication	by	John	Marshall	in	
inaugural	Sepsis	journal	1997	(Marshall,	1997b).	
Masur	is	included	on	the	table	because	it	stood	out	to	me	that	he	was	an	early	
participant	in	the	guideline	development	process.	He	was	part	of	the	2016	guideline	
committee	on	behalf	of	the	Infectious	Diseases	Society	of	America	(IDSA),	but	due	to	
substantive	disagreement	with	various	guidelines,	he	cordially	decided	that	IDSA	could	
not	endorse	the	guidelines	in	time	for	publication.	He,	and	four	other	Sepsis	Task	
Force	members	within	IDSA,	penned	a	document	for	IDSA’s	highly	respected	journal	
providing	an	explanation	to	readers	of	the	specific	areas	of	disagreement.		
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Appendix	F—Growth	of	Sponsoring	and	Endorsing	Organisations	
(Guidelines)	
Guideline	publications	
Bone	et	al.	
(1992)	
2	organisations;	35	committee	members;	12	pages;	45	references	
American	College	of	Chest	Physicians	
Society	of	Critical	Care	Medicine	
Supplement	
(2001)	
1	organisation;	17	authors;	ICM	Supplement	of	134	pages	
International	Sepsis	Forum	
Dellinger	et	
al.	(2004)	
11	participating	organisations;	46	faculty;	13	pages	(+Supplement);	
135	references	
American	Association	of	Critical-Care	Nurses	
American	College	of	Chest	Physicians	
American	College	of	Emergency	Physicians	
American	Thoracic	Society	
Australian	and	New	Zealand	Intensive	Care	Society	
European	Respiratory	Society	
European	Society	of	Clinical	Microbiology	and	Infectious	Diseases	
European	Society	of	Intensive	Care	Medicine	
International	Sepsis	Forum	
Society	of	Critical	Care	Medicine	
Surgical	Infection	Society	
(IDSA	declined	to	endorse)	
Dellinger	et	
al.	(2008)	
16	organisations;	55	international	experts;	44	pages;	341	references	
American	Association	of	Critical-Care	Nurses	
American	College	of	Chest	Physicians	
American	College	of	Emergency	Physicians	
Canadian	Critical	Care	Society	
European	Society	of	Clinical	Microbiology	and	Infectious	Diseases	
European	Society	of	Intensive	Care	Medicine	
European	Respiratory	Society	
International	Sepsis	Forum	
Japanese	Association	for	Acute	Medicine	
Japanese	Society	of	Intensive	Care	Medicine	
Society	of	Critical	Care	Medicine	
Society	of	Hospital	Medicine	
Surgical	Infection	Society	
World	Federation	of	Societies	of	Intensive	and	Critical	Care	
Medicine	
German	Sepsis	Society	
Latin	American	Sepsis	Institute	
(The	American	Thoracic	Society	and	Australian	and	New	Zealand	
Intensive	Care	Society	withdrew	their	sponsorship;	IDSA	declined)	
Dellinger	et	
al.	(2012)	
30	organisations;	69	international	experts;	64	pages;	636	references	
American	Association	of	Critical-Care	Nurses	
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American	College	of	Chest	Physicians	
American	College	of	Emergency	Physicians	
American	Thoracic	Society	
Asia	Pacific	Association	of	Critical	Care	Medicine	
Australian	and	New	Zealand	Intensive	Care	Society	
Brazilian	Society	of	Critical	Care	
Canadian	Critical	Care	Society		
Chinese	Society	of	Critical	Care	Medicine	
Chinese	Society	of	Critical	Care	Medicine—China	Medical	
Association	
Emirates	Intensive	Care	Society	
European	Respiratory	Society	
European	Society	of	Clinical	Microbiology	and	Infectious	Diseases	
European	Society	of	Intensive	Care	Medicine	
European	Society	of	Pediatric	and	Neonatal	Intensive	Care	
Infectious	Diseases	Society	of	America	
Indian	Society	of	Critical	Care	Medicine	
International	Pan	Arabian	Critical	Care	Medicine	Society	
Japanese	Association	for	Acute	Medicine	
Japanese	Society	of	Intensive	Care	Medicine	
Pediatric	Acute	Lung	Injury	and	Sepsis	Investigators	
Society	for	Academic	Emergency	Medicine	
Society	of	Critical	Care	Medicine	
Society	of	Hospital	Medicine	
Surgical	Infection	Society	
World	Federation	of	Critical	Care	Nurses	
World	Federation	of	Pediatric	Intensive	and	Critical	Care	Societies	
World	Federation	of	Societies	of	Intensive	and	Critical	Care	
Medicine	
German	Sepsis	Society	
Latin	American	Sepsis	Institute	
(International	Sepsis	Foundation	no	longer	among	the	sponsoring	
organisations)	
Dellinger	et	
al.	(2017)	
36	sponsoring	and	endorsing	organisations;	59	international	
experts;	67	pages;	655	references	(+	additional	digital	content)	
American	Association	of	Critical-Care	Nurses	
American	College	of	Chest	Physicians	
American	College	of	Emergency	Physicians	
American	Thoracic	Society	
Asia	Pacific	Association	of	Critical	Care	Medicine	
Associação	de	Medicina	Intensiva	Brasileira	
Australian	and	New	Zealand	Intensive	Care	Society	
Centroamericano	y	del	Caribe	de	Terapia	Intensiva	
European	Respiratory	Society	
European	Society	of	Clinical	Microbiology	and	Infectious	Diseases	
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German	Sepsis	Society	
Indian	Society	of	Critical	Care	Medicine	
International	Pan	Arab	Critical	Care	Medicine	Society	
Japanese	Association	for	Acute	Medicine	
Japanese	Society	of	Intensive	Care	Medicine	
Latin	American	Sepsis	Institute	
Scandinavian	Critical	Care	Trials	Group	
Society	for	Academic	Emergency	Medicine	
Society	of	Hospital	Medicine	
Surgical	Infection	Society	
World	Federation	of	Critical	Care	Nurses	
World	Federation	of	Societies	of	Intensive	and	Critical	Care	
Medicine	
Academy	of	Medical	Royal	Colleges	
Chinese	Society	of	Critical	Care	Medicine	
Asociación	Colombiana	de	Medicina	Critica	y	Cuidado	Intensivo	
Emirates	Intensive	Care	Society	
European	Resuscitation	Council	
European	Society	of	Paediatric	and	Neonatal	Intensive	Care	
European	Society	for	Emergency	Medicine	
Federación	Panamericana	e	Ibérica	de	Medicina	Crítica	y	Terapia	
Intensiva	
Sociedad	Peruana	de	Medicina	Intensiva		
Shock	Society		
Sociedad	Argentina	de	Terapia	Intensiva	
World	Federation	of	Pediatric	Intensive	and	Critical	Care	Societies	
European	Society	of	Intensive	Care	Medicine	
Society	of	Critical	Care	Medicine	
(Infectious	Diseases	Society	of	America	and	Canadian	Critical	Care	
Society	no	longer	endorsing)	
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Appendix	G—Growth	of	Sponsoring	and	Endorsing	Organisations	
(Definitions)	
	
Bone	et	al.	(1992)	
2	organisations;	35	committee	members;	12	pages;	45	references	
1. American	College	of	Chest	Physicians	
2. Society	of	Critical	Care	Medicine	
	
Levy	et	al.	(2003)	
5	organisations;	27	committee	members;	9	pages;	41	references	
1. Society	of	Critical	Care	Medicine	
2. European	Society	of	Intensive	Care	Medicine	
3. American	College	of	Chest	Physicians	
4. American	Thoracic	Society	
5. Surgical	Infection	Society	
	
Singer	et	al.	(2016)	
32	organisations;	19	Task	Force	Members;	10	pages;	36	references	(+	additional	
supporting	articles	and	references)	
1. Academy	of	Medical	Royal	Colleges	(UK)		
2. American	Association	of	Critical	Care	Nurses		
3. American	Thoracic	Society	(endorsed	August	25,	2015)		
4. Australian–New	Zealand	Intensive	Care	Society	(ANZICS)		
5. Asia	Pacific	Association	of	Critical	Care	Medicine		
6. Brasilian	Society	of	Critical	Care		
7. Central	American	and	Caribbean	Intensive	Therapy	Consortium		
8. Chinese	Society	of	Critical	Care	Medicine		
9. Chinese	Society	of	Critical	Care	Medicine–China	Medical	Association	
10. Critical	Care	Society	of	South	Africa		
11. Emirates	Intensive	Care	Society		
12. European	Respiratory	Society		
13. European	Resuscitation	Council		
14. European	Society	of	Clinical	Microbiology	and	Infectious	Diseases	(and	its	
Study	Group	of	Bloodstream	Infections	and	Sepsis)		
15. European	Society	of	Emergency	Medicine		
16. European	Society	of	Intensive	Care	Medicine		
17. European	Society	of	Paediatric	and	Neonatal	Intensive	Care		
18. German	Sepsis	Society		
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19. Indian	Society	of	Critical	Care	Medicine		
20. International	Pan	Arabian	Critical	Care	Medicine	Society		
21. Japanese	Association	for	Acute	Medicine		
22. Japanese	Society	of	Intensive	Care	Medicine		
23. Pan	American/Pan	Iberian	Congress	of	Intensive	Care		
24. Red	Intensiva	(Sociedad	Chilena	de	Medicina	Critica	y	Urgencias)		
25. Sociedad	Peruana	de	Medicina	Critica		
26. Shock	Society		
27. Sociedad	Argentina	de	Terapia	Intensiva		
28. Society	of	Critical	Care	Medicine		
29. Surgical	Infection	Society	
30. World	Federation	of	Pediatric	Intensive	and	Critical	Care	Societies	
31. World	Federation	of	Critical	Care	Nurses	
32. World	Federation	of	Societies	of	Intensive	and	Critical	Care	Medicine	
	
